

The European Space: Borders and Issues

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The European Space.
Borders and Issues

In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga

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The European Space.

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In Honorem Professor Ioan Horga

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Foreword

Beyond the establishment of the European Union, in a context where nationalism of the nineteenth century continues to have real success in the twentieth century, debates about the historical past and the future of this important *actor* on the international scene are always present in the current political environment and the European academia and beyond. The analysis on the character of the EU, the essence of the European integration process, the many types of internal and external borders are in a constant change under the impact of numerous factors of influence of all kinds, and this is the very topic of this volume.

Not coincidentally chosen by the editors, this volume titled *The European Space. Borders and Issues* brings together a collection of articles and studies that combine, for a scientific purpose, the authors' concerns regarding the exceptional scientific work of Professor Ioan Horga¹. He has dedicated much of his academic research and teaching activities to European realities, to the history of the European Union and not least to borders of all kinds². Trained as a historian, Ioan Horga managed through his interest in international relations, European studies and security studies, and through a wide openness to interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary, to give his research a complex perspective and necessary understanding of phenomena and processes current in the Europe of today.

His research activity is crowned by a rich activity in academic teaching. He is, through his role in the academic landscape from Oradea and at national level, a road opener, a founder of the school, a benchmark for the new generation that he has helped to shape. Historian by training, Ioan Horga managed through an interest bend on international relations, European studies and security studies, research to give his insight into and understanding of phenomena and processes necessary to present in Europe. His work consists of scientific research synthesis and analysis published as monographs, books sole author or collaboration, coordinated and edited collective volumes, specialized studies and articles published in prestigious journals in many ISI or international databases. .

¹ See the bio and the bibliography of Professor Horga in this volume, put together by Florentina Chirodea.

² See *Eurolimes* journal, launched in 2006. Bimonthly journal, currently holds 20 issues.

Complex analyzes of the European space are crowned by an overview of European realities, the capacity to see beyond the historical realities of European prospects. It took into account the historical perspective on European space, whether it was bent on present realities, Professor Ioan Horga vocation is leading the research, the ability to see both the general and the particular. Either that he has taken into account the historical perspective on the European space or he has been preoccupied with the present realities, Professor Ioan Horga's vocation is leading the research, the ability to see both the general and the particular.

The theme of this volume-homage dedicated to Professor Ioan Horga reflects his interests regarding Europe. These interests include, as mentioned, the *historical perspective*, present in great works of historical synthesis, but also in historical analyses on local-regional realities. They come to argue our statements regarding Professor Ioan Horga's superior ability to understand the realities of contemporary European by historic referencing. The *European balance* and, in particular, the *process of European construction* associated to the European enlargement eastward and cross-referenced with international relations are research topics that are found both in the scientific work of Ioan Horga, but also in the activity of our colleagues who have subscribed to the emergence of this special volume. Identifying solutions for a better governance at both national and sub-national (local, regional) and supranational (European) levels are challenges which require political and institutional transformation in national and European decision-making process. Special references to Central and Eastern Europe led the research to a special emphasis on the *European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)* and to the *size of cooperation and security at the EU borders*. This is nothing else than the core binder of the proposed research by Professor Ioan Horga, and which constitutes themes that can be found in the following pages: *regional and Euro-regional development*; *cross-border cooperation* and the study of borders, respectively.

His research activity is crowned by a rich activity in academic teaching. He is, through his role in the academic landscape from Oradea and at national level, a road opener, a founder of the school, a benchmark for the new generation that he has helped to shape. We once more like to emphasize his role to establish institutional structures that lay the grounds for outstanding research. The creation of the Department of International Relations and European Studies, an institutional structure research (International Centre for Euroregional Research, then the Institute for Euroregional Studies - Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) or certain journals, created the premises for a rich activity whose landmark is the scientific research expertise of Professor Ioan Horga. A successful project initiated and coordinated by Ioan Horga has been *EuroTimes*. It is a journal

that is considered a true epistemological collection of border study. Each issue attempts to reflect an “image”, a facet of the rich typology of the border. Besides the theoretical work of conceptual and epistemological analysis about the European borders, Professor Ioan Horga runs analytical thinks on the many kinds of borders as case studies. The approaches are, on the one hand, references to the evolution of relations between states / regions in the border areas, the historical and cultural heritage, the role of the media in the process of cooperation at the border area, on the religious dimension of borders, the cleavages of ethno-national character or the other types of borders/frontiers like the linguistic ones, pr those based on culture, identity, economic, community-urban and so on.

Using different theoretical and methodological perspectives, this volume examines the multiple aspects of the historical and political in Europe, of external borders and internal frontiers of the European Union, including the neighborhood policy, security issues, the issue of migration, autonomous regions, European internal crises and their repercussions. The first part of the volume summarizes some theoretical research and empirical studies on the historical and political realities in the European space³, mainly the Romanian one⁴. The following section deals with Professor Horga's interests in the realities of the border space⁵ in the context of the European integration process⁶. The last part of the volume largely addresses security

³Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, *Europe – Idea/Europe Integration. Times. Spaces. Actors.*, G. Contogeorgis, *De la nature de la crise occidentale. Une crise de transition de la monarchie électorale au système représentatif.*

⁴Zănea Ion, *Cultură și ideologie în România anilor 1971-1972*; Antonio Faur, *Endeavours to establish the “Cele Trei Crisuri” in Oradea and Aspects of its Activity (1990-2000)*; Gabriel Moisa, *Between Democracy and Totalitarianism the Case of Patriotic Union from Bihor County (1945-1947)*; Mihai D. Drecin, *Nicolae Iorga și Oradea*; Nicolae Păun, *Sur l'économie et les politiques industrielles de Roumanie dans l'entre-deux-guerres*; Ludmila Roșca, *University mission in the knowledge society*; Gábor Kozma, Klára Czimre, *Effects of the Natural Environmental Components on Sports.*

⁵ Isabel Maria Freitas Valente, *The Portuguese Outer most Regions and the 30th anniversary of Portugal's accession to the European Communities*; Mirela Mărcuț, *EU and Cyberspace - a Plea for the Fifth Freedom of Movement*; Ana Maria Costea (Ghimis), *Beyond the minimum common denominator between the EU and Russia Study case: Ukraine*; Radu Romînașu, *Intellectual Elites, European Spirit and Interethnic Cultural Collaboration on the Western Border of Internar Romania. Case Study: The Main Editorial Concerns of the Great Cultural Reunion “Cele Trei Crisuri” in Oradea*, Mircea Brie, *Identity as frontier in Central and Eastern Europe. The case of the Republic of Moldova.*

⁶ Melania-Gabriela Ciot, *BREXIT case – From individual idiosyncrasies to a collective answer*; Constantin – Vasile Țoca, Bogdan Pocola, *Leadership debate in the United Kingdom as a result of the Brexit vote*; Istvan Süli-Zakar, *The Social - Economic Reasons of the Hungarian*

and cooperation issues in Europe in the context of the challenges arising from the changes that have occurred over time.

This volume undoubtedly reflects the desire for recognition and appreciation of the faculty staff of the Department of International Relations and European Studies of the way in which Professor Horga, mentor and colleague, has managed to create a local school in the area with national and international recognition, channeling the group effort to the research of border, thus shaping an identity niche, well-defined in the academic research. Each member of the Department has found, under the guidance of the Professor, an own scientific pathway, being able to develop professionally in the chosen direction.

We thank our colleagues from universities in Europe and those in Romania for sending an article for publication in this volume dedicated to the 60-year-anniversary of our Professor and colleague -- this proves that we share the gratitude that we all feel he represents for all and for each of us PROFESSOR IOAN HORGA.

At this celebration moment in time, we are happy to know that we can always count on your support and advice.

Mircea BRIE
Alina STOICA
Florentina CHIRODEA

Ioan Horga – Visionary, Professor and Researcher by Vocation

Florentina CHIRODEA*

Ioan Horga was born sixty years ago, on an April day, in Țara Moșilor Region, on the middle course of Arieș River, in a village scattered on the slopes of the Apuseni Mountains¹. His education started in his native village. After completing secondary school in 1971, he continued his studies at "Horea, Cloșca and Crișan" High School, in Abrud. Starting with 1976, he became student at one of the oldest faculties of "Babes - Bolyai" University

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¹ Mușca settlement residents were confirmed as presence ever since the 'primitive commune'. Later sporadic archaeological discoveries and numerous documents testify to the continuity of the ancient village community from the period of the Roman occupation until today. Currently, the village belongs administratively to Lupșa, best known for its tourist attractions, among which one can mention: the Ethnographic and Folk Art Museum, founded by Professor Pamfil Albu opened in 1939 and housed in a building dating from 1800 (the museum houses over 6000 exhibits from Țara Moșilor ethnographic region, including a valuable collection of icons on glass and wood from the 18th and the 19th centuries); the Orthodox wooden church in the village of Valea Lupsii (dating from 1429, restored in 1694 and plastered in 1865); Lupșa monastery; the church from Hădărău village (1770). The census of 2011 registered only 531 inhabitants. See *The history of Lupșa village* available at http://www.primarialupsa.ro/lupsa_istoricul-localitatii-109.html, accessed on November 28th, 2016; Dan Ghinea, *Enciclopedia geografică a României*, Encyclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, available at http://enciclopedia.romaniei.ro/wiki/Lupsa_Commune, accessed on November 28th, 2016; *Geamăna, un sat din Munții Apuseni*, available at <http://www.vacantesicalatorii.ro/modules/revista/articole/articol.php?artID=2182>, accessed on November 28th, 2016; Alba Regional Statistics Department, *Tables of the Population and Housing Census - 2011. The Rural Population of Alba County at the census from 2011*, available at http://www.alba.insse.ro/cmsalba/rw/pages/rezultate_rpl.ro.do, accessed on November 28th, 2016

in Cluj-Napoca, that of History - Philosophy², a “peak institution in relation to similar faculties in the country”³. Despite the “gradual restrictions of activity, restructuring, internal merging” and “the chronic underfunding”⁴ that defined the second half of the 70s, the Historical Schools⁵, founded in Cluj Napoca by Constantin Daicoviciu, Stefan Pascu, Zsigmond Jakó, Virgil Vătășianu, Nicolae Lascu or Camil Mureșanu⁶ continued their remarkable research activity in the fields of archeology, medieval and modern history of Romania, the history of Transylvania, world history or art history. The major lines of study, opened by renowned professors from Cluj-Napoca, were continued, in the coming years, by some young teachers, who eventually became prominent names of contemporary historiography. The responsibility for the formation of young historians was undertaken by distinguished professors, among whom we should mention: academician Camil Mureșanu, Dean of the Faculty of History - Philosophy⁷ between 1968-1976, academician Dumitru Protase – who, from 1974 on, became senior lecturer at the faculty mentioned above⁸, academician Pompiliu Teodor - Head of the Department of Middle History and Historiography⁹, emeritus professor Vasile Vese - lecturer and then reader at the Department

² The history of the Faculty of History – Philosophy, “Babeș-Bolyai” University Cluj-Napoca, available at <http://www.ubbcluj.ro/ro/despre/prezentare/istoric>, accessed on November 28th, 2016

³ Vasile Vese, „Universitatea „Babeș-Bolyai” în perioada regimului comunist 1959 – 1989”, in Ovidiu Ghita (coord.), *Istoria Universității „Babeș-Bolyai”*, Mega Publishing House, Cluj-Napoca, 2012, p. 281

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 285

⁵ The term is used by professor Vasile Vese in a chapter dedicated to the History of „Babes-Bolyai” University during the period of the Communist regime (1959-1989) in order to characterize the teaching and research activity performed from the initiative or with the contribution of distinguished specialists from Cluj.

⁶ Vasile Vese, *op. cit.*, p. 281-282

⁷ *In memoriam, academician Camil Mureșanu*, article published in the on-line edition of the *Făclia* newspaper, in February 25th, 2015, available at <http://ziarulfacia.ro/in-memoriu-academician-camil-muresanu/>, accessed on November 29th, 2016

⁸ Eugen Gheorghe, *Academicianul născădean Dumitru Protase, decorat de președintele României*, article published in August, 11, 2016 on the website www.timponline.ro, available at <http://www.timponline.ro/academicianul-nasadean-dumitru-protase-decorat-de-presedintele-romaniei/>, accessed in November, 29th, 2016

⁹ Doru Radosav, *Pompiliu Teodor - profesor și istoric (1930-2001)*, in Nicolae Bocșan, *Tentația istoriei. In memoria profesorului Pompiliu Teodor*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2003, p. 7-15

of Universal History¹⁰, emeritus professor Ioan Piso, assistant lecturer and then lecturer at the same Department, professor Nicolae Bocșan – assistant lecturer between 1978-1982, professor Ovidiu Mureșanu – assistant lecturer between 1978-1984, professor Avram Andea - assistant professor between 1971-1981.

Valedictorian at the end of the four years of study, Ioan Horga became teacher of History at „Înfrățirea” Industrial High School, in Oradea, activity that he conducted until 1984. At the age of 28, he became member, first of the Municipal and then of the County Young Communist Union Committee, where he was responsible with the education sector. In the 5 years that followed, his qualities as teacher were fully demonstrated in the organization of professional contests and school Olympiads for the pupils of Bihor county¹¹, especially in the national stages of those competitions (the National Informatics Olympiad was held in Oradea in 1989)¹². From 1990, the professor Ioan Horga returned to the teaching activity, gaining tenure at the Department of History of "Emanuil Gojdu" National College. A year later, he began his collaboration with the freshly set up University of Oradea and got a doctoral scholarship at the University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, France. On May 30th, 1995, in front of a commission made up of renowned specialists in modern history, church history and Romanian history (J. Bérenger, Viviane Barrie-Currien – as thesis coordinator, Catherine Durandin¹³, Grunberg Bernard¹⁴, Pompiliu Teodor¹⁵) doctoral student Ioan Horga defended his thesis on „L'Église

¹⁰ See the official site of the Faculty of History – Philosophy, "Babeș-Bolyai" University, available at <http://www.ubbcluj.ro/ro/despre/prezentare/istoric>, accessed in November 29th, 2016

¹¹ *Ioan Horga, candidat la Rectorat: "Vreau să scoatem Universitatea din ghetoizare"*, article published in on-line edition of the Bihoreanul newspaper, in Aprilie, 22th, 2012, available at <http://www.ebihoreanul.ro/stiri/ultima-or-31-6/ioan-horga-candidat-la-rectorat-vreau-sa-scoatem-universitatea-din-ghetoizare--101026.html>, accessed in December, 5th, 2016

¹² Official website of the National Informatics Olympiad available at <http://www.lego.rdsor.ro/oni98/info/ist.html>, accessed in December, 5th 2016

¹³ Professor at the National Institute of Eastern Languages and Civilizations and the Superior Institute of International and Strategic Relations, specialist in the history of Romania, see <http://www.inalco.fr/recherche-generale/durandin>, accessed in December, 5th, 2016

¹⁴ Professor of modern History at the University of Reims, specialist in the history of Latin America, See <http://www.univ-reims.fr/site/laboratoire-labellise/habiter-ea-2076/1-equipe,11220,20294.html>, accessed in December, 5th, 2016

¹⁵ Professor of History at "Babeș-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca, renowned specialist of the Enlightenment and pioneer in fields such as the history of ideas, the Romanian enlightenment and church history. See Doru Radosav, *op. cit.*, p. 7-9

gréco-catholique roumaine (uniata) de Transylvanie à l'époque des Lumières. L'évêché d'Oradea (1780-1830)"¹⁶, obtaining his PhD in History with the qualification *Tres honorable a l'umanite*¹⁷ At the same time, his collaboration with the University of Oradea became permanent by his tenure, in 1992, to the position of lecturer at the Department of History of the Faculty of History - Geography. The quality of his teaching and research activity have always been the strong points of his academic career, his tenure in the post of lecturer (1997) and assistant professor (2000), confirming his expertise in the field of modern and contemporary history, history of Europe and European integration.

His remarkable research and teaching experience was appreciated in major European university centers, professor Ioan Horga being invited to conference and deliver lectures and courses to students from Universities and Institutes in: Reims (France)¹⁸, Siena (Italy)¹⁹, Nancy (France)²⁰, Wroclaw (Poland)²¹, Paris (France)²², Montpellier (France)²³, Bologna - Campus Forli (Italy)²⁴, Coimbra (Portugal), Salamanca (Spain), Rzeszow (Poland), Alicante (Spain)²⁵, Bratislava (Slovakia), Banska Bistrika (Slovakia)

¹⁶ See database of the University of Reims, available at <http://www.theses.fr/1995REIML004>, accessed in December, 6th, 2016

¹⁷ The diploma has been acknowledged by Romanian authorities based on the Order of the Minister of Education no. 3763/30.04.1996.

¹⁸ Collaboration starts in 1998; at present, professor Ioan Horga teaches at the University of Reims, as Associate professor, the course entitled *Regional development policy & Central and Eastern Europe in Transition* and is member of the scientific committee of the Master studies programme "Specialists in the field of Integration and Neighborhood European Policies"

¹⁹ Since 2003 he has been member of the scientific committee of the Master's programme "Building of Europe" at the University of Siena and holds, as associate professor, the courses *EU's Cohesion Policy* and *European Neighborhood Policy*

²⁰ The collaboration with the University of Nancy started in 2005 and covered a period of 8 years, being invited to conference on themes such as The new interpretation of the EU's east frontier; Romania and EU

²¹ In 2006 he was invited to conference in front of the students and the teaching staff of the University on the theme: *Romanian Integration in EU: present and future*

²² In 2007 he was invited at the Institute of Political Sciences to conference on the theme *Religious frontiers and The New Europe*

²³ As visiting professor at the University of Montpellier, he held the conference *European Cohesion Policy* (2008).

²⁴ The conference *European Neighborhood Policy at the Eastern Frontier of EU* is held in 2010 as visiting professor

²⁵ As part of the Erasmus Teaching Mobility Programme he delivers courses at the University of Alicante and Coimbra (the university year 2003-2004), Salamanca (university year 2004-2005) and Rzeszow (university year 2007-2008)

, Brescia (Italy), Venice (Italy), Krakow (Poland), Lublin (Poland), Prague (Czech Republic), Hannover (Germany), Maribor (Slovenia)²⁶. His work was rewarded with distinctions such as: the *Pro Cooperazione Award* of the Academy of Hungarian Sciences - Debrecen Branch (2003)²⁷ the *Pro Universitas Award*, from the University of Debrecen (2010), the *Award of Excellence* of the Ministry of Culture of Romania (2010), the *Award of Excellence* of the European Institute of Romania (2012). In 2013, the National University in Uzhgorod, Ukraine, awarded him the distinction of *Doctor Honoris Causa* for the contributions brought to the fields of science and education.

The extensive experience accumulated in European universities, as well as the close understanding of internationalization projects and strategies promoted by such institutions determined professor Ioan Horga to bring forth similar objectives to the heads of Oradea University, in 2000. As a result, by the Rector's decision, a Department of International Relations and European Integration was established within the University of Oradea, with the mission of "promoting contacts with other universities and institutions abroad, in order to open the possibility for the participation of students, teachers and researchers in mobility programs, research and professional training"²⁸. As head of that department, professor Ioan Horga institutionalized "active levers for developing a consistent package of inter-university relations with similar institutions from Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary."²⁹ For 7 years, European programs, aimed at increasing the mobility of teachers and students in the European space, along with programs that could attract European funds for teaching or research projects were intensively promoted. During his mandate, Oradea University signed an Agreement for Scientific and Teaching Cooperation whereby the University became a member of the group of institutions enabled to organize the master's degree

²⁶ See the structure of Romanian Association of the International Relations and European Studies available at <http://www.rise.org.ro/structura/ioan-horga/>, accessed in December, 6th, 2016

²⁷ The prize was awarded for the collaboration with Hungarian specialists, for the quality of conferences held as part of Symposia and Scientific Sessions organized in our neighboring country, as well as for the studies published in Hungarian journals.

²⁸ See the official website of the International Relations Department, University of Oradea, available at <http://arhiva-www.uoradea.ro/romanian/topic/52/Departamentul%de%Relatii%Internationale.html#prez>, accessed in December, 6th, 2016

²⁹ Ioan Horga (coord.), *10 ani de Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene*, Oradea University Press, Oradea, 2013, p. 6

program *The Process of Building Europe*³⁰; professor Ioan Horga also managed the General Secretariat of the Carpathian Region Universities Association (ACRU)³¹.

The institutional framework thus created, professor Ioan Horga managed to use favorable circumstances in order to implement the project "Action Learning for SMEs in Bihor, Salaj and Satu Mare counties - a new model of entrepreneurial school in the field of human resources", funded by Phare Program 2000 Economic and Social Cohesion, Human Resources Development. The actions performed in association with the partners in the project (the Local Council of SMEs of Oradea, Salaj Branch of SMEs, The Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture Satu Mare, The Chamber of Commerce and Industry Bihor, The Chamber of Commerce and Industry Salaj, The Revans Institute for Action Learning & Research - University of Salford, UK) led to the establishment of the Center for Information and European Consultancy (CICE), which was provided with the necessary technical and informatics equipment, and a specialized book fund, later included in the CICE library; a total of 300 students from the University of Oradea (support staff and teaching staff with managerial positions) and different business representatives from Bihor, Salaj and Satu Mare also benefited from training sessions. Another source of funding used was the Jean Monnet Programme of the European Commission, which opened the possibility to establish, in 2002, at the University of Oradea, two Jean Monnet Chairs, one of them being the Euroregional Studies one³², headed by professor Ioan Horga³³. The interdisciplinary character of this Jean Monnet Chair was fully valued in activities related to the *Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations* Master's program, students from Oradea having thus the possibility to deepen their knowledge in various fields (economics, geography, international relations, European studies, CBC, history, communication, law, etc.) and gain practice as employees characterized by an open mind and the ability to communicate in a multicultural environment.

³⁰ See the official website of the Centro di Ricerca sull'Integrazione Europea. Master in European Studies, available at <http://www.crie.unisi.it/en/1004/master-in-european-studies.htm>, accessed in December, 6th, 2016

³¹ Between 2006 and 2009, professor Ioan Horga held the position of Secretary General of this inter-university association. Currently he is the University of Oradea representative. See the official website of the *Association of Carpathian Region Universities. Membership*, available at <http://acru.uvlf.sk/membership.html>, accessed in December, 6th, 2016

³² Department established by the EAC/A2/BBQ/AmD decision no.16138, of July 24th, 2002.

³³ Ioan Horga (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 40

With a constant concern for developing curricular areas that the University of Oradea could make available to high school graduates, professor Ioan Horga, together with colleagues from the Departments of History, Sociology and Law, set up, in 2003, the International Relations and European Studies (RISE) license program. The wide range of scientific areas that were part of the proposed subjects in the curriculum ensured the formation of graduates with solid interdisciplinary training, so as they might be able to meet job requirements. Moreover, from the very first semester, students had the opportunity to study at least two foreign languages and acquire skills in the field of information and communication technology. Another key feature of the curriculum was the practical character of most courses offered to students, and especially the internships performed by students in institutions and organizations in Oradea. For their deployment, professor Ioan Horga concluded cooperation agreements with The Council of SMEs Bihor, The Employers' Federation of Bihor county, Oradea Metropolitan Area, The Prefecture of Bihor County, the Carpathian Euroregion Foundation etc., thereby strengthening the links between the University of Oradea and the local socio-economic environment. In addition to the theoretical and practical training of students, professors Ioan Horga also created an environment where students could express their ideas freely, present projects or demonstrate their knowledge. As expected, the management of Bachelor and Master specializations were provided first by the Collective of European Studies and International Relations, and then by the Department of International Relations and European Studies, structures created at the initiative of professor Ioan Horga. The team of teachers and scholars gathered around Ioan Horga imposed itself, over the years, as a "close-knit and dynamic structure"³⁴, individualized within the national and the European academic environment.

In the scientific domain, with the same energy and determination, directed for the benefit of Oradea academic community, professor Ioan Horga strengthened the collaboration with the team of researchers from the Department of Geography and Regional Development at the University of Debrecen. Together with professor Istvan Suli-Zakar, he laid the foundations the *Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen* (ISER, 2005), as Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence³⁵. Meanwhile, ISER has become a real "research pole for European border issues"³⁶, the results

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 11

³⁵ It is the 3rd created Center of Excellence, after those in Cluj-Napoca and Timișoara. In 2010, a similar center was created in Iasi.

³⁶ Ioan Horga (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 9

being published in *Eurolimes*³⁷ and in numerous collectively edited volumes³⁸. Under the aegis of the Institute, the research team carried out numerous projects with European, local and national financing. Thus, in addition to coordinating the Jean Monnet Modules earned³⁹ ISER members have implemented projects funded by: PHARE CBC 2006 INTERREG III A; Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Hungary - Romania 2007 - 2013; Transnational Cooperation Programme South East Europe; the European Commission – European Thematic Network for European Studies. With another funding direction, the local one, research was also performed, its results contributing to the understanding of the local and the regional past, to the valuing of heritage and the development of the local community⁴⁰.

His experience, exigency, energy, visionary spirit, obvious organizational and interpersonal skills, fully demonstrated throughout his entire professional activity, were elements that recommended professor Ioan Horga for the position of Vice Rector of the University of Oradea. Despite the very short term of office (2007-2008), the objective to increase the number of collaborative partnerships, concluded with other European universities, was doubled by that of ensuring the openness of the academic space to both civil society and the media. By the creation of an Office for Communication, University of Oradea managed to develop an institutional relationship with the local and national media and enter the online environment, the beneficial effects being visible in improved communication with different actors in society and the constant contact with the public opinion. In 2008, Ioan Horga resigned from the Vice-Rector position to become Dean of the Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations, a position he occupies at present at the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Studies.

Benefiting from an extensive educational and scientific activity and being animated by a constant desire to discover and shape young researchers, Professor Ioan Horga directed his efforts towards coordinating

³⁷ Biannual publication, listed in international databases, *Eurolimes* appeared in the local publishing landscape in 2006. Under the guidance of Professor John Horga, the editorial staff publishes thematic issues, offering each time a different perspective on borders. See the website of the *Eurolimes* journal, available at http://www.igri.ro/?page_id=441, accessed in December 6th, 2016

³⁸ The 26 volumes published so far can be accessed on the official ISER website of ISER, available at <http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/e-books.htm>, accessed in December 6th, 2016

³⁹ See the official site of ISER, Projects section, available at <http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/project.htm>, accessed in December, 6th, 2016

⁴⁰ Ioan Horga (coord.), *op. cit.*, p. 50-53

doctoral internships. In 2006, he began supervising doctoral theses in the field of History, as part of the Doctoral School within the University of Oradea, and continued to materialize his desire to form many specialists in international relations and European studies in 2010, when he moved to "Babes-Bolyai" University of Cluj-Napoca⁴¹. His skills and expertise are recognized at the European level as well. Thus, in the period 2009 – 2010, professor Ioan Horga was invited to become member of The Commission for the assessment of doctoral theses, as part of the annual competition organized by the Committee of the Regions. The scientific, professional and ethical character of his supervising activity, along with the patience demonstrated in outlining every niche of research and dedication to follow the development of each doctoral student are reflected in the several dozens of doctoral thesis supervised so far by professor Ioan Horga, and also in the character of young specialists whom he mentored.

It is not an easy task to present, in just a few pages, the prodigious activity of the person to whom this volume is dedicated. Surely some biographical data might have been omitted, others have been probably just mentioned, while others are extensively presented. We can, however, conclude that the following elements characterize Ioan Horga's personality: innovative and inventive spirit; energy invested in each project; determination to reach objectives; seriousness and rigor in addressing each activity; warmth and passion demonstrated while talking to students and doctoral students; care for younger colleagues, materialized in valuable pieces of advice, and respect for senior colleagues; dedication in defending the interests of the collective to which he belongs. By summarizing in few words his personality, we merely begin to shape a portrait, based on vocational qualities of the Professor IOAN HORGA

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⁴¹ In 2010 he receives the right to conduct doctoral theses in international relations and European studies within the Doctoral School - the International Relations and Security Studies. See The Doctoral School of the International Relations and Security Studies – teaching personnel, available at http://hiphi.ubbcluj.ro/RISS/cadre_didactice.html, accessegd in December, 6th, 2016

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Horga – “Moțul”¹

*Mihai DRECIN**

The colleague Ioan Horga has reached to a round age. Sixty years is the age of maturity from all points of view: biologically, professionally, of life experience. Now you make a first inventory of what you went until now, you set the objectives of the near future which must fulfill you as human being and, exceptionally, to remain in the conscience of the family and community.

The present volume gives the possibility to the colleagues from our university not only, to evocate memories about professor Ioan Horga which can complete the knowledge upon his personality.

I knew him and remarked him as a young student, in 1980, of the Faculty of History of the University “Babeș - Bolyai” from Cluj-Napoca, working later at the Industrial Highschool “Înfrățirea” from Oradea. Together with some young graduates from Cluj and Oradea, he remarked during the discussions carried on at the monthly meetings, rigorously organized, on diverse topics from our national history, by the School Inspectorate of Bihor County by his specialized methodists. He used to come up with datas and new interpretations of some events from our national and universal history, result of the new way of teaching of the university teachers from Cluj, but also of some personal lectures of the daily bibliography. Thus, I found out that, as a chief of promotion, he did not have the chance to remain as a preparatory teacher to one of the university Chairs from Cluj-Napoca. The decision of the political leadership from Bucharest was to reduce more and more drastically the number of students from humanist faculties, they proceeded in consequence with the renewal of the university teaching environment or the acceptance at doctorate of young people capable and willing to progress.

In such situations, some young people are in the dangerous pericle of plafonation. Moreover, this is more likely to happen in an industrial highschool, where, with some exceptions, as a teacher you could not valorify

¹ Moț = inhabitants from the Apuseni Mountain Area, Arieș River

* Professor PhD, University of Oradea

all the accumulated professional knowledge, to be motivated to study further, to make scientific research. Ioan Horga defeated this pericle what explains his reuse by contest, in 1990, to a position of titular teacher at the Hightschool “Emanuil Gojdu”, the most renewed from Oradea and Bihor.

The opening towards West, after 1989, gives him a chance to get a scholarship for the preparation of a doctorate to the University of Reims. His thesis, anchored in history of the Greek–Catholic Bishopric of Oradea and of illuminism of the Ardelean School, has on its base intentions of research that started before 1989. Parts of these researches he will valorify in the paper by which he obtains the didactical grade I in the preuniversitarian education in 1992.

The re-creation of the University of Oradea and, in its framework, of the specialization History–Geography, determines the leadership of the university and of the academic staff to look and select young promissing people to occupy the university positions whom to consolidate the nucleum of the university staff from Oradea, formed in the years 1963–1984 in the framework of the former Pedagogical Institute of three years. In this context, Ioan Horga becomes titular lector in the university year 1992/ 1993 in the framework of the Chair of History.

After he takes his PhD at the University of Reims (1995), more and more anchored in research and in the university environment, he will evolve rapidly in didactical and administrative functions: senior lecturer (1997), professor (2000), professor who leads doctorates in History at Oradea (2007) then in “International Relations and Security Studies” at Cluj – Napoca (2008), founder and chief of the Chair of International Relations and Security Studies in Oradea (2000, accredited in 2007/ 2008, independent Department from 2010), Dean of the Faculty of History, International Relations and Sciences of Communication (from 2012).

His university activity brings acknowledgement also in national diplomatic plan, being involved expert on problems of European Security.

I reminded this profesional path of our colleague because this way one can characterize him and to underline his qualities. Born and raised in the Country of Apuseni Mountains, in the areal of Băii of Arieș, our colleague inherited several of the mental features of his special inhabitants from this “Country of Stone” as it is renamed by Geographers. With the thought at “the people from the Mountains of Apuseni”, which I know very well even in my own family, I find on the way of Ioan Horga’s previous years of living the power of work, the wish of affirmation, the capacity to adjust to new times; the resistance at the pressions that the life can throw in one’s face, loiality towards the ones who supported him, at a certain time, on the way of his affirmation and towards the collaborators, defender of

national traditions combined with the European assumption of continental values, wise negociator, Romanian patriot.

I was not and I am not the adherent of the “cult of personality”, whoever would be the person and whatever as much it would have been influenced my destiny by the kindness of the respectiv chief. If I found to Mr. Ioan Horga the above mentioned qualities, it does not mean that he would not have, until know in life also mistakes, maybe even regrets. No man is perfect. But if we dream on perfection, it is fine!

In such moments of professional and family achievements, I wish to the “men from Apuseni Mountains” good health, several years of life with new professional achievements, the pursuation of his continuous endeavour by doing real facts and actions for the cause of national interests.

The vocation of research: the European space and the study of borders in the scientific work of Professor Ioan Horga

*My gratitude to my Professor
to whom I owe my entire career!*

Mircea BRIE*

The contemporary European realities, the European construction and the particularities of the EU are general themes that define the milestones of rich scientific research of Professor Ioan Horga in the last two decades. His scientific work, which includes historical research during his early career, has about 200 titles. These works include research analysis and synthesis published as monographs, books of sole author or in collaboration with others, coordinated and edited collective volumes and conference proceedings, specialized studies and articles published in prestigious ISI journals or in various international databases. His publications have been published by prestigious publishing houses and journals of institutions in the country and abroad (France, Belgium, Britain, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Moldova, Italy, USA, Spain, Ukraine, Sweden, Germany, etc.).

Trained as a historian, Ioan Horga managed through his interest in international relations, European studies and security studies, and through a wide openness to interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary, to give his research a complex perspective and necessary understanding of phenomena and processes current in the Europe of today.

His research activity is crowned by a rich activity in academic teaching. He is, through his role in the academic landscape from Oradea and at national level, a road opener, a founder of the school, a benchmark for the new generation that he has helped to shape.

From this perspective, mainly I but also my colleagues at the University of Oradea, owe respect for a man who served a cause: the creation of a school of international relations and European studies at

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Oradea. Furthermore, the inclination towards niche areas such as research on the (euro)regional development, on the study of borders and CBC managed to put Oradea on the map. His research is, from this point of view, a reference standard nationally and internationally. From this position, Professor Ioan Horga campaigned for institutionalizing at the University of Oradea, and also at nationwide universities (through work in the National Council for Attesting Titles, Diplomas and Certificates - CNATDCU and the Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education - ARACIS) of a field of study in International Relations and European Studies, and Security Studies. This rich activity of the university management activity is part of a comprehensive process of organizing Romanian university studies in the context of Romania's integration in Euro-Atlantic structures.

Without taking upon highlighting the rich work of Professor Ioan Horga, we would like to emphasize his role in establishing institutional structures that were the basis of outstanding research. The creation of the Department of International Relations and European Studies, a research institutional structure (International Centre for Euroregional Research, then the Institute for Euroregional Studies - Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence) or some specialized journals have created the preconditions for a rich research whose landmark is the scientific expertise of Professor Ioan Horga.

The complex analyses on the European space are crowned with an overview of European realities, with the capacity to see beyond the historical realities of European prospects.

Either that he has taken into account the historical perspective on the European space or he has been preoccupied with the present realities, Professor Ioan Horga's vocation is leading the research, the ability to see both the general and the particular. *Europa Luminilor*¹, *Europa secolului al XIX-lea*² or *Relațiile internaționale de la echilibru la sfârșitul concertului european (secolul XVII – începutul secolului XX)*³ are works of historical synthesis that come to argue our statements regarding the superior ability of Professor Ioan Horga to understand realities by linking behaviors of contemporary European history to the "actual history"⁴. His European thinking sees and understands the European realities, including historical stands when these writings calls for the "democratization of European historiography" which is required to rise above national ones⁵. Besides, Professor Horga noted the need to

¹ Ioan Horga, *Europa luminilor*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2002.

² Idem, *Europa secolului XIX*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2000.

³ Ioan Horga; Brie M., *Relațiile internaționale de la echilibru la sfârșitul concertului european (secolul XVII – începutul secolului XX)*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2006.

⁴ Ioan Horga, *Europa luminilor*..., p. 7.

⁵ Idem, *Europa secolului XIX*..., p. 13-14.

reform the educational and cultural policies in order to create solidarity and cooperation pillars of the European construction process, namely the creation of a European identity. Complex realities of the process of European construction, successes and difficulties recorded during the stages of this process, and opening eastward toward New Europe, are topics of attention and understanding of this dedicated and devoted researcher. *Construcție Europeană. Tradiție, realitate și perspectivă* (1998) is not only a historic telltale of the process of European construction, but reference is made to a dispute between national versus European. As the Europeanist as I've known him, Professor Ioan Horga advocates for strengthening the European institutions and reminds about "reducing the significance of borders"⁶ prefacing future research in the study of European borders. European institutions, the European Union functionality as a whole, and other international organizations have been subject of his research at both general and particular. Scientific papers are both applied and theoretical, analytic, and synthetic. In this last category, the book *Teoria relațiilor internaționale*⁷ is positioned as a fundamental work of his research.

The process of European enlargement towards the east began after the fall of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, and remained constant to the core of Professor Horga's research. Two collective volumes, coordinated by Professor Horga, were the center of debate between the contribution of the media⁸ and its relation to the governance⁹ in the context of EU enlargement. The purpose is to find solutions for a better governance at both national and sub-national (local, regional) and supranational (European) levels. The European enlargement eastwards brings in his opinion challenges that require political and institutional transformation in national and European decision-making process. Moreover, even in the years before and after the wave of EU accession of Central and Eastern European states in 2004, Ioan Horga anticipates the need for systemic reformation of the European Union in the context of enlargement to the east¹⁰. This need is given by the particularities of these

⁶ Idem, *Construcție Europeană. Tradiție, realitate și perspectivă*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 1998, p. 6.

⁷ Idem, *Teoria relațiilor internaționale*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2006.

⁸ A. Landyt, Ioan Horga and R. de La Brosse, *The contribution of Mass-Media to the Enlargement of EU*, International Institute of Administrative Studies, Bruxelles, 2003.

⁹ F. Maron, Ioan Horga and R. de La Brosse, *Media and Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement*, International Institute of Administrative Studies, Bruxelles, 2005.

¹⁰ Ioan Horga, „The Enlargement of the European Union Increases the Need for New Solutions for European Good Governance. Which is the Place of the Media in this Process”, in F. Maron, I. Horga, R. de La Brosse, *Media and Governance Facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement*, International Institute of Administrative Studies,

countries in the enlargement process¹¹ or by economic realities¹², the realities of their cultural heritage and social identity. Romanian historical peculiarities, the specific national context of the accession process and economic realities often serve as case studies. The particular realities of central and eastern Europe led him to invoke European institutional reform based on intercultural dialogue, the need for democratization of decision-making. European Parliament debates regarding European enlargement in the past, the functionality, are among his academic concerns. These include works such as *The European Parliament, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy*¹³ or *Le Parlement Européen et la Démocratisation du Processus Décisionnel Européen*¹⁴. Reforming the European system includes debates regarding *The Multilevel Governance*, which Ioan Horga associated to respecting the principle of subsidiarity¹⁵, regional governance and institutional outlook on the Committee of the Regions¹⁶, but also to the needs of institutional and legislative reform after the Treaty of Lisbon in the context of *The White Paper of Multilateral Governance*¹⁷. Lastly, the European

Bruxelles, 2005, p. 57-76; Ioan Horga, „General Considerations on European Enlightenment”, in I. Țepelea, C. Antal, *Proceedings of the 27th ARA Congress*, Polytechnic International Press, Oradea, 2003, p. 175-184.

¹¹ Ioan Horga, „Romanian and its historical peculiarities amongst the newcomers in the European Union”, in A. Landuyt, D. Pasquinucci (ed.), *Gli allaramenti della CEE/EU (1961-2004)*, il Mulino, Bologna, 2005, p. 565-592.

¹² Ioan Horga and L. Șoproni, „Romania's Accession to the European Union. Economic Conditions”, in J. Kundera (ed.), *Economic Relations in the EU Enlarged*, Kolonia Limited, Wrocław, 2007, p. 319-329.

¹³ Ioan Horga; G. Silași; I. Suli-Zakar and S. Sagan, *The Parliament European, Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2009.

¹⁴ Cristina Dogot and Ioan Horga, „Le Parlement Européen et la Démocratisation du Processus Décisionnel Européen”, in *The Romanian Review of European Governance Studies*, 2009, vol. 1, 1, p. 18 – 24.

¹⁵ Ioan Horga, „The Multilevel Governance (MLG) and the Respect of the Subsidiarity Principle”, in I. Horga, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), *Cross-Border Partnership. White special regards to the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, Editura Universității din Debrecen/Editura Universității din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2010, p. 169-175.

¹⁶ Ioan Horga, „Multilevel Governance (MLG) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of MLG of the Committee of the Region (CoR)”, in I. Horga, I. Gh. Barbulescu, A. Ivan, M. Palincsak, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011, p. 158-164

¹⁷ D. Gal and Ioan Horga, „Multilevel Governance from Lisbon Treaty to the White Paper of Multilateral Governance”, in *Revista de Estudios Jurídicos of the University of Jaen*, 2010, nr. 10 (Segunda Época)

enlargement is seen as a geopolitical reality that has imposed a new European agenda, new priorities and interests, both internal and external. The new Member States in line with their new status assume besides interests and preferences “a possible higher interest”¹⁸. The legitimacy of the European enlargement, seen in both its meanings (States and the European Union), is closely linked to the reformation of the EU.

The research of Professor Horga about the European space, the co-operation between organizations, countries or regions, the cooperation at the EU's borders, have as binder research the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). the EU external relations took as a starting point the support from the European Neighbourhood Policy, the results of which were noted by the European Commission as positive ever since the early years of its launch in 2003¹⁹. “The ENP has strengthened relations with partner countries and brought tangible benefits to both the Union and its partners, including the launch of regional initiatives and support to democratization in the European neighborhood”²⁰. Under the influence of the European Neighbourhood Policy, the concept of external border of the European Union tends to acquire new forms of expression. On the one hand we find a flexible contact area between the two sides of the border. Such a tendency is amplified by cross-border cooperation mechanisms, through Euroregions and European instruments successfully implemented at the external border²¹. On the other hand, the actions of the European Union which is trying to implement regional cohesion policies on its borders today are, according to analysts, proving that the Union is strengthening its external borders, currently taking this into account, at least for now, the variant of a slowdown process of enlargement towards east, without effectively closing doors²². The proximity area of the European Union was among his

¹⁸ Cristina Dogot and Ioan Horga, „Enlargement Process, Classic Geopolitics, and EU Internal Priorities”, in *Eurotimes*, 14/Autumn, 2012, p. 167.

¹⁹ See *Communication de la Commission. Une politique européenne de voisinage vigoureuse*, Bruxelles, 05/12/2007, COM(2007) 744 final.

²⁰ EUR-Lex, Access to European Union law, *Regulamentul (UE) NR. 232/2014 AL Parlamentului European și al Consiliului din 11 martie 2014 de instituire a unui instrument european de vecinătate*, Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene, L 77/27, 15.03.2014, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/RO/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.077.01.0027.01.ROM, accessed on 30.11.2016.

²¹ Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu (coord.); Mircea Brie and Nicolae Toderaș, *Cooperarea transfrontalieră între România și Ucraina, respectiv între România și Republica Moldova. Oportunități și provocări între 2014-2020*, Tritonic, București, 2016

²² In connection to the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy Benita Ferrero-Waldner declared at December 1st, 2004 that „la question de l'Ukraine dans l'UE n'est pas à l'ordre du jour. Mais il est clair que nous ne fermons aucune porte”. See Régis Matuszewicz,

concerns before the official launch of ENP. Topics such as the democratization of Central and Eastern Europe were in the research agenda by connection to the role played in this process by the media and new communication technologies and information. Just to remind some of the titles published along with one of his friends, the French Professor Renaud de La Brosse: *Two media threats to democracy in Central and Eastern Oriental*²³ or the collective volume *The Role of the Mass-Media and of the New Information and Communication Technologies in the Democratisation Process of Central and Eastern European Societies*²⁴. Romania joined the European Union led to a growing interest for the neighbouring space. In 2007, together with Alla Roșca, published a study about the Republic of Moldova, *La Moldavie tete de pont de l'UE*²⁵, where the complexity of the realities of this region, but also the difficulties in implementing the ENP are analysed. The European Neighbourhood Policy is then approached in relation to Romanian state border with Ukraine²⁶, in relation to inter-university cooperation²⁷, intercultural dialogue²⁸ and contribution to the responsibilities of Romania under this policy²⁹. Reforming the ENP and new EU policies in relation to

Vers la fin de l'Élargissement?, in Laurent Beurdeley, Renaud de La Brosse, Fabienne Maron (coord.), *L'Union Européenne et ses espaces de proximité. Entre stratégie inclusive et partenariats removes: quell avenir pour le nouveau voisinage de l'Union?*, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2007, p. 109.

²³ Ioan Horga, R. de La Brosse, „Two media threats to democracy in Central and Eastern Oriental", in *Democrația în Europa Centrală și de Sud-Est- Aspirație și Realitate (secolele XIX-XX)*, Editura Muzeului Sătmărean, Satu Mare, 2000.

²⁴ Ioan Horga, R. de La Brosse (ed.), *The Role of the Mass-Media and of the New Information and Communication Technologies in the Democratisation Process of Central and Eastern European Societies*, International Institute of Administrative Studies, Bruxelles, 2002.

²⁵ Ioan Horga, A. Roșca, „La Moldavie tete de pont de l'UE", in R. de la Brosse, L. Beurdelai, F. Maron(ed.), *Quel perspective pour la politique de voisinage de l'UE?*, Bruxelles, Bruyere, 2007, p.164-182.

²⁶ Ioan Horga, „La frontiere roumaino-ukrainienne de la perspective de la politique de voisinage", in G. Edelstam, T. Lunden (ed.), *European Neighbourhood Policy and Security: Challenges, Goals and Means*, Stockholm, 2008.

²⁷ Ioan Horga; Mircea Brie, „La coopération interuniversitaire aux frontières extérieures de l'Union Européenne et la contribution à la politique européenne de voisinage", in G. Rouet, P. Terem (coord.), *Elargissement et politique Européenne de voisinage*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2008, p. 203-233

²⁸ Ioan Horga; G. Silași; I. Suli-Zakar and S. Sagan, *op. cit.*; Mircea Brie; Ioan Horga and Sorin Șipoș (coord.), *Ethnicity, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union's East Border*, Editura Universității din Debrecen/Editura Universității din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011.

²⁹ Ioan Horga; A. M. Costea, „Eastern Partnership between the Permeability and Impermeability of EU Eastern Borders", in C. Pacheco Amaral, G. Gabrichidze, Ioan

proximity to the eastern approach find a place in his studies of strategies, opportunities and challenges of the new format of the Eastern Partnership³⁰ or analysis regarding the permeability or impermeability of the EU's eastern borders in the context of the Eastern Partnership³¹.

Regional and Euroregional development remained constant to the attention of Professor Ioan Horga both in the scientific research, and institutional, educational or research management. He created at the University of Oradea, together with colleagues from the University of Debrecen, a research center that promotes research in euroregional development, and specialized masters programs which have the euroregional study or the regional development specialization. The Institute for Euroregional Studies (IRES) was formed as a result of both the need for developing an institutional research collaboration, as well as for the recording of the result of anormal rapprochement between the two academic communities. „As for the regional and Euroregional development at the Hungarian-Romanian border there has been a highlight on the role played by smaller or larger town from within the border area in creating development poles. The towns are centres of the economic space of their counties and the value of the inner potential depends on the distance from the county-seat”³². Regions, including the border (Euroregions) are addressed from the perspective of economic, social and cultural structures in which the integrated development of human resources and mobility take place³³. In 2006, Professor Ioan Horga, along with his close collaborator István Suli-Zakar, coordinates two collective volumes analyzing the national and European prospects related to regional development in the Euroregional space, CBC Romanian-Hungarian (*Regional Development in the*

Horga, A. Kruglashov, E. Latoszek, M. Pachocka, V. Cucerescu, *EU Relations whit Eastern Partnership: Strategy, Opportunities and Challenges*, Print-Caro, Chişinău, 2016.

³⁰ M. Pachocka; E. Latoszek; V. Cucerescu; G. Gabrichidze; Ioan Horga; A. Kruglashov and Amaral, C. Pacheco, *EU relations with Eastern Partnership: strategy, opportunities and challenges*, Editura Print-Caro, Chişinău, 2016.

³¹ Ioan Horga; A. M. Costea, *op. cit.*

³² Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar, „Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen to Shaping the Border into a Space for knowledge and Development”, in *Analele Universităţii din Oradea, Seria Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene*, vol. 2, 2010, p. 170-183. Pentru o mai complexă imagine asupra activităţii desfăşurate de IRES vă recomandăm parcurgerea lucrării I. Suli-Zakar, Ioan Horga, A. Ilieş, C.V. Ţoca, „Institute for Euroregional Studies - «Jean Monnet» European Center of Excellence”, in I. Suli-Zakar, *Fahvainak sorsa es A vasosnovekedes Szakaszi*, Debrecen University Press, Debrecen, 2011, p. 15-45.

³³ Ioan Horga, A. Ilieş, O. Dehoorne, „Romania, regional internal and external economical structures integration, development and human mobility”, in *Human Mobility in a Borderless World?*, Societa Geografica Italiana, 2001, p. 117-134

*Romanian-Hungarian cross-border space. From national to European perspective*³⁴) and, a second volume (*Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional Issues in the New Europe*), the challenges and the perspectives of regional and Euroregional development in the space of the New Europe³⁵. Administrative territorial reform has been a much discussed topic in the Romanian public space in recent years without finding resolve at the decision-making level. In this debate, Professor Ioan Horga proposed to take into account the realities of cultural and historical heritage, historical regions of functionality that are part of the Romanian state. The historical perspective is important in defining regional structures, it was born of a geographical reality and cultural, economic and social which must be taken into account today. Appeal is made to a debate on regional structures to include reference to both local space, subregional, but also at the national and supranational space³⁶. The historical regional perspective is then associated with a new type of regional approach: „The subject of regionalization is even more pressing if we speak about frontier cities in Romania, because they are influenced by the national level, the regional one and also by the interregional level, given the fact that their border is also the border of the Romanian state and often citizens cross it or the regional authorities develop cooperation projects with other centres from the frontier regions”³⁷. Lastly, regional and Euro-regional development topics in the area of Central and Eastern Europe is associated to the cohesion policy and regional development policies. In 2011, as a coordinator and collaborator, Ioan Horga published the collective volume *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*³⁸. This, along with other papers regarding the White Paper of the

³⁴ I. Suli-Zakar, Ioan Horga, *Regional Development in the romanian-hungarian cross-border space. From national to European perspective*, Editura Universităţii din Debrecen, 2006.

³⁵ Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar, *Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional Issues in the New Europe*, Editura Universităţii din Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2006.

³⁶ Ioan Horga, „Romanian perspective on the regional and local structures”, in C. Pacheco Amaral (ed.), *The External Projection of Regional Autonomy in Europe*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2010.

³⁷ Ioan Horga, A. M. Ghimiş, „The role of the borders in the Romanian regionalization”, in *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, Supplement No. 2, 2015, p. 164.

³⁸ Ioan Horga, I. Gh. Barbulescu, A. Ivan, M. Palincsak, I. Suli-Zakar, *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Editura Universităţii din Debrecen/Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011.

committal of the Region (CoR)³⁹, multilevel governance subsidiarity principle, regional policy in Central and Eastern Europe⁴⁰, constitute the main core of the thesis proposed in this area, where the state remains an important partner of the European Union⁴¹.

Cross-border cooperation has proved to be one of the favorite topics, associated to the research of the euroregional border space, which Professor Ioan Horga approached with attention and passion. This research topic is based on the complex analysis of the space frontier, especially of the border between Romania and Hungary, where an emphasis is on the need to build a dialogue, the institutional-legislative levers contributing to the development of cooperation between the two sides of the border. A special role in this process was played by European instruments to stimulate cross-border cooperation. We refer here to the institutional and legislative structures of regional/euroregional European funds for territorial cooperation, especially those targeted specifically by the CBC. Developments marked the transition from the communist period corresponded in large over a period of openness compared to the neighboring space in Central and Eastern Europe. Contained in a Euro-Atlantic integration process, Romania, like other states in this region, responded positively, registering significant progress on the path of dialogue and development cooperation opening its borders with neighboring states allied. Border cooperation relations between Romania and Hungary have benefited from a comprehensive analysis of ten years after the fall of communism⁴². The emphasis is on the effects of cooperation has in the border area. The actors involved in this process that creates leverage and

³⁹ Ioan Horga, „Multilevel Governance (Mlg) and Subsidiary Principle in White Paper of Mlg of the Committee of the Region (CoR)”, in I. Horga, I. Gh. Barbulescu, A. Ivan, M. Palincsak, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), *Regional and Cohesion Policy – Insights Into the Role of the Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design*, Debrecen University Press & Oradea University Press, Debrecen/Oradea, 2011, p. 158-164.

⁴⁰ Idem, „Regional Policy in Central and Eastren Europe”, in *Analele Universitatii din Oradea*, Seria Relații Internaționale și Studii Europene, vol. VI, 2014, p. 7-22; Ioan Horga, A.-M. Costea, „The Regional Policy in the EUMS from Central and Eastern Europe between Decentralisation and Recentralisation”, in *Debater a Europa*, nr. 12, janeiro/junho, 2015, p. 103-134.

⁴¹ Idem, „The State remained the most important partner of the European Union in the field of regional policy in Central and Eastern Europe”, in E. Latoszek, M. Proczek, A. Klos, M. Pachocka, E. Osuch-Rak (ed.), *Facing the Challenges in European Union. Re-thinking of EU Education and Research for Smart and Inclusive Growth*, EuInteg, Warsaw, 2015.

⁴² Idem, „Co-operation and effects on borderlands Romania-Hungary in the ten years after communism fall”, in The 7 Geopolitical conference's act *Changing role of border areas and regional politics*, Lodz, 2000, p. 89-98.

develop relationships beyond the perspective and the national, regional and local level, in line with the realities and mutual interests are identified and analyzed by Ioan Horga in 2005⁴³. Together with Professor István Suli-Zakar at the University of Debrecen, edit the collective volume in 2010, *Cross-Border Partnership. With special regards to the Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border*⁴⁴ „which contains case studies and complex analytical references. References to the Romanian-Ukrainian border were on the research agenda of Professor Horga on other occasions. In 2009 he published a paper on European instruments of Romanian-Ukrainian border cooperation⁴⁵. Special attention is given in recent years by Professor Ioan Horga to the evaluation border cooperation. In 2013 he coordinates the evaluation volume *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României*⁴⁶, with public and material valorisation of scientific research regarding the evaluation of CBC programs⁴⁷. He advocates for the institutionalization of public policies and programs evaluation at European (and national) level to implement appropriate practices and to act in the public expertise in evaluation. Academia is required to be involved in the evaluation process that contribute to the development of public policies and programs throughout their implementation. On-going assessment turns out to be from this point of view a tool that can be a natural adjustment imposed by the realities recorded in the running process⁴⁸.

Studying various types of borders by Professor Ioan Horga conferred to the city of Oradea and to the University of Oradea, through the Euroregional Studies Institute, a privileged place in this niche area not only nationally but also internationally. A successful project initiated and

⁴³ Idem, „The actors of Cross-Border Cooperation on the Romanian-Hungarian Border”, in *Acta Geographica Debrecenensis*, vol. XLVII, 2005, p. 244-265.

⁴⁴ Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar (ed.), *Cross-Border Partnership. With special regards to the Hunagrian-Romanian-Ukrainian Tripartite Border*, Editura Universității din Debrecen/Editura Universității din Oradea, Debrecen/Oradea, 2010.

⁴⁵ M. Brie, Ioan Horga, „The Romanian-Ukrainian Cross-Border Cooperation an The European Instruments”, in A. Kruglasov (ed.), *Ucraina- Romania- Moldova: aspecte istorice, politice si culturale ale relatiilor în contextul proceselor europene contemporane*, vol. 3, Cernăuți, 2009, p. 302-318

⁴⁶ Ioan Horga, C. V. Țoca, F. Chirodea, *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României*, Primus, Oradea, 2013.

⁴⁷ Idem, „Valorizarea cercetării științifice din mediul academic pentru evaluarea on-going. Evaluarea programelor de cooperare teritorială / transfrontalieră”, in I. Horga, C. V. Țoca, F. Chirodea, *Evaluarea cooperării transfrontaliere la frontierele României*, Primus, Oradea, 2013.

⁴⁸ A se vedea Ioan Horga, „Evaluarea on-going a Programului de Cooperare Transfrontalieră Ungaria-Romania (2007-2013)”, in I. Horga, C. V. Țoca (ed.), *Evaluarea cooperării teritoriale europene*, Editura Universității din Oradea, Oradea, 2013.

coordinated by Ioan Horga was and remains the *Eurotimes* journal. It is a journal that, through 20 issues published so far, constitutes a genuine epistemological collection relating to borders. Each issue is a consistent attempt to reflect an “image”, a facet of the rich typology of the border. This project is presented in the study *Why Eurotimes?* in the first issue. „Nowadays, to dedicate a journal to the issue of the borders in Europe – as Eurotimes is – seems to be an outdated question from both the point of view of process of the European integration, or the enlargement, and from the point de view of the expectations of the Europeans, who wish to circulate, work and live wherever they want to. But the issue of the border is much more complex than we assume from the viewpoint of its essence and of the different experiences of Europe as a whole ... This “border” scepticism envisages the complexity of the interpretation given to the notion of border and its evolution in the context of the present-day phenomena of globalization and integration”⁴⁹. In 2010, five years after the first issue, in the study *Eurotimes, where to?*, Ioan Horga shows confidence in his interest shown towards this project: „Eurotimes will show an open interest”⁵⁰. After ten years and twenty published issues he tries to redefine the essence and purpose of this project. *Still Eurotimes?*, the study opening issue no. 20, introduces us to the universe a mature project, which sits on a solid foundation and that rethinks the light of new realities.. “Eurotimes will remain an active platform for reflection on the European borders, in general, and on the EU’s borders, in particular, aiming to respond, rapidly, with knowledge products, to the fast changes of the European society. On the other side, Eurotimes, although is has been forced by the recent years’ realities to nuance its opinions regarding the future of the European borders, it strongly reaffirms that the EU will exist as long as it will have osmotic borders, that for very short periods of time can become closed, for needed adjustments, as it happened in the fall of 2015, under the pressure of the refugees’ wave. But the European Union will be forced to find solutions in order to keep its borders permanently open, in a space Eurotimes – type, appealing for this, among others, to the electronic surveillance of the traffic at its borders and even within it.”⁵¹. In *Eurotimes*, but also in various other publications, Professor Horga runs a series of conceptual analyses regarding the border. Under this category fall studies like: *Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers* (2007)⁵²; *The New EU Borders: the historical and culturale*

⁴⁹ Ioan Horga, „Why Eurotimes?”, in *Eurotimes*, nr. 1, 2006, p. 5.

⁵⁰ Idem, „Eurotimes, where to?” in *Eurotimes*, nr. 10/Autumn, 2010, p. 5-16.

⁵¹ Ioan Horga, I. Suli-Zakar, „Still Eurotimes?”, in *Eurotimes*, nr. 20/Autumn, 2015, p. 18-19.

⁵² Ioan Horga, D. Pantea, „Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers”, in *Eurotimes*, nr. 4/ Autumn, 2007, p. 5-10.

Heritage (2007)⁵³; *The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach* (2009)⁵⁴; *Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago* (2010)⁵⁵; *Europe between Exclusive Border and Inclusive Frontiers* (2010)⁵⁶; *Europe: Internal Cultural Frontiers or Union Cultural Area* (2010)⁵⁷; *The European Union External Border. A Conceptual Analysis* (2010)⁵⁸ or *Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell'identità* (2014)⁵⁹. “According to the same pattern, the *Eurolimes* paradigm designs, according to several researchers in the field, what we understand by “inclusive frontier”⁶⁰, that is, the borders to which the European construction tends. The main idea of the integration process is not to settle barriers, but to attenuate them. From this perspective, internal borders become more and more *inclusive* and less visible. Security and border traffic control are transferred to external borders that become more and more *exclusive*, more restrictive if we respect the logic above. Such a theory is valid up to a point. Internal borders do not simply become more open, more *inclusive*⁶¹; there is an integration process taking place in steps. On the other hand, we cannot consider as fully equal good and *inclusive/open*, or bad and *exclusive/close*. A simple example can confirm our hypothesis: in war areas, borders are relatively open to refugees⁶². However, we cannot conclude that

⁵³ Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş, „The New EU Borders: the historical and culturale Heritage”, in *Actas del VIII Congreso, Cultura Europea*, Pamplona, 2007, p. 545-557.

⁵⁴ Ioan Horga, M. Brie, „The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach”, in *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, anul XI, nr. 1/2009, p. 15-31.

⁵⁵ Ioan Horga, Mircea Brie, „Europe: A Cultural Border, or a Geo-cultural Archipelago”, in *Eurolimes*, vol. 5/Spring, 2010, p. 155-169.

⁵⁶ Ioan Horga, M. Brie, „Europe between Exclusiv Border and Inclusiv Frontiers”, in *Studia Universitatis „Babes-Bolyai”*, Seria Europeea, vol.1/2010, p. 63-86.

⁵⁷ M. Brie, Ioan Horga, „Europe: Internal Cultural Frontiers or Union Cultural Area”, in *Moldoscopie*, nr. 3 (I), 2010, p. 123-143.

⁵⁸ M. Brie, Ioan Horga, „The European Union External Border. A Conceptual Analysis”, in A. Kruglasov (ed.), *Ukraine – Romania - Moldova; Historical, political and cultural aspects of their relations in the contemporary European processes context*, vol. 4, Chernivtsi, 2010, p. 204- 227.

⁵⁹ Ioan Horga, M. Brie, *Le frontiere europeee – espressioni dell'identità*, in *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, supliment nr.1, p. 202-216.

⁶⁰ Kalypso Nicolaidis, *Les fins de l'Europe*, in Bronislaw Geremek & Robert Picht (ed.), *Visions d'Europe*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2007, p. 275-290; Jan Zielonka, *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union*, London, Routledge, 2002; Idem, *Europe as Empire*, Oxford University Press, 2006; Geremek, Bronislaw, Picht, Robert, *Visions d'Europe*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2007.

⁶¹ Gerard Delanty, *Border in Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure*, in *Eurolimes*, vol. I, *Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective*, ed. Ioan Horga, Sorin Şipoş, Institutul de Studii Euroregionale, Oradea, 2006, p. 51.

⁶² *Ibidem*, p. 50.

we have an *inclusive* border “open just for pleasure” like European borders to which community integration tends as a model.⁶³ In general, the concept of border is associated with the *hard* physical border, a concept related to the barrier that can be crossed provided certain special conditions and requirements (visa to enter that country is the best example of a restrictive requirement in the case of *hard* border). On the other hand, a state can have *hard* borders with a neighbouring country, while having *soft*, open borders with another neighbouring country. A border can be both *hard* and *soft* at the same time. A state can eliminate visas for the citizens of a state while strengthening and reinforcing requirements in border control⁶⁴. In the European Union, community institutions suggest that Member States should have *hard* external borders and *soft* internal borders. Besides, several authors consider that *hard*, *exclusive*, *close*, *sharp-edges* or *barrier* are equal. They are all associated with restrictions and strict control being characterised by the numerous conditions imposed to those intending to cross them. On the other hand, *soft*, *open*, *inclusive*, *porous*, *communicative* or *bridge* type borders remove transit restrictions by rendering traffic more flexible⁶⁵. From another perspective, Charles Maier identifies three possible conceptual approaches of the border⁶⁶: the first, „*positive and constructive*”, considered as a border providing political order and good neighbouring relationships; the second, „*negative and revolutionary*”, seen as an illogical obstacle against normality, peace and unity; and the third approach, „*dialectical and evolutionary*”, characterized by the dissolution of a border and the inevitable settling of another, yet not necessarily at the same level of formality⁶⁷. For a long time, the concept of border has developed as an “intolerance axis” of nationalism and racism, of neighbours’ rejection⁶⁸. Beyond physical border, irrespective of the analysed conceptual approach, either within or outside the European Union border, we identify other types of “borders”. We consider these borders as symbolic and ideological considering that, more

⁶³ Ioan Horga, M. Brie, „Europe between Exclusiv Border and Inclusiv Frontiers...”, p. 69.

⁶⁴ See Olga Potemkina, *A „Friendly Schengen Border” and Illegal Migration: The Case of the EU and its Direct Neighbourhood*, in Joan DeBardeleben (ed.), *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe*, Ashgate, Hampshire, 2005, p. 165-182.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*

⁶⁶ Charles S. Maier, *Does Europe Need a Frontier? From Territorial to Redistributive Community*, in Jan Zilonka (ed.), *Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Governance and European Union*, Routledge, London, New York, 2002, pp 41-43.

⁶⁷ Horga, M. Brie, „The European Union External Border. An Epistemological Approach...”, p. 7.

⁶⁸ Gabriel Wackermann, *Les frontières dans monde en mouvement*, Ellipses, Paris, 2003, p. 28.

often than not, they are not palpable. From Europeanism to nationalism, from ethno-religious identities to social chasms, the wide range of approaches on symbolic and ideological borders may continue in the context of a new fight against terrorism or of the implementation of an effective European neighbourhood policy. The physical border at the external limit of the European Union may “open” in time. Yet other types of borders may exist between people and communities. For instance, immigrants live within the European Union; by preserving their identity, they can create a world that “refuses integration” due to the particularities they develop. Thus, we can identify a split that may take the form of a symbolic cultural border sometimes even turning into an “external” border⁶⁹. In addition to these works of conceptual and epistemological theoretical analysis about the European borders, Professor Ioan Horga runs analytical analyses on many kinds of borders as case studies. The approaches are, on the one hand, references to the evolution of relations between states / regions in the border area seen by analogy compared to historical realities. Historical and cultural heritage form a substrate that give special meaning to border areas, to the border directly⁷⁰. The media played an important role in the democratization of societies in Central and Eastern Europe, and made its contribution to the transformation of border areas, in the sense/meaning that borders have⁷¹. The religious dimension of the border, where the border separate communities, ideas and religious currents, is analyzed and noticed as a peculiar reality of the area of Central and Southeast⁷². It is a region where ethnic-national identities often are accompanied by distinct religious identities. Historical perspective provides a picture of European cleavages in this area. Often overlapping ethno-national cleavages with the religious ones led to tensions and conflicts, which not infrequently have become a form of violent expression (as is the case of the Balkan area,

⁶⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 7-8.

⁷⁰ Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş, „The New EU Borders...”, p. 545-557. Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş and I. Suli-Zakar, *Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective*, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2006.

⁷¹ Ioan Horga, „The role of Media in Changing the Meaning of the Borders”, in *Eurolimes*, nr. 3/Spring, 2007, p. 28-46; Ioan Horga, L. Şoproni, „The role of media in transforming the sense of borders of the World: The European Experience”, in P. Dobrescu, A. Ţăranu, A. Bărgăoanu (ed.), *Globalization and Policies of Development*, Editura Comunicare.ro, Bucureşti, 2007, p. 293-301; Ioan Horga, „Media, Identity and the Meaning of the European Frontier”, in D. Rolland, A. Landuyt (ed.), *Historiographies, politiques et territoires: la construction de l'espace politique européen*, l'Harmattan, Paris, 2010.

⁷² Ioan Horga, S. Şipoş, „Considérations sur les frontières religieuses de l'Europe Centrale et de Sud-Est, in *Eurolimes*, nr. 5, 2009, p. 5-13.

recognized by periods of decay and violence, generated quite often by this overlap of religious frontiers than other types of borders - ethnic, linguistic, cultural, etc.). This perspective is added by the references of the cultural frontiers⁷³ and identity frontiers⁷⁴. The economic frontiers⁷⁵ or the urban-community frontiers⁷⁶ are often placed against a complex approach which contains both the image of a space for communication, and of a space of fragmentation and cleavages⁷⁷.

In conclusion, we note the rich scientific activity of Professor Ioan Horga by his openness towards themes less addressed in national and international literature, and by the methodological contribution that his work brings. His references to the evolution of relations between states / regions in the border area are landmarks in the scientific area of European Studies and, moreover, International Relations or Security Studies.

Being a historian at core, he has been finding meaning in the historical and cultural heritage which together form a substrate that give special meaning to border areas. In view of the above, the research infrastructure that he has created led to the diversification of approaches regarding the European space in general and the border space in particular. Professor Ioan Horga managed through a wide openness to interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary, to give his research a complex perspective and anecessary understanding of phenomena and processes current in the Europe of today.

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⁷⁴ Ioan Horga, M. Brie, *Le frontiere europee – espressioni dell'identità...*, p. 202-216.

⁷⁵ L. Șoproni, Ioan Horga, „The Economic Frontiers of Europe”, p. 5-6, in *Eurotimes*, Vol. 8/Autumn, 2009, p. 5-6.

⁷⁶ Ioan Horga, A.-M. Costea, „The Regional Policy in the EUMS from Central and Eastern Europe between Decentralisation and Recentralisation”, in *Debater a Europa*, nr. 12, janeiro/junho, 2015, p. 103-134.

⁷⁷ See Ioan Horga, „Forms of Fragmentation or the European “Border Anxiety”?” in *Eurotimes* 20/Autumn, 2015, p. 108-123.

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I. Historical and political realities in Europe

Europe – Idea/Europe Integration Times. Spaces. Actors.

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As historian Robert Frank wrote in 2001: “l’histoire de l’Europe n’est en aucune façon une histoire de certitudes; elle est l’histoire de la question européenne, l’histoire d’un questionnement que l’historien doit constamment renouveler”¹ [The history of Europe is in no way a history of certainties; it is the history of the European question, of a questioning that the historian must continue to ask at all times].

The relationship between Europe – idea – “thinking Europe” – and Europe-integration – “integrating Europe” over such a long period of time – from the 1919-1920 peace treaties to the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, allows us to examine the history of the European integration in an approach well beyond facts and institutions. It shows that the efforts of uniting Europe are not only embodied in the numerous achieved or failed attempts to give Europe some sort of political, economic or cultural architecture, but also raise complex ideological debates in various circles – of intellectuals, politicians, senior officials, industrialists, trade unionists, etc.. All this gives rise to a clash of projects.

Thinking Europe means to reflect about projects of political or economic unity for the old continent, and also about European order and European security from the end of the First World War to the end of the Cold War and to the imploding of the Eastern bloc; it is also about searching for the roots and specificities of the European cultural identity and to reflect about the fate of “European civilisation”, its decline or role in the rest of the world”. “Building Europe” means realising the European idea in the field of realities. This is a complex process in which various methods are used (federal, confederal, communitarian), governing more or less

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¹ Robert Frank, “Une histoire problématique, une histoire du temps présent”, vingtième Siècle. *Revue d’histoire*, juillet-septembre, 2001, n. 71, p. 89.

powerful drivers (quest for peace, search for prosperity, the preservation of national interests, the weight of public opinion) and involving many actors (experts, policy makers, pressure groups, economic resources, etc.)²

The time periods used to shape this brief analysis – 1919-1992 – are indicative of the richness and complexity of the 20th century Europe integration. In 1919, weakened by a civil war, Europe wondered about its decline and fate, which rests on a new order laid down by the peace treaties (Treaty of Versailles), seeing in the emergence of the League of Nations a new international organisation being called to become more and more ‘Europeanised’. 1992 pins down the end of a decisive period in the history of the European continent marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), by the unification of Germany (1990) and by the dissolution of the USSR (1991). 1992 marks, in particular, the date of signature of the Maastricht Treaty, the difficult ratification of which caused a profound euro-pessimism trend at a time when the war in the former Yugoslavia further compounded in a community Europe unable to settle the conflict.

A historiographic account

According to archive documents, the history of European integration began in the late 1970s. Despite being a relatively new field of research, it has nevertheless produced many different historiographic works.

By making an account of this process, we have sought to summarise the various trends that enable the 20th century European unity narrative in the period under analysis.

Three main approaches stand out due to the order in which they appear in the historiographic field: first, a federalist-inspired narrative, the inter-governmentalist vision, followed by a more contemporary approach that sought to overcome the “models” and integrate the “social” dimension of the European integration process.

Let us then consider the first European integration narrative: the federalist approach.

What is the founding narrative of the pioneers of European unity?

The first works on European integration were not produced by historians, given that official document archives were not available at the time. So, these texts were produced by those who took the first steps towards European unity, filled with idealism and finalism, describing European unity as a historical need, while upholding the teleological vision

² Elisabeth du Reau, *La construction européenne du XXe siècle. Fondement. Enjeux. Défis*, Nantes, Editions du temps, 2007. Hélène Fréchet (coord. par), *Penser et construire l'Europe 1919- 1992*, Nantes, Editions du temps, 2007. Nicolas Beaupré, Caroline Moine (sous a direction de), *L'Europe de Versailles à Maastricht. Visions, moments et acteurs des projets européens*, Paris, Editions Seli Aslam, 2007.

of European integration. This desire, disseminated across many works published in the 1950s and 70s, deeply marked the overall interpretation of the European integration process.

Its actors often took the leading role in the European “mysticism” that characterised the old continent in the aftermath of the Second World War. Let us call to mind an important event: the “Congress of Europe” in The Hague, in May 1948, organised by the federalists – who were its mentors, facilitators and protagonists.

We take note of the most representative of these staunch federalists: Denis de Rougemont, Swiss, the author of *Vingt-huit siècles d'Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les siècles d'Hésiode à nos jours* (1961), Bernard Voyenne, French, who wrote *Histoire de l'idée européenne* (1964), and the Dutch Hendrik Brugmans, who published *L'idée européenne 1918-1965* in 1966. Brugmans (1906-1997) concedes: “Notre travail est un acte de foi, autant en Europe qu'en l'Histoire...”³. Denis de Rougemont, in turn, states: “L'Europe a exercé dès sa naissance une fonction non seulement universelle, mais, de fait, universalisante... Le vrai moyen de la définir, c'est de la bâtir... Et il s'agit bien moins de la délimiter dans le temps de l'histoire et l'espace terrestre, que de renouveler sans cesse le rayonnement de son génie particulier qui se trouve être, justement, universel”⁴. For these authors, European federalism had already gained a foothold for over several decades, and they blamed the gradual weakening of the nation state, which, in their opinion, led Europe to chaos during the Second World War.

As the idea was to “make Europe”, the Hague Congress in May 1948 was, in the eyes of the federalists, the biggest lost opportunity to give the old continent the bases of a federal organisation. Instead, the Council of Europe created in 1949, a symbol of a close intergovernmentalism, embodied by Great Britain, was immediately considered as hopeless.

Both the Schuman Plan (1950), embodying the genes of a European federation, and then the European Political Community project (EPC-1952-1953), of federalist inspiration, raised the hope of those who fervently advocated a federate Europe. This project, however, was affected by the rebuff of the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC-1954). It was then that a large number of federalists opted for a realistic and non-idealist path, supporting the emerging European Communities, as, for them, economic functionalism seemed to be the only way to achieve European unity.

³ Jean – Michel Guieu (et al.), *Penser et construire l'Europe au Xxe siècle*, Paris, Ed. Belin, 2006, p. 10-11, 16, 18- 20.

⁴ Denis de Rougemont, *Vingt – huit siècles d'Europe. La conscience européenne à travers les siècles d'Hésiode à nos jours*, Paris, Payot, 1961.

As a result of this, a hagiographic narrative of the early days of European integration is filled with the heroes of the federalist pantheon. Note how Jean Monnet, the precursor of federalism, announced in 1943 that he wished that the peoples of Europe would unite under a federation or a “European entity” rather than under European economic unity. However, he followed a different method and neo-functionalism became a prime driving force in the dynamics of European integration.

In the 1950s-1960s, some Anglo-Saxon political scientists took an interest in the development of Community institutions and theorised on the neo-functionalist method. Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003) conceptualised about this mostly pragmatic process introduced by Jean Monnet through the creation of the ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community). Haas, a young American political scientist, stayed in Strasbourg between 1955 and 1956 and in 1958 published his famous work *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950-1957*. He was the first to develop the theory that true political union is gradually built based on the common practice of technical competences (the *spill-over theory*).

Another author, León Lindberg, a follower of Haas, published in 1963 *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, in which he explains the neofunctionalist process, showing, however, that European integration is achieved primarily through the socialisation of elites and the involvement of interest groups⁵.

Federalism and historians

The federalists’ theories on the European integration process were also analysed by some historians, in particular in Germany and Italy. One of the first historians on European integration was Walter Lipgens, a federalist militant and member of the *Europa-Union*, the German section of the Union of European Federalists (UEF). He was the first holder of the Contemporary History Chair (1976-1979) at the Florence European University Institute founded in 1972. The first volume of his work published in 1977, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950* (*The early days of European integration policy 1945-1950*) analyses the period 1945-1950: the roots of European integration since the Second World War and the development of the European idea within the non-communist resistance movements and governments in exile. He was more interested in the history of ideas and thoughts about the federalist movements than in intergovernmental negotiations or the first institutional commitments to European unity.

⁵ Alice Cunha, *O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A Experiência Portuguesa*, FCSH da UNL, 2013 (doctoral dissertation).

In a similar vein, Lippens also published a seminal collection of documents on the history of European integration since the Second World War, a task that was later continued by his follower Wilfried Loth. The purpose of the publication, however, was not fully achieved. He proposed to publish the key discourses, statements and documents, country by country, of the Resistance, of the militant movements for European integration, commented by professional historians. He published four volumes - *Documents on the History of European Integration (1939-1950)*, in 1986-1991, in which he emphasised the visible contrast between the various appeals to European integration and their poor influence on the actions of European leaders in the aftermath of the Second World War. These documents nevertheless explain the Schuman Plan and the beginnings of sector-wide European integration. In fact, this led to a shift in the approach to European integration in the 1980s.

The federalist approach is also strongly represented in Italy, where an influential school privileges the historians' understanding of the European integration process. This school is represented by Sérgio Pistone, a history professor of European integration at the University of Turin and a member of the *Movimento federalista europeo*, Ariane Landuyt and Daniele Pasquinucci, of the University of Siena, Daniela Preda of the University of Genoa, Piero S. Graglia (University of Milan) and also Corrado Malandrino (University of Eastern Piedmont), among others.

While the federalists produce historiographic works on the history of ideas, a certain number of historians base their research on archives to produce a discourse that emphasises the place and involvement of national governments in the European integration process.

The “realistic” discourse of the European integration

1. *The first analysts of “realistic” Europe*

As a reaction to the idealism represented by the federalist school, a number of teachers from the English-speaking world dwelt on the economic explanation and on the intergovernmental motives in the history of the European integration process.

The first university scholar to develop this theory is Stanley Hoffmann, a Political Science Professor at Harvard University. In observing the policy undertaken by Charles De Gaulle and the paralysis of the Community institutions (the “empty chair” policy), in his article entitled

“Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe”, Hoffmann proves that the Nation-State was still quite influential⁶

Among the historians, in the 1980s British historian Alan Milward suggests a “realistic” vision and goes on to explain that the creation of the European Communities does not stem from an ideal, but rather from the desire of nation-states to consolidate the bases of their legitimacy after the Second World War. Milward, a renowned expert in Second World War economic history, steered his research to the economic reconstruction of post-war Europe. Thus, in 1984, he publishes *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951*, showing that the American aid under the Marshall Plan American economic aid was not what saved Europe from the crisis in itself. He further explained that from 1945 on the reconstruction of Europe was underway, but nevertheless recognised the importance of the financial aid from the United States. He strongly criticised the federalist interpretation and stressed that the federalist movements had no role in a process led mostly by national interests. In his opinion, the new economic agreements in Europe introduced new forms of cooperation, both ambitious and pragmatic, instead of far too theoretical major political peace treaties as was the case after the First World War.

Milward used his later work *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (1992) to reaffirm, giving justifiable reasons, his theory that the European integration is essentially an economic rather than a political process, and that we should therefore act on the classic diplomatic narrative of international relations. The author also stated that rather than weakening the Nation-State, European integration strengthened it. In a chapter suggestively entitled “The lives and teaching of the European Saints”, he explains that the so-called “Fathers of Europe” (Spaak, Schuman, Adenauer, Gasperi, Monnet) acted according to national interest. According to Milward, they viewed European integration as the most significant means to ensure the safety and prosperity of their country, of their national State. In the same line of reasoning, the British historian Frances Lynch (*France and the International Economy. From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome*, 1997) pointed out that France’s commitment in the Treaty of Rome was based more on economic rather than political determinants. The author grounded her studies on the French governmental and top administration discussions held between the end of the Second World War and the signing of the Treaty of Rome (1957), and on thorough research work done in French and British archives.

This intergovernmentalist discourse was also used by the American political scientist Andrew Moravcsik, a Professor at the Princeton

⁶ Stanley Hoffmann, “Obstinate or obsolete? The fate of the Nation – State and the case of Western Europe”, *Daedalus*, vol.95, n. 3, 1966, p. 862- 915.

University. In his work published in 1999, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, the author explains why the EEC was a success. His theory is underpinned by two fundamental principles: on the one hand, that European integration is driven by the large nation-states that control the process; on the other hand, that the key driver of those states is not political but rather economic, and, more particularly, of a commercial nature. The author added that it is the trade relations and not the political, ideological or other economic relations that underlie the European integration process, which, in her opinion, strengthens more than undermines the states.

Although important, Moravcsik's study has some shortcomings: his research is mostly based on secondary sources, more on memories (of Alain Peryrefitte) than on archive documents. His work falls within a classic diplomatic narrative. In the same vein, John Gillingham, a professor at the University of Missouri, expert on the history of the ECSC, in his book *European Integration, 1950-2003. Superstate or New Market Economy?* (2003) presents his theory grounded on two key pillars: classic liberalism in economy and neoliberal institutionalism in political science. European integration is therefore associated with a clash between two economic models – a statist model and one more liberal model. According to Gillingham, market forces dominate the European integration process from the 80s. Although some of his ideas are appealing, the chronological study just scratches the surface and the methodology is not very objective, in other words, his work wavers between the history of ideas and the history of the decision-making process⁷ What is the importance of the French School of International Relations?

2. *The French school of international relations*

It is interesting to note that in the 1950s the history of international relations was deeply renewed in the French school much to the influence of Pierre Renouvin, who sought to overcome the classic diplomatic narrative in order to integrate the “deep forces” – “material forces” and “collective mentalities”. In the 1950s, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle studied, in the light of what he had learned from the American political science, the decision processes. That is, Duroselle was the first to conduct a historian's reflection on European unity. He did it at conferences, in articles, and in books. For example, he co-authored an article with Pierre Gerbet on “L'unification de l'Europe occidentale”, in *Encyclopédie Française*, t. 11. His work published in 1965, *L'idée d'Europe dans l'histoire*, was prefaced by Jean Monnet. In his

⁷ Jean-Michel Guieu (et al.), *Penser et construire l'Europe au XXe siècle*, Paris, Ed. Belin, 2006, 10-11, 16, 18-20.

famous book *L'Europe. Histoire des peuples*, dated 1990, Duroselle analysed all the factors that gave Europe some sort of unity, giving it the prominence of a true centuries-old civilisation community. Duroselle's arguments on the decision process gained a following in the field of international relations. His successor at Sorbonne, René Girault, launched an international research programme on the "power in Europe in three different periods: 1938, 1948, 1956-1958", which were, without a doubt, remarkable milestones. He also examined how the power of the large European states (Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy) was perceived by the political, economic, military officials and by public opinion to better understand its decline and to identify what had replaced the nationalism and imperialism of the European nation-states. Three major colloquia were held in the 80s gathering more than one hundred European historians – Sèvres, in 1982, Augsburg, in 1984, and Florence, in 1987 –, that resulted in three publications which occupy a prominent position in the historiography of the European integration process⁸.

In the 1980s, the history of European integration gradually became a privileged field of research of historians of international relations, focused mainly on the role of decision-makers, of strategists, of diplomats, promoting the role of the National-State and national policies in European integration. The works of Pierre Guillen, Raymond Poidevin, Pierre Mélandri, and Maurice Vaisse are an example of this.

However, new prospects had opened up. Gérard Bossuat associated economic history to a history of the decision process and published his work in two volumes in 1992 on *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944-1954*. For the period between the two world wars, the works of Éric Bussière (1992) and Sylvain Schirmann (2000) also crossed economic history with the history of international relations, emphasising the importance of economic resources. Other particularly relevant works were produced by Pierre Gerbert, *La construction d'Europe*, 1983, Gérard Bossuat, *Les fondateurs de l'Europe Unie*, 1994, and Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, *La construction européenne*, 1996, re-published several times to the present day. Their importance in international relations is manifested in numerous historians on European integration, for e.g., among others, the Italian historian Antonio Varsori, or, among the Germans, Wilfried Loth. All their works tend to demonstrate that nation-states and national decision-makers have a great deal of latitude in the complex game of international relations and of

⁸ René Girault, Robert Frank (dir), *La puissance en Europe, 1938- 1940*, Paris, Pub. de la Sorbonne, 1984. Franz Knipping, Joseph Becker (dir), *Power in Europe: Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a postwar world 1945- 1950*, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1986. Nolfo, Emio (dir), *Power in Europe?*, vol. II, Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the origins of the EEC, 1952- 1957, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1992.

the forces that shape them. This holds true for historian Georges-Henri Soutou who, inspired by the work of the American historian Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848*, published in 1994, problematised the “European order” in the context of extensive research following the Vienna Congress. “European order” as being characterised by a mechanical balance of powers, but also by legal and diplomatic structures, and by a Community of values. Soutou referred to the originality of forms of cooperation between European states that developed before the formal process of European integration⁹

3. The Europe of the historians of European integration

In response to the historians who analysed, at local level, the history of their own countries, some university historians sought to interconnect their analyses and views, which enabled them to form lasting personal ties and, moreover, made it easier to set up institutionalised networks from 1982 on. This was the case of the Group of Contemporary History Teachers, encouraged by the Commission of the European Communities, which was formed after a major Colloquium organised by the Commission in Luxembourg. Its purpose was to encourage historical research on European integration. This network published a trilingual journal – in French, English and German – entitled *Revue d'histoire de l'intégration Européenne*, and has organised regular conferences for the advancement of historical research on the history of European integration, presenting some innovative approaches (vol. 33, n. 4, 2011).

This advancement is also explained by the opening of several archives. The findings of this research have been disclosed in several and extensive works.

4. Between the federalist school and the intergovernmental school

A new and ambitious school appeared between the intergovernmental school, which stressed the importance of member States, and the federalist school, mainly interested in Community dynamics. The aim of this new school was to interconnect the archive sources from the various member countries with those of European institutions. Hans Jürgen Küsters, Raymond Poidevin, Dirk Spierenburg and Piers Ludlow presented pioneering studies, and several doctoral theses were prepared at the

⁹ Steinert, M., Soutou, G.H., „Ordré européen et construction européenne XIXe – XXe siècle, *Relations internationales*, n. 90, 1997; Jean – Michel Guieu (et al.), *Pousser et construire l'Europe au XX e siècle*, Paris, Ed. Belin, 2006, p. 10-11, 16, 18-20. Sylvain Schirmann (et al.), *Penser et construire l'Europe (1919- 1992). Etats et opinions face à la construction européenne*, Paris, Editions Sedes, 2007, p. 7-11.

European Institute in Florence. In 1982, Hans Jürgen Küsters published his work *Les Fondements de la Communauté économique Européenne*, republished in 1990, which is a systematic historical study in which he outlined the entire negotiation and ratification of the Treaty of Rome in a multilateral approach, based mostly on private archive collections and interviews, without, however, having had access to the archives of the governments of the six EEC member countries.

Based on the ECSC archive, Raymond Poidevin and Dirk Spierenburg, a Dutch diplomat and former member of the ECSC High Authority, wrote a seminal work on the Paris negotiations (1950) to the merging of the Communities (1967), *Histoire de la Haute Autorité de la CEEA*, 1993.

As the result of an European research programme and in response to a call from the European Commission, Michel Dumoulin (University of Louvain-la-Neuve) coordinated the production of a volume that describes the history of this institution since its early days, based on the evidence given by 120 protagonists of that time and on numerous written sources. Collective work entitled *La Commission européenne (1958-1972). Histoire et mémoires d'une institution*, 2007.

One of the key EEC common policies, the Common Agricultural Policy, was the subject of a doctoral thesis produced by the Danish Ann-Christina Knudsen, presented to the European Institute in Florence, supervised by Alan Milward. The Danish author conducted her research based on the archives of the EEC member countries and those of the European Commission, providing us a picture of the intergovernmental negotiations and of the mobilisation ability of the then European Commissioner for Agriculture, Sicco Mansholt, in her work *Defining the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study*, 2003.

A comparative study based on documents issued by the EEC and various other European countries, by Piers Ludlow, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist challenge*, 2005, served to show that the States continued to play a central role, even though their opinions were limited by Community rules.

5. The transnational approach

To tackle an approach more focused on government and national administrations, many studies were carried out to analyse the various non-state resources, but which were also aimed at European unity.

Thus, Laurence Badel emphasised (1999) the connection between French trade and free-market practices. Françoise Bugar (2000) showed us how the French and German steel industries resumed their negotiations after 1945 and promoted European cooperation projects, rejecting the

ECSC's technocratic intervention. Marine Moguen (2002) studied the commonalities and differences between the French and German unions. In 2005, Francesco Petrini analysed the Italian General Confederation of Industry.

Note also the relevance of the seminar organised by the Comité pour l'histoire économique et financière de la France du ministère de l'Économie et des Finances on *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au xx^{e} siècle (2001-2004)*, attended by several researchers and directed by Éric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin and Sylvain Schirmann. One of the various collective publications that ensued was *Milieus économiques et intégration européenne au xx^{e} siècle. La relance des années quatre-vingt (1979-1992)*. The aim of these publications was to show how the various economic media, companies, employer associations, trade unions, etc., according to a national and transnational perspective, identified the different European economic models, the confrontation of which lies at the core of the dynamics of the European integration since its inception. These analyses and studies allow us to assess the existing opposition in the early stages of the European integration process between a free-market European model and the desire to create more contract-based and more organised forms of European cooperation¹⁰

In the political sphere, studies are characterised by having a transnational approach. We have, therefore, used comparative studies to analyse international cooperation, for e.g., those that deal with the relevance of Christian Democracy in Europe. Kaiser, for example, discussed in depth the weight of transnational networks, that is, of organised groups having a European vision in different countries.

This transnational analysis is expressed in the works and networks of intellectual circles. Note, for example, the case of historians Andrée Bachoud, Josefina Cuesta, Michel Trebitsch (2000), but also the religious circles (Philippe Chaunu, 2007).

Studies on senior officials, on administrative cultures and their European views have also been systematically analysed (Laurence Babel, S. Jeanesson, P. Ludlow, 2005). The military are also the topic of discussion, for example in the article by P. Vial et D'Abzac-Épezy, "Quelle Europe pour les militaires? La perception de l'Europe à travers la presse militaire (1947-1954)", *Revue Historique des Armées*, 1993.

In fact, pro-European militancy projects also appeared and were the subject of recent research work. They bring fresh ideas to our knowledge, in particular in respect of the period between the two world wars, as shown in

¹⁰ Eric Bussière, "Les milieux économiques face à l'Europe", *Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne*, vol. 3, n.2, 1997, p. 5, 9, 14.

the works of the following authors: Anne-Marie Saint Gille on *Panurope*, Geneviève Duchenne on Belgian Europeanism between the two world wars, Christophe Le Dréau on the pro-European movements in Great Britain, Claus Corneliussen on Heerfordt, Véronika Heyde on the resistance movements and the European concept, and Bernard Vayssière on the Union of European Federalists, among others.

Public opinion, identities and public space

Like the constructivist approach developed by political science and as in the theory of international relations, many historians problematised the issue of European integration based on “collective subjectivities and identities”. From this point of view, an international research programme on “identité et conscience européennes au xxe siècle” was enforced between 1989 and 1995, first at the instigation of René Girault, and then of Robert Frank. Both historians questioned the European image and the frailness of the “European feeling”. They created a vast network formed by dozens of researchers (180) who analysed comparative themes at transnational level. Among their findings, they show that the old and century-old European cultural identity does not automatically result in the European integration. In fact, it is the trauma resulting from the 20th century disasters that have helped shape a “European awareness”, that is, the need for the unity of Europe. The latter was vital in early efforts, but did not automatically transform into a new contemporary political identity. The feeling of belonging to the Community/European Union is very fragmented. It is worth emphasising the continuing national feelings. In this respect, we note the publications of René Girault and Gérard Bossuat, *Les Europes des Européens*, 1993; René Girault, *Identité et conscience européennes au xxe siècle*, 1994, Robert Frank, *Les identités européennes au xxe siècle*, 2000.

Historians have given particular attention to public opinion. Opinion surveys exist for the early days of the Community, but this assessment instrument only became a relevant source from the 1970s on – the Eurobarometer surveys. We can mention the studies by Christine Manigaud and A. Dulphy (2002). The same goes for the reflections of some historians, such as Robert Frank, Hartmut Kaelble, among others, on the reality and modalities of a European public space, i.e., a common space of references and public debates. While from this point of view culture is an important element, the experiences relate mostly to the elites. Even if the European public space should be regarded differently in relation to the national public spaces, historians reflect on the emergence of common spaces of reference for Europeans – the memory of war, European places of remembrance, common heroes of united Europe, European symbols.

In conclusion, even though the history of Europe – European integration – is relatively young, especially due to the belated access to archive, its production is nevertheless abundant, its approaches are numerous, and its written production is multinational and is constantly being renewed.

As we make this brief historiographic inventory of *Times, Spaces and Actors*, we note that historiography, strongly dominated by the 1945 cleavages, has to be classified according to major chronological periods: between the two world wars, during the Second World War, and the period from 1945 to 1992.

We conclude that the various historiographic trends and the wealth of historical production raised by the study of projects, of the European unity processes in the 20th century and of its actors have enabled us to confirm that far from being a linear process, the European integration process should be understood as unique changeovers between success and failure, of recoveries and of crises. It is an immensely rich and complex history filled with different ideas, times, spaces, actors and forms that have converged or clashed throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.

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De la nature de la crise occidentale. Une crise de transition de la monarchie élective au système représentatif

George CONTOGEORGIS*

La crise actuelle. Une crise de transition à une phase nouvelle

Les dernières décennies du XX^e siècle ont marqué l'achèvement, pour l'Occident, de la transition du despotisme à l'anthropocentrisme (les sociétés en liberté). Deuxième chose, tout aussi importante : l'expansion des paramètres anthropocentriques sur l'ensemble de la planète. Désormais, les sociétés de ce que l'on appelle le « tiers monde » sont à leur tour sorties, pour l'essentiel, du despotisme et participent donc au devenir anthropocentrique. À une différence près : alors que l'Occident est arrivé au terme de cette première phase et crée les conditions de son installation dans la nouvelle période, la phase suivante, le reste de la planète vit à peine son entrée dans la première phase des sociétés en liberté.

Il s'est passé dans le monde, depuis les années quatre-vingt, un changement d'importance cosmohistorique : l'économie monétaire et la communication, deux des facteurs clés qui façonnent la vie des gens, ont imposé leur autonomie face aux frontières et au pouvoir de l'État. L'économie monétaire a étendu son rayonnement à l'ensemble de la planète ; la communication fait que ce qui se passe dans un pays se sait dans le monde entier.

À l'inverse, la société (en tant que catégorie politique) et l'État (en tant que système politique) sont demeurés hermétiquement fermés et pensent leur fonctionnement en termes du XVIII^e siècle.

Cela veut dire que la crise actuelle n'a rien à voir avec les crises antérieures (économiques ou politiques). Les crises antérieures, depuis le XVIII^e siècle jusqu'aux années quatre-vingt du XX^e siècle, étaient essentiellement des crises de transition de la féodalité à la société proto-anthropocentrique. En d'autres termes, elles traduisaient la lutte que menait

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l'homme social pour se libérer en tant qu'entité individuelle et acquérir certains droits sociaux et politiques.

En réalité, pourtant, tant le système économique que le système politique continuent à reproduire l'ancien régime : ils appartiennent, en termes de propriété, à un tiers, un acteur qui se situe au-delà de la société des citoyens. La rencontre entre la société du travail et la société des citoyens, d'une part, et les systèmes de l'économie et de la politique, de l'autre, se faisait et continue à se faire d'une manière extra-institutionnelle : dans la rue, par des grèves ou des manifestations.

Néanmoins, le fait que l'essentiel de la vie économique, communicationnelle, sociale et politique ait lieu à l'intérieur de l'État, c'est-à-dire dans le cadre du système politique, a permis l'établissement d'un certain équilibre et, au-delà, des compromis entre les acteurs de la dynamique socio-économique qui a mené à l'État de droit et à l'État providence.

Le véhicule, pour ces évolutions sur l'ensemble de la planète, s'avère être la technologie, dans l'économie et la communication. Dans l'espace du tiers monde, elle désagrége les bases de l'ancien régime et crée des liens organiques cohérents avec l'Occident, qui mène les opérations, dans une relation de centre à périphérie. L'une des manifestations significatives de cette relation est le phénomène de migration économique (et politique), qui donne à penser qu'on cherche dorénavant à résoudre le problème social (et politique) de la périphérie en le transférant au centre, en Occident. Une autre évolution, non moins intéressante, est la modification galopante du concept et du contenu du travail par le biais de l'innovation technologique, qui change complètement la logique même de la relation entre économie et société.

Dans le monde occidental, ces changements aboutissent à un bouleversement radical des valeurs et des rapports de force et, à présent, à une rupture de l'équilibre entre société, État/système et économie, au profit de la domination universelle de cette dernière. Cette rupture est aussi marquée, au sein de l'économie, par un bouleversement essentiel en faveur des forces du capital financier et marchand. Le trait propre de ces forces, conventionnellement appelées «marchés», est qu'elles provoquent une redistribution interne en accumulant, en Occident en l'occurrence, où elles ont leur siège, chez un cercle restreint d'individus la richesse créée par l'économie productive. Cependant, la base productive de l'économie occidentale s'est déplacée dorénavant vers les pays du «tiers monde» et, à l'heure actuelle, en Chine. Ainsi se fait-il que les emplois, qui relèvent du processus classique de production, sont créés dans le «tiers monde», tandis que la richesse se déplace en Occident, et avec elle le problème social (et politique) du «tiers monde».

Cette richesse, précisément, produit en Occident une force politique énorme, sans toutefois créer d'emplois en proportion. En tout état de cause, le monde du travail en Occident n'a plus rien à voir avec celui de la période antérieure à la Guerre froide.

L'économie et la communication comme paramètres du cosmos planétaire, émancipés des États

Cette répartition au sein de l'économie, le développement cosmosystémique/planétaire de celle-ci et la mobilité horizontale (interétatique) du travail sont la première cause de la faiblesse politique à laquelle a été réduite la société des citoyens.

L'une des manifestations de ce bouleversement est la déstructuration complète à laquelle nous assistons de nos jours, de la relation entre travail et propriété (du système) – l'illustration la plus visible en étant la mutation du travail, qui était une *relation de droit public* et devient un *travail marchandise* – et l'orientation sans équivoque du *but de la politique* vers l'intérêt des marchés.

Cependant, si l'on jette un regard plus circonstancié sur les faits, on s'aperçoit que les marchés ne tirent pas d'eux-mêmes leur force démesurée : celle-ci dérive du fait que, d'un côté, les paramètres de l'économie et de la communication sont passés *dans le futur*, se situent à un niveau cosmosystémiquement planétaire, tandis que, de l'autre côté, société et État demeurent, comme il a été dit, hermétiquement enfermés dans le passé, au siècle des Lumières essentiellement.

La relation entre société et politique instaurée au départ aux XVIII^e-XIX^e siècles, quelles que soient les acrobaties conceptuelles qui l'entourent, est d'une texture extra-institutionnelle. La *société des citoyens* est inexistante comme concept, la *société civile* occupant sa place de catégorie politique extra-institutionnelle. Cela explique que la société des citoyens ne participe pas au processus de prise de décisions et il est explicite que son intérêt ne fait pas partie du but de la politique.

De même, la *société des citoyens* ne cherche pas à prendre en charge elle-même la gestion de ses intérêts comme elle le fait pour les questions qui concernent sa vie personnelle directe, et elle ne cherche pas à établir une relation institutionnelle avec les agents du pouvoir politique (et économique). C'est ainsi que la fonction politique a été prise en charge par des *intermédiaires* autoproclamés (les forces de la *société civile* ou les *forces politiques*) qui ont brigué leur légitimation en brandissant la promesse d'intervenir dans le pouvoir politique ou d'assumer la gestion de celui-ci dans le but de défendre les intérêts de la société.

Pour la société postféodale, le fait d'avoir pu accéder à *l'espace privé* (la liberté individuelle) et que le système politique ait pu être cédé à des tiers

intermédiaires qu'elle pourrait légitimer au pouvoir a été considéré, par rapport au passé, comme un énorme progrès... D'ailleurs, ses priorités, mais aussi son expérience politique, prédisposaient à l'existence d'un système de valeurs qui ne contesterait pas le fait que le système économique et politique fasse l'objet d'une propriété de la part d'un tiers. N'oublions pas que les luttes du XX^e siècle ont eu lieu sous le signe de l'appartenance du système à la propriété privée ou à l'État. Dans les deux idéologies, la société était située hors du système économique et politique.

Cela signifie que la *liberté sociale et politique* ne fait pas partie des valeurs de notre temps. Ainsi, après que les pays européens ont introduit le suffrage universel à la veille de la Première Guerre mondiale, l'Allemagne, qui était la société la plus attardée d'Europe, lésée de nombreux fardeaux autoritaires, qui ont leur référence dans le culte de l'État, a cédé de manière totalitaire l'ensemble du pouvoir politique à Hitler.

La crise de 1929 n'a pas été la cause de l'avènement d'Hitler et du nazisme. Elle a été l'occasion qui a permis à la société, simple *masse politique* qui ne constituait pas une catégorie politique, de porter Hitler au pouvoir. La même chose s'est produite en Russie. On ne se rend pas compte que du point de vue formel, le système politique dit représentatif/démocratique et celui du fascisme/nazisme sont de la même nature. Il est incarné totalement par l'État, la société étant cantonnée dans le secteur privé.

Il s'ensuit donc que le rétablissement de l'équilibre entre le social et l'économique, dans le nouvel environnement créé par le développement cosmosystémique de l'économie et de la communication, ne peut se produire par le biais de l'ancien système politique. Aucun des intermédiaires politiques n'a de raisons de prendre en compte la société, puisqu'ils tirent leur légitimation exclusivement des appareils et des rapports de force qu'ils tissent autour de l'État. Le *coût politique* est lié aux réactions de ces forces, et la *cohésion sociale* ne se mesure plus en prenant pour critère la société des citoyens, mais ses résistances et ses tolérances face aux politiques de déconstruction qui la relèguent en marge.

En somme, la puissance des marchés résulte de leur développement planétaire, mais elle est due au fait que le système politique et, par voie de conséquence, la relation entre société et politique sont demeurés inchangés.

Le pire, c'est que cette relation est considérée comme une réalité non sujette à évolution. Je pense que cette approche du régime politique est anhistorique et, de toute façon, profondément conservatrice.

Si nous envisageons le système politique actuel comme la phase primaire de la transition anthropocentrique – ce qu'elle est effectivement –, nous conviendrons que les marchés sont devenus tout-puissants et ont totalement pris en otage la classe politique parce que la volonté de la société est absente de ce système.

Une transition menée par l'avant-garde occidentale

Nous allons revenir à cette question plus loin. Pour l'instant, il convient de se demander comment ce contexte général se concrétise au sein de l'Union européenne.

Il est bien connu que l'Europe politique a été fondée sur une sorte d'entente cordiale, de *gentlemen agreement* qui cherchait des consensus, sinon l'unanimité dans la prise de décisions. Dans ce même cadre, on n'a pas considéré que l'axe franco-allemand était nuisible, parce qu'il constituait une sorte de *primus inter pares* qui, de plus, favorisait la création des équilibres politiques.

C'est précisément ce système de fait qui a permis, d'une part, la montée de l'Europe politique et, d'autre part, son attractivité parmi les pays du continent et dans le monde.

Depuis la crise grecque, qui symbolise l'entrée de l'Europe dans ce que j'ai défini, tout à l'heure, comme *crise occidentale*, on assiste à un renversement pur et simple du système européen. Les instances européennes ne servent plus que pour ratifier, en dernière analyse, la volonté allemande.

L'axe franco-allemand semble être, lui aussi, en panne. La France se prépare, semble-t-il, à jouer un rôle semblable à celui de la période d'entre les deux guerres.

Le passage d'une *Europe de synergies* et de *consensus* à une Europe à *hégémonie allemande* a été l'effet d'une stratégie de longue date dont les étapes récentes sont : la réunification du pays, le démantèlement de la Yougoslavie, l'élargissement brutal vers l'est et essentiellement l'euro.

Cette volonté de puissance allemande s'est exprimée sans périphrases à l'entrée de la crise. L'occasion a été offerte par la Grèce, qui a servi de maillon faible pour plusieurs raisons.

Pour mettre en lumière la gestion de la crise grecque par l'Allemagne, il est important de décrypter la stratégie qu'elle a déployée pour s'emparer du pouvoir européen.

Je retiens: a) que la stratégie allemande vise, au-delà de l'Europe, le cadre occidental, voire international. L'Allemagne sait plus que tout autre, à mon avis, que son ambition internationale passe directement par l'Europe politique; b) étant donné que les armes ne peuvent plus servir sa cause et que la géopolitique est entre les mains des États-Unis, elle a choisi l'économie. Elle entend imposer l'institutionnalisation de la logique et de l'intérêt des marchés comme finalité de l'Europe politique.

Il est évident que ce qui manque dans cette approche de la crise, c'est les sociétés. Il ne s'agit pas de sous-estimer la question de la dette ou la

concurrence mondiale, mais de mettre en lumière l'enjeu qui se cache derrière cette option et au-delà de la stratégie adoptée pour envisager la crise.

Certains disent que c'est dans la mentalité allemande de placer la raison d'État au-dessus de l'intérêt de la société. Et qu'en vertu de cette approche, la plus grande économie européenne a déjà opté pour la dite « dévaluation » du niveau de vie des Allemands avant de l'imposer à l'Europe. Pourtant, dans le cas de l'Allemagne, cette politique visait à l'accumulation dans le grand secteur économique et, au fond, au renforcement de l'État allemand. Dans les autres pays de l'Union, cette « dévaluation » porte atteinte, en dehors du niveau de vie des citoyens et de l'État providence, à leur infrastructure économique et à l'indépendance de l'État. Tout montre que l'Allemagne cherche à créer des cercles concentriques à l'intérieur de la zone euro, avec à la tête le noyau dur, ses anciens alliés du Nord. Il ne s'agit pas de faire sortir la Grèce, par exemple, de l'euro, car elle perdra la passerelle de ses ambitions vers la Méditerranée orientale et le Moyen Orient. La Turquie n'est plus comme autrefois un allié sûr, elle est un concurrent potentiel pour ses intérêts. La Grèce, pour jouer ce rôle, doit être mise à genou. Y compris Chypre. En outre, si le laboratoire grec réussit, la formule sera valable pour la dite « périphérie » de la zone euro.

De ce point de vue, il est intéressant d'esquisser en quelques lignes l'approche de la crise grecque par l'Allemagne et ses alliés.

Au niveau économique d'abord : en projetant la dévaluation interne comme remède à la crise grecque, on l'a considérée comme étant l'égale de la *dévaluation d'une monnaie nationale*. Même si l'on oublie un instant que le but poursuivi est de servir l'intérêt des marchés, la dévaluation de la monnaie nationale améliore, sous certaines conditions, la compétitivité de l'économie ; la « dévaluation interne » marque une intervention violente et déstructurante au niveau de la base productive de l'économie elle-même, ce qui hypothèque la consommation et l'État providence.

Dans le cas de la Grèce, c'est la « dévaluation interne » qui a été choisie pour faire face, nous l'avons dit, à la crise de la dette. Mais ainsi, elle a rendu la dette ingérable et a inévitablement imposé son « effacement partiel ». La « dévaluation interne » a porté un coup fatal au tissu productif de l'économie et a en fait entraîné la faillite du pays. Faut-il alors penser que seule sa « sinisation » fera que la société grecque cessera de vivre au-dessus de ses moyens ? D'un autre côté, les gouvernants n'ont toujours pas expliqué pourquoi la dette n'était pas gérable quand elle était égale à 120% du PIB au début de la crise et qu'elle le sera avec le même pourcentage en 2020, c'est-à-dire une fois que la société grecque sera exsangue. Surtout que, dans le premier cas, les créanciers n'auraient pas eu à subir le fameux « effacement partiel ».

On entend dire également que la désagrégation de l'économie et la paupérisation forcée de la société amélioreront *la compétitivité* puisque la dévalorisation du marché du travail et de la richesse privée et publique éveillera l'intérêt des investisseurs et relancera l'économie. Indépendamment de ce que l'on peut penser de cette option, on convient que l'argument qui prétend que les Grecs vivaient au-dessus de leurs moyens était mensonger : il a servi de prétexte à l'objectif véritable du mémorandum, qui n'est manifestement pas de faire face au vrai problème de l'économie grecque, à savoir la dette, mais d'utiliser le pays comme cobaye dans la promotion du nouvel ordre européen. Sinon, la troïka n'aurait pas eu recours à l'effacement partiel. En tout état de cause, cette option renvoie au dogme des marchés selon lequel l'intérêt de ces derniers prime celui des sociétés ou, dans le meilleur des cas, l'intérêt de la société s'identifie par définition à celui des marchés.

Cependant, dans le cas de la Grèce, le problème est que, de la sorte, *la dimension politique de la crise* est contournée. En effet, la crise grecque a pour cause première la transmutation partitocratique du système politique, l'appropriation et, au-delà, le pillage de l'État. Il n'est pas lieu d'expliquer ici la spécificité grecque. Contentons-nous de noter que, malgré tout ce qui se dit, ce phénomène est révélateur du déficit démocratique de la modernité et non du retard politique de la société grecque. De ce point de vue, la Grèce est ce qu'elle a été dans le passé, même moderne, à savoir le laboratoire qui indique la voie d'évolution des pays occidentaux.

Dans ce cadre en tout cas, le mémorandum, prévu au départ comme un programme de sortie de la crise, est devenu une autre cause essentielle de l'impasse grecque. Et même, dans la mesure où il a choisi de transférer de manière univoque la charge de ses choix à la société sans s'attaquer à l'État, la société en déduira que la classe politique grecque sert de « véhicule » à l'instauration dans le pays de son propre despotisme, à côté de celui de la partitocratie grecque. En confondant la société grecque avec l'État, la troïka a perdu l'avantage de la légitimité. Ce n'est pas un hasard si la troïka, alors qu'elle va jusqu'à s'occuper en détail de l'imposition des chômeurs, n'a pas effleuré un seul instant les privilèges de la classe politique, les fondements de l'État dynastique ni, par extension, la fraude fiscale.

Plus intéressant apparaît le côté politique et culturel de l'approche des pays en crise, et essentiellement de la Grèce, par le Nord. Les Grecs sont classés comme une *catégorie raciale* composée de voleurs, de menteurs, de paresseux, de corrompus, etc. Je ne reviendrai pas sur ce que j'ai décrit comme étant la cause première de la crise en Grèce, qui révèle la nature anthropocentriquement « tiers-mondiste » du système politique occidental, comparé au développement politique de la société grecque : pourquoi l'Allemagne n'a pas touché à la corruption et aux privilèges de la classe

politique grecque et a mis à l'abri de toute responsabilité les entreprises allemandes et leur personnel en Grèce.

La crise actuelle a révélé une différenciation fondamentale entre le Nord et le Sud de l'Europe. L'Europe germanique n'a pas participé au devenir anthropocentrique vanté par la civilisation gréco-romaine. Le passage de l'Europe occidentale au féodalisme et les ravages causés par les hordes allemandes dans l'aire du cosmos anthropocentrique grec de l'époque s'inscrivent dans la lignée directe de cette division contemporaine. L'Allemagne a provoqué deux guerres mondiales pour établir son hégémonie en Europe. Si l'Allemagne avait le sens de la liberté de la société, elle aurait aussi conscience des limites de la puissance. Et l'Europe aurait été depuis longtemps allemande.

Si l'histoire de l'Allemagne est vivante aujourd'hui chez les peuples européens, c'est parce que c'est l'Allemagne qui la rappelle. En deux mots, l'Allemagne n'a pas encore réglé ses comptes avec l'acquis de la civilisation européenne.

Je cite un détail modeste mais néanmoins particulièrement significatif : pendant l'Occupation, l'Allemagne n'a pas seulement causé la perte de 30% de la population grecque pour servir d'exemples aux autres parce qu'elle rencontrait dans le pays la résistance la plus forte ! Elle a volé l'or grec de la Banque centrale et elle a pillé la société grecque en imposant, entre autres, un prêt obligatoire. Depuis, elle refuse de respecter son obligation de restituer le produit de ce pillage à la Grèce. Et il s'agit de centaines de milliards d'euros. En outre, elle refuse d'indemniser les victimes de ses actes de génocide. Cette attitude comporte un symbolisme de haut niveau, dans la mesure où la gestion de la crise actuelle va dans le même sens : on prête à la Grèce avec un taux élevé grâce à l'argent commun de la BCE, à laquelle on paye moins.

Si j'ai évoqué ces tristes questions, c'est parce qu'il existe une constante dans la culture politique européenne allemande, qui revient maintenant à l'occasion de la crise. Une mentalité qu'on avait cru pouvoir laisser derrière grâce à l'Union.

La violence, suivie d'une propagande légitimatrice sans égale, exercée sur la Grèce a fait revivre dans l'imaginaire de cette société, et plus ou moins dans l'ensemble des pays du Sud, la barbarie de l'Occupation, voire l'histoire. Il n'est pas sans intérêt de dire que le choix de la Grèce, à l'heure actuelle, comme laboratoire, acquiert une valeur symbolique supplémentaire, car c'est la Grèce qui, par sa résistance, a changé le cours de la guerre et doté d'espoir l'Europe démocratique des années quarante.

Quoi qu'il en soit, l'accent mis sur l'intérêt des marchés et non sur celui des sociétés révèle que chez une partie des Européens du Nord, ce n'est pas la société qui est considérée comme la raison d'être de l'État et des

marchés, mais l'inverse. Il est évident que cette partie de l'Europe n'a pas encore réglé ses comptes avec le progrès anthropocentrique.

La question qui revient est donc celle-ci : est-il possible qu'une Europe des peuples fasse prévaloir sa volonté sur une Europe des marchés qui sert les tentations hégémoniques de certains pays ? Une Europe fondée sur la liberté et prospère, sur une Europe régie par des considérations de force ?

Car, en dernière analyse, le problème de l'approfondissement de l'Europe politique ne sera pas résolu sans qu'il soit répondu à la question de la nature de son système politique et de sa finalité. La réponse à cette question dépend à la limite, d'une part, de la volonté des peuples européens de montrer les limites de l'Allemagne sans risquer d'aboutir à la fin de l'Europe politique ; et d'autre part, des évolutions au sein de l'Occident et au niveau de la planète.

La rupture de l'équilibre entre société et économie. L'économie ayant passée dans le futur, la société reste enfermée au 18^{ème} siècle

Si nous adoptons ce raisonnement et que nous sommes donc d'accord que la crise qui régit l'Occident est avant tout politique, nous devons y faire face en termes politiques. Je ne veux pas dire, évidemment, que nous devons stopper l'évolution et revenir à l'ancien type d'État – le dit État souverain – ou privilégier la déontologie en dressant un code de conduite des détenteurs du pouvoir face à la société. Le retour à l'ancien régime conduirait à la disparition de la perspective anthropocentrique des sociétés. Et la déontologie a cours là où les sociétés sont rejetées du système politique, auquel cas le leader n'est pas soumis à contrôle et encore moins à des restrictions dans l'exercice du pouvoir.

Par conséquent, la solution ne peut venir que de réglementations qui modifieront les rapports de force politiques de sorte que l'État et, par extension, la société passent au futur.

Dans la phase que traverse actuellement le cosmos anthropocentrique, il est exclu de rechercher des solutions au niveau cosmossystémique / planétaire en constituant, par exemple, un *cosmoÉtat* (*cosmopolis*). D'ailleurs, la question n'est pas de créer un État de plus qui incarnera le système politique, mais un nouveau système politique qui remodelera la relation entre société et politique afin de mettre fin à la prise en otage de cette dernière par les forces du marché.

Il nous faudra garder à l'esprit qu'il existe dans les sociétés anthropocentriques une « relation » inéluctable : plus les marchés s'autonomisent et se développent au niveau cosmossystémique / planétaire, plus les sociétés tenteront de contrôler le système politique afin d'équilibrer

la force de ces marchés. Cela ne peut se faire, dans les conditions actuelles, qu'à l'intérieur de l'État. Et dans ce cadre, il est tout aussi clair que la relation entre société et politique ne peut pas changer au sein de l'État actuel sans qu'il soit porté atteinte aux fondements du système politique moderne. Par conséquent, pour dépasser la crise, il ne suffit pas de réviser la Constitution, de régler de manière différente les pouvoirs entre le président et la Chambre des députés ou le gouvernement. Ce sont là des détails qui concernent la structure interne, la forme du pouvoir qu'incarne l'État.

Premièrement, nous devons être conscients de ce qu'est et de ce que n'est pas le présent système. Malgré les mensonges que dispense l'enseignement de l'intelligentsia oligarchique, le système politique de notre époque est typiquement oligarchique, avec à sa tête une monarchie élective à temps limité. Il n'est ni représentatif, ni démocratique. Cette prise de conscience est la condition *sine qua non* pour que nous cessions d'être enfermés dans le passé, prisonniers d'une logique tordue et, surtout, conservatrice et sans issue. Logique qui traverse l'ensemble des idéologies et des forces politiques, depuis le libéralisme jusqu'au socialisme. Nous libérer des certitudes que nous ont servies les élites modernes dès l'époque des Lumières en Europe est une condition fondamentale pour passer au futur.

Je dois dire que la guerre des concepts est implacable, parce qu'elle présuppose une catharsis intérieure, la constitution d'un nouveau système de valeurs. Ce débarras est nécessaire pour réfléchir à la cause de la crise. Pour comprendre où va le monde. Pour apercevoir la sortie et savoir ce que nous devons faire.

Plus vite nous nous libérerons des servitudes d'un passé devenu conservateur, plus les conséquences négatives seront réduites pour la société. Si nous ne le faisons pas nous-mêmes, la nécessité nous l'imposera : la descente des sociétés vers l'Enfer.

La conscience que nous ne vivons pas dans un régime de démocratie, ni même de représentation, que le système contemporain est authentiquement oligarchique, avec une instance de monarchie élective à sa tête, n'a donc pas une valeur théorique, cela ne fait pas partie d'un exercice intellectuel. C'est la condition nécessaire à l'élaboration d'un projet nouveau qui nous sortira de la crise et nous conduira vers l'avenir.

J'ajoute également que le fait de préciser en nous-mêmes ce qu'est la démocratie, que c'est quelque chose de tout à fait différent de la représentation, ou que le temps d'un système politique ne dépend pas de notre imagination mais de notre stade de maturité, nous permettra de ne pas répéter les sottises qui circulent partout concernant lesdites « démocratie directe », démocratie « représentative » ou « participative », etc.

Pour arriver à la démocratie, nous devons passer par un stade transitoire, qui est la représentation.

La représentation transforme la société en institution partielle du système politique, elle reconstitue le lien entre société et politique, vu comme un pont obligatoire vers la démocratie. Mais ce n'est pas la démocratie.

Même si cela ne plaît pas aux fervents partisans de l'oligarchie, des institutions comme le référendum ne sont pas démocratiques, ni même représentatives. De même, le choix de certaines institutions à titre tout à fait complémentaire, comme le tirage au sort ou le principe majoritaire, ne définissent pas la démocratie. Nous pouvons les rencontrer dans d'autres systèmes.

La démocratie n'est pas une fin en soi, ni un système de gouvernance. Elle est le système destiné à réaliser une finalité concrète : la liberté globale (individuelle, sociale, politique), contrairement au système actuel qui garantit uniquement la liberté individuelle et certains droits socio-politiques.

Le passage au système politique représentatif comme condition pour le transfert de la société dans le futur

Le passage au futur, celui qui changera les choses, exige que la société soit institutionnalisée en une constante stable, quotidienne du système politique – et non pas occasionnelle, au gré de la conjoncture, comme le sont exactement la Chambre des députés et le gouvernement. La constitution politique de la société des citoyens s'appelle « démos ».

La question suivante est de savoir quelles compétences seront attribuées à la société/démos. Bien évidemment, certaines de celles qui vont de pair avec la qualité de mandant. Quelles peuvent être ces compétences ? La définition du cadre politique général dans lequel se situera le pouvoir politique, le contrôle, la responsabilité (pénale et civile) de ses agents, le retrait des décisions et la révocation du personnel politique qui s'écarterent de la volonté de la société des citoyens, etc.

Ce système, nous pourrions le qualifier de représentatif. Cependant, il est manifeste que l'entrée de la société dans la politéia sous le signe de la représentation modifiera aussi complètement l'agenda du dialogue, et donc la nature du processus politique.

Le bénéficiaire final du travail préparatoire à la prise de décisions sera désormais la société/démos, et non le ministre, le Premier ministre ou la Chambre. Ces derniers auront des tâches préjudicielles, de préparation des lois, pas des tâches de décision.

Ces remarques montrent finalement ce que n'est pas la démocratie. La démocratie n'est pas la représentation. La démocratie abolit la représentation, la relation de mandant à mandataire, et confie l'ensemble du

système politique à la société/démos. Cette dernière devient ce qu'est l'État aujourd'hui par rapport au système politique : son incarnation exclusive.

Dans la démocratie, la société fait ce que font le gouvernement, le Premier ministre, les ministres, la Chambre et bien d'autres institutions, ensemble ou séparément. Dans la représentation, les compétences sont partagées entre mandant et mandataire selon certaines règles. Dans la démocratie, le leader politique est simplement le rapporteur habituel, l'orateur, pas celui qui gouverne.

De nos jours, en dehors de la liberté individuelle, l'homme moderne ne jouit pas d'un pouce de liberté sociale et politique. Le tragique, c'est qu'on lui a appris à croire le contraire. Je dirais même que la description mensongère des concepts est parvenue à un tel degré qu'on en arrive à affirmer que la reconnaissance au citoyen de certains droits équivaut à la jouissance de la liberté sociale et politique. Grave erreur, aux prolongements idéologiques profonds !

La liberté se définit comme une autonomie, elle présuppose l'abolition de toute « répartition » dans l'exercice de l'œuvre socio-économique et politique, exige qu'on ne soit « commandé par personne ». La démocratie constitue donc un processus d'accumulation de liberté sur le plan social et politique, au-delà de la liberté individuelle. En ce sens, elle annonce un système économique, social et politique entièrement nouveau.

Ces précisions sont nécessaires pour comprendre que le système de valeurs de l'homme social actuel est dépourvu de tout cet arrière-plan qu'entraîne le concept de démocratie, mais aussi celui de la simple représentation. C'est pourquoi la question de la transition se pose aujourd'hui sous sa forme primordiale. Premièrement, en termes d'assimilation du système politique moderne avec la représentation et non, manifestement, avec la démocratie. Deuxièmement, au sens où l'évolution du système politique vers la représentation va de pair avec la modification des rapports de force, de sorte que la société des citoyens cesse de perdre ce qu'elle a réussi à acquérir sous le régime précédent, avant que son quotidien ne soit bouleversé. Cependant, il est sûr que ce qu'elle vivra mènera à l'éclosion de la nouvelle mesure axiologique de la société, la liberté politique, qui, à terme, mènera à la démocratie.

La nécessité d'une révolution conceptuelle

Quels éléments de la représentation le système politique actuel contient-il ? Aucun ! Le politicien prétend que le système politique est représentatif en arguant qu'il n'est pas possédé par un chef tel que l'était Louis XIV, le monarque absolu. Mais il proclame qu'il ne représente pas la société, mais la « nation », l'intérêt « général », pas l'intérêt commun.

Mais qui définit ce qu'est l'intérêt national ou général ? Le politicien lui-même, qui mettra aussi en œuvre les politiques qu'il s'ordonnera à lui-même d'appliquer ! Dans le système moderne, le politicien est à la fois mandant et mandataire ! On admet d'ailleurs aujourd'hui que l'État possède la souveraineté politique et que la société est un simple particulier.

Les oligarques à tout crin ont grand soin de faire circuler l'idée que la société élit les politiciens, et autres sornettes du même acabit. On dissimule le fait que le vote ne contient aucun élément de représentation, ni de démocratie. C'est un acte de légitimation d'un personnel politique, fabriqué le plus souvent par les « appareils » qui se partagent l'État. Le fait de choisir un parti plutôt qu'un autre, un leader plutôt qu'un autre, n'a pas d'importance pour le système puisque, après le vote, le caractère irresponsable, incontrôlable et irrévocable du politicien est consacré expressément.

Si vous demandez à un oligarque de tous les jours comment il explique que le droit du politicien d'ignorer ses promesses électorales est consacré par la Constitution, il va tout de suite vous regarder avec surprise et il ne fait aucun doute qu'il vous accusera de populisme. De même que si vous lui signalez que « l'État de droit » est valable pour tout le monde, excepté la classe politique.

Pour les tenants de la modernité, la démocratie, c'est la possibilité qu'a le citoyen de manifester. Pas l'obligation du gouvernement d'entendre et de prendre en compte la volonté sociale. Par conséquent, la société peut se rassembler tout entière devant le siège du gouvernement ou de la Chambre pour manifester son opposition à la politique suivie ou à la corruption, ou bien la déclarer par la voie des sondages d'opinion. Il n'empêche que la Constitution donne au gouvernement le droit de dire qu'il se fiche de ses objections. C'est lui qui sait ce qui est bien pour elle, pas elle...

Pensons à ce que seraient les politiques d'un gouvernement si ses décisions devaient avoir chaque fois l'approbation expresse de la société. Si, au lieu d'être le mandataire d'un vague intérêt « général », il devait fonctionner institutionnellement comme mandataire de la société des citoyens.

Du «peuple» à la «société des citoyens». La société comme partenaire institutionnel du système politique à titre de mandant

D'abord, il faut savoir ce que l'on veut. Veut-on voir la société se rassembler sur la Pnyx, sur la place centrale ou ailleurs ? Ou bien recueillir sa volonté ? Ce qui poussait les Athéniens à se rassembler sur la Pnyx, c'est que c'était un moyen de former leur volonté, et donc de prendre des décisions !

Naturellement, si nous nous projetons dans l'avenir, la façon dont une société se constituera en démos et fonctionnera comme telle, la constitution même du système politique, devra être cherchée au niveau de la technologie de la communication, quelque chose comme l'Internet que nous connaissons aujourd'hui.

Au stade actuel, nous avons déjà certains moyens simples, mais infaillibles, de nous enquerir de la volonté sociale : le vote électronique, qui donnera à tout citoyen la possibilité, après information et dialogue, d'élaborer les orientations générales du processus politique, de voter sur chaque point, de contrôler, révoquer, etc., les politiciens, ou leurs propres décisions au niveau local et national.

J'insiste sur la remarque que le concept de démos désigne la constitution de la société des citoyens en *institution permanente*, à l'image du gouvernement ou de la Chambre, et non occasionnelle. Et j'ajouterai une autre chose, plus simple encore : la création d'un « échantillon » de *démos délibératif* permanent. Soit par la voie conventionnelle des sondages, soit sous une forme plus avancée, avec un « démos délibératif vivant », un échantillon de citoyens qui délibérera et se prononcera sur les points de l'ordre du jour de la Chambre ou du gouvernement, ou qui soulèvera lui-même d'autres points à traiter. À l'instar des sondages d'opinion quand ils se déroulent de manière scientifique, le « démos délibératif vivant » offrira une exactitude de quasi 100 % dans la formulation de la volonté sociale. Au contraire, les élections fonctionnent d'habitude dans l'optique du vote utile et, surtout, concernent seulement la légitimation, par arbitrage, du personnel politique qui gouvernera.

Il existe donc des moyens. Il suffit que la réflexion des sociétés mûrisse, qu'elles dépassent leurs réserves oligarchiques et surtout qu'elles comprennent que c'est la seule voie pour sortir de la crise actuelle, pour passer, elles aussi, au futur. Car la question n'est pas de réguler à nouveau les marchés : elle est de savoir qui paie le prix ou, plus précisément, quelle sera la place des sociétés dans le devenir économique et politique.

Cette question n'appelle qu'une seule réponse. Les sociétés sont la raison d'être des marchés, des États, de tout. Il n'est donc pas possible d'inverser la logique des choses et qu'elles vivent sous leur joug. Ce système qui veut voir les sociétés assujetties aux propriétaires de l'économie et aux possesseurs de la politique remonte au passé de la barbarie despotique et n'appartient pas au futur.

Supposons que les sociétés exigent d'avoir une substance représentative dans le système politique. Comment cela se fera-t-il, étant donné que les forces socio-économiques et politiques dominantes le refusent ?

Une première remarque. La tendance générale qui continuera à se développer dans le futur sera précise : plus les marchés acquerront des forces qui traverseront horizontalement les États, plus ils évolueront au niveau cosmo-systémique, plus les sociétés revendiqueront une participation accrue au système politique, de sorte à peser sur la fonction politique et à équilibrer ces forces. La représentation et, en perspective, la démocratie seront appelées à constituer la réponse au problème qui se pose déjà.

De nos jours, la prépondérance totale des marchés marque la domination politique des forces de l'oligarchie. En soi, cette domination des marchés présage une régression majeure de l'acquis des sociétés au service de laquelle toutes les forces politiques établies sont mobilisées, d'une manière ou d'une autre.

Car toutes les forces politiques, aussi bien celles qui se déclarent favorables au peuple que les autres, de la gauche à la droite, sont, vu le système politique, profondément oligarchiques. Toutes sont hostiles à l'institutionnalisation politique de la société des citoyens et, par conséquent, à l'évolution du système politique vers la représentation. Il se peut qu'elles s'opposent entre elles pour la possession du pouvoir, mais elles sont totalement solidaires sur la question du maintien de la société des citoyens hors du processus politique. Aussi le changement des rapports de force au profit de la société ne surviendra-t-il pas avec l'alternance des partis au pouvoir.

Il ne faut pas non plus espérer des forces politiques dominantes qu'elles adoptent un projet de sortie vers le futur. Elles ne le veulent pas et ne le peuvent pas.

Cela explique pourquoi jamais, au cours des derniers siècles, il n'y a eu une telle pénurie d'idées et de projets. L'émancipation de la société passe par l'éjection de la partitocratie, par une confrontation globale avec tout ce qui renvoie au passé.

L'opposition générale visant à contraindre la classe politique offre deux éventualités : l'une est qu'émergent de celle-ci certaines forces qui discerneront la possibilité d'installer leur hégémonie au prix d'une association avec la société ; l'autre, que surgissent des entrailles de la société des forces nouvelles qui conduiront à la marginalisation de l'establishment oligarchique.

La perspective du rejet de la classe politique établie, comme celle de la révolution, est soumise à une condition. Au-delà de l'évidence que les nuages d'une contestation importante (ou même d'une logique insurrectionnelle dans les sociétés) s'accumulent déjà, plus ou moins selon les lieux, un paramètre essentiel fait défaut : la dépersonnalisation de la responsabilité et, au-delà, son attribution à sa source politicienne. Le fait de signaler ce paramètre nous ramène donc à notre pensée initiale.

Le dépassement de la crise présuppose le dépassement de notre époque, c'est-à-dire de nos certitudes. Il faut tout d'abord un changement de projet et, surtout, une révolution sur le plan des concepts. Celle-ci aboutira à l'élaboration d'idées nouvelles avec en vue l'élargissement de la liberté et, en dernière analyse, à la transition vers le système politique représentatif du futur.

Mais en tout état de cause, la dynamique sociale comporte un élément d'indéfinition en rapport avec la capacité de l'establishment politique et économique de contrôler les évolutions. Le *mythe du berger* piétiné finalement par son troupeau épuisé est instructif de ce point de vue, du moins pour ceux qui sont capables de se défaire de leur arrogance et de discerner les changements.

Aujourd'hui donc, l'enjeu est, à mon avis, très clair : pour dépasser la crise, il faut dépasser notre époque.

Résumé

Notre époque recommande que la société quitte le passé où s'est installée depuis la Renaissance et s'harmonise à la phase suivante comme l'ont fait déjà les "marchés".

Pour cela il faut: une révolution des concepts à commencer par la démocratie et la liberté; la réorientation de la finalité politique vers l'intérêt du social; la transformation du peuple en société des citoyens (en démos), qui égale à la transition du système de

"Monarchie oligarchique" actuelle en système représentatif.

Mots clés: Crise ; Europe ; Démos ; Gnoséologie

Culture and Ideology in Romania During 1971-1972

*Ion ZAINEA**

Under the Communist regime, the entire literary and artistic creation was under the strict supervision and guidance of the party. The ideological program elaborated by it, mostly by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Romania in November 1971 tasked the literary and social-cultural publications to promote more firmly the Marxist aesthetic principles, to militate for a realist and engaged culture, which would serve the cause of the social construction and the formation of the new man.

Without exceptions, magazines, newspapers, books, plays, movies or exhibits were rigorously controlled by the General Directorate for Press and Publishing¹, where all publications were brought to be analyzed and certified. Obviously, the control was finalized with observations, notes, papers and syntheses. Such a document, inscribed as „confidential information”, drawn up on December 14, 1972², deals with the way in which literary and socio-cultural journals promotes realist, militant, engaged literature. The paper analyzes the period from November 1971 to November 1972, where all journals from the country were analyzed, except for the ones printed in minority languages. Not merely the significant accomplishments were analyzed, which are featured in the introduction of the paper³, but the mostly negative sides. More specifically, those journals

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¹ The institution was founded in 1949 and was under the subordination of the Council of Ministers.

² National Archives-Bihor County Service, Fund General Directorate for Press and Publishing-Oradea Unit, File 51/1972, f. 331-382. Paper no. S/2329. The paper has 16 typed pages and has a 35 page-annex.

³ mentioning that "a dominant feature of literary-cultural journals was the integration in the general effort to transpose the tasks given by the party, by reflecting on the events from political and spiritual life, by debating the major issue of the current development of the country"; that "numerous articles of the editorial board or signed by famous writers from every generation, as well as investigations or interviews, mirrored the adhesion to the new policy promoted by the Communist

and authors refusing to frame themselves according to the established orientations, objectives and their tasks. The observations are exemplified with materials from the interventions of the General Directorate for Press and Publishing, which meant that those materials would be eliminated or modified. Their content is annexed to the paper, meaning that it is now known.

The first part of the analysis handles prose, considered to be defective compared to the requirements of the Romanian writing "to mirror the beauty of work, the constructive push, to redeem the concrete reality of our times in its true light". It was said that, on the one hand, some stories, sketches, novel fragments appeared, which were inspired from the fighting past of the working class, past heroic figures and moments, but on the other hand, "the approach on subjects, such as workers' lives, the efforts of the people engaged in the process of creative work, was poor and totally insignificant". This major issue was partially covered by the literary investigation, which gained in importance due mainly to the efforts of editorial boards, but it could not supply the role of literature in reflecting the socialist transformations from people's lives and conscience.

A series of epic, drama or aesthetic writings were considered to have "discussed negative aspects and practices from the socio-political life in the past 25 years of socialist construction", either from the beginning or from the following years and, within them, there was "a tendency to negatively look at relations and conditions from our society". The accumulation of failings, mistakes, generalization would lead in some cases to "the deformation of realities..., to the presentation of a closed, suffocated universe that was hostile to the individual, to the affirmation of ethical value, incapable of transformation and superior development" and, in this context, "the alienation of man, his lack of satisfaction and aspirations would appear as an objective phenomenon". Several examples were given, such as the short story fragment entitled "Drumul câinelui" [Dog's Travel], the novel fragment entitled "Limita" [The Limit], both by Ion Lăncrăjan⁴, the play "La început a fost păcatul" [At first there was sin] by Virgil Cacoveanu⁵, the sketch "Cearta" [The Quarrel] by Alexandru Târziu⁶, the

Party of Romania, the answers of the writers on the destiny of the national culture, the feeling that they participate in the socialist construction, in the making of contemporary history" and, as a result "valuable prose was published, stemming from the knowledge of life, of the tribulations of our contemporary spirituality, as well as political poetry full of vibrant patriotism, debates, exchanges of opinions on the current literary-artistic phenomenon and on current theoretical issues..."

⁴ The first of which was sent for publication in *România literară* no.16/1972, the second in the journal *Luceafărul*, no. 13/1972

⁵ *Tribuna* (Cluj), no. 15/1972.

story "Babel" by Radu Cosașu⁷, the novel fragments "Dezghețul" [Snow break] by Petru Popescu⁸, "Insule mici, trecătoare femei" [Small islands, passing women] by Augustin Buzura⁹ and "Vine procurorul" [Here comes the prosecutor] by C. Toiu¹⁰.

Another category of incriminated articles referred to those which "used allegory", approached more general problems, such as freedom, truth, power and, which due to their elements generated "political meanings with negative implications regarding the life of our society". Such examples were the short story "Funerariile lui Polonius" [Polonius' Funeral] by Adrian Păunescu¹¹, the novel fragment „Tăietorul de lemne” [the Wood Cutter] by Mircea Ciobanu¹², the sketch „Hotelul bunului Dumnezeu” [Good Lord's Hotel] by Vasile Hristea¹³, the story „Centrifuga” [The Centrifuge] by Romulus Rusan¹⁴, the play entitled „Halta viitorului-sau proprie nouă fiecare culoare” [The Halt of the future or each our own by every colour] by Teodor Crișan¹⁵.

A category of prose published or aiming to be published in pages of newspapers was considered as having a "minor theme, insignificant for the tribulations of the current man". They were on "peripheral subjects of an sought unusual character" about "bizarre characters manifesting their disinterest towards everything happening around them", "cases of human degradation, even if they were motivated by objective conditions", such as war, erotic obsessions or of another nature, which were characteristic to certain instinctual areas. Such examples were "Vina" [Guilt] by Maria Luiza Cristescu, "Accidentul" [Accident] by Roxana Pană, "Ploaia" [Rain] by Gabriela Adameșteanu, "De atunci în nici o iarnă n-a mai nins atât de frumos" [Since then, no winter had better snow] by Teodor Mazilu, all from *România Literară*, "De duminică" [From Sunday] by Alexei Rudeanu, "Autostop" [Hitchhike] by Dora Kalmuschi, from *Cronica* - Iași, "În plin sezon" [Full season] by Anișoara Odeanu, "Narațiuni" [Stories] by C. Fintinelu and "Evadăm împreună" [Escaping together] by Eugen Uricaru, all three from *Argeș* - Pitești, issues 3 and 9/1972.

⁶ *Luceafărul*, no. 37/1972.

⁷ *Vatra* (Fărgu Mureș), no. 8/1972.

⁸ *Tribuna*, no. 11/1972.

⁹ *Steaua* (Cluj), no. 19/1972.

¹⁰ *Luceafărul*, no. 42/1972.

¹¹ *Vatra*, no. 7/1972.

¹² Idem, no. 6/1972.

¹³ *România literară*, no. 42/1972.

¹⁴ Idem, no. 44/1972.

¹⁵ *Familia* (Oradea), no. 1/1972.

There could be only one unequivocal conclusion: "Lacking a clear message, the capacity to convey emotions, given their insufficient artistic harnessing, such prose cannot contribute to the exertion of the social, educational function of new literature".

The second part of the analysis handles poetry, where things were even worse. As we find out from the preamble, of the total poetic production in control at the Directorate in the period, three quarters were in the category "without any connection to reality", the poetry "lacking in any meaning or mobilizing character", while the remaining quarter represented the political and social verses "of those expressing the feeling of responsibility and engagement of the citizen poet".

In connection to the first category, a first group was made up of "intimate, sterile meditation, metaphysical sadness" poetry, which were completed by those filled with "desperation, disorientation, the desire to escape from an apocalyptic, delirious universe". It was significant that "the theme of death, of the collapse and degradation of life resurfaced", seen either from the level of the universe, as an inevitable global cataclysm or from the level of the poet's environment, appearing as a frozen, unbalanced place, which is drifting or wrecked". Such poetry was: "Final" [Final] by Modest Morariu¹⁶, "Și ce laudă va bucura pretutindeni" [What prance will rejoice everywhere] by G. Alboiu¹⁷, "Judecata de apoi" [The Last Judgment] by Petru Romoșan¹⁸, "Orașul meu" [My city] by Ion Dragomir¹⁹, "Să fie chemat scafandru" [Let us call the scuba diver] by Traian Coșovei²⁰, "Vulturi enormi se roteau" [Enormous eagles swirling around], "Echilibru pe un fir de păianjen" [Balance on a spider web] and "Mișcare în derivă" [Adrift], all authored by Virgil Nistor²¹.

A smaller group of poetry was formed of the poetry describing the "condition of the poet", poetry that "expressed the feeling of loneliness, helplessness, failure", but also "the feeling of frustration, lack of understanding from fellow man" of the poet trying to bring about a renewal. Such examples were: "Vînt de semănat" [Planting wind] by Florența Albu²², "Turn" [Tower] by Cezar Ivănescu²³, "Poemul puțului părăsit" [The poem

¹⁶ *Ateneu* (Bacău), no. 6/1972.

¹⁷ *Luceafărul*, no. 46/1972.

¹⁸ *Tribuna*, no. 22/1972.

¹⁹ *Viața Românească*, no. 11/1972.

²⁰ *Tomis* (Constanța), no. 16/1972.

²¹ *Steaua*, no. 19/1972.

²² *Viața Românească*, no. 8/1972.

²³ *Idem*, no. 9/1972.

of the abandoned well] by George Alboiu²⁴, "Grivița poetului" [Poet's Grivița] by Ion Iuga and "Patria" [The Country] by Marin Mincu²⁵.

A frequently seen category was the poetry with "obscure, unintelligible, pastiches, after surreal, avant-garde clichés". It was mentioned that such verses would characterize the lyrics of young poets, appreciated as flawed through the "absurdity of idea association, their absurdity, through their stringent language", a lot of them being "simple, shocking, terrible prosodies". Such conclusive examples were the following poems: "Idee fixă de cadmiu" [Fixed cadmium idea] by Dan Stanciu, "Elegii cu o pisică de cârpă" [Elegy with a raggy cat] by C. Abăluță, "Învelit de limba unui câine" [Surrounded by a dog's tongue] by Dorin Tudoran, all three from *Luceafărul*, "Grădina ospiciului" [Hospice garden] by Constanța Buzea from *România literară*, "Maimuța din tâlpi" [Monkey on the foot] by I. Dinică, from *Ramuri* - Craiova, "Locul blestemat din curte" [Cursed garden spot] and "Damigeană" [Demijohn], both by Petre Stoian, from *Steaua*, "Timp în care-ți ucizi fratele" [Time to kill your brother] by St. Damian in *Amfiteatru*. It was also mentioned that "poetry lacking in positive ideas, with grotesque and macabre images" were signed also by famous names, such as: "Groapa" [The hole] and "Boala bolnavă" [Ill illness] by Adrian Păunescu (*Vatră*), "Acord" [Agreement] by Gheorghe Pituț (*România literară*), "Damnați" [Damned], "Totuși" [Even though] by Maria Banuș and "Glin glin" by Emil Botta (*Viața Românească*, no. 11/1972).

In the final part of the poetry analysis, the control institution mentioned that there were cases when the poetry of certain journal issues was characterized by "lack of message, disengaged character, existentialist atmosphere", because of which they were not authorized for print, such as the case of issues no.4, 14, 39 and 46/1972 from *Luceafărul* or the "Caietul de poezii" [Poetry Book] of *Viața Românească*, no. 1, 3, 6, and 9/1972. Hence, there were situations when the elimination of some poems could not change the overall tone of some batches.

With a defective prose and poetry that was mostly unaligned to the directions given by the sole party, it was only natural to look for the causes and for the culpable parties. According to the control institution, the main guilty party were the editorial boards, which were accused of lack of discipline in "selecting and printing the prose and especially the novice poetry". The pages or columns meant to launch new names in literature, such as the column in *Luceafărul* open to the productions of its literary cycle or the *România literară* column "We propose a new poet/We propose a new writer", were considered to "bear the seal of gratuity, of formalism or

²⁴ *România literară*, no. 44/1972.

²⁵ Idem, no. 20 and 21/1972.

ambiguity of the idea phenomenon". Examples from both fields were mentioned; from prose: fantasy prose fragment "Căldură" [Heat] by Ion Bledea, the sketch "Întoarcerea" [Return] by Petru Dan Lazăr²⁶, sketches "Solia" [Mission] and "Lecție de libertate" [Freedom lesson] by Vasile Hriștea, the fable "Și lupul fugi..." [So the wolf ran...] by St. M. Găbrian²⁷, stories "Ines" by Antoanela Iordache²⁸ and "Un oraș pentru o vacanță" [A city for a holiday] by Adriana Grănescu²⁹; from poetry: "Spațiu ipocrit" [Fake space], "Vîrsta" [Age] and "Tremur" [Shiver] by Sorin Vînătorul, "Cenușă" [Ashes] by Ioana Moroiu³⁰, "Perspectiva" [Perspective] by Doru Valeriu Veliman, "Dincolo" [Beyond] and "Cum e" [How it is] from the "Atelier literar" [Literary studio] of *României literare*³¹.

The recommendations by some editorial boards for debuts that did not have the necessary value in terms of artistic realization and content was deemed "to be able to exert a certain influence in the orientations of some new comers". The institution concluded that the more careful selection of the original creation - poetry and prose - "would lift the general quality of the journals" and would become "an impetus for creative self-exigence, to the more active promotion of writings tied to the acute and complex issues of our Socialist realities and their objective and constructive reflection. "

The literary review was considered to be another guilty party, given that its activity was very important for the "realist and engaged orientation" of literature for the "education and cultivation of the artistic taste" of readers. However, even in this sector analyzed in the third segment, "aesthetic conceptions and attempts to support and recommend defective literary productions in terms of ideas and message have emerged" beyond, of course, theoretical contributions, analyses and wise critical evaluations published in the spirit of Marxist party principles.

Firstly, it was mentioned that, during inquiries, round tables, writing and articles, there were views according to which "the only criterion in appreciating literature is its artistic value, not its idea content, its realist character or militant message". This would have generated "confused considerations" regarding the report between creator and age, "pleas for a review autonomy", "a rejection of directions", of the so-called "norms" or "artistic biases", that would impair literary creation. Some discussions on the freedom of creation, creator's freedom of conscience, as a fundamental condition of the viability of art and use of talent, were seen as "replies to the

²⁶ both from *Luceafărul*, no. 46/1972.

²⁷ all three from *România literară*, no. 45/1972.

²⁸ *Amfiteatru*, no. 2/1972.

²⁹ Idem, no. 4/1972.

³⁰ all from *Luceafărul*, no. 46/1972.

³¹ *România literară*, no. 13/1972.

current times", when the emphasis was on the issue of growing the leadership and guidance role of the party in literary and artistic creation. The examples were numerous: the article "De ce să-mi placă Pablo Neruda?" [Why would I like Pablo Neruda], signed "Polemical Thomas"³², notes "Cum se face un film" [How to make a movie] and "Pictînd cu predilecție oameni" [Painting mostly people] by Corneliu Baba³³, the article "Ceea ce ai în fața simțurilor în momentul cînd scrii" [What takes place in your senses when you write] by Gabriela Melinescu³⁴, the note "Dragoste și revoltă" [Love and revolt] by Ana Blandiana³⁵, the article "Poetul nu e un taxi" [Poet is not a taxi] by Ion Caraion³⁶, "Exigența criticii" [Exigence in review] by Dan Cristea³⁷, "Condiția criticii din țara noastră" [The state of review in our country]³⁸ and "Se simte lipsa unei reviste de critică literară" [There is a need for a literary review journal]³⁹ by Dan Culcer, the interview done by Adrian Păunescu with Alexandru Paleologu, entitled "A continua să proclamăm adevărul cu caracter general, acoperind cu glasul abstracției, țipătul de durere - aceasta e minciună, e lășitate, e crimă" [To continue to proclaim the general truth and cover the voice of abstraction and scream - this is a lie, cowardice, it is a crime]⁴⁰.

The literary review community was also accused of the "tendency to reject <the so-called interference in the creation process>", most likely blamed on "cultural servants", who were unadvised or incompetent, who would hinder the development of original literature and drama by using conjunctures. The idea that the only competent voices to express their opinion and decide are the creators themselves was considered to aim at the "guidance and control on the creation in publishing and circulating these types of productions". Such examples were the articles "Simple note" [Simple notes], "E timpul concretului" [It is time for the concrete] by Augustin Buzura and his interview by Adrian Păunescu⁴¹, the article "Evaziune etică și estetică" [Ethical and aesthetic evasion] by Viorel Șîrbu⁴²,

³² *Steaua*, no. 12/1972. The article uses as a pretext an imaginary discussion with a friend on the creation of the Chilean poet in order to invalidate the value of "bells and whistles" poetry.

³³ *Astra* (Brașov), no. 3/1972.

³⁴ *Steaua*, no. 20/1972.

³⁵ *România literară*, no. 13/1972.

³⁶ *Luceafărul*, no. 2/1972.

³⁷ *Idem*, no. 43/1972.

³⁸ *Convorbiri literare* (Iași), no. 1/1972.

³⁹ *Ateneu*, no. 10/1972.

⁴⁰ *Tribuna*, no. 8/1972.

⁴¹ all from *Tribuna*, no. 5, 15 and 42/1972.

⁴² *Vatra*, no. 6/1972.

the investigation "Realitatea socială și prezența literaturii" [Social reality and the presence of literature]⁴³, done by *Luceafărul*, the articles "Direcția Teatrelor, for de autoritate morală" [The Directorate for Theaters, a moral authority forum], by Mihai Sabin⁴⁴ and "Hitckok"⁴⁵.

The analysis went on to mention that some review materials would treat "the issue of the accessibility of different modern cultural forms" wrongly, thus ignoring the social role of art. It was shown that authors of such articles were trying to prove that the difficulties of the reception of works of art by the public were due to the ignorant character of the public, its lack of preparedness and understanding of art. Moreover, another idea is expressed by the same authors, namely that certain fields, such as poetry, painting, modern ballet, cannot be accessed by large masses, but only to a limited category of the "initiated". It was concluded that such articles "cannot become a plea for realist art". Such examples were: "Identificarea realității în artă" [Identifying reality in art], author Victor Ernst Masek, "Trup și tenebre" [Body and darkness] by Ion Caraion, "Literatura dificilă" [Difficult literature] by Ion Cîrstoiu⁴⁶.

Discussing the issues regarding the literary-artistic phenomenon, the control institution mentioned, in an approving tone until a certain point, that dogmatic conceptions and negative practices were criticized, which affected the development of literature in the early stages of the "revolution", but in some materials this was done "in a way in which was not only generalized for an entire historical era, but it also expressed a certain nonconformism towards the realist direction of art and culture"⁴⁷.

The presentation of the creation and evolution of poets affirmed after 1950 caused not once "the challenge to the importance and value or engaged lyrics", as "the commendation of visions from the realities of life", exemplified by reviews for volumes entitled "Sărbătorile absenței" [Celebrations of absence] by Vasile Vlad and "În bătălia pierdută" [Lost battle] by Dan Deșliu⁴⁸, „A.E. Baconski” and "Maria Banuș” by Mircea

⁴³ *Luceafărul*, no. 46/1972.

⁴⁴ *Ateneu*, no. 1/1972.

⁴⁵ *Steana*, no. 14/1972.

⁴⁶ seen in order in *Astra*, no. 4/1972, *Luceafărul*, no. 23/1972, and *Ateneu*, no. 2/1972.

⁴⁷ "Culisele memoriei" [Behind the scenes of memory] by C. Ungureanu, "Condiția dialectică a istoriei literare" [Dialectic condition of literary history] by Gh. Grigurcu, "Valorile literaturii exprimă ființa românească angajată" [Values of literature express the engaged Romanian being] by D. Micu, "Romanul unor idei" [The idea novel] by G. Pruteanu, all destined to the column "Argument pentru o istorie a literaturii române contemporane" [For a history of contemporary Romanian literature] opened by *Tribuna. Tribuna*, no. 8/1972.

⁴⁸ both from *Vatra*, no. 3/1972.

Iorgulescu⁴⁹, "Deschideri" [Openings] by Leonid Dimov⁵⁰, "Poarta cu săgeți" [Arrow door] and "Temperatura cuvintelor" [Temperature of words] by Aurel Gurghianu⁵¹.

The author of the analysis was annoyed by the fact that, while the party press "analyzed a series of defects in our literature", journals, with minor exceptions did not consider such phenomena. On the contrary, almost all literary journals highly recommended the books of Al. George "Semne și repere" [Signs and marks] and "Marele Alpha" [Grand Alpha], as well as the essay volume "Bunul simț ca paradox" [Common sense as a paradox] by Al. Paleologu, which, according to the control institution, "were distinguished by an opposition and nonconformism spirit towards established values and directions". Some reviews were poignant for the way in which they commended what had to be criticized and vice versa, volumes as "Semne și repere" [Signs and marks] by Al. George⁵², "Nebunul și floarea" [Mad man and the flower] by R. Guga⁵³ și "Teatru - antiteatru - teatru" [Theater - anti-theater - theater] by Horia Deleanu⁵⁴, all banned from publishing.

Finally, the role of review in orienting and ideological and artistic education of readers was diminished also because that "there were a lot of reviews, critiques and notes basing their analysis and comment solely on elements related to poetic formula, the technical construction, the new character of images" in the permanent columns of the literary-artistic production, without the authors to "think of the idea content or the way in which the book reflected the truth of life". Moreover, the authors "would not say their opinion on the value of the works", they neither recommended them, nor rejected them.

Again, the editorial boards were blamed because they "did not intervene actively within contradicting debates to clarify certain points of view and finalize discussions for one purpose". The case of *Convorbiri literare* was mentioned as an example, which stated that the editorial board does not intend to draw conclusions given that "each participant has its own conclusions, the reader is free to choose"⁵⁵. Likewise, the case of the investigation organized by *Viața românească* on "Young people and issues of literature" with a few young writers considered "not the most representative

⁴⁹ *Convorbiri literare*, no. 4/1972.

⁵⁰ *Tribuna*, no. 31/1972.

⁵¹ both from *România literară*, no. 13/1972.

⁵² *Vatra*, no. 6/1972.

⁵³ *Convorbiri literare*, no. 12/1972.

⁵⁴ *România literară*, no. 25/1972.

⁵⁵ while the material printed in *Lupta de clasă* appreciated that this discussion "needed certain ideological clarifications of principle".

for their generation", where the editorial board did not follow conservations that were "weak and confused" with a comment.

It was suggested that editorial boards had to express their views in the permanent columns of journals on theater, arts, music, where the issues of these arts were presented through "the eyes of the authors". The theater column from *Luceafărul* was offered as an example, which was held by Marin Sorescu, Ion Băieșu and R. Penciușescu, who each pleaded for "the modern tendencies corresponding to their formation as playwrights and theater specialists". The interventions of editorial boards in certain situations would have moved the theater debate "to a general interest for their audience".

Also regarding reviews, the analysis saw "unilateral preoccupations" regarding the "scientific potential of literary heritage", an area where the focus of journals was "on certain personalities", such as Eugen Lovinescu, Titu Maiorescu, Lucian Blaga, Vasile Voiculescu, Ion Barbu, while "the Marxist traditions of our culture are rarely presented". Such an example was one article on Gherea in *Argeș* ("În căutarea lui Gherea" [Finding Gherea], author Mircea Iorgulescu), who also wanted to separate the personality of the socialist militant from the literary reviewer. Given such a situation, the recommendation from the final part of the analysis is natural for "the more active and consistent approach of rich materialist, progressive traditions of the literary history and review", considering its role as "a theoretical foundation of our contemporary literature, for the firmer affirmation of Marxist aesthetic principles in cultural and artistic life".

Two major ideas were mentioned in the general conclusion of the Directorate analysis from November 1971 to November 1972. On one hand, "editorial boards must promote militant literature, tied to our socialist realities more strictly, more objectively and firmly", parallel with stimulation of "alive, interesting debates that aim for efficiency and finality more actively for the assertion of Marxist aesthetic principles and the elevation of our literary and artistic life to the level of current requirements".

Conclusions

The regime controlled, supervised and sanctioned writing with censorship, one of the instruments of Communist power, for the ultimate purpose to produce literature based on ideological requirements and the will of the Communist Party. As a result, writers had to accept or to learn to accept the guidance suggested by superior party leadership as a basic requirement for publication or risk being censored.

We see that writing was produced in a different manner than required by censors; that there were journals and authors refusing to fit in the established orientations and tasks; that there was a certain nonconformism towards the "realist direction" of art and culture; that

writers, especially those from the interwar period had the most difficulty in adapting to the new cultural policy, as they became clients of censorship; that the writing considered problematic by censorship were preserved so that we can nowadays consult them; that they discuss practices of the Communist regime, such as limiting freedom, the value system, the interference in the creation process, but also in aspects related to social life, types and characters, times such as dogmatism, which are severely criticized and denigrated; moreover, according to the censors, the critique was extended from the particular to the general to the system and social relations that they generated.

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Endeavours to Establish the “Cele Trei Crisuri” in Oradea and Aspects of its activity (1990-2000)

*Antonio FAUR**

After the events occurring in December 1989 that had a deep impact on our contemporary history, an unprecedented publicist activity had the premises to appear as a consequence of the freedom of speech and expression. Given the background, there were several initiatives aiming to print periodicals (of attitude, culture, and so on) as an expression of the wish for communication of the intellectuals in Bihor who started to get involved in post-December specific activities.

Understanding the importance of cultural associations and foundations and to acquire a doctoral title on the Romanian cultural issue in Bihor (1848-1849), the associate senior lecturer Dr. Viorel Faur – who was also a member of the Romanian Senate in the first office (1990-1992), when it acted as a Constituent Assembly – made a series of cultural endeavours, amongst which the establishment of the “Cele trei Crisuri” Cultural Foundation (in April 1990)¹, a genuine sequel of the interwar “Cele trei

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¹ On the 1st of March 1990 was held the meeting establishing the “*Vatra Românească*” Cultural Association – Bihor affiliate. It approved the statutes (shortly validated by the local legal authorities after the process of submitting the documents to become a “legal entity”). The initial part of the *statutes* comprise the following anticipatory statements: “The movement for national spiritual revival determined by the December 1989 Romanian revolution also comprises the *action to restore some cultural associations that used to be active before 1948*, to which we should add the *efforts to establish new associations (societies) meant to respond to the desiderata of this historical moment, and particularly to those of the future* (emphasis added – A.F.). Amongst them is the “Vatra Românească” National Union – Bihor affiliate seated in Oradea (Consiliul de coordonare, Documente: Asociația culturală „Vatra Românească” – filiala Bihor, in *Cele trei Crisuri*, no. 1, 1990, p. 3). One of the “means” used by this association (to achieve its “cultural” objectives) was settled then (in the first point of this subchapter of the statutes) as follows: “1. *It will take steps to establish the “Cele trei Crisuri” Cultural Foundation that will contribute to reactivating local interwar valuable traditions and will become an efficient element to stimulate the cultural and scientific activity*” (emphasis

Crișuri” Great Reunion. It was high time for the recovery of significant traditions and their pursue on the level of current requirements.

Referring to the initiative of the academic Viorel Faur, the late historian Barbu Ștefănescu stated as follows:

“For a long time, actually from several points of view, ever since I have known *Professor Viorel Faur*, he has been concerned with cultural activities related to his basic ‘job’ as a historian. Several years ago, he established, and has ever since run, the “*Cele trei Crișuri*” Foundation, the one editing the magazine bearing the same name. In the editorial office of the foundation, he has published a series of historical works and more, contributions of the academics from Oradea, of training youth from a scientific point of view, together with renowned names in the field of the Romanian historical writing, such as: *Pompiliu Teodor, Nicolae Bocșan, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Doru Radosav, Ioan Lumperdean, Gelu Neamțu* etc.”² (emphasis added - A. F.). Such a scientific acknowledgement from a historical point of view is worth a justified attention, as it is the only cultural foundation in Bihor concerned with editing the “*Cele trei Crișuri*” magazine and over thirty history and literature books without the support of the state. Everything that was printed was achieved after persistent and tiresome endeavours (particularly of the director of the foundation, Prof. dr. Viorel Faur) to get advertisements (in the magazine) and sponsorship.

Nowadays, a cultural foundation is under the sign of goodwill or generosity of a commercial company or a (cultural-scientific) institution that has grasped its meaning in the local spiritual and public life. Nevertheless, we have to say that more often than not, the relationship between the “*Cele trei Crișuri*” Cultural Foundation (as a beneficiary) and its material supporters was based on “persuasion ability”, or on the relations of its director with the enterprise leadership that decided to sponsor or advertise in the pages of the “*Cele trei Crișuri*” magazine. Hence, persuasion prevailed over the reason of such an endeavour, while the maturity process of the Romanian society has not been achieved to this day.

An introduction was written on the history of the foundation and its activities in local press and particularly in an article published in one of the volume dedicated to the historian Viorel Faur on his 65th birthday³. The

added – A.F.) in this part of the country” (*Ibidem*). Certainly, this was the reason of the *Cele trei Crișuri* Cultural Foundation that worked independently until the end of the past century.

² Barbu Ștefănescu, *Istoria ca profesie de credință*, în *In honorem Viorel Faur (la împlinirea a vârstei de 65 de ani)*, volume coordinated by Corneliu Crăciun and Antonio Faur, Editura Universității din Oradea, 2006, p. 10.

³ Florin Ardelean, *Istoricul Viorel Faur*, director al Fundației Culturale *Cele trei Crișuri* (1990-2000), p. 12-29. The study is based on the original documents of the *Cele trei Crișuri* Cultural Foundation in the personal archives of the director (historian Viorel

doctoral student Florin Ardelean, the author of this historical reconstruction referring to the “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation, expressed useful considerations, out of which we will render the most relevant ones:

“... in its activity, the director of the cultural foundation stood out as an element of continuity and stability by succeeding to imprint coherence to the editorial line of the foundation and of the magazine, as well as a steady rising evolution, thus strengthening the prestige of the cultural and artistic expressions developed under its auspices in time.

The studies published in the magazine have succeeded in starting a rich dialogue between the local, the regional, the national and the European historiography. Thus, the blunt narrow-minded provincialism was replaced by a wide opening towards the researchers with most varied concerns coming from different parts of the country. Its dynamism has positively influenced the working environment in the foundation that has gradually stood out in the city of Oradea as a prestigious cultural-scientific institution”⁴.

Undoubtedly, the projects of the foundation were very important (such as: the publishing of the “Cele trei Crișuri” magazine, the publishing of history and literature books, and the organisation of cultural events) and were implemented, thus contributing to enriching the spiritual life in Bihor with genuine events (such as the book releases belonging to personalities from Bucharest or Cluj-Napoca, or the publication of contributions belonging to well-known local and national intellectuals in several fields in the *Cele trei Crișuri* magazine). The value standards rose, thus making Bihor integrate in national spiritual life. Local creation mentioned in the *Familia* and *Cele trei Crișuri* magazines during the interwar period acquired substance. In fact, it was one of the objectives of the foundation and particularly of its contributors, all devout intellectuals with no material interests.

1. The editorial activity of the foundation

If until the end of the year 1989, the editorial activity was the exclusive task of the Committee for Culture and Socialist Education of the Bihor County (controlling and funding mostly the printing of books of history, literature, folklore and collections of scientific works in different fields, as well as the publishing of the *Familia* magazine), at the beginning of 1990, this monopoly faded away (together with socialism) making room to civil society initiatives expressed through the concern for printing new periodicals (testimonials for the freedom of expression) and other activities with cultural-scientific finality.

Faur), where we found the information together with reading the edited books and the content of the “*Cele trei Crișuri*” magazine and the “*Alma Mater Crisiensis*” cultural-scientific supplement.

⁴*Ibidem*

Considering the favourable background, the new foundation decided to proceed to *reviving* important traditions, such as editing (from April 1920 to August 1940) the “Cele trei Crișuri” magazine that was the most widespread cultural magazine in Bihor and abroad, up to several American cities, for over two decades.

The first issue of the second series of the “Cele trei Crișuri” magazine (that we will tackle in a subchapter of the present study) was published on *the 15th of April 1990*.

In 1992-1997, the “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation edited the following:

I. History books:

1992

1. Viorel Faur, *Cultura românilor din Bihor (1849-1918)*, 186 p. (the author was a senior lecturer at the University of Oradea; the book was originally his doctoral thesis);

2. Idem, *Viața politică a românilor bihoreni (1849-1919)*, 236 p.;

3. Pompiliu Teodor, *Istorici români și probleme istorice*, 194 p. (the author was a professor at the Faculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca and a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy);

1993

4. Viorel Faur, *Generația Marii Uniri. Evenimentele din Bihor (decembrie 1918-aprilie 1919)*, 144 p.;

5. Flaminia Faur, *Mărturii despre evenimentele din Bihor (noiembrie 1918-aprilie 1919)*, 144 p.;

6. Sever Dumitrașcu, *Românii de peste hotare*, 95 p. (the author was a senior lecturer at the University of Oradea);

1994

7. Roman R. Ciorogariu, *Zile trăite*, vol. I, 156 p. (re-edited by senior lecturer dr. Viorel Faur);

8. Idem, *Zile trăite*, vol. II, 174 p. (idem);

9. Nicolae Bocșan, I. Lumperdean, Ioan-Aurel POP, *Etnie și confesiune în Transilvania (sec. XVIII-XIX)*, 188 p. (the three authors belonged to the academic staff of the Faculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca; (two of them subsequently became rectors of the university, i.e. Nicolae Bocșan and Ioan-Aurel Pop);

10. Flaminia Faur, *Manifestările românilor din Bihor împotriva proiectului de lege școlară din 1907. Documente*, 179 p.;

11. Antonio Faur, *100 de documente despre activitatea politică a dr.-ului Aurel Lazăr (1899-1918)*, 146 p. (the author was a student at the Faculty of History – Philosophy in Cluj-Napoca and subsequently became a professor at the University of Oradea);
12. Pompiliu Teodor, *Incursiuni în istoriografia română a secolului XX*, 196 p;
13. Barbu Ștefănescu, *Tehnica agricolă și ritm de muncă în gospodăria țărănească din Crișana (sec. al XVIII-lea și începutul sec. al XIX-lea)*, vol. I, 255 p. (the author was a lecturer at the University of Oradea and subsequently a professor at the same higher education institution; the book was awarded the Romanian Academy Prize and was originally his *doctoral thesis*);
14. Idem, *Tehnica agricolă și ritm de muncă în gospodăria țărănească din Crișana (sec. al XVIII-lea și începutul sec. al XIX-lea)*, vol. II, 350 p;
15. Doru Radosav, *Carte și societate. Secolele XVII-XIX*, 307 p. (the author was a senior lecturer and the director of the „Lucian Blaga” University Library in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was his *doctoral thesis*);
16. Antonio Faur, *Măsuri legislative și economico-administrative de aplicare a Convenției de Armistițiu (septembrie 1944- mai 1945)*, 150 p;
17. Nicolae Edroiu, *Paleografia româno-chirilică*, 148 p (the author was a professor at the Faculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca and subsequently a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy; the book was used to teach the course at the Faculty of History – Geography at the University of Oradea by Prof. Dr. Viorel Faur);
18. Viorel Faur, *Tragedia de la Sighiștel* (decembrie 1918-martie 1919), 50 p. (was printed in Beius and released at the unveiling of the Martyrs Monument in Sighiștel);
19. Gelu Neamțu, *Alexandru Roman – marele fiu al Biborului (1826-1896)*, 200 p. (the author was a researcher at the „George Baritiu” Institute of History in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was his *doctoral thesis*);
20. Stelian Mândruț, *Mișcarea națională și activitatea parlamentară a deputaților Partidului Național Român din Transilvania între anii 1905-1910*, 175 p. (the author was a scientific researcher at the „George Baritiu” Institute of History in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was his *doctoral thesis*);
21. Viorel Faur, *Contribuții la istoricul bibliotecilor românești din Crișana (1830-1940)*, 161 p. (the author was a professor at the Faculty of History – Geography at the University of Oradea);
22. Ioan Horga, *Tradiție și noutate în spiritualitatea românească greco-catolică din Epoca Luminilor. Epsicopia din Oradea*, 176 p. (the author was a lecturer at the Faculty of History – Geography at the University of Oradea, then a professor; originally, the work was his *doctoral thesis*);
23. Viorel Faur, *Presa românească din Crișana despre mișcare memorandistă*, 212 p;

1996

24. Maria Crăciun, *Protestantism și ortodoxie în Moldova secolului al XVI-lea*, 210 p (the author was a lecturer at the Faculty of History – Philosophy at the „Babes-Bolyai” University in Cluj-Napoca; originally, the book was her *doctoral thesis*);

25. Corneliu Crăciun, *Societăți academice din Bucovina (I): Arboreasa și Junimea*, 224 p (the author was a lecturer at the Faculty of Greek-Catholic Theology in Oradea; the book is a part of his *doctoral thesis*);

26. Vasile Gionea, *Femei vestite din trecutul neamului nostru*, 213 p. (the author was a deputy and one of the „fathers” of the 1991 Constitution)⁵.

II. On poetry and literary criticism

a. Poetry

1992

1. Ioan Țepelea, *Poverile din oglindă. Poezii*, 65 p.

1993

2. Miron Blaga, *Manuscrisele de la Remesias*, 68 p.

3. T.M. Mirodot, *Pași în cuvinte*, 95 p (the author was a student at the University of Oradea)

4. Florian Lazăr, *Iubire rodind*

1994

5. Octavian Blaga, *N-am să uit niciodată nimic și totdeauna am să răzbum*, 42 p (the author was a student at the Faculty of Philology in Cluj-Napoca)

6. Alexandru Sfârlea, *Către Sing*, 46 p;

Literary history:

1995

7. Ioan Derșidan, *Tranziții literare*, 260 p. (the author was a lecturer at the University of Oradea)

⁵ Ibidem, pp 27-29 (the list of the books edited by *Cele trei Crișuri* Cultural Foundation from 1992 to 1995). On the foundation, see the first articles published in the media: Viorel Faur, Fundația Culturală *Cele trei Crișuri*, 1993, in *Cele trei Crișuri*, 1994, no. 3-4, p. 3; Nicolae Moraru (Viorel Faur's penname), Premiile pentru știință și literatură acordate de Fundația Culturală *Cele trei Crișuri* și S.C. Keysis Grafex Srl. din Oradea, pe anul 1993, in *Cele trei Crișuri*, 1994, no. 3-4, p. 3; Activitatea editorială a Fundației Culturale *Cele trei Crișuri* (1990-1995), in *Cele trei Crișuri*, 1995, no. 3-4, p. 3; Aniversarea Fundației Culturale *Cele trei Crișuri*, 1995, no.5-6, p. 2; Fundația Culturală *Cele trei Crișuri*. Oradea, cărți tipărite în anul 1995, in *Cele trei Crișuri*, 1996, no.1-2, p. 1

Thus, in five years (1992-1997), the “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation made a decisive contribution to the publication (in Oradea) of *twenty-six history books*, an average of five books each year. From a numerical point of view, it was a rare performance, particularly if we think of the fact that the amount needed to edit them was provided by companies and institutions after several endeavours.

The director of the Foundation thought of an “editorial policy” overcoming the provincial requirements and routine. Consequently, his interest focused on scientific personalities in Oradea and particularly in Cluj-Napoca and Bucharest, thus experiencing for the very first time an activity requiring maximum efforts (both intellectual and material).

Retrospectively, we can see that three members of the Romanian Academy in Cluj-Napoca published books (Pompiliu Teodor, Ioan-Aurel Pop and Nicolae Edroiu). Another significant fact is that *eight doctoral theses* by historians Viorel Faur, Barbu Ștefănescu, Doru Radosav, Ioan Horga, Gelu Neamțu, Stelian Mândruț, Maria Craciun and Corneliu Craciun were printed, which is a real record for a cultural foundation, especially since it was the initiative of private persons, not a foundation of an institution or a high patronage with material means.

To this we should add the fact that, besides the academic staff from Cluj-Napoca and Oradea (Prof. Dr. Sever Dumitrașcu, Prof. Dr. Antonio Faur) other young authors (such as Flaminia Faur), or experienced authors (such as Vasile Gionea, a reputed Romanian journalist) were published.

The valuable work entitled *Zile trăite (Living Days)* by Roman R. Ciorogariu (Bishop) was re-edited (by Viorel Faur). It is the most important memoirs book on the events occurring in Bihor (in November 1918 – April 1919).

At the same time, the “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation in Oradea focused on the literary manuscripts belonging to six poets from Bihor (Miron Blaga, Ioan Țepelea, Octavian Blaga, Alexandru Sfârlea, Florian Lazăr and T.M. Mirodot) that they edited, thus encouraging this type of intellectual concerns too. We should also remind the book by lecturer Dr. Ioan Derșidan entitled *Tranziții literare (Literary Transitions)*.

Even this note on the titles of printed works accompanied by some references to their authors allow us to draw the conclusion that *an exceptional scientific and cultural element was working in Oradea in the last decade of the past century* that cannot be compared to what other similar foundations have ever done.

The “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation found its expression in these editorial achievements lying at the foreground of the scientific life in the area of Bihor.

2. Editing the second series of the „Cele trei Crișuri” magazine

The cultural climate at the beginning of the year 1990 was an incentive for the initiative of the intellectuals from Bihor that was very active particularly in the field of the press. From only one party newspaper and one magazine (*Familia*), they shortly reached a high number of periodicals (edited by different groups), most of them short-lived.

The leadership of the “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation reflected the opportunity to revive one of the most valuable magazines from the interwar period printed by the “Cele trei Crișuri” Reunion, a cultural association with a prominent role in the local cultural life, mentioning that it had material suport from the Royal Foundation during the interwar period. We also have to mention that the magazine was the only one that was ceaselessly published (in Oradea) during the interwar years, and then moved to Bucharest (where it was published until 1944, when the Soviet ‘specialists’ decided to ban it).

After December 1989, an objective of the people involved in the action of reconstructing the most important traditions was reviving the “Cele trei Crișuri” magazine. The first issue (of the new series) was published in April 1990. The editorial office was made up of intellectuals with old cultural and literary concerns: Dr. Viorel Faur (director), Miron Blaga (editor-in-chief), Constantin Mălinaș (secretary general of the editorial office), Nicolae Brânda, Corneliu Crăciun, Teodor Crișan, Ion Davideanu, Dr. Mihai Drecin, Blaga Mihoc, Barbu Ștefănescu and Ioan Țepelea, only personalities that represented some fields of science and local and national literary activity.

During its development, there were changes in the editorial committee, yet its basic structure remained the same, thus providing a necessary and productive continuity, particularly from a qualitative point of view.

Certainly, the most interesting would be an analytical aproach of the content of the cultural magazine and of its contributors.

On this occasion, we aim at noting the essential dates referring to its publication. Due to the fact that the magazine had as priority reaching the legal stores of some libraries, in order to be aware of the *real situation* of the issues in this (second) series of the *Cele trei Crișuri* magazine, we have decided on mentioning this very useful information for the researchers of the *Cele trei Crișuri* magazine:

- I, 1990, no. 1 (April), 12 pages
- no.2 (May), 16 p.
- no. 3 (June), 12 p.

no. 4-5 (July-August), 16 p.
no. 6 (September), 12 p.
no. 7 (October) 16 p.
no. 8 (November), 16 p.
no. 9 (December), 16 p.

Total: 8 issues comprising 116 pages

II, 1991, no. 1-2 (January-February), 20 p
no. 3 (March), 12 p.
no. 4 (April), 12 p.
no. 5 (May), 12 p.
no. 6 (June), 16 p.
no. 7 (July) 12 p.
no. 8 (August), 12 p.
no. 9 (September), 12 p.
no. 10 (October), 12 p.
no. 11 (November), 12 p.
no. 12 (December), 12 p.

Total: 11 issues comprising 144 pages

III, 1992, no. 1-2 (January), 12 p.
no.2 (February), 12 p.
no. 3 (March), 12 p.
no. 4 (April), 12 p.
no. 5 (May), 12 p.
no. 6-7 (June-July), 12 p.
no. 8 (August), 12 p.
no. 9-10 (September-October), 12 p.
no. 11 (November-December), 12 p.

Total: 9 issues comprising 108 pages

IV, 1993, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p.
no. 3-4 (March-April), 16 p.
no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p.
no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p.
no.9-10 (September-October), 12 p.
no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p.

Total: 6 issues comprising 76 pages

V, 1994, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p.
no. 3-4 (March-April), 12 p.
no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p.

no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p.
no.9-10 (September-October), 12 p.
no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p.

Total: 6 issues comprising 76 pages

VI, 1995, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p.
no. 3-4 (March-April), 16 p.
no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p.
no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p.
no.9 (September-October), 12 p.
no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p.
Total: 6 issues comprising 76 pages

VII, 1996, no. 1-2 (January-February), 12 p.
no. 3-4 (March-April), 16 p.
no. 5-6 (May-June), 12 p.
no. 7-8 (July-August) 12 p.
no.9 (September-October), 12 p.
no. 11-12 (November-December), 12 p.
Total: 6 issues comprising 72 pages

VIII, 1997, no. 1-3 (January-March), 8 p.
no. 4-6 (April-June), 8 p.
no. 7-9 (July-September), 8 p.
no. 10-12 (October-December) 8 p.

Total: 4 issues comprising 32 pages

IX, 1998, no. 1-2 (January-February), 8 p.
no. 3-4 (March-April), 8 p.
no. 5-6 (May-June), 8 p.
no. 7-8 (July-August) 8 p.
no.9-10 (September-October), 8 p.
no. 11-12 (November-December), 8 p.
Total: 6 issues comprising 48 pages

IV, 1999, no. 1-2 (January-February), 8 p.
no. 3-4 (March-April), 8 p.
no. 5-6 (May-June), 8 p.
no. 7-9 (July-September) 8 p.
no. 10-12 (October-December), 8 p.
Total: 5 issues comprising 40 pages

IV, 2000, no. 1-3 (January-March), 8 p.

Thus, during the time covering (April) 1990– (January-March) 2000, *fifty-eight issues* of the “*Cele trei Crișuri*” magazine with 788 pages (format 14/50 cm) were published.

After that date, the leadership of the editorial committee was taken over by Prof. Dr. Antonio Faur (as a *director*) and the magazine was edited in much better printing conditions. At the same time, the format changed to book, in order to be better preserved in the library. Since then (i.e. issue no. 4-6/2000), the *third series* of the *Cele trei Crișuri* magazine has been published.

We believe that all data referring to the second series of the *Cele trei Crișuri* are useful to both researchers and readers willing to become familiar with its content.

Abstract

The establishment of the “Cele trei Crișuri” Cultural Foundation in Oradea at the beginning of the year 1990 had beneficial consequences on the local and national cultural life. Its initiator, Professor Viorel Faur, revived the activity of the nation wide famous interwar institution, Reuniunea Culturală Cele trei Crișuri (Cele trei Crișuri Cultural Reunion) working in Oradea and Bucharest from 1920 to 1944, when it was banned by the Soviet occupation forces. He had the support of the Royal Foundations and of the Romanian Government. Unfortunately, the new foundation had to acquire funding from different economic agents and received it due to the endeavours of the director. Several history, poetry, and literary criticism belonging to local authors, or authors from other academic centres, were thus published. It was the result of a successful long-term effort thanks to the perseverance and influence the director enjoyed in public area. An important aspect of the Cele trei Crișuri Foundation was the publishing of the second series of the interwar magazine Cele trei Crișuri that was printed from 1990 to 2000. From the year 2000 on, the third series was published in a new format. Many well-known representatives of local and national culture contributed to the second series. The article aims to show in broad lines the achievements of the Foundation and the magazine while run by Professor Viorel Faur, so that the reader may have a good knowledge on this important page of the cultural history of Bihor.

Keywords: *Cele trei Crișuri Foundation, Oradea, cultural magazine, publishing activity, cultural traditions.*

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Culture and Power in European Space

*Alina STOICA**

The conscious process of forming the political, institutional and economic unity of European space can be traced back only a few decades ago, actually beginning in the context of world bi-polar situation established by the end of the Second World War, once proposed by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950¹. This action of transposition in practice of the idea of European unity came as a first materialisation of numerous initiatives and projects of the political thinkers that were supported throughout the centuries. The end of the war and the realities that followed have created the perception of danger in Europe's awareness of its position, the loss of its role on the stage of international relations worldwide, and last but not least of its identity.

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¹ At 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman, by his proposal, determined the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first supranational institution from which today's EU has developed, he started from the assumption that “[w]orld peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it”; and that “[t]he coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany”. He continued to make his case through the arguments of the changing material structure and the change of minds triggered by supranational integration: “The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe ... The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible ... that fusion of interest ... may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions”. Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May 1950, text version on http://europa.eu.int/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm.

Culture, religion and the idea of European unity

Special attention has been paid in recent years, in the published literature at the national and international level, to the reason which led to the unification of Europe and its historic journey. If we try to answer briefly to the first challenge, that regards the reason of unification, researching the history, we reach to the writings of the ancient Greeks and to the default theme of the opposition between the two continents, Asia and Europe², mirrored in many military conflicts, which have awakened the consciousness of Greek cities of belonging to the Hellenic culture. The need for unity, on grounds of security, convinced ancient Greeks to find a language, a religion, a mentality and a culture with an important common substratum. Subsequently, unifying ideas have become definite from the Imperial perspective, around a hegemonic power-Rome. Among the factors of the construction of the of Cicero's Ecumenical Fortress³, the leading cultural factor is the default language, religion, customs and traditions that colonists and Roman veterans have forwarded to the newly incorporated regions of Rome by means of soft power or peaceful or by a military one, by means of force or hard power. The Roman force of ideas was not limited to the power, the victories or to the dominant status of the Empire, but has boosted and given the consistency of the concept of the "Roman civilization", opposite to and superior to that of the "barbarian"⁴. Medieval time has preserved landmarks of the Roman world, its values, its impressive culture (which had assimilated the Hellenistic culture, the Dutch, but also local peculiarities of the provinces conquered or assimilated), Latin, which continued to be used as an official language in the West of the continent by the end of the Middle Ages, the criteria of political organisation, science of law, the idea of universal empire, etc. The cumulative power of the Roman Empire, completed by the unifying role of Christianity formed the basis for European unity.

² See: Hippocrates – *About Waters, Places and Winds*; Aristotel – *Politica* etc.

³ Alina Stoica, *History of European Unity Idea*, Oradea University Press, 2015, p.56.

⁴ Barbarian means the other one, one who lived outside the Roman space and belonged to other people. The etymology of the word is onomatopoeic and derives from the sounds of the bar, and we convey the impossibility of the Greeks and Romans to understand each other's language. Transposed in facts, this idea has become an element of identity and differentiation between civilizations (n.n.). See also Maria do Ceu Fialho, *Cidadania e Celebração na Grécia Antiga*, in Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (coord.), „Europa em Mutação”, Coimbra, Quarteto, 2003, p.13-15; Helen Bacon, *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy*, New Haven, 1961; Eschil, *Agamemnon*, <http://ro.scribd.com/doc/24825912/Eschil-Agamemnon#scribd>.

Do we have nowadays a United Europe in terms of economic, political or military perspective? We can admit without doubt numerous attempts in this direction, but any glimpse of success? The Romanian scholar, Member of the Romanian Academy, N. Bagdasar, in a paper which he had signed in 1931, regarding the idea of European unity, having previously made a review of the gap which characterizes the creative peoples of European culture, N. Bagdasar noted: "From about 1845 until now we didn't do anything else than asking ourselves what Europe says and we strived to match us up after it. Almost one hundred years, in which a young and healthy people makes the politics Caragiale heroes. Without asking a single moment what is this Europe and if it truly exists"⁵, cautiously underscored the Romanian researcher.

About "the dream of European unity as a seductive possibility"⁶ writes O. Pecican, in his efforts to highlight the "East intake"⁷ in the deliberations concerning the formation of Europe. The famous professor from Cluj Napoca city is the opinion that the only real and full basis for the idea of European unity is "risk-taking, internalizing and feeling as being imperative the need of the citizens -no matter what part of the continent- to be together. This has become more and more a reality starting from an elite and becoming, through education or contagion, the mirage of prosperity etc.-a wider aspiration"⁸.

What chance of coagulation would have had Europe if it would have started from the principle of cultural unity, instead of the economic? Jean Monnet himself, *father of Europe*, towards the end of his life said that "If we were to do it all again we would start with culture." If the geographical delimitation of Europe had in mind at all times outlining the borders, cultural and spiritual side of Europe has abolished the frontiers, giving european space a unity.

The success of Christianity as a unifying factor was the central idea of this religion, according to which all men have one God, so they must enjoy the same rights and rules according to their merit. "*We believe that there is one God, creator of the world, which has forged it out of nothingness through his word, who was born before all ages*"⁹.

⁵ Nicolae Bagdasar, *Înspre realitățile noastre*, în Nae Ionescu, *Roza vânturilor*, 16 aprilie 1931, București, Editura Roza Vânturilor, 1991, p.91-94; prima ediția datează din 1941

⁶ Ovidiu Pecican, *Europa o idee în mers*, Cluj-Napoca, Editura Fundației pentru Studii Europene, 1997, p.17.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p.12.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p.18-19

⁹ Tertulian, *De Doctrina Cristiana*. See: <https://bucatidincarti.wordpress.com/2008/04/25/scurta-istorie-a-aparitiei-crestinismului/#more-184>

Therefore, the religious dimension of the European culture is represented by Christianity. Its rapid spread and the impact on people was closely followed by an intense culture that, thoroughly analysed, can justify the tendency of Christianity to spread over the whole surface of the Earth. Beneficiary of the contribution of Greek philosophy, Christianity has proven the creator character in terms of politics and culture, an "axis mundi", with rules from which neither Kings could derogate. The European world was turned into a very well organized structure itself, influencing European States. "In none of the existing cultures, State organization never came to the development Europe has met -a separation of powers in a State, which guarantees a normal running¹⁰."

It should be also noted that, in the first part of I Millennium a.d., the emergence of more significant cracks, led to the replacement of political and territorial unification tendencies with one at a spiritual level, based on the idea of Christian universalism. However, 1054 schism also prompted breaking this unit, emphasizing the political rivalries. The Christian Church could not, with few exceptions, become a true theocratic power. And yet, her contribution is indestructible. With the coming of Christ on Earth, has emerged in the world a new era of culture and progress, without which we would probably return in prehistory.¹¹

What Christianity meant for European culture? Her very existence. At the cultural foundation of the European peoples there are the book, school, science and Christian art, being all promoted and supported by the Christian Church, since ancient times, to the middle ages and modernity. Where Christianity has spread and Church was being organized, there entered the light of book and culture. In the Church's covenants, reading and writing were the most common occupations. Thanks to the writings of Christian monks, historians have benefited from unusual sources, required to the reconstitution of the past. Furthermore all the peoples of Europe "have started their literature and culture by Christian writings initiated and inspired by the Church"¹². The first European schools have been set up in addition to the churches or monasteries. The books used were books of hours and teachers were clergymen. The school as an institution is "a house of culture, the institution in which they are taught letters, formed the ideas, cultivated the spirit and matured the culture. Until modern times, the State had no connection with the school. Instead, the Church makes the school one of its essential purposes. Having as purpose the need of catechizing and

¹⁰ Ionescu, Nae, *Scrieri*, București, Editura Eminescu, 1988, p.377.

¹¹ Felea, Ilarion, *Religia culturii*, Arad, Editura Episcopiei Ortodoxe Române a Aradului, 1994, p.227.

¹² *Ibidem*

learning in general, which begins suddenly with the spread of Christianity, the Church has taught in school all the neophytes, getting them used to books and with the light of science"¹³.

Therefore, the Church has promoted values that have contributed to the creation of European culture. Nowadays, in a society reached by disruption, which functions at the limit of laws and social norms¹⁴, which focuses its efforts on meeting the immediate needs of the people, but at the same time stimulates the wishes to enhance the consumption of goods, Churches are in a complex situation, to constantly remind people that their existence is not reduced at right away.

Therefore, "the bigger attachment to Mysteries and Sacredness, the more difficult the adaptation, because the "body "civilization has come to claim that it can work even without the presence of the sacred"¹⁵. Here comes education, school, culture and mentality of the community, which community, State and the European Union convey.

"The European Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting national and regional diversity and putting the highlights at the same time on common cultural heritage"¹⁶. To what extent is there a unifying cultural, educational level in Europe?

European educational policies

Since the mid-1980s, the Council of Europe has been involved in a major research programme on the evaluation of national cultural policies. At first there were evaluated the founding States of the EU. Then, in 2000, 15 countries had already been analysed, other 4 were under consideration and some other 9 were to be analyzed¹⁷. European Commission has adopted a series of recommendations on the promotion inside each European State of an education encompassing not only structurally, but also in the educational content, elements of coincidence. Currencies adopted were "education for democracy", "long life education", "multicultural education".

¹³ *Ibidem*, p.228-229.

¹⁴ Ilie Bădescu, Ozana Cucu-Oancea, Ghe. Şiştean, *Tratat de sociologie rurală*, Bucureşti, Editura Mica Valahie, 2012, p.157.

¹⁵ Alexandru Duţu, *Ideea de Europa şi evoluţia conştiinţei europene*, Bucureşti, Editura ALL Educaţional, 1999, 225.

¹⁶ Official Journal of the European Union, the Treaty ..., art. 165, 2004, p. 74. See to <http://www.justice.gov.md/file/Centrul%20de%20armonizare%20a%20legislatiei/Baza%20de%20date/Materiale%202012/Legislatie/32004L0882.pdf>

¹⁷ Simion Mundy, *Politici culturale. Un scurt ghid*, Editura Consiliului Europei, Strasbourg, 2000, p.2

Currently, the correlation between education and religion at national level but also at European level, advocates for healthy evolution of society. European standards, adopted by the national ones have in mind the role religion can play in the field of education, even though the school is no longer the prerogative of the Church nowadays.

The fall of the Communist bloc in 1989-1991 and technological revolution have generated radical changes within the States released, modifying, among others the importance given to the role of the Church in society. The relationship between education and religious values is being reviewed. For example, in the case of Romania, shapes without background which migrated from West to East-and we are referring in particular to the *freedom and democracy* that are in contrast with the constraints with which the Romanian society was accustomed to- totaled questions respecting the direction toward which straightened the Romanian society and education. Then, certain objectives of national educational policies are induced by concerns about speeding up the process of European integration. These effects are felt either directly, by strengthening the foreign languages teaching, either indirectly by comparing the school policies. As a result, European institutions see themselves forced to imagine innovative policies, thus trying to keep up with the renovation of educational systems.

Therefore, At EU level, education is the responsibility of the Member States. Union institutions play a supporting role only. In accordance with article 165 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, the community "shall contribute to the development of quality education by encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and supplementing their action while fully the responsibility of the Member States towards the content of education and the organisation of the education system, as well as their cultural and linguistic diversity."¹⁸

Undoubtedly, the present European educational policies and strategies are geared primarily towards education in the spirit of democratic citizenship and social cohesion. Educational systems must face various challenges, developments and issues related to both education and society as a whole. Under these circumstances, it increases the role of education as a factor contributing dramatically to social cohesion. Cooperation on European policies in the field of education and vocational training began with the adoption of the white paper on education and training. "Teaching and learning-towards the knowledge society", by means of which European Union is selfdefining it as heading towards a learning based society, based on the acquisition of new knowledge and on lifelong learning. The

¹⁸ Official Journal of the European Union, p.74, accessed by May 2012

document was published just prior to the launch in 1996 of the European year of Lifelong Learning¹⁹.

In 1997 issued a communication from the Commission- "For a Europe of knowledge"-linking the objective of lifelong learning with proposals for programmes relating to education and training in the period 2000-2006. Among them we mention the Erasmus programme, which, over the past 20 years, has allowed cross-University exchanges, which have received tens of thousands of students and teachers in education scholarship programs, placement, staff training and teaching staff. We can also add Leonardo da Vinci programme, addressed to students but also to academics who have been successful in conducting staff training.

In January 2000-Socrates II Programme began Grundtvig subprogram aimed at adult education, and in November 2006 there appeared- "Programme for Lifelong Learning 2007-2013". New program brings together former programmes as Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci²⁰.

European educational policies aimed at the educational systems. Influenced by the phenomenon of economic globalization/regionalization, which we are facing recent years, these cross significant changes involving an increasingly tendency for uniformity. Adapted to evolving society, which they represent, they are still marked by a multitude of differences among which we mention the education organization on cycles/levels of education or the school guidance concept. The phenomenon of globalization generates an evolution of EU educational systems on two levels: vertical, qualitative-"the need to develop and adapt the school curriculum to the exigency of the optional perspective through curricular projects integrated into the Community requirements which belongs to the school; the formation of specialized teachers per fields of studies "-and "quantitative, horizontal – the growth and diversity of social phenomena facing the school: school migration and school deviation"²¹. On the other hand, the effects of political and social events of recent years (wars, technological revolution, etc.) that led to racism, violence, xenophobia, made it necessary to grant a special attention to education. One of the few instruments

¹⁹ *Educația ca politică Europeană. Cooperarea europeană în domeniul educației*, vezi: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/72382860/politici-educationale-europene>, p.12, accessed by Aprilie 2012.

²⁰ *Ibidem*

²¹ Camelia Ciucureanu, *Dinamica sistemelor de învățământ în Uniunea Europeană (teza de doctorat)*, București, 2009, p.2, accessed by Aprilie 2012. Vezi: <http://www.unibuc.ro/studies/Doctorate2010/Noiembrie/Ciurescu%20Camelia%20-%20Dinamica%20Sistemelor%20de%20Invatamant%20in%20Uniunea%20Europeana/Rezumat%20Teza%20doctorat.pdf>.

available to States and communities, education is absolutely necessary to find some cures for European and world issues. But for this the European Commission and the European Council have decided to concentrate educational policies towards increasing the quality and effectiveness of education systems and vocational training in the EU, but also to the improvement of education and training of teachers and trainers.

European cultural networks

The unification of Europe, "the European Common House", tries to eliminate formal borders between different cultures which make up the European area. Thus, future generations will no longer need to have the option for one of the cultures, but will focus on the educational element, which can freely access any of them.

An essential contribution in that direction have European cultural networks. Established since the 1980s, they are now approximately 500 so far of which about 100 are functional. In the 1990s became a generic term encompassing unofficial contacts between professionals. It should be noted, too, that they have the advantage of "alternative approaches that official bodies, too limited by inherited policy cannot offer. In the same way, the networks provide a broader base for policy development than any individual institution, protecting its own funding base and projects"²².

Particularly effective in the direction of cooperation, networks represent "functional compromise between market and organization, maximizing the positive characteristics and minimizing negative ones." When you create a network there are usually some concrete common objectives, it is the answer to the need to exercise a mutual aid, the need to break isolation, establish contacts and the framing of a common approach. Most of the times the network becomes the platform for exchanging and acquiring the attitudes, beliefs and ideas, promoting the common interests of its members²³.

Manifesto of European cultural networks adopted in Brussels on 21 September 1997, by the Forum of European Cultural Networks, considered that "European cultural networks contribute to European cohesion, facilitating mobility of cultural operators, cross-cultural communication, makes it easy to combat xenophobia, racism and provides practice in intercultural understanding, strengthens the cultural dimension of development which is not produced by purely economic factors." Even

²² Simion Mundy, *op.cit.*, p.22.

²³ *Ibidem*, p.23.

nowadays European institutions encourage the formation of thematic networks²⁴.

Perhaps the first European regional alliance with cultural pursuits was The Working Community of the Alpine Countries. Created in 1972, with the name Arge Alp this unified new regions in four States (Austria, Italy, Germany, Sweden). Designed to protect the alpine cultural differences, this goal has resulted in recommendations in various fields, including that of education at local, regional, and State level. Maybe one of those long living cultural networks, was the one that resulted in 1976 from intergovernmental relationship involving France, Germany and Sweden. Originally intended for the settlement of problems of the neighbourhood, it has long controlled even inter-university relations, and since the 1990s has encouraged school collaboration towards promoting bilingualism²⁵, one of the most pressing local issues, possible a trigger of violence.

Work Community for the Western Alps founded in 1982 whose cooperation protocol called together three Italian regions, two French and three Swedish cantons, has provided a framework for cooperation in the field of culture and education.

Currently, the best known networks in the field of culture in Europe are IMET (Informal Meetings of European Theatres), EFACH (European Forum for the Arts and Cultural Heritage), ENTFCFM (European Network of Training Centres and Faculties of Cultural Managers), AIRS (Association of Independent Radio Stations), etc.²⁶, all acting in the direction of cooperation and the development of European culture in a uniform manner.

In **conclusion**, regional cross-border cooperation at the educational level is not yet an interstate European education policy, but only a start in this direction. At the education level, each State observes and analyzes the education system of neighbouring State or States, thus making its own reform. Exchange of experience for pupils, students and teachers effectively contribute to an alignment of the European educational systems. To all this it is added validation of diplomas that attests to mutual recognition between States. Part of the national or European culture, educational system evolves

²⁴ *Prima strategie europeană pentru cultură*. (The First European Strategy for culture), accessed May 2012. Vezi: <http://www.muze.org/romania/ro/noutati/foarte-important-prima-strategie-europeana-pentru-cultura.html>; Dorel Zaharia, *Beneficiile existenței rețelelor culturale tematice europene*, p. 269-270. Vezi: http://www.philologica-jassyensia.ro/upload/VI_2_Zaharia.pdf

²⁵ *Euroregiunile – forme și structuri teritoriale de cooperare transfrontalieră*. Accessed by May 2012. Vezi: <http://www.scribd.com/doc/78230866/Intro-Ist-Euroreg>

²⁶ Zaharia, Dorel, *Beneficiile existenței rețelelor culturale tematice europene*. Vezi: http://www.philologica-jassyensia.ro/upload/VI_2_Zaharia.pdf ., p. 270.

in parallel with it. In an era of globalization, national culture of European countries gives individuality and unity even for European Union. In support of these ideas come the thematic cultural networks of the European Union, which, on the path of cooperation and mutual support, are able to approach the States, regions, and especially people.

Abstract

In the present context of attempts to achieve the objectives of strengthening European unity, when it is obvious the failure of previous attempts of unity from the economic policy side to the political one, it might be time to look with more confidence toward the role that culture might play in this regard, as essential element of the European integration process. It is already well known the role of cultural diplomacy in the foreign policy of the states, from the most powerful to all other. On the occasion of several national and international conferences we have addressed this topic. Moreover we tried to demonstrate the probability of creating a unique foreign policy of the European Union, based on the cultural factor and on how it manages to retain the link between European cities and the former ex-colonial Territories. We have tried to demonstrate the economic power and the role that the EU could gain on the international relations scene.

The present work aims to develop another text of ours published only in Romanian, in 2013, at Marne Publishing House, Italy, in a collective volume- "Education and Faith toward a Reunification of the Values". We propose to show the role that culture had in the case of the idea of European unity, relying for centuries on religion as a unifying factor, but also on the relationship between these European peoples, culture and education.

Keywords: culture, religion, education, European Union

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Between Democracy and Totalitarianism. The Case of Patriotic Union from Bihor County (1945-1947)

*Gabriel MOISA**

Situated in the category of “the traveler fellows” of the communists, the Patriots’ Union of Romania played an important role in the effort to conquer the power, along with other such structures as Plowmen Front, Hungarian People’s Union, Patriotic Defense, etc.

The Union of Patriots was founded by the communist circles in Romania as an illegal organization in the summer of 1942, in order to contribute to finalize a comprehensive internal opposition as against the war unleashed against the Soviet Union. After August 23rd 1944, its work was quickly redirected in order to *un-fascism* the country. The Union of Patriots joined the platform draft of the National Democratic Front prepared by the communists and claimed Dr. Petru Groza government installed on March 6th 1945, under which the government had 5 ministries¹. That in the conditions under which one of the party’s leader, Gheorghe Vlădescu-Răcoasa, said in September 1944 that the Union of Patriots was not “*a political party that splits posts and ministries*”². Since September 1944 the Union of Patriots assignment remained the coordination of the *citizen committees* and *village committees* recently emerged. Structures of the Union of Patriots have been established throughout the country, with the purpose of “*cleaning enterprises, institutions, faculties and schools of Guard elements*”³. In the world of villages, the members of the Patriots’ Union joined first the organizations of the Plowmen Front to “share as” the greater properties than 50 hectares. In

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¹ The National Bank of Romania, *Restituție. Viața și opera lui Mitiță Constantinescu*, nr. 4, Martie, 2004, p. 13

² Gheorghe Onișoru, *Alianțe și confruntări între partidele politice din România (1944-1947)*, Fundația Academia Civică (București, 1996) p. 142

³ Idem, *De la Uniunea Patrioților la Partidul Național Popular, 1942-1949*, in „Anuarul Societății de Științe Istorice din România. Filiala Prahova”, tom III-IV, 1992, p. 163

cities, the “guards” of the organization dealt with “unmasks” within the frame of the “*saboteurs of enterprises, speculators and owners who dose goods*”⁴.

The General Congress of the Union of Patriots in January 10-12th 1946 decided to turn this organization in the National People Party. Among the 120 members of the Central Committee of the new party were among others Dr. Dumitru Bagdasar, Petre Constantinescu-Iasi, Traian Săvulescu, Andrei Oțetea, Alexandru Philipide, George Călinescu, etc. It was passing to a new stage in the conquest of the power by the communists, and they had to be stronger organized, the year 1946 being a decisive year in this respect with regard to runoff election in November.

The first organization of the Patriots’ Union in Bihor County was founded on October 15th 1944 in Beiuș even before the total release of Bihor County by the Romanian and Soviet armies, at a setting meeting, followed by a call on the purpose and program exposure of the organization⁵. This meeting was attended by several residents of Beiuș city, the most of them attending out of curiosity rather than of a real interest. The population was not extremely eager to enroll in the new political structure. This can be found also from a report of January 17th 1945, where they were placed 200 members on the lists of Beiuș organization. But only 50 of them paid regularly their membership fee and only one, in the person of the branch president, Alexandru Rițiu, could be considered active, the other members remaining “*inactive*”⁶. Also, the report mentioned that despite of this situation, the political party supporters were numerous, at least 3000 - 4000 people, “*closely grouped around the P.U.*”⁷. Given this situation, only a small number of persons of the supporters of the crowd succeeded to be worked in, the document noted that there was “*a defect in the organization*”⁸; blamed on the “*lack of propaganda and the small number of the held meetings*”⁹. On the other hand, it was specified here, “*the lack of a democratic political party*”¹⁰ more difficult to organize because people wanted “*to join not the organization but the democratic political parties*”¹¹, cause of which it was believed that the “*Plowmen Front would be more successful*”¹².

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 165

⁵ Arhivele Naționale – Serviciul Județean Bihor, *Fond Partidul Național Popular – Organizația Județeană Bihor*, dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 1 (referenced as A.N.- S.J.Bh)

⁶ *Ibidem*

⁷ *Ibidem*

⁸ *Ibidem*

⁹ *Ibidem*

¹⁰ *Ibidem*

¹¹ *Ibidem*

¹² *Ibidem*

Since January 1945 they started the expansion of the Patriots' Union, moving the party delegates in over than 30 communes and towns of the county area and the organization of some constituent assemblies. Of the 30 localities only 20 were able to begin the organizing of the committees of the Patriots' Union. In the other region of the county the structure of the organization was in progress.

In the northern part of the county, the Union of Patriots was founded on October 20th 1944, soon after setting free of Oradea. The starting point was the general meeting of the day of November 12th 1944, held in a building in Oradea, 6 no. Theater Street ¹³, when it was formed a provisional County Committee composed by 9 members. Two were intellectuals, a clerk, a craftsman and five workers. Also, on this occasion it was set the political line, taking the decision to fight "*against the national chauvinism existing between the cohabitant peoples (Romanian-Hungarian) and against the Nazi-fascist enemy until his final destruction*"¹⁴. The first initiative in this regard was the exclusion of the two intellectuals who belonged to the provisional committee for that they proved to be "*unhealthy elements, one of them having a fascist past*"¹⁵.

About how to conduct the Union organization in Oradea we find from a report of the local leaders of the party at December 30th 1944: "*The village organization is running slowly and very hard, because the city population majority is Hungarian, in terms of propaganda we should act in two languages, Romanian and Hungarian, and the field of organization of the P.U. is the middle population stratum - intellectuals, merchants, craftsmen - and until today they withdraw to enter the political organization. But mostly that withdrawal is felt from the Romanian population, which both intellectual and the rest of the population is tested by chauvinist ideas and we are regarded as communists*"¹⁶. However, in the first month of 1945, the Patriots' Union organization in Oradea had registered 170 members of whom 30 Romanian, 60 Hungarian, 50 Jews and 30 other nationalities (Germans, Serbs, Bulgarians)¹⁷.

During this period, the Union of Patriots carried a little more consistent propaganda through the press articles explaining "*What is the Patriots' Union?*"¹⁸ So, according to that "*the P.U. is an organized mass movement. To it can participate and can be joined by all the patriots determined to fight against the oppressor and exploiter Hitlerism and fascism without difference of gender, age, language or*

¹³ *Ibidem*, d. 5/1945, f. 2

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, d. 1/1944, f. 3

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 2

¹⁶ *Ibidem*

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 3

¹⁸ *Ce este Uniunea Patrioților?*, in „Viață Nouă”, an I, nr. 17, 4 februarie 1945, p. 2

*religion, being excluded only the enemies of democracy*¹⁹. Meanwhile the political line of the Patriots' Union is defined as one which *"is reflected in its platform of fight and it is alongside the political struggle of the Romanian Communist Party, the most achievable progressive political line"*²⁰.

An overview of the political life in the north-central part of our county is presented by Imre Tóth, an activist of the C.C. of the R.C.P. sent from Bucharest to Oradea in February 1945 to organize, control and direct the activities of the Patriots' Union - Oradea. A few days after his arrival in the city on the Crisul Repede River he found that the political scene was monopolized by the left forces: *"The M.N.S. groups (n.n. Magyar Nepi Szövetség – the Hungarian People's Union), the Plowmen Front and Union Organization are highly organized, but M.N.S. grouped inside many Hungarian reactionary elements"*²¹ – the activist warned. The conducted survey reveals the exclusiveness practiced by the Hungarian revanchist circles infiltrated in the leftist parties, particularly the communist²². This situation is aggravated in his view as the Communists of Bihor sat the Hungarian national interests before those of the party. *"The Communist Party, composed of the Council of 11 persons attending the board: Miklós Gyarmati, Boros Janos, Feldman and Balasz Emil lead the N.D.F. organization following their own principles"*²³, says the report by Tóth Imre. Regarding the Union of Patriots, the Romanian Communist Party put its great expectations to attract people on its side; the activist sent from Bucharest noted that *"the line of the Union of Patriots is no existing"*²⁴.

In the report drawn up on February 13th 1945, Imre Tóth specified that if till that moment the organization had registered 350 members of all nationalities, after that *"it has ceased to be even a democratic mob directly to the Communist Party, with the main influence of Miklós Gyarmati, who sent a circular to all members of the U.P."*²⁵. The same figure was presenting a bleak picture of the party: *"Their indiscipline (n.n. of U.P. members) led to the disintegration of the Union of Patriots that deliberately dissolved in several ethnic cells. We notify all the members of other origin than Romanian, women, youth, and friends that the organization of Oradea does not accept any more as so far members of any ethnicity - as instructed from the center.*

¹⁹ *Ibidem*

²⁰ *Ibidem*

²¹ A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Național Popular – Organizația Județeană Bihor, dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 4

²² Ion Zăinea (coordinator), *Democrație occidentală și democrație populară: evoluția spectrului politic în nord-vestul României (1944-1950)*, Oradea, Editura Universității din Oradea, (Oradea, 2004) p. 166

²³ A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Național Popular – Organizația Județeană Bihor, dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 4

²⁴ *Ibidem*

²⁵ *Ibidem*

So, only people of Romanian ethnic origin can be members of our organization. For this purpose we please the friends - who we are sure they will understand the political deep meaning of this issue - to be enrolled in Madosz²⁶ and Jewish Democratic Union”²⁷.

In a letter on February 12th 1945, concluded with the slogan of FREEDOM! (text broadcast in Hungarian and translated into Romanian), signed on behalf of the Patriots’ Union - Oradea organization of Balogh Dumitru, Aranycs M., Szabo Dumitru, Riffod M., Zuh Alexandru, Juhasz G. and Lusztig I., addressed “*To all the members of the ns organization in Oradea of non-Romanian origin*”, it was clearly called on ethnic segregation. It was, clearly, a text and an action of ethnic discrimination, produced, in fact, of political calculations, invoking inexistent provisions whereby the members of the Patriots’ Union who were not Romanian, were encouraged to enroll in the Hungarian People’s Union and the Jewish Democratic Union. The address asked the Romanian exclusivity of this organization, “*without any justification for those who had registered or intended to join and without any real benefit for the Romanian population and beyond any of its requirements, in the place of this expected justification, just the expressing of the confidence in the friends who we are sure they will understand the political deep meaning of this issues ...*”²⁸

In fact, the measure to forbid the non-Romanians to enter the Union of Patriots, despite the invocation of some provisions received from the higher bodies, was found to be abusive and - in a determined way - local generated by obvious political interests of group.

The conclusions drawn by Tóth Imre led to eliminate from the Union of Patriots in Oradea of all those who were not ethnic Romanian. Therefore, only 40 people remained registered. This fact actually showed something else, the desire of the power to implement a new stage of organization and struggle of the Hungarians, that of regrouping in a single pole of power, of the Hungarian People’s Union, which could provide a better coordination of the planned actions, but also the discipline necessary to achieve the final objective²⁹, namely to keep the Northern Transylvania on Hungary.

In short time, the Union of Patriots – the organization of Bihor County, has become a structure composed exclusively of Romanian ethnics. They have organized a meeting on February 18th 1945, where “*with Dr. Simonca presidency all the ethnic Romanians joined the block and entered the Union of Patriots but without any program, any organization and any instructions given by us with*

²⁶ It is certainly a confusion, as they are Nepi Szövetség Magyar - Hungarian People’s Union Mandosz, as an organizational structure of the Hungarians in Romania has been in the interwar period

²⁷ A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Național Popular – Organizația Județeană Bihor, dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 3

²⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 2.

²⁹ Ion Zainea (coordinator), *op. cit.*, p. 166-167

the principles they had from various chauvinist parties. Being a special Romanian party, under the camouflage of the U.P., taking the first meeting, there was divergence between the principles of the U.P. and of the new congeries and, in fact, I wanted to intervene to explain the U.P. line, I was off being Jew ...”³⁰. We are here in a paradoxical situation in which after Tóth Imre’s report practically prompted the leaving of Hungarians from the organization of the Patriots’ Union, it is him who deplores all this in an ostentatious gesture of facade.

On February 18th 1945, in the Heymann cinema hall of Oradea, the general meeting of the Union of Patriots took place, attended, in addition to representatives of the other democratic organizations in the county, about 600-700 Romanians. As we learn of the daily *Viață Nouă* (New Life) “*during this great assembly, the intellectuals and Romanian democratic citizens of the town joined the organization of the Union of Patriots*”³¹. Also during this meeting, they elected the Union of Patriots County Committee, composed of 7 members, and the Board of Directors of the Union of Patriots of 22 people³². On February 20th 1945, the first sitting after the general meeting of the management structure was completed in the following structure: first president - Gheorghe Șimonca (General Attorney), President - Ștefan Lipcei (Lawyer), Executive Chairman - Virgil Ciacan (Lawyer), First Secretary - Dumitru Balogh (Official), Secretary - Iosif Tăutu (Official), treasurer - Michael Arania (Craftsman) plus two members of the Board - Ioan Magdu (Official) and Teodor Popa (Lawyer)³³.

The Board consisted of: Laurențiu Botoș (Judge), Aron Popoviciu (Court Official), Traian Surducan (Sedra Orphan County Chairman), Teodor Prodan (City Hall First Advisers), Gavril Seleșiu (Senior Official of the Municipality), Ioan Abrudan (T.T.P. Engineer), Petre Fărcașiu (Inspector T.T.P.), Iosif Caba (Conductor T.T.P.), Iosif Pop (Police, retired), Alexandru Pop (Police, retired), Alexander Caloș (Finance Official), Ioan Florea (Finance Official), Ioan Rosca (Bank Director), Dumitru Hera (County School Inspector), Ernestine Tiponuțiu (Official), Ioan Mezei (Trader), Vasile Oraș (Craftsman), Peter Hușca (Craftsman), John Breban (Craftsman), Teodor Bențiu (R.R.W. Official), Traian Leu (Worker) and Dumitru Sabău (Worker)³⁴. In the same meeting, there were also elected the members of the organization that would represent the Union of Patriots in the County Parliament of the N.D.F., respectively Șimonca Gheorghe,

³⁰ A.N.- D.J. Bh., fond Partidul Național Popular – Organizația Județeană Bihor, dosar nr. 4/1945, f. 4 and back

³¹ *Înainte de marii adunări a U.P.*, în „Viață Nouă”, an I, nr. 30, 18 februarie 1945, p. 1

³² A.N.- S.J. Bh., fond Partidul Național Popular – Organizația Județeană Bihor, dosar nr. 5/1945, f. 3

³³ *Ibidem*, f. 1

³⁴ *Comitetul de conducere al U.P.*, în „Viață Nouă”, an I, nr. 38, 28 februarie 1945, p. 2

Ciaclan Virgil and Aranici Mihai, as the old representation in the person of Mr. Pop Ionel should be changed. As it can be ascertained, the management structures were composed exclusively by Romanian ethnic citizens.

In conclusion, we can say that the whole situation was caused not by any xenophobic attitude of the local political leaders, Romanian or Hungarian, of the Union of Patriots – the organization of Bihor County. This successful attempt to segregate the formation on ethnic criteria had joined the effort almost general of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania ceded to Hungary after the Vienna Dictate, which aimed at preserving the territory to Hungary. This did not hesitate to separate from the Romanians constituting its own political structures to campaign in this regard. The Hungarian People's Union was the most important of them being in close alliance relationship adjunct to the Romanian Communist Party, a Romanian Communist Party dominated in that period at the decisional level of Hungarian and Jewish ethnic elements in Transylvania, the latter of Hungarian culture. The very representative of the C.C. of the R.C.P. sent to Oradea to target the local organization of the Union of Patriots, Tóth Imre, was a Hungarian Jew of Transylvania, as he himself acknowledges. The conclusions of his report are relevant in this regard. Even he, a messenger of the C.C. of the R.C.P., suggests the separation on ethnic principles which shows us the official line of at least a substantial part of the central management of the Romanian communists.

The leaders of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania did not hesitate for a moment during that period being involved in their national interest, to *acquire* communist feelings, hoping that they will come to meet Moscow and Stalin who has not decided yet the fate of the Northern Transylvania, showing be more loyal and more reliable to the Soviet power than the Romanians. Moscow's decision of March 9th 1945, according that Transylvania lost by Romania after the Vienna Dictate is in the composition of the Romanian state has produced disappointment among the Hungarian minority leaders. Their effort to *communize* after in the interwar period they had, as members of the Hungarian Party, an anti-Soviet position had been in vain. They have not however dropped the idea and the examples are numerous in the years following the World War II.

After the return of the Romanian administration in the Northern Transylvania, the Hungarian local political structures have temporarily suppressed their impulses, even if only of surface, bound to accept the international realities of ethnic cohabitation with the Romanians until the arrival of better times. Locally, shortly after returning of the Transylvanian territories to Romania, on March 18th 1945, were published "The Apeal of the Patriots' Union and of the Plowmen Front to the Romanian Brothers in Oradea and Bihor County" and "The Apeal of the Hungarian People's

Union to the Hungarian Population of Bihor County”, produced and disseminated in the context of restoring the Romanian administration in the Northern Transylvania, which was urging the citizens to discipline and mutual respect³⁵.

Abstract

The political attitude taken by the Bihor County's organization of the Patriots' Union in the first years after the World War II was one that seemed to be xenophobic. However, no one could talk about such thing because the whole situation was caused not by any xenophobic attitude of the local political leaders, Romanians or Hungarians, of the Union of the Patriots - organization of Bihor County. This successful attempt to segregate ethnic formation had joined the effort almost general of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania ceded to Hungary after the Vienna Award, which aimed the preserving of this territory to Hungary. For this, it did not hesitate to separate from the Romanians constituting its own political structures to campaign in this regard. The Hungarian Popular Union was the most important of them, found in a close alliance relationship to the Romanian Communist Party. A Romanian Communist Party dominated in the respective period at the decisional level by ethnic Hungarian and Jewish elements in Transylvania, the latter of Hungarian culture. The very representative Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party sent to Oradea to target the local organization of the Patriots' Union, Tóth Imre, was a Hungarian Jew from Transylvania, as he himself acknowledges. The findings of his report are relevant in this regard. Even he, a messenger of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, suggests the separation on ethnic principles which shows the official line of at least a substantial part of the central management of the Romanian Communists.

Keywords: *the Patriots' Union, Bihor County, Romanian Communist Party, Changing World, Romanians, Hungarians, Jewish*

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³⁵ *Apelul Organizațiilor democratice de masă ale Frontului Național Democrat adresat populațiunii române și maghiare a județului Bihor*, in “Viața Nouă”, an I, nr. 47, 18 martie 1945, p. 3.

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Nicolae Iorga and Oradea

*Mihai D. DRECIN**

Nicolae Iorga, in good faith being named “the historian of his people” dedicated his entire life to the writing of the Romanian past and to the making of our national history in the first half of XXth century. In the central part of his writing and his political activity stood the demonstration of autohtony and continuity of his forerunners in the national geographic space, of economic, cultural, religious and soul unity of Romanian people from Nistru to Tisa, until 1918¹. As a political man, party leader, depute and senator in several legislatures, president of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate, prime-minister, supporter of Royal House- he remarked himself as a defender of the Union from 1918 and consolidator of united Romania².

In this double quality of researcher of the past history and creator of history of his times, Nicolae Iorga comes twice in the city near the Cris River, at 36 years distance of time, during the Austro- Hungarian regime, respectively during Romania Reunited.

After in 1901, he published “The history of Romanian literature in the XVIIIth century”, a paper as Iorga himself acknowledges “with such a difficult subject from whose prelucration they were completely missing the preparatory papers”³ (in the sense of virgin terrain, not approached until

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¹ Look for arguements in his syntheses *Istoria poporului românesc* (*The history of the Romanian people*), Editura Casei Școalelor, Vălenii de Munte, 1922- 1927; *Istoria românilor*, f.e., București, 1936- 1939.

² Mihail Oprișescu, *Partidul Naționalist – Democrat (1910- 1938) condus de Nicolae Iorga* (*The Nationalist – Democrat Party (1910- 1938) led by Nicolae Iorga*, Tip. Fed Print SA, București, 2000; Petre Țurlea, *N. Iorga în viața politică a României*, (*N. Iorga in the political life of Romania*), Editura Enciclopedica București, 1995; Idem, *N. Iorga. O viață pentru neamul românesc* (*N. Iorga. A life for the Romanian people*), Editura ProHistoria, București, 2001.

³ N. Iorga, *O viață de om așa cum a fost*, (*The life of a man as it was*), Editura Minerva, București, 1964, p. 211, edition prepared by Valeriu Râpeanu and Sanda Râpeanu.

then, even on small pieces, by the predecessors –n.n.), the author feels the need of its completion with unpublished material from the libraries of Blaj and Greek- Catholic Oradea. It is about the studies owned to the representatives of Ardelean School and to their students.

It must be underlined the fact that at the end of XIX century, once with the proclamation of the Kingdom of Romania (1881), especially after 1900, the Bucharest shows more and more its attention towards Romanian Transylvania, towards the cultural, economic, political elite from Braşov, Sibiu, Blaj, Năsăud, Beiuş, Oradea, Lugoj, Caransebeş, Arad. They were taken into consideration both personalities belonging to the older generations but also the young ones around “Tribuna” of Sibiu or around Octavian Goga. The personal and family relationships that intensify and consolidate, including through reciprocal visits⁴, fortified the fundament on which it was build the enlarged Romania.

In this context, Nicolae Iorga makes more visits in Transylvania – the one from 1902 interesting us especially because of the wish to underline his ties with Oradea.

⁴ See the case Partenie Cosma, the executive director of “Albina” Bank from Sibiu (1886- 1916) in excelent relations with the university and political world from the Kingdom of Romania. Cf. Mihai D. Drecin, “O instituție bancară din Transilvania în vremurile Primului Război Mondial. Studiu de caz: Banca “Albina” from Sibiu (1914- 1919)” in vol. *Primul Război Mondial. Perspectivă istorică și istoriografică, The First World War. Historical and Historiographical perspective*, coordonators: Ioan Bolovan, Gheorghe Cojocaru, Oana Mirela Tamaş, Editura Presa Universitară Clujeană/ Academia Română- Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj – Napoca, 2015, p. 480. N. Iorga, *Ceva despre Ardealul românesc. Viața culturală românească astăzi (Două conferințe cu privire la românii din Ardeal și Ungaria)/ Something about the Romanian Ardeal. The cultural Romanian life today (Two conferences with regard to the Romanians from Ardeal and Hungary)*, Editura Onișor, Năsăud, 1907. It results that N. Iorga was at Sibiu in 1906 where he sustains the second conference published in the volume presented above. Ion I. C. Brătianu, *Din Țara Moților. Amintiri, From the country of Apuseni Mountains. Memories*, Imprimeriile “Independența”, București, 1924, p. 9- 12. In 1907 he visits the areal and he saves the Church from Albac in which “they were cuminecated Horea and his honest fellows”. The Hungarian administrative local authorities wished to sell the the wood of the church. Brătianu buys it, transports it to Turda, than with the special wagons takes it on his property from Florica. Here Nicolae from Sohodol rebuilds it. Pr. Piso from Brad gives away the imperial gates from the Church of Cloșca from Cărpiniș and the glass from the wood of cerisier from the church of Mestecăniș, where Crișan made his swears.

Firstly he stopped to Blaj, where, together with the research of manuscripts, he concludes durable relations with I. Micu Modovan and Augustin Bunea⁵.

In the spring of 1902, Iorga arrives to Oradea “where the activity of Mecena of the understanding bishop Samuil Vulcan, his ties with a Șincai and other forerunners of Romanian culture in the XVIII th century gathered in the library of the diecesis so much unused material, comprising also the given chronic of the Principate of Muntenia”. The bishop of Greek-Catholic Oradia at that time was Mihail Pavel that he names “the great benefactor” which “did not take anything for himself giving all for the cherishing and enlightening of the people”. Although he did not know him personally, he kept in touch with the canonic Neș, the father of the future professor Teodor Neș⁶.

Interesting is the observation that he makes on the Greek-Catholic Clergy from Oradea in comparison with the ones from Blaj. If the clergy from Blaj were a combination of “proud romanticism, by severe peasantry and of catholic exclusivism without nothing from the Jezuit finesse; they were also happy and rapid people, not without a high culture, but whom, used with the advantages of a peaceful life of province, would not have died for a belief and they would not stand up for an idea”⁷, the people from Oradea were on the opposite pole. They looked like on the times of Vulcan (Samuil –n.n.), with “bolden heads, longue moustaches of Hungarian nobles from the days of Pavel Chinezul (1432- 1494, Romanian ruler of Timișoara, general captain of the army of the king Matia Corvin –n.n.), the old Ottoman clothes lagging behind, the long pipe as a Turkish one. And not the least the foreign accent of our ears....The word had fallen slowly, interrupted by slow comfortable falling or full of meaning, from the mouth full of tabac of these old men who nurtured with their modest isolation great dreams, which nobody liked to confess”⁸. With other words, if Blaj

⁵ N. Iorga, *O viață de om...*, p. 213-215. University studies at Roma, canonics and professors at the schools from Blaj, close collaborators of the mitropolitues Ioan Vancea and Victor Mihali, author of papers of great historical and theological eruditions, brave continuators of Ardelean School, members of Romanian Academy, fighters for the national cause and the modernization of the society of Romanians from Transylvania. See more recently the study of Marcel Știrban, “From the life and the activity of the historian Augustin Bunea (1857- 1909)”, in vol. *Din Istoria României, XI, Aniversări și comemorări. Bibliografii (From the history of Romania, XI, Anniversations and commemorations. Bibliographies*, Ed. Napoca Star, Cluj-Napoca, 2014- 2015, p. 63- 86.

⁶ N. Iorga, *O viață de om... (A life of men...)*, p. 215.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 213.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 215.

brought with him “the atmosphere of the prelats of the court from Austrian times”. With other words, if Blaj brought with him “the atmosphere of the vallets of the court from Austrian period”, more communicative, more full of life, smiling, the Greek – Catholic Oradea was cold, silent, full of secrets, modest by its clothes, talking a Romanian language full with a lot of Hungarianism. The particularity of behaviour I explained through the geopolitical position of the two important centers of iluminism of the Romanian culture. If Blaj, was in a demographical zone massively Romanian, Oradea was placed at the ethno-demographical margins of Romanian geographical space, subjected to the direct pression of Hungarization that came from Pusta Panoniei. Moreover, the city of Blaj was inhabited in its great majority of Romanians, while in Oradea, in 1900, the Hungarians represented 89, 55% (48. 456 inhabitants), and Romanians only 6,43% (3481 inhabitants) recenezed after maternal language⁹. One more thing, we should bear in mind is the influence of the protestant way of life and behaviour well represented in Oradea, one more cold and subtle than the Catholic one or the Orthodox one, in spite of the activity of the powerful Roman- catholic and Greek- Catholic from Oradea, which in the last two centuries tried to diminish the protestant inheritance of the city, so as the Orthodox one from the entire areal of Bihor.

In 1938, N. Iorga is, again, the guest of Oradia. At December 1st, on the territory of the Western Theatre, he sustained in front of a numerous auditorium, the conference “For the defence of the Western boundary”¹⁰. Its text was published in the review Familia, no. 1/ 1939, a special number dedicated to the idea of union at Romanians which emphasizes the small union from 1859, but also the great union from 1918, on the achievements of Romanian people both before but also after 1918, until the day. Besides the historical text, the number in discussion publish poetry, theatre,

⁹ *Recensământul din 1900 (The censorship from 1900)*, Editura Staff, Cluj- Napoca, 1999. p. 110- 111. In the same censorship achieved by authorities of the Hungarian state, according to the religion we had the next datas. Hungarian Roman – Catholics, reformed and unitariens – 34 410 inhabitants (62, 91). Izraeliți 12.338 (22,80 %) , Orthodox Romanians and Greek – Catholics 6760 inhabitants (12, 49 %). See the numerical evolution of the inhabitants of Oradea, including on ethnies and religion in Mihai D. Drecin , “Considerații asupra evoluției demografice a orașului Oradea, pe baza recensămintelor oficiale (1880 – 2011)” (Considerations on the demographical evolution of the city of Oradea, on the basis of official conscripts (1880- 2011)”, in vol. *Economie și Istorie. Dialog și interdisciplinaritate, In Honorem prof. univ. dr. Ioan Lumperdean la împlinirea vârstei de 60 de ani*, coordonatori: Dana Bako, Iosif Marin Balog, Rudolf Graf, Răzvan V. Mustață, Editura Academia Română/ Centrul de Studii Transilvane, Cluj- Napoca, 2015, p. 513- 524.

¹⁰ *Familia* (Oradea), January 1939, p. 33- 50.

memories, political comments to the day which made reference to the idea of “union” and the dangers that were threatening it at 1938¹¹.

The times in which Nicolae Iorga came to Oradea were troubled in the international context. The corrections of the boundaries imposed in 1918- 1919 by the fight of the nations from the multinational Empires (Austro- Hungarian, Russian, Ottoman) and agreed upon the decisions of the Peace Conference from Paris (1919- 1920), mentioned in the treaties of peace from Versailles, Saint – Germain, Neuilly, Sevres and Trianon – was sustained by the Fascist Germany and Italy, Horthyst- Fascist Hungary, Bulgaria, Soviet Union. Moreover, the Hungarian revisionism manifested more and more ofensively in Transilvania, being financed by the neighbouring Hungary¹². The anti-revisionist movement from Romania, including Oradea and Bihor¹³, was trying to bloc the Hungarian offensive by cultural actions which framed perfectly in the doctrine of cultural nationalism and humanism cultivated by Nicolae Iorga since 1910¹⁴.

Considering, in good reasoning, that December 1 st 1918 was the astral year of the history of Romanians, N. Iorga wrote and delivered speeches each year around the great event about its historical roots, the sacrifices made up by nation in order to accomplish the perenial dream, the duty to keep awake the great political and military achievement from 1918¹⁵. His thoughts about this important event he spread in conferences hold in front of an auditorium more and more divers from a social point of view, but on everybody’s understanding, in articles of the gazzettes, studies and scientific volumes, interpelations in the chambers of the Romanian Parliament.

¹¹ *Ibidem*. See “Sumarul” where are stipulated the articles and the literary products published by the: Victor Papilian, M. G. Samarineanu, G. Tulbure, Tiberiu Moşoiu, Tudor Mănescu, Augustin Chirilă, George Bota, Dr. V. German, C. S. Anderko, George Sfârlea, Alexandru Olteanu, Paul Constant, Tiron Albani – cultural personalities, scientific and political of first instance of the Romania of the time.

¹² See Mihai Stratulat, *Revişionismul şi neorevişionismul ungar*, Editura Globus, Bucureşti, 1994, p. 230- 274. Cristian Troncotă, *Istoria serviciilor secrete româneşti. De la Cuza la Ceauşescu*, (*The history of secret services. From Cuza to Ceauşescu*), Editura Ion Cristoiu SA, Bucureşti, 1999, p. 169- 176.

¹³ Dr. Lazăr Iacob, Teodor Neş, Ştefan Mărcuş, *Bihorul strajă la hotare*, Editura Casa Naţională a judeţului Bihor, Tipografia Diecezană, Oradea, 1933; Nicolae Iorga, *În luptă cu absurdul neorevişionism maghiar*, (*Fighting with the absurdity of Hungarian neorevişionism*), Tipografia Diecezană, Oradea, 1939.

¹⁴ Nicolas M. Nagy – Talavera, N. Iorga. *O Biografie*, (*Nicolae Iorga – A biography*), Editura Institutului European, Iaşi, 1990, p. 12, 18.

¹⁵ Gheorghe Sbârna, “Nicolae Iorga şi păstrarea < icoanei unităţii naţionale > from December 1 1918” in vol. N. Iorga (1871- 1940). *Studii şi documente* (N. Iorga (1971- 1940). *Studies and documents*, IV, Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2007, p. 473- 482.

The conference from Oradea is a remarkable synthesis of the history of the place, caught in the national history of Romanians and of Central Europe, but also with pertinent sendings to the political movements of the year 1938 on the European plan.

From the very beginning Nicolae Iorga declares firmly that the discourse that he will keep in front of the “Saints fathers bishops and their beloved listeners” *is not a simple conference but a process he fulfilling the role of prosecutor*. He motivates his assertion by saying “the conferences are for another times, for the peaceful times and for the assured times, for the times when before of a people does not stay united the daresness and the most characteristic stupidity in the negation of the fundamental laws of the nation which is beyond (Romanian – n.n.) It is not about of a conference as for the good times, it is about an assertion as for the time of threath which are directed on the meaning, which from generation to generation, through our admirable peasantry. I had them there”¹⁶. In consequence, the ideas presented are framed in a “process (in which) I have today the function of prosecutor against the ones that without justice try to hit in our law, also of defender in the same time of the saint laws of Romanian people. It is a judicial task which I have on my account and the judge must be fair, but brave, in consequence with all fairness and with all the courage of a judge which knows all the pieces of the process and knows who are the fair and true things and which are the falsified things.”¹⁷

The age, life experience and the professional knowledge – as history- summed up by a life, gives her the moral right to talk, him, Iorga, being “one of the few survivors of the generation who decided these boundaries of Romanians and who have the right and duty to defend them”¹⁸.

Before concluding on the history of Oradea and Bihor, in fact the history of the Great Romania, in paralell with the history of international relations at European level of those times, N. Iorga caracterized the Romanian people as being “a great people and a humble people, a people that do not offend and not purge. Our soul denies any of these means used to bring violence to other human souls. They can not close the eyes concerning the social and cultural benefits which we (Romanians) had achieved for us all (in the sens for all cohabiting ethnies – n.n.)”¹⁹.

¹⁶ *Familia (Oradea)*, seria a III-a, nr. 1, 1939, p. 33.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

Analyzing the international political constellation from the Europe of the moment, Iorga has in mind our relationships with the close neighbours but also with the great Western powers.

The Hungarian danger Iorga considers it as being the most important, not necessarily by the military force of this Hungarian neighbour but through the incisive propaganda made by the entire world for the himerical territorial laws where always there were minorities in comparison with the local inhabitants²⁰. Iorga makes reference to some “tendentious books” published by the historians and other personalities of Hungarian culture, appearances of last hour, in which the Romanians are “deep and unfarely offended”. Metodically, the Romanian historian points out the basic ideas of the respective papers coming immediately with its counterarguements. This incloses both data of evenimential history framed in regional and European context, but also the arguments of comportamental logic not only one time dressed in the clothes of fine irony.

From the paper coordonated by the philosopher, literary historian and the estetician of leftist orrientation Georg Lukacs, entitled “The Hungary and the civilization”²¹, Iorga debates the assertion according to which only the Hungarians created the civilization in this part of Europe, less the Romanians. The answer of the Romanian historian is direct and severe when he says: “if it is a Hungarian civilization, civilisation of borrowing, by admirable capability to borrow from everybody, but with all incapable to introduce something personal, if it exists such a civilization of transmitting, with big churches, with imposing palaces, in these places of ours, in the fundamental life which is the life of the peasant, they are not only two kinds of houses: the house of the Romanian peasant and the house of the Germans from Mozela and Rhine, which belongs to the sachsen. Besides these, I try to discover what represents the conquering nation (Hungarian – n. n.) in the field of the fundamental civilization and I reach to no conclusion”. Finally it comes to an irony when it is made reference to the floral motif with which the secui decorated the Palace of Culture from Târgu Mureş: “the tulip which is graved on all the trays from Braşov which were given to the daughters as wedding present to all nationalities. With a tulip is too less in order to reclame a great chapter in the history of human civilization”²².

²⁰ „the crazy dreams of the lords from Budapest”. Cf. *Ibidem*.

²¹ „with the foreword of the two Tharaud: Jerome and Jean, who bring from time to time to us (in Romania –n.n.) with friendly image”. Cf. *Ibidem*, p. 37.

²² *Ibidem*. Moreover, we would add, even the tulip is taken over from the turks in the same time with the organization of Pasa ‘s domain from Buda and the dissapearance of Hungary as a state

In the same volume, the young historian Eckhardt Francisc²³ published a study in which he makes endeavours to consolidate the old theory of the migration of the vlachs from the South in the North of Danube starting with the XII century. The Romanians who stay massively in Hungary as “a people of shepards”, so people who raised sheeps, used to have a life of migratories that receive from the Hungarian masters, the task to cut off the woods and to arrange the agricultural terrains in order to practice agriculture. From the XIVth century, the leaders of these colonies of vlachs – the cnezial leaders (kenez in the text – n.n) mix through marriages with the families of Hungarian masters, receiving nobility titles. The rest of the Romanians remained in their social condition of Servs together with Hungarian servs²⁴. From all this scenary embraced by the Hungarian historiography with scientific roots since the XVIIIth century, N. Iorga subscribes, on the basis of documents, to the process of Hungarianisation of some families of voievods, cnezi and juzi from Transilvania that stood on the basis of the great families of great Hungarian nobles from the province (Iosika, Bekes, Kornis)²⁵. Referring to the late migration of Romanians in Transilvania, where they would have found the Hungarians, Nicolae Iorga comes with a logical counter-argument when he says “If the shepards came later, no one comes to be servant and slave, but, if there is someone slave and servant, this means that he is the old inhabitant that was defeated because no one did not throw him out from his old supposed country; if they came in another place, this means that they looked for something better: they did not come to decrease their situation and honour in their new country that they might have found it”²⁶. Not even the young historian Eckhardt, captivated by the theories of Romanian migratory shepards theory, do not escape the irony of Iorga which says “How it is known, against the shepards, the ships never stood up, but very often protested the dunkays”²⁷.

²³ N. Iorga names him “one of the smartest historians from the new generation of free Hungary (after the First World War – n.n.)”. In can be also an irony from the moment that it remains claustrated in old historiographical mentalities from Austro-Hungary. Cf. *Ibidem*.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 35- 36. Passing by, N. Iorga talks about a discussion that he had with somebody from Ioşika family, to whom he reminded the Romanian origine of his family. The reaction of the Hungarian noble is thus registrated: “Mr. Ioşika, I insist to tell, that he did not get angry at all but, he smiled and his smile made us see better how Romanian he is”.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

The historian Gherevits Zoltan is more restrictive with the historical time of Romanians who would have came in Transylvania only after the invasion of tatars. Before the area had been abandoned, because of the fact that the goths, gepizi, avarii, slavians would have threwn all Roman colonists, Hungarians finding here the pecenegi and cumans. Moreover, the areal of provenance of the migratory vlachs is localized in Southern Istria. Nicolae Iorga dismantles, with logical arguments, all this theory. He says "No one do not settle in an unpopulated region,... that it has to be somebody to explain the country, because otherwise the bears from the woods will eat you and spoil all you do, it must be somebody who introduces the place where you want to settle. This is also valuable for Hungarians and Sachsen"²⁸. On the other hand, the German migratories, avarians, slavians, pecenegi who fought with the Hungarians, "there are not people whom to work the land, they are neither shepards, but they go on their horses, they sit somewhere in a military centre where they gather the tents because they are colonists all...they were living in primitive conditions as a people who is not fed from the work of his hands. In consequence to assert that it existed barbarians in the Dacia of Traian from a moment of time before is the best argument for the <existence> of Romanians because it can not exist the parazitism without the people of whose behalf it lives this parasite. Also, Hungarians themselves are a parasite people which did not settle in any region, until they did not know that it exist a popular mass incapable to defend itsef, but capable to work and give them means of living"²⁹. Concerning the geographic base of migration of Roman colonists – Southern Istria, N. Iorga underlines with his exceptional logic: "The lower part of Istria is like the uper part, only stone; there the sheeps don't have what to eat...How do you imagine in this little peace of land to be all the forefathers of Romanian people?" And now, it comes the irony: "Wouldn't be left for us only to say that they were (the forefathers of Romanians – n.n) in the hands of a Hungarian magnate and when they opened it, it came out from there a group of little men that grew up until they reached normal people"³⁰. In the end, the lack of written documents whom to prove the presence of Romanians at North of Danube, but also in Transilvania, only in later centuries rather than the presence of Hungarians, is thus logical explained: "We write today also for things without value and we keep all the archives; but on that time there were some extraordinary things or changes of boundaries, in order to exist a written act. Also in general it is written much more about people who were not kind than of people who are kind.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 39- 40.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 40-41.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 40.

In consequence, in the proportion in which there are fewer documents, it is observable what a kind people we are, who do not provoked any kind of quarelling in front of justice and in consequence we do not need documents to guarantee our mastership”³¹.

The broaden horizon of knowledge of European and global history, of the psychologies of the people, allows to Nicolae Iorga to make the separation between the ambitions and the frustrations of political leading class and the mass of Hungarian people. He stated: “So when I talk about Hungarians, it is about of some people from Budapest who live as in the years 1700, with the same ideas, with the same feelings, with the same prejudices and with what is necessary in order to ruin for once their country, as their forefathers through the same habits demolished it for once and if the Austrians had not come to take them (Hungarians) out from the grave sealed by the Turks, it would not have existed a Hungary. Because, the old Hungary was killed by the representatives of Hungarian monarchy, in the battle of Mohacs, abdicating from their national duty”³². In contradiction with this minority of elitists, Iorga knew and supported “...people from the country – one that he told me, above all, a task to earn the bread for me and my people. This bread it can be gained perfectly in this country (Romania – n.n.), nobody does not prevent this, asking what nation belongs somebody in order to earn his living. We are workers of Ardeal and do not enter in the same band with the parasites from Ardeal (Hungarian noble men supporters of Budapest – n.n.) of our nation. Also, since then the group maintained its existence (as supporter of Romania – n.n.) and the ones who followed me, encountered often this kind people who made the same declaration”³³. The obvious delimitation between usual Hungarian and the medieval aristocracy it makes it very clear when the Romanian historian says: “Not between us (Romanians- n.n.) and Hungarian people who is a very capable people, very hardworking, very brave, very loyal or towards whom the state who reaches the margins of its rights, but between us and the ones whom from centuries exploited, brought their own nation to poverty and to the condition of animals”³⁴. In consequence, Nicolae Iorga completes his national – European belief of the peaceful coexistence between nations with the following specification: “I love any honest, hardworking, right among people. To the question “Why you do not take into consideration that for us Budapest is Mecca?” he answers: “If it is about by a Mecca of spirit and of culture, each of us can go to this Mecca?

³¹ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

³² *Ibidem*, p.36.

³³ *Ibidem*.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

If it is about a Mecca of spirit and culture, each of us can go to this Mecca. If there is about a Mecca that is not the black expensive stone of Caaba, but the old symbol of Hungarian kings from the Middle Age, obviously that the way towards this Budapest is for anybody a betrayal towards a state that has the duty and has the power to defend itself.”³⁵

The cousin country Poland, is accused that by its external policy made by the minister Beck, it achieves a “change of front in each moment, pursuing aims that can be never accomplished”³⁶. It is understood the reaching out of Germany and Hungary, that meant the violation of Czechoslovakian territory and the suport of anti-Romanian actions of Hungarian aristocracy³⁷, considered as “very high ilusions” in their endeavours of preserving their own territorial integrity. “A relief of Poland from this politics would mean, no doubt, one of the greatest benefits for this admirable people”- concludes N. Iorga³⁸.

Towards *The Nationalist Germany*, the great military power of the moment, N. Iorga has an attitude of apeasement considering that “today (this – n.n.) is too nice to suport the hand of some categories from Poland whom correspond to the aristocrate class from Hungarians”. This hope the historian shares also towards the Italy, asserting “that never an Italian soldier will not die, to fulfill the crazy dream of the masters from Budapest”³⁹. Unfortunately, here he got wrong.

In order to close, I would say today, the analysis of the European geopolitical situation, N. Iorga expresses himself in subtle manner towards *the diplomacy of our traditional allies France and England* which they do not even not nominate. The rejection of the conciliatory French – English towards the offensive of the revisionism of Germany, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria is made indirectly warning the aggressive Poland who attacked Cechoslovakia: “I believe – says Iorga- they make (the Poles –n.n.) very big illusions also in what concerns ... the elites from the same story that are no doubt our allies, just that they make two many things which we do not know (Romanians – n.n.) so that we have no more the conscience that they still are our allies”⁴⁰.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

³⁷ See the Polish- German agreement from August 24 1938 concerning the actions against Czechoslovakia and the occupation of Czechoslovakian region Tesin from October 2-3 1938, respectively the gathering of old family ties between Hungarian noble men and Polish panes.

³⁸ N. Iorga, “Întru apărarea..”, p. 35.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 34.

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 35.

The conference typed in the review *Familia* is a logic and precise architecture, the ideas that they needed to be underlined being titrated by expressive, direct and mobilising titles⁴¹.

In continuation, the senior lecturer approaches events from local history, history of Oradea and Bihor County, interpreting issues and explaining the relationship Romanian – Hungarians, the role of local inhabitants in the economic affirmation of the areal found Hungarian rule⁴².

N. Iorga discusses about “the tradition” that Hungarian historiography is transmitting to Oradea as a necropolis of the kings Ladislau and Sigismund of Luxemburg, by the virtue of which Budapest has territorial pretensions on the areal. “To burry yourself somewhere – says Iorga- this does not create only an extraordinary right: not what you give to the land from your ashes is an argument but what you give us all from your creative energy. Yes, a number of Hungarian kings, among whom some were so very less Hungarians such as Sigismund of Luxemburg. Having a French origine, being a predecessor of the dynasty of Angevins, all French, the chief of a new aristocracy of chevalliers that included a lot of Romanians, all brave people of Maramureș, from the Country of Hațeg and so on, and, in what concerns his situation, it was that of the Roman emperor. Hungary was for him a mean through which he served his imperial ambition, all these kings it might have died there, but from where the argument that, if in your house somebody dies, his heritiers to come and to make process because our father died in your house, <the house is our inheritance>. I confess that I don’t see the argument... So, if the Hungarian kings are burried in Oradea- in fact their graves never came up – it is only a tradition of hazardated burrial, not even a popular memory (subl.ns) To us, in Argeș, there was no stone on the grave of Voda Basarab from 1340- 50, but all the world knew what to say: look, here is burried the architect. Or in the parts of Buzău there was no sign which to say that there they were the grave and the treasures of lady Neaga, but the people knew, and they took out the church and the stones from the grave and the necklesses and the court. There is a popular tradition while in these places there is no popular tradition in connection with the Saint Ladislau but only a literary memory, a memory for the cronical”⁴³.

The Hungarians, says Iorga, came after 1100 at East from Tisa. Defeated in Western Europe as any “predatory band that looks for the gain

⁴¹ The subtitles on whose basis we synthetized the ideas until now they are: *Politica Poloniei* “The politics of Poland”, “Anumiți oameni de la Budapesta”(Some people from Budapest), “Cărți tendențioase”(Tendentious books).

⁴² Subtitles: “Rostul nostru în aceste regiuni” (Our mission in these regions) and “Rolul macedonenilor”(The role of macedoneans”

⁴³ N. Iorga, “Întru apărarea”, p. 41, 42-43.

where it is.” So, they take the way of the Byzantine Empire where “there were castles, cultivated camps, economic civilization old of a few thousands years”. In order to reach there they had to pass the Ardeal with “forests, searched paths that served for the food of local inhabitants...It would have been a crazy from the side of Hungarian kings, so if they would have left the ways of the West to go after what?”. Here the conquerers found Romanian inhabitants. Only a few in numbers, the Hungarians “they are spread here and there; so that it is not an installed people, but one that spreaded around. In the old sense of the world, spread means the stone that comes from the arch, it falls a little stone here, another there, so that they are spread the Hungarians in these places (in Ardeal n.n.). This is obvious until here. The bischopal registry from Oradea of the Roman – Catholic Bishopric “I see our peasants and then how they are even now”⁴⁴. Moreover, the name of the villages and places are of Romanian origine with roots in the world of Dacians. The architecture of the households, of houses and their surroundings, the way of work of the land and the care of the animals and ships is in “his traditional way of Romanian people, somewhere”⁴⁵.

From all these reasons with direct reference to Oradea, N. Iorga concludes: “In consequence it remains only a single thing: the presence, temporal and incidental, of Hungarian kings that stay in the fortress, that do not create cities, excepting the original fortress. The first fortress of surveillance before passing the Apuseni Mountains and entering in Ardeal, this settlement of Hungarian kings was made in the middle of Romanian population how it is shown in these areals by the nomenclature with a clear Romanian character⁴⁶.

Nicolae Iorga knew and, so, he underlined the important role that the macedo- Romanian sellers had in the modernization of Central Europe, during the passage from feudalism to capitalism. In the particular case of Oradea, N.Iorga knew that, during the XVIII th century, after the Habsburg conquest of Transilvania, besides the peasants’ world of Romanians from Velenta and other suburbias apeared around the military Fortress from Oradea, the Macedo – Romanian sellers gave the configutation of the city of Oradea. After how they raised “this wonderful church” from the centre of the city (The Church with the Moon – n.n.), they were the factor of modernization of Timișoara, Buda, Pesta, Triesta, Viena etc., and “they were everywhere”. It is underlined that “from the life of the company from Macedonia, it developed the Romanian cultural life”. On this financial – banking fundament it is built the Romanian iluminism of Samuil Vulcan

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 41-42.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 43.

⁴⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 43-44.

until Mihail Pavel. For Hungarians Oradea “was a corner of province where some people were writing in latin a few unusual books. It was not any sign of national pride in all their literature from these sides, while our literature was an enthusiastic song dedicated to the past, present and future of the Romanian people. If it is about culture, what it meant Oradea for our culture, it can not be compared with that course of cultural content, entirely abstract, teoogical, fiological, of some Hungarians that stood around here”⁴⁷.

In the next chapters, N. Iorga anchors in the present of his time and transmits his faith in the future. They are encouragements, based on the achievements of “Romanian epoch” of only two decennies, a duty of all Romanians from the Western boundaries of the country, in troubling European political times⁴⁸.

After 1918, the Romanian state gave land to the peasants, including the Hungarian ones, reform that Hungary did not succeed to make in his own postwar state. “You see the supreme gratitude of us: we gave land to the Hungarian, not moving them who knows where, in order not to become dangerous elements but, even if they could be dangerous, on the land that his forefathers had. A unique case in the history of all people with an admirable generosity, indeed Romanian and Christian”. Iorga says in continuation:”I am amazed by what I see. Here there are peasants that have their land, peasants that woke up to another life. Here not only that they are raised our churches, from which some of them are pride achievements, but next to the cottage of former servant, it is built a high, luminous house, covered with bricks. All that read from the bricks, layed on these lands, it does not mean only what it normally comes out from the liberty and economic growth of the peasant. We created here here a life of human liberty for all⁴⁹. In this way, it was put an end to the cruel domination of Hungarian aristocrats who, “as some vampires, that suck the human blood without choice, if the blood comes from the Hungarians or from Romanians”. In consequence, it dissapeared “those Afrikan houses where the vegetal roof is higher than the walls and where almost a sunshine can get through until the house where he is living, lays down and dies the most rejected and humiliated from all servants that had always been in Europe. And this not only valid for ours, but for theirs”⁵⁰.

For our historical rights, that we got by work and sufference, for the achievements from the last two decennies, Romanians must “fight”⁵¹, to

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 45- 46.

⁴⁸ Subtitles are entitled “What do we have achieved”, “We are fighting each other”, “How there are strenghtened the consciousness”, “Our duty”.

⁴⁹ N. Iorga, “Intru apărarea”, p. 47.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 38-39.

defend them- says Iorga. This is the duty of the priests and teachers, independantly of their religious confession, of Romanian peasants. Thinking on the possibiity of imixting the interests of some great powers between Romanians, Hungarians or Bulgariens, the great historian was reffering the conditions for success “who wants to beat with us ... to come, but only us and only them”.⁵²

In the end of his speech, N. Iorga makes it very clear the purpose of his coming to Oradea: “I did not come here to make speeches of great days, but only to strenghten your consciousness (subl. ns) and I don’t believe that them are gathered otherwise that by the fact of deep knowledge of the past of our people with his rights. It does not exist no further action than this awareness of our people, until the last peasant... A people has the right – and I would like that this formula to remain in the mind of everybody – a people has the historical right on some land only in the case when his possession was never interrupted, when in the middle they were not two foreign dominations and when the conquest of his territory was made with his own forces”⁵³.

With the characteristical objectivity, as a result of the accumulations of an enormous baggage of datas and learnings from the history of the world, but also for their own political experience, N. Iorga ended his conference making reference to a source of oral history, as we would say today: “A Hungarian minoritarian, an old friend – says Iorga- was telling: to wish an old country (Hungary – n.n.) it means to re-enter in a feudal regime which, by the intelligence and by the spirit of sacrifice of Romanian people, it ceased. But this does not mean only this. This (Romania – n.n.) is a receiving country for everybody, because is a wise country and quiet that did not look for misunderstandings. To re- enter in Hungary, this mean to associate to a political adventure, renewed from year to year and whom will drive safely, if they will not find a smart man to stop this. This I told to our Hungarians from these places”⁵⁴.

Having in mind the theme of the present conference, “Nicolae Iorga – our contemporary”, we try a brief radiography of the political situation from the Europe of our days, in the same context as the Romanian one – by the veil of the ideas launched by the great historian in 1902 and 1938 in Oradea.

From the considerations of Iorga towards the cultural atmosphere which was entertained by the Greek – Cathololic Bishopric from Oradea of the year 1902 – we must retain the role of culture in the prezervation of

⁵² *Ibidem*, p. 50.

⁵³ *Ibidem*, p. 45.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 48- 49.

nationality. Without a cultural life based on tradition and its endeavour of permanent renewal, a nation will perish, disappear. The affirmation through authentic culture, full of patriotism and opened towards Europeanism is an actual and permanent objective of the Romania of our times.

Still, lately, the idea of multiculturality, at the level of each country from European Union, starts to be put on question mark, being even labeled as a failure and danger, in the conditions of the surprising and massive emigration from Orient. In other words, the political factors of decision of our country must support each other, on all the possible ways, the learning, assimilation and development of Romanian language and culture by all the citizens of the country, independantly of ethnîe. Concomitently, the values of the culture and national science must be propagated at European and world level, as an example of intelectual force of our people, always opened towards new, capable to contribute to the culture and the modern science of humanity, with ideas and models even in world premier.

On the other hand, the suport of cultivation of the language and of the cultures of ethnical minorities from our country is enrolled in the principles of European democracy, that pretends the insurance of the interethnical harmony, a cohabitation with the ethnical majority following the model “not some near others, but some together with the others, in a peaceful and fruitful collaboration”.

The ideas and calls of the conference from 1938, marked by the situation political of the time, are in concordance with the political realities of our times.

Making a tour of horizon on politics of our neighbours, Nicolae Iorga transmitted us a sum of fears that are valable also today for Romania.

On the first plan stays the Hungarian danger that continues to involve in the destabilization of our country, by a multitude of ways and forms. The governors from Budapest use with ability the Hungarian minority from Transylvania, on the fundal of narrow interests of Romanian parties, of corruption and of week achievements in the administration of the country by the governments from Bucharest. If in 1938, URSS was staying still in a “splendid isolation” while we were part from the already traditional alliance with France and England, today the isolated Russia found economic and political allies in Central Europe with the special intention to undermine the unity of European Unity. Among these, Hungary is in the first places. In consequence, it is obvious the suport granted of Russia granted to Hungary in the last minutes of peaceful silence in Central Europe. The present day Hungary as interwar period and communist Hungary can not hope to a dismanteling of our country by a military action, even through the suport of “military camps organized by the Security and Partium” by extremist

elements from the ranks of Hungarian ethnics. Still, an international favourable conjunction, of the kind August 1940, could annulate the enormous difference between them and us in military and demographical plane. Thus, let us not forgive that the Hungarians, per ansamble, can be more easily fanatized as “the slow” Romanian people.

If after 1938, when Romania and Poland had direct boundaries, N. Iorga talked of cousin Poland as about a friend, sometimes, with surprising reactions of friendship with Hungary, postume valorification of nobility sensibilities of our Polish panes with Hungarian aristocrats of the Middle Age, today *our neighbour in the north is Ukraine*, taken out in 1991 from Soviet Union. For our country, the ucrainean independent state represents a real danger, in spite of Romanian – Ukrainian Treaty closed by the president Emil Constantinescu, less advantageous for us by its stipuations, including the ones from the secret additional protocol of the treaty. Ukraine does not have a past of independent state. In short time after the setting up as a medieval state it was attached to tsarist Russia. After the period Bogdan Hmelniŭki, short upheavals of independance we registrate between the years 1917- 1920 and 1941- 1944, always under foreign influence and control, soon defeated by bolshevik arms. In consequence, the ucrainians could not burn the nationalist burn with extremist notes, particular for each national state at its beginnings. This spirit instead to diminish today, in raport with ethnical minorities (Russiana, Romanians, Polish, Hungarians) is exacerbated even above the phenomenon known in Soviet epoch. Combined with generalizated corruption, the decrease of the level of life of usua population, Russian military pressures, the loss of Crimeea, the decrease of Western European political suport and American, Ukraine tends to become a theatre favourable to the outburst of a civil war, a politica uncontrolled areal. The possible political reintegration in the Comunity of Independant States (CSI) found under Russia’s control would complicate the security of our country. Even if we bet on good relations Romanian – Ukrainian how can be explain a recent declaration of a high military ucrainean official, it is true ulteriouir retractated, that Ukraine is positionning an important military unity at the boundary with our country, from which it gave us reasons that Romania is a much more dangerous than Russia?!

In 1938, Nicolae Iorga does not enroll between enemies *Bulgaria and Ingoslavia*. Maybe because in front of these states it was a monarchy of German origine (Bulgaria) as in our country, and with Iugoslavia we were related by the marriage between the former king Alexandru and Mărioara, the sister of the king Carol II. With Iugoslavia we have solid relations and older dipomatic ties consolidated in the Small Understanding and Balkanic Understanding. Thus things are more nuanced. The panslavism and pan russianism are strong political currents in Bulgaria and Serbia, even if the

first is member of EU, and the second tries to bypass the economic storm in which it had fallen after the dismanteling of Iugoslavia by an accession in EU. The Romanian diplomacy will have to cultivate good relations with the two neighbours from south in order to ensure us at least the back.

The boundary with the *Republic of Moldova*, our twin brother born artificially through the decision URSS, is one quiet and dangerous in the same time. Bucharest lost the moment 1991 when we could have got united with Bassarabia. The causes of this failure to build the reunited Romania from 1918/ 1919 are known. The pro- Moscovite communists which took over the power in December 1989 in our country could not forgive the revolutionary youth spent at studies or during “the nights around Moscow” (“Pad moscovschie vecera”). Today, the cousin country and a brother constitutes a battle field between pro- European parties and pro- Russian, in fact, both some and others, dominated by political groups that has in mind their own enrichment, abandonning the principles of justice, western – European democracy, national Romanian unity. The rise of the pressure of the Russia, including by transnistrean enclave; the migration of the youth from Bassarabia in Romania (mother country) or somewhere else in the world – a part of it grewed in Romanian schools: the dramatic decrease of the level of life of usual citizens and of the interest of European Union and United States towards “The Republic of Moldova as a potentia oasis of real democracy”- it can bring to the imposal in the Eastern part of our country as a statal teritory pro- Russian, anti – Romanian and anti- European. This perspective must be stoped through a Romanian diplomacy and western-European energical diplomacy, well though in economic, cultural, and mass – media plan which to attract towards European ideals, including of the levels of living, all inhabitants of Bassarabia, independantly of ethnîe. The strategy must be continued with optimism and pragmatism in the same time, without generatory interruptions of demobilization and pessimism.

Towards the Germany and Italy of the year 1938, Nicolae Iorga was wrong. He hoped that his great inheritance and German and Italian cultural tradition will matter more in the political decision of the political leaders of these states. Unfortunately, the mediocrity and the excessive authoritarianism of Hitler, Mussolini and of their teams, imposed another destiny of Europe and, in this context, of Romania. Today, *Germany, France, England, even latin states from the southern Europe*, there are the main pillars of European Union. The historical experience of the past, especially in the years of the Second World War and of Cold War would have to lead us towards the effort of consolidation of European Union, of treating all members as equals in rights, leaving on secondary plane, even partially, their own economic interests including in the energy sector which would favorize Russia and its accolites. These great economic powers, symbols of the real

democracy, would have to understand that “the state sitting between two boats” is dangerous, to an equal extent, for them and their new partners from Central and Eastern Europe. In order to accomplish this we must share the difficulties of the settling of democracy in equal way, according to the economic possibilities of each member country of EU in part. Thus, the model of EU will remain in history as a sublime one, failed from arrogance, selfish interests and stupidity.

In order to close the geopolitical voyage of the momentum (2015-2016) that it is found our country, let *us not forget the Black Sea*. A lot of time considered the most faithful neighbour after the selective argumentation of the great historian and political man Gheorghe Brătianu, today it starts to become very “hot”. Crimea found under Russian control – with a military armada in continuous increase and evolution; the political discontents Russian – Turkish on the fundal of some incidents still minor of a military nature; a Gruzian and Ukrainean seaside, uncertain for a certain peace; the military manoeuvres of the Russian and American flottes (here together with his allies from NATO) – they annuled the old quality of Romanian seaside as an areal of traditional peace for the country. With other words, Romania of our days is in a dangerous isolation in Europe.

In all great political complex of nervous setting of EU, SUA has, in our opinion un important role if not decisive. Here we have in mind the democratic tradition, the economic and military force, the world diplomatic vision of nord- Americans. An eventual isolation of United States towards Europe and its problems would be equivalent with the asiaticization of the old continent, but also with comunization by stages of their own country. The populists presidents, mediocres in the domain of general culture, restrained in the box of a North-American life for the moment a reach one they will sign the death à la longue of our North – American political nation.

The second part of my communication based on edited bibliography and written and presented informations from mass – media on the Romain and foreign TV channels which we did not foresee at footnote, is a try to accomodation of assertion of the historian Nicolae Iorga, made in 1938, at the realities of Romania from after eighty years. They are based also on a certain experience in the local and national position of the undersigned, but also of the university researcher of the past and recent present of the history of Romanians – in the last fundamented on rigour and scientific sincerity, not always accepted and used by our political, actual, nervous world, eager for the inedite and spectacular of the moment.

Abstract

The first part of the study points out the circumstances of the great Romanian historian's presence in Oradea in 1902, and 1938, respectively. The first visit is linked to a scientific research he had carried out at the Archive and Library of the Greek-Catholic Diocese, where the historian studied the works of the most prominent figures of the Romanian Enlightenment from the eighteenth century, preserved at the Episcopal Court of Mihail Pavel. In 1938, N. Iorga delivered a lecture at "Queen Mary" Theatre Hall, exactly on December 1st, during which he took a stand against the assertions of the Hungarian historiography who claimed that Oradea and Transylvania were traditional geographic areas of the Kingdom of Hungary. N. Iorga's arguments in favor of Oradea, Bibor and Transylvania as a whole – as Romanian geographic and demographic areas are based on archival and archaeological data and on the historical logic. The political situation of the Europe of his time, as seen by politician Nicolae Iorga, is closely analyzed at the end of his lecture.

In the second part of the study, starting from the closing of Nicolae Iorga's lecture, the author makes a presentation of the current political situation of 2015 Romania, where many of N. Iorga's fears from 1938 come to surface, perhaps even more heightened than they were 80 years ago.

Keywords: Nicolae Iorga, Oradea, 1902- 1938, culture, history, politics.

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Sur l'économie et les politiques industrielles de Roumanie dans l'entre-deux-guerres

*Nicolae PĂUN**

L'économie mondiale a eu de la peine à se rétablir suite à la Grande guerre. Pendant les quatre années, de 1914 à 1918, les ressources humaines et matérielles de la planète entière ont été engagées pour la première fois. La guerre totale, comme elle est souvent appelée dans l'histoire économique, a laissé des traces profondes, surtout en Europe. Il a fallu plusieurs années pour que la valeur des économies atteignent les niveaux d'avant-guerre, bien que nous ayons remarqué des augmentations spectaculaires des nouvelles branches économiques, selon les tendances d'une autre révolution industrielle – l'automobile, la chimie, la métallurgie etc.

Les nouveaux moteurs du développement économique sont visibles à partir de 1922-1923 au niveau global. Dans le cas de la Roumanie aussi, les perspectives favorables dont les exploitations industrielles extractives et de transformation bénéficieront commencent à être mises en valeur, suivant les tendances des nouvelles politiques européennes.

Sous l'inspiration de la doctrine néolibérale, les gouvernements et les parlements d'après 1918 se sont appuyés sur ce nouveau paradigme économique de développement et de modernisation des industries. Il est évident que le rapport entre l'agriculture et l'industrie n'a pas pu être changé pendant une période moyenne de développement, ce que, d'ailleurs, on ne souhaitait pas, mais il faut apprécier la politique économique de l'État roumain, qui a soutenu le nouveau modèle d'industrialisation. Celui-ci était fondé sur la spécificité des relations socioéconomiques du pays, qui permettaient de mettre en valeur les ressources de matières premières et d'énergie, la transformation supérieure, industrielle, des produits agricoles¹. Dans l'argumentation de l'option pour le modèle agraire-industriel, un poids important est attribuable à la défense nationale, d'autant plus que les liens

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¹ Vasile Pușcaș (coord.), *Dezvoltare și modernizare în România interbelică 1919-1939*, Bucarest, p. 69.

déficitaires avec les fournisseurs pendant la guerre ont compté beaucoup dans le développement d'une industrie métallurgique-sidérurgique, de transformation. Une industrie de défense nationale² est apparue sur la carte de Roumanie, ayant comme citadelles Hunedoara, Reșița, les nouvelles usines de Copșa-Mică, Cugir, Malaxa, IAR Brașov et beaucoup d'autres.

Selon Nicolae Arcadian, en 1919, aproximativement 25% de la valeur de l'entière industrie de Roumanie était générée en Transylvanie. La contribution de cette dernière au processus d'industrialisation de la Roumanie a été impressionnante. Corroborées avec la structure de l'Ancien Royaume, en 1916, les statistiques indiquent une croissance du nombre d'entreprises industrielles, de 845 en 1916 à 2 747 entités, à la fin de la conflagration mondiale³.

Tableau 1. Importation des voitures et des moteurs 1919-1932

Première période	Milliers de tonnes	Millions de lei
1.	2.	3.
1919	8	93
1920	13	198
1921	36	553
1922	52	841
1923	36	1 517
1924	30	1 743
1925	32	1 992
1926	41	4 104
1927	46	3 202
Moyenne annuelle	33	1 583
Deuxième période	Milliers de tonnes	Millions de lei
1928	55	3 864
1929	51	3 968
1930	35	2 852
1931	17	1 650
1932	13	1 041
Moyenne annuelle	34	2 675

Source: Victor Axenciuc, *Evoluția economică a României: cercetări statistico-economice 1859-1947*, vol. 1, Ed. Academiei, Bucarest, 1992-1996, p. 100.

Une image quantitative du commencement du processus d'industrialisation soutenu par tous les gouvernements de Roumanie est offerte par l'importation des voitures, appareils et moteurs pendant la

² Enciclopedia României, vol. III, 1939, p. 822.

³ V. Axenciuc, *Introducere în istoria economică a României*, vol I, Ed. Fundația România de Măine, Bucarest, 1959, p. 275.

première décennie de l'entre-deux-guerres, y compris lors de la grande dépression économique.

Dans une approche comparative, on constate sans trop d'effort que l'Ancien Royaume ne disposait que d'une modeste partie de l'industrie de transformation, mais il se positionnait relativement bien par le pétrole, le sel et le charbon. La Transylvanie et le Banat offraient du charbon, des minerais de fer et non ferreux complexes, du gaz méthane, de l'or, de l'argent etc., mais aussi une importante dimension de transformation – voir Reșița, Hunedoara, Titan-Nădrag-Călan.

Revenant à Nicolae Arcadian, il est à remarquer aussi la proportion de la population totale employée dans l'industrie – environ 401.000 travailleurs en 1919. 164.200 travaillaient dans le milieu urbain ou étaient représentatifs pour le commencement d'un processus d'urbanisation et d'industrialisation. Nous pouvons également souligner le dynamisme de la population de Transylvanie, notamment avec ses 1.884.400 habitants qui étaient employés dans l'industrie extractive, le commerce, les banques, les crédits et l'administration. Le poids des petites et moyennes entreprises était spécifique à cette province-là.

Toutes ces données statistiques nous déterminent de constater le fait que le potentiel économique et industriel de la Roumanie a augmenté, en 1919, de 135%, par rapport à 1913, en grande mesure grâce à l'industrie de Transylvanie.

Tableau 2. L'industrie en Transylvanie - 1919

Région	No. des entreprises	Capital investi	Force motrice	Personnel occupé	Valeur de la production
Transylvanie	42.0	37.0	55.0	52.0	38.0

Source: *Industria și bogățiile naturale din Ardeal și Banat*, Tipografia Cartea Românească, Cluj, 1927, p. 51.

À partir de ces prémices favorables, fondées sur le potentiel économique de la Transylvanie, de la Bucovine et de l'industrie extractive de l'Ancien Royaume, le débat sur le caractère de l'économie roumaine a été marqué par la doctrine néolibérale.

L'homme politique et économiste Vintilă Brătianu soutenait que, depuis 1918, la Roumanie disposait de toutes les conditions naturelles afin de devenir un État industriel complet⁴, pour que plus tard, en 1923, il ajoutât

⁴Csucsuj, Ș., Știrban, M., Báthory, L. (2003), « Continuitate și schimbare în politica economică a României în perioada interbelică și dezvoltarea industriei metalurgice în Transilvania », in *Dezvoltarea întreprinderilor metalurgice din Transilvania (1919-1940)*, Cluj-Napoca, p. 11.

que l'industrie énergétique avait un rôle décisif dans le développement de l'économie en général.

Mihail Manoilescu, à son tour, soulignait le rôle particulier de l'industrie lourde dans le cadre des branches industrielles, la politique du fer étant considérée par celui-ci comme « la politique de la défense nationale, économique et militaire, qui à la fin des fins conditionne l'activité entière de production et de circulation »⁵, et considérait que la civilisation roumaine était étroitement liée à l'existence de l'industrie. Manoilescu visait, par la politique industrielle, un développement selon des critères scientifiques, avec la satisfaction des propres demandes, aussi bien que l'assurance d'un volume de produits industrialisés destinés à l'exportation. Il soutenait en 1923 que « maintenant que le monde se trouve dans une étape de démarrage économique, lorsque pour la Roumanie il s'imposerait catégoriquement l'élaboration et l'application d'une politique d'industrialisation, solidement fondée du point de vue scientifique, nous ne pouvons pas contourner les critères de l'efficacité. »⁶ Bref, il proposait une consolidation de l'industrie en général, avec une attention particulière accordée à l'industrie métallurgique et sidérurgique.

La pensée économique tout entière de la période était d'accord avec la stratégie qui posait une industrie consolidée parmi les priorités du développement. Le néolibéralisme soutenait l'industrialisation et la priorité de défendre le pays, sur la base des nouvelles technologies. Du point de vue de l'évolution sociale, les économistes ont soutenu également que le développement de l'industrie était une option pour l'absorption de la force de travail des milieux ruraux, qui ne pouvaient pas assurer son existence de l'agriculture. On envisageait aussi l'arrêt des émigrations.

En concordance avec la doctrine néolibérale, l'État avait un rôle crucial dans le processus d'industrialisation et, par la suite, il s'imposait la participation directe de ce-dernier pour des raisons économiques, sociales,

⁵Voir aussi les commentaires visant le modèle industrialiste de développement de la Roumanie proposé par Mihail Manoilescu, in Nicolae Păun, *Viața economică a României 1918-1948*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj-Napoca, 2009, p. 112-114. Pour des informations supplémentaires, nous recommandons : M. Manoilescu, *Doctrinile și teoriile noastre în lumina criticii. Răspunsul d-lui profesor Gh. Tașcă*, extrait, Bucarest; *Idem*, *Forțele naționale productive și comerțul exterior. Teoria protecționismului și a schimbului internațional*, Bucarest, 1986; *Idem*, *Potențialul românesc neutilizat*, București, 1937; *Idem*, *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești*, Ed. Albatros, 2002; *Idem*, *Un plan de politică economică*, Bucarest, 1930.

⁶ Ioan Saizu, *Modernizarea României contemporane (perioada interbelică). Pas și impas*, Ed. Academiei Române, Bucarest, 1991, p. 169.

nationales et de sécurité⁷. On a imposé la doctrine « par nous-mêmes », en tant que fondement conceptuel du développement du capital autochtone et de l'accélération de l'évolution économique nationale. Ceci exigeait que, dans le cadre du processus de reformation et de développement de l'économie roumaine, la priorité fût accordée au capital national, notamment au libéral. Le capital étranger était bienvenu en partenariat avec le roumain dans les branches que le capital libéral ne pouvait pas exploiter.

Comme Vintilă Brătianu, les économistes Constantin D. Bușilă et Alexandru Topliceanu ont soutenu aussi le développement de l'industrie énergétique. Alexandru Topliceanu argumentait qu'il fallait mettre en valeur tout d'abord les ressources inépuisables d'énergie (les chutes d'eau), et ensuite les épuisables (combustibles), confirmant les études de l'époque sur le rôle de l'électrification dans le développement⁸.

I.G. Duca (Parti national libéral) plaidait pour l'industrialisation, mais avec la primauté du caractère agraire de l'économie roumaine. Il affirmait, en 1927, que « par sa structure économique, la Roumanie est sans doute, premièrement, un État agricole, et elle doit à tout prix garder ce caractère⁹ ». « Il ne nous semble pas du tout qu'il y ait une incompatibilité entre l'essor de l'agriculture et le développement de l'industrie [...]. En outre, de nombreuses industries sont elles-aussi étroitement liées à l'agriculture; ne sont-elles pas une condition indispensable de son progrès? Enfin, notre pays a de nombreuses richesses. Ces richesses ne peuvent pas rester improductives. Leur mise en valeur s'impose, et par cette mise en valeur, on crée inévitablement de nouvelles industries. Une telle évolution naturelle, peut-elle être arrêtée simplement parce que nous sommes un pays agricole et que nous devons rester un pays agricole? Certainement pas¹⁰. » Le néolibéralisme, dans la conception du PNL et tel qu'il a été perçu par I.G. Duca, se caractérisait par le progrès social obtenu par l'ordre, la démocratie, le nationalisme et l'harmonie sociale¹¹.

I.N. Anghelescu, beaucoup plus acharné qu'I.G. Duca, a plaidé pour le besoin d'industrialisation, soutenant que si la Roumanie continuait à garder son profil agraire, elle n'avait pas d'autre chance que de « s'intégrer

⁷ I. G. Duca, « Doctrina liberală », in vol. *Doctrinile partidelor politice*, Bucarest, 1924, p. 100-104.

⁸ Voir, pour plus de détails, l'étude de l'ingénieur D. M. Șerbulescu, « Considerații asupra electrificărilor rurale realizate până în prezent în România. Modul de organizare și propuneri pentru dezvoltarea viitoare », in *Buletin I.R.E.*, 1940, 8, no. 1, p. 369-415.

⁹ Ștefan Csucsujă, Marcel Știrban, Ludovic Báthory, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁰ Ioan Saizu, *Politica economică a României între 1922 și 1928*, Ed. Academiei, Bucarest, 1981, p. 35.

¹¹ I. G. Duca, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

économiquement dans un autre pays, avec lequel elle crée une économie intégrale »¹².

Il devient visible, même suite à ces quelques opinions consignées ci-dessus, qu'il y avait une préoccupation des économistes et des politiciens roumains pour l'industrialisation, soit qu'elle ait un rôle prioritaire, soit secondaire. L'expérience de la guerre, aussi bien que le succès de l'industrialisation occidentale, ont éclairci le fait que l'industrie occupait un rôle central dans l'économie d'un pays et que c'était la voie à suivre. En plus, la Roumanie a ressenti pendant la Première guerre mondiale le manque d'une industrie de défense, mécano-sidérurgique.

Afin que l'industrie devînt effectivement une partie importante, voire stratégique, du développement, il était nécessaire de créer un cadre législatif qui l'encourage et la soutienne.

Comme nous avons remarqué, presque toutes les prises de parole au sein de la société plaidaient pour la transition d'une économie fondée en principal sur l'agriculture (elle-même extensive), vers une autre moderne, industrialisée. Nous avons également observé que les élites politiques, aussi bien que les économistes les plus notables du pays, ont plaidé pour un développement de l'économie agraire-industrielle, qui, bien qu'elle maintînt son caractère agraire en premier lieu, allait mettre l'accent sur le côté industriel.

L'élaboration du cadre législatif nécessaire au développement de l'économie est devenue une priorité depuis même le premier Parlement de Roumanie et a démarré dès ses séances inaugurales. La Commission pour l'agriculture et celle pour les industries ont été parmi les plus actives et extrêmement préoccupées.

La réforme et la législation agraires ont été les premières qui aient marqué l'époque des nouveaux changements. Ainsi, la législation agraire a été promulguée immédiatement, dans les années 1919-1921, et a envisagé le lotissement en faveur des paysans et le développement d'une agriculture intensive. Cette réforme se trouvait en étroite connexion avec l'industrialisation, puisque, comme nous l'avons remarqué dans les opinions de l'époque, une agriculture intensive s'avérait impossible en l'absence d'une industrie.

La législation industrielle¹³ a visé la mise en concordance des nouvelles réalités économiques avec le développement et le progrès désirés par l'État roumain. En plus, son rôle était de consacrer du point de vue juridique un nouveau marché économique, capable d'intégrer l'apport des

¹² Ioan Saizu, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹³ Voir, pour plus de détails : Nicolae Păun, *Stat și economie*, Ed. Interferențe, Cluj-Napoca, 1991.

nouvelles provinces et d'en résoudre les problèmes (la reconstruction économique après la guerre et le développement). Les lois élaborées dans le cadre de ce processus devaient offrir des normes et des institutions en vertu desquelles l'État envisageait de développer des politiques d'action, notamment en ce qui concerne l'approvisionnement de l'industrie avec des machines et des outillages, l'élargissement de la base du crédit industriel, les plans d'action dans le domaine des combustibles, des matières premières et des transports. Ce sont les principaux aspects qui ont déclenché l'élaboration des normes juridiques promulguées par notre pays pendant l'entre-deux-guerres.

Dans les années 1918-1921 seulement, on a adopté plus de 60 lois, règlements et décrets-lois¹⁴. Parmi ceux-ci, les plus importants ont été : la Loi sur l'encouragement de l'industrie nationale, le Décret-loi sur la création de la Caisse de crédit pour la reconstruction de la petite industrie, la Loi sur l'institution des syndicats des fabricants et des artisans etc.

La loi sur l'encouragement de l'industrie nationale de 1912 a été considérée vitale pour l'économie du pays, de sorte qu'elle a été déclarée loi fondamentale et étendue, par conséquent, à l'échelle de l'entière économie nationale. Celle-ci imposait des tarifs douaniers pour les produits étrangers, et qu'un nombre important des travailleurs industriels soient roumains, bien que les entreprises appartinssent au capital étranger¹⁵. Les termes d'application de cette loi ont été constamment prolongés, couvrant tout l'intervalle de l'entre-deux-guerres. Par exemple, seulement pendant la période du gouvernement Gh. Tătărăscu (Parti national libéral) ont été émises des lois pour un tel prolongement les 4 avril 1934, 8 avril 1935, 8 avril 1936 et 12 novembre 1936. Les nouvelles lois ont introduit des modifications importantes au texte de base de 1912, comme la création du « Fonds industriel », constitué par une taxe de 1% sur la valeur des emprunts faits avec exceptions aux taxes douanières. Le fonds était destiné « à l'assistance accordée aux petits industriels et artisans roumains avec machines et outillages ». En outre, les lois sur l'encouragement permettaient à l'industrie d'établir des prix beaucoup plus grands sur le marché intérieur que ceux de l'extérieur. Par exemple, en 1935, les produits métallurgiques sur le marché de Roumanie étaient plus chers de 220% que ceux sur le marché belge¹⁶.

Un autre pas important a été la fondation, par un décret-loi, de la société par actions anonyme « Reconstruction industrielle », dont l'objectif

¹⁴ Selon Nicolae Păun, *Rolul statului în viața economică a României în perioada interbelică. Evoluție doctrinară și instituțională*, Cluj- Napoca, 1991, p. 62.

¹⁵ Selon Alexandru Cuzin, « Relațiunile comerciale dintre Austro-Ungaria și România », in *Românul*, no. 153, 12/25 juillet 1912, p. 1.

¹⁶ Selon Emilia Sonea, Gavrilă Sonea, *Viața economică și politică a României (1933-1938)*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, Bucarest, 1978, p. 71-72.

était « d'approvisionner l'industrie avec des machines, des installations, des matériaux de transport, des matières premières, des combustibles, de participer aux entreprises industrielles existantes ou qui seront créées à l'avenir, tout en procurant du capital et des matériaux, en accordant des avances sur les droits des industriels aux compensations de guerre¹⁷ ». La société avait pour but d'aider les industriels et les entreprises industrielles à se rétablir suite à la guerre, mais en même temps, de contribuer à la création de nouvelles entreprises.

Le plus important corpus législatif a été la Constitution de 1923, qui garantissait le droit à la propriété, mais elle faisant également un autre pas important : l'introduction du principe de nationalisation du sous-sol et des dépôts miniers (selon le modèle des mesures similaires prises par les États occidentaux bien auparavant).

Les articles économiques de la constitution ont rendu possible la transformation de la Roumanie, d'un pays agraire en un pays agraire-industriel. L'industrie placée sous des auspices libéraux éprouvait un essor remarquable. On a créé des institutions nécessaires au développement de la vie industrielle, des leviers économiques, et les entreprises anciennes ont été placées sur de nouveaux fondements libéraux, par le biais d'au moins trois lois importantes : la Loi sur la création de la Société nationale du crédit industriel du 23 juin 1923; la Loi sur la commercialisation et le contrôle des entreprises de l'État du 7 juin 1924 et la Loi des mines du 4 juillet 1924.

La Société nationale du crédit industriel a eu pour rôle principal d'accorder des crédits à l'industrie et, ainsi, elle a soutenu le développement industriel de la Roumanie. Elle était soumise au contrôle de l'État et a accordé la primauté et soutenu notamment l'industrie métallurgique. Par conséquent, jusqu'en 1925, 42 firmes métallurgiques ont reçu des crédits industriels, avec un montant total de 597.152.824 lei, soit 30,5% du total des crédits accordés à l'industrie par la Société nationale du crédit industriel pendant les années 1924-1925¹⁸.

Une place particulière dans le cadre des politiques du gouvernement national-libéral est revenue aux mesures destinées à la création d'une forte industrie des équipements et de l'armement. Le 11 juin 1925, on a adopté la Loi sur « les entreprises industrielles liées à la défense nationale ». Graduellement, les usines de Cugir, Copșa Mică et Reșița ont été transformées en fabriques d'armement. En plus, par la Loi du 13 novembre 1934, le Ministère de la défense nationale et le Ministère de l'armement ont été autorisés à utiliser « Le fonds de la défense nationale créé par la Banque nationale de Roumanie, pour l'acquisition d'installations, le partage et la

¹⁷ Monitorul oficial, no. 110, 8 août 1919.

¹⁸ Selon Ștefan Csucsujă, Marcel Știrban, Ludovic Báthory, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

réparation de l'armement, des munitions, de l'équipement, du harnais¹⁹ ». L'industrie métallurgique a été soutenue par l'intermédiaire des lois promulguées, car elles ont mené à une participation importante de l'État dans le cadre des entreprises et à un meilleur financement de celles-ci.

La grande dépression économique a eu des effets sur le plan législatif. Ainsi, en 1933, la préoccupation des politiciens d'aider les industries minières et métallurgiques à dépasser la crise s'est concrétisée en la promulgation de la « Loi sur l'autorisation de la Régie publique commerciale des entreprises minières et métallurgiques de l'État, de Transylvanie », par le biais de laquelle on a contracté un emprunt de la BNR avec un montant de 114.000.000 lei²⁰. L'emprunt a assisté les entreprises gravement affectées par la crise économique à se rétablir et à recommencer leur production. Les stipulations budgétaires du chapitre « impôts directs » en 1935-1936 exhibaient la somme de 3 675 600 000 lei; 1936-1937 – 4 350 000 000 lei, et en 1937-1938 – 4 725 000 000 lei. La contribution de l'industrie à ces valeurs, en pourcentages, pendant les années respectives, était de 24,30%; 23,72%; et 25,30%, respectivement. Dans le cas des impôts directs (douanes, taxes sur la consommation, timbre, chiffre d'affaires et impôt sur les spectacles), à l'exception de ce dernier chapitre, la contribution de l'industrie était faible, comme suit : 1935-1936 – 71,60%, respectivement 6 285 000 000 lei; 1936-1937 – 71,97%, soit 7 443 000 000 lei; 1937-1938 – 71,3%, ou 8 724 000 000 lei. À l'exception de ces données, l'industrie a participé aux encaissements publics des taxes de timbre et aux impôts sur les actes et faits juridiques, par un montant de 760 millions lei, en 1935-1936, de 865 000 000 lei en 1937-1938, et de 1 056 000 000 lei dans l'exercice 1937-1938²¹.

Le cadre législatif industriel a été enrichi aussi par des mesures protectionnistes établissant des quotas à l'exportation, depuis 1932, des réductions aux importations des biens de consommation qui pouvaient être produits dans le pays, un système des primes d'exportation etc. En outre, l'État a augmenté ses commandes vers les entreprises du domaine de la défense nationale et a accordé des facilités de financement aux entreprises industrielles qui exécutaient des commandes d'État, par l'octroi d'avances et de crédits de la BNR. Ces mesures ont permis l'essor de l'industrie et l'ont encouragée à se développer vers de nouveaux domaines.

Les politiques, aussi bien que la législation par laquelle on a réalisé l'industrialisation de la Roumanie jusqu'à un certain niveau, qui a été atteint

¹⁹ Emilia Sonea, Gavrilă Sonea, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

²⁰ Monitorul oficial, no. 97, 8 août 1919.

²¹ Voir « Contribuția industriei naționale la sarcinile fiscale », in *Analele industriei și comerțului*, 1939, 4, no. 8-9, p. 19-20.

pendant une période extrêmement tendue, marquée par les conséquences de la grande dépression et de la menace de la guerre, ont eu un effet positif au niveau de l'économie et ont encouragé l'évolution des entreprises métallurgiques et sidérurgiques d'extraction, aussi bien que de transformation.

L'économie du pays a connu une ample restructuration, qui lui a permis de changer son caractère, d'agrar à agraire-industriel. On a avancé dans la société non seulement des solutions économiques, mais aussi des programmes pour la modernisation et le développement de la communauté.

L'expérience roumaine n'a pas été une simple copie du modèle occidental, mais un appréciable raccordement à l'esprit européen, dans des conditions socio-économiques et géopolitiques spécifiques, relativement différentes de celles à l'occident.

Sommaire

Les lignes d'évolution d'après 1918, tracées autour de la pensée et la pratique économiques de notre pays, ont mis en valeur le potentiel de développement des provinces historiques et, notamment, de la Transylvanie. L'industrialisation et le changement du caractère de l'économie roumaine, d'agrar à agraire-industriel, voilà les réponses de l'économie, d'encadrement et de rapprochement au modèle occidental, dans des conditions socioéconomiques et géopolitiques particulières, différentes de celles trouvées à l'occident.

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- ***, « Contribuția industriei naționale la sarcinile fiscale », în Analele industriei și comerțului, 1939, 4, no. 8-9.

University mission in the knowledge society

*Ludmila ROȘCA**

Introduction

Research study: University mission in the knowledge society is a topic based on current and extremely valuable things for social, political, economic reality in the Republic of Moldova, because professionals are needed for the dynamic development of these areas, who are characterized by strategic thinking; who have formed a respectful attitude towards the concept that incorporates all the country; who manifest themselves in diverse forms of social relations as integer figures. The presence of this social group is a prerequisite for the prosperity of society at all times, but its contribution is required, particularly in crises, social system malfunction. The social system is open, complex, non-linear, characterized by its own regularities of operation. In normal operation, the objective and subjective factors, which ensure dynamic stability of the social system, interact, cooperate and thereby ensure at the same time, system stability and dynamism. In crisis conditions of part of the social life or the whole system, the significance of the subjective factor activity increases. Namely university is responsible for this segment of social life, summarizing the results of the institutions' educational efforts of other levels of organization, but responsible for the formation, training, mentoring younger generation. Given that, the Republic of Moldova is characterized by various crises: political, constitutional, economic, financial, cultural (inter-ethnic, religious conflicts etc.), the mission of the university in Moldovan society is complicated, but it has decisive role.

Now, at the level of European Council there are no events, actions, which would have addressed the need to increase the performance of national training and education. European higher education reform is dictated by the imperative of increasing the quality of services provided by universities, competitiveness. In the contemporary world, higher education is seen as a strategic area because the power of a state can be enhanced

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through the efficient functioning of the system of training and education. Objectives of the training and university education also include questioning the person; training and skills development required by a field of professional activity.

The knowledge society is a formula generally accepted by scientists, designating entering a new phase of development of the Information Society (Session of Extraordinary European Council in Lisbon on 23-24 March 2000). The subject of knowledge society is *Homo sapiens sapiens*. Trained and educated in the university of the XXI century, joining education / training with research and production, it is competitive in the labour market, active in social relations, characterized by high moral character, which feeds the sense of duty and responsibility. From promoting ethical principles of academic integrity: academic freedom, autonomy and accountability, transparency, meritocracy, honesty and fairness - it is shaping the mission and role of the university XXI century. This is the central objective of the investigation, the results of which are presented in the article.

Applied methods: systemic analysis, content analysis, comparative study, interdisciplinary approach.

Research results: The concept of university as a socio-cultural institution is elaborated by contemporary philosophers. In his work "The idea of university", K. Jaspers emphasized that to work at the university "means to gain a sense of truth in science", knowledge of methods and their potential and thereby "knowledge of science limits". The university develops philosophical sense of truth that can be achieved along the path of the methods applied. University should be devoted to research without compromise that should not be justified only to the criteria of reason and truth. The concept of university not only secures the mission of institution in human society, but also designates the limits of scientific knowledge. In Jaspers's conception, university is the refuge of freedom of thought, freedom responsible for spirit.

Both in philosophy and at work, in everyday life, K. Jaspers pays great attention to communication. Authentic communication between two human beings constitutes a decisive factor, and university as a place of freedom provides the possibility of authentic communication between teachers and students, and between students, and between teachers. To communicate is to design a common perspective of those who discuss and investigate gnoseologic problems. In philosophy, K. Jaspers uses the verb to call for, which is understood to awaken the existence of the interlocutor, as it is present in case that would be distracted or numb. Existentialist

philosopher did not admit to say that someone cannot make him call for or that someone lacks inner possibilities. K. Jaspers was convinced that in every human being there is the possibility of existence, we can always call for it and this is the most important part of the work of professors of philosophy¹.

An original interpretation of the mission of the university in contemporary society we find in the work "Existentialism and Education", signed by G.F. Kneller. The author noted that university is the core of the education system, it should be concerned with: deciphering the contents of good life; human nature, the nature of society, the nature of ultimate reality that any kind of knowledge they seek to penetrate. G.F. Kneller assigns to education a double meaning: "act or experience that has a formative effect on the mind, character or physical ability of an individual" and another as a process "by which society through schools, colleges, universities and other institutions, deliberately transmits its cultural heritage - knowledge, values and skills gained - from one generation to another"². Simultaneously, education has the meaning of a product, it means what we get by learning - forms, methods, principles, levels of knowledge, ideals and techniques we are taught.

Education as a highly complex phenomenon can be studied from many perspectives, each revealing new meanings. A sense of education, which cannot be ignored because it defines the mission of university, has been exposed by a founder of sociology of education, E. Durkheim. The scientist pointed out: Education is methodical socialization of the young generation ...; it is the action exercised by adult generations on those who are not yet ripe for social life ... It covers not man as was created by nature, but man wished by the society and it wants him as the inner structure requires: to exist any society needs homogeneity and education is the means by which society renews the conditions of its own existence gradually, by planting the child's soul essential similarities that are most appropriate to the type of society. The purpose of education is to socialize biological individual by building his social being which overlap the individual one ³.

Education is a manifestation of social and human reality. Inherent in social life, education is a direct shareholder perceptible reality, especially in the encounter between generations, knowable by traces the history of civilizations (documents, institutions and others) and logically deductible systemic approach to the evolution of society in which there are large

¹ K. Jaspers, *Texte filosofice*. – București: Editura politică, 1988.

² G.F.Kneller, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, John Wiley and Sons, inc. N.Y-London-Sidney, 1967, P.20

³ E.Durkheim, *Educație și sociologie*. – București: E.D.P., 1980.

differences the potential of knowledge tending, law-like, towards equilibrium. Balancing continuous education system is performed in a communication process focused on the exchange of information, and is subject to its laws. Education is a form of human action practice, it results from the interaction of an individual or collective subject who initiates it.⁴

With globalization, the university cannot be measured only in relation to its own design or those of universities in the country, or specific region. University is measured (and must be measured) with the best universities in the world. This means that the university is required to carry out scientific research at the forefront recognized and different institutions, firms, etc. in key positions prefer its graduates. Professor at the University of Michigan, James J. Duderstadt, describes the transformation of the university through evolution and revolution.⁵ In the first case, changes occur gradually over time, universities adapt to the external environment, in response to various influences that come from society. In the second situation, the transformations take place in a relatively short time, producing radical, dramatic and axiological core aims of universities. Analysing the transformations of social institutions, it is hard to appreciate which of these two models of change are dominant today. Looking at the results of these transformations in higher education, we see the coexistence of traditional universities, universities that have adapted and reinvented entirely new universities, born in response to requests of historical time, social practice.

The dangers and opportunities of the new environment in which universities operate today can be addressed by two trends: adaptation via withdrawal or proactive, entrepreneurial adaptation. In the first case, it is expected that the problems go away by themselves or that they will find their own solution. In the second situation, it is seeking constructive solutions to the challenges coming from inside and outside, to adapt the market to exploit the novelty of the permanent changes. The main hazards related to the activity of contemporary universities are: massification of higher education, the decline in public funding, increasing demographic and socio-economic diversity, demand for permanent adult education, the unprecedented development of information technologies, market globalization of higher education etc. Referring to the massification of higher education, Professor K.J. Dougherty noted that the evolution of higher education, traditionally elitist to a mass higher education, is a reflection of new technological developments, democratic values, the needs of the new knowledge-based

⁴ L.Roșca, C.Lazari, *Etica și integritatea universitară: experiențe, realizări, probleme*. Monografie. IRIM – Chișinău: Tipogr. "Print-Caro", 172 p.

⁵ J.J. Duderstadt, *The future of the university in an era of change*, 07.03.1997. <http://milproj.umm.umich.edu>.

society.⁶ The next challenge - the decline in public funding for universities - to the universities tends to seek alternative sources of funding, primarily from the private sector. It is about the direction of transformation that showed Burton R. Clark a teacher, referring to how universities adapt to market requirements, namely, the existence of a diversified funding base.⁷

Together, these reform efforts opened new opportunities for universities and students. In essence, this process has two purposes: to create a European higher education area by reducing barriers to the mobility of teachers, researchers and students; enhancing competitiveness of European universities. Underlying the need to implement the Bologna Process there were more visions. One is that, since the Middle Ages, European continent gave rise to mainstream universities that passed through centuries and are still present in the modern world. Second, European countries (European Union) are lagging behind their competitors: the United States, China, Canada, Japan, Australia.⁸ And the third would be the principle of social cohesion, intercontinental mobility, unity of the European continent etc. In essence, all these visions contain two basic components: the European economy and European values.

Therefore, the XXI century - requires a new kind of education. No one can be the beneficiary of a new civilization, without a new kind of education, and no longer provide this new kind of education without making changes in the organization of universities, interacting with the cultural, economic, administrative, technological environment. Higher education institutions are communities that offer higher education and research. Along the way, they have turned into complex, large-scale organizations, which cannot be directed, administered just under the traditional academic standards. The mission of universities is to produce, exploit and transmit knowledge. In a globalized economy, knowledge is capital and the true engine of society development. Currently, university is facing new challenges in terms of performance and accountability. The products offered by the university are knowledge and power, supplied to society in various forms:

- training of specialists in various socially useful fields;
- research, consulting, expertise;
- involving academic community in society.

This benefit of the university can be considered only as quality products and its activity satisfy the requirements and expectations of

⁶ K. J. Dougherty, *Mass higher education: What is its impetus?* 1997.

⁷ R.B.Clark, *Crearea universităților antreprenoriale: direcții de transformare organizațională.* – București: Editura Paideia, 2000.

⁸ N.C. Burbules, *Universities in transition: The promise and the challenge of new technologies.* Teachers College Record, 2000.

customers, internal and external partners regarding formation society representatives in areas required by the labour market at an appropriate level of problem solving by socio-economic research and consulting, creating an appropriate work-life performance in the said institutions.

We see thus that the mission of universities is complex and it is based on three essential points:

- vocational mission (in this way students are being transmitted knowledge and skills to be prepared as highly skilled workforce in a specific area or specialization);

- mission to create knowledge (knowledge is transmitted to students and is developed or transferred to technology and other areas that have an economic impact of progress in social development); and

- social mission (graduates obtain skills and values of general character and this allows the development of societies based on knowledge and communication between people, with democratic character).

Analysing aspect of globalization of higher education, Professor R. Deem presents a set of changes, modifications, changes in financing arrangements, organizational and cultural changes, new forms of education delivery through the Internet or by attracting foreign student groups, using a speech based on different cultural and linguistic resources. This change is necessitated by the fact that different groups - results of globalization - different discourses claim.⁹ When we talk about globalization in higher education, we consider the existence of a global market for higher education, which creates a global competition. In the world penetrated various integration processes, human capacity is important to orient in time and social space. Human orientation is based on decision, having options, and choosing kind of occupation etc. University is required to develop human cognitive abilities, particularly strategic thinking so that students, graduates, employees, skilled in the art will be able to steer the social life of the community.

The social orientation of contemporary human temporal-spatial changes has particular significance, determined by the evolution of society from traditionalism to modernism and postmodernism. The orientation of the first category of people, highlighted by Bauman, is driven by the desire to take advantage of cultural and economic expansion American and European, which simultaneously can lead to denial / ignorance values, customs and traditions, morals, constituted in historical time, into a concrete space. In other words, the problem interdependencies and temporal-spatial changes

⁹ R. Deem, Globalization, new managerialism, academic capitalism and entrepreneurialism in universities: is the local dimension still important? Comparative Education, 2001, vol.37. P.7-20

characteristic of the contemporary world can be traced through the dialectic of tradition, innovation and traditional culture - culture progressive and innovative. It is also important that the teacher not only to youngsters be prepared theoretically but personally accept change, to respect the principle of tolerance in intercultural communication, be ready to accept other opinions and approaches. The correct orientation of young people ready to fit in socially useful activities carried out in a world of many colours "woven from inequalities", in our opinion, would mean:

- knowledge of the native language, history and moral foundations
- customs, traditions, manners; civilizational process steps, carried out within the space of the state;
- development of historical consciousness, under which recognition of belonging to a nation, to a certain culture and civilization is possible;
- ability to observe in time the change of natural environment of existence, the socio-cultural environment and to respond to the requirements / conditions thereof.¹⁰

University can be seen as an organization that operates in a competitive market of services (education, research, expertise, consultancy etc.). In this regard, higher education institution competitiveness is determined by its ability to adapt to the changing needs of economic and social environment. Its main task is to meet the specific needs of the education and training of the individual and the social and economic development needs of the community (local, regional, national, international). University reaches this goal only if it meets these requirements to a quality standard, which enables both the individual and society to become proficient in a globalized environment, characterized by competition and dynamism. Maintaining standards is possible only in conditions of academic activity oriented performance through continuous improvement of supply and results by providing an efficient management of financial policy, the rational use of resources, encouraging a responsible attitude of the staff etc. However, the university continues to retain scientific and cultural mission. It produces new scientific knowledge and critically evaluates the general - accepted by the academic community, creates, through its members, intellectual works of national and international value. In performing these functions, it seeks autonomy and academic progress of human knowledge, usually unpredictable process. However, these major goals of the university must harmonize with their mission of educating and training the younger generation. By preparing the younger generation who will manage the affairs of society in various fields,

¹⁰ L. Roșca, *Supraviețuirea, moralitatea și potențialul personalității umane: analiză teoretico-metodologică*. Monografie. – Chișinău: CEP UASM, 2007, 330 p., P.296.

universities still have mission to prove the truth of the maxim: There are no poor countries and rich countries. There are well-managed and poorly managed states!

Currently, we are witnessing major changes in European educational system. Higher education is a major public service offered by a national society of universities of different types and profiles. The impact of the personal development of an impressive number of citizens is particularly important: it provides an opportunity for greater personal autonomy; enhanced social mobility; professional and international mobility; the higher income etc. From year to year the number of people who have access to this service in several European countries entry into tertiary level education is a right guaranteed to all those who have completed secondary education with an appropriate certificate (baccalaureate). Although retaining students is never one hundred percent for higher education, the yield of this training is recognized in society and the university becomes more engaged in lifelong education of a person.

In terms of ethics, contemporary society is a society of post-debt, where more and more people recognize the need for ethical minimum of debts, pragmatic, pluralistic, liberal rules that make people and social groups' coexistence possible. We all live in a society of knowledge or information - knowledge society - post-industrial form of social organization in which the main activities and sources of income are related to content management. By knowledge, we understand a certain use of data, information, knowledge, training session or training for certain activities and education. Knowledge, in the narrow sense, is a precondition for the generation of novel useful and relevant. In the economic activity immaterial capital (staff qualifications, relativity, flexibility, knowledge bases, etc.), now, has a more important role than visible assets.

University integrity aims at union of education with research, with production. As it was established historically, universities currently remain selective in their work, and young people undergoing university experience remain deeply transformed throughout their lives. Research recruit persons exclusively through academic training, which means that the license only becomes the basis for selection in future for higher levels of training of the person. In addition, the broader recruitment base is, the more chances to grow and discover more human resources and better equipped. Today, elite, exceptional individuals endowed, not only are trained in higher education institutions, they formed more at masters and doctoral programs. Yet, keeping universities remains from the establishment at the beginning - to seek and to transmit the truth into science and morality. Universities, as large companies do, should also educate request, provide curricula of the future. In the XXI century, university remains stable future institution

having the following characteristics: multidisciplinary, requires continuing education, integrates science, education and production, treats information properly and has a particular rhythm work, states Professor Malița.¹¹

As the future is in favour of several disciplines and a broad specialization, it is good that in every educational system there are two ways to field approach: one - as a profession and two - as a discipline. And this is on the grounds that university not only grants a professional qualification, but rather, a license versatile in a broad field of science. Under the new conditions, university involves education. Everything in the concept of university that is particular, specific or narrow in scope of application becomes general, broad and comprehensive. More and more note that university becomes a permanent place and it is tied back periodically to keep a record of training and training needs. Not that university has classrooms and gives supremacy or upward, but its modern laboratory is significant, failing in which the universities are less likely to adapt to something new, to the requirements. Namely, university is obliged to treat the information accordingly. Under the new conditions, university reveals its second vocation when it promises to be a documentary centre to the volume of information. The existence of computing centres enable universities to investigate the so-called problem of finding information.

University remains the institution, which has a special working rhythm, sometimes criticized for the slow pace, its enviable task sometimes referred as instantaneous. University integrates science, education and production. University is considered an institution able to link with other research and production factors, which are essential for tomorrow's society. Public works, presentations, communications, discovery could not be coagulated only after decades of work. We can ask: In whose favour pace future is pronounced? University is an institution in the long term. It has in its structure necessary time to pursue core objectives for society, such as the progress of science. Type of human activity in the future will be closer to the type of university investigation.

If we refer to the Moldovan economy, then it continuously records an average gap with the European Union countries and these differences, instead of diminishing, continue to increase. Reducing disparities requires a sustained pace of economic development, economic efficiency comparable to many resources. If we try to rapidly recover the delays, treading the same path they have travelled European countries, our attempt will fail. In the process of economic evolution it is required a new strategy, a more appropriate one, of integration of the walk. Social Reality shows us that

¹¹ M. Malița, *Aurul cenușiu*. – Cluj: Editura Dacia, 1972.

something is possible (for example, development of mobile telephony and cable television).

Starting from the specified above, we notice that economy must be directed to those areas of economic development that require less costly infrastructure and more reduced energy resources, where the gap is measured in years, not decades or centuries. We remember that each major industrial revolution gave rise to a certain cycle of development that had both beneficiaries and losers. The start of these cycles has been marked, each time, the use of certain energy. If we cannot reduce the gap in terms of power management, then it may be diminished in information management. The first industrial revolution was the one that started with the use of steam, its beneficiary, in large part, was England. The second revolution was triggered by the use of the internal combustion engine, which used oil instead of steam and led to the development of the automotive industry and aeronautics, the main beneficiary being the USA. The third revolution was triggered by the use of nuclear energy, the US and Russia beneficiaries, who played world supremacy. From 1970 comes a new kind of energy altogether different from the others, by its immaterial - information. The information revolution is in full swing, development has allowed the US to establish itself as the leading world power. However, this revolution has led to the emergence of new Asian economic powers, countries lacking energy resources, but quickly adapted to this race of new technologies, such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia or Thailand and India. It is extremely important that the way as each country integrates into the race of this new revolution, information revolution, it also depends on the position, the place that it will have in the process of globalization.

Another example is that after the 40s of the XX century in the US higher education gains a mass character, becoming a social and political elite education in education accessible to all. This wave of massification of higher education in Europe barely reaches over thirty years in the 70s. In recent years, there is an increase in the number of students, for example: US (295.5 mln. population) in 1978 was 11 mln., in 1988-13 mln. and in 2000-14 mln. of students or 4.8% of the population; France (63 mln. population) in 2004 is 2.2 mln. students or 3.49% of the population; Chile (15 mln. population) in 1978-131.000, in 1988-235.000, in 2000-311.000 students or 2.75 of the population; the Republic of Moldova (4 mln. population) in 2005-115.000 students or 2.9% of the population. Higher education is becoming more accessible both for students who have financial means and capabilities for students who do not have such power. Today, the problem of access to higher education remains of great importance for the successful development of a society based on research and knowledge and it is solved differently from country to country. For example, the US has drafted Trio

project, UK Aimhigher project, which offer various activity programs to support and assist students from all social levels. In Australia, UK etc. governments provide funding to higher education institutions for the latter to accept a greater number of students, throughout the UK there are Foundation Degrees, which aims to help and to broaden the participation of students from all social layers. Such programs exist in Sweden, France etc. China's example is also of great interest, which in 1978 opened the outer world, focusing on higher education (students from disadvantaged social strata benefit from financial support from the state), or Japan, where 98% of the population has higher education, and such examples may be followed. All of them have one explanation: in a more and more competitive world, the percentage of people who received higher education is a crucial factor in the society development from economic perspective.

Currently, we are witnessing the commercialization of university studies. Higher education and research are conceived as products, goods. Universities provide education, research, expertise, consultancy etc. that can bring profit, and quantity, their quality and price are already market driven. Academics, students, funders etc. choose alternatives based on individual preferences at universities. In a commercial world, universities, looking for investment shareholders are obliged to operate under the business model: they have a reduced board, undertake commercial and financial experts etc. However, university should serve government objectives, its activity being assessed in terms of efficiency and competence of public authorities who manage the reform process. In most cases, these two perspectives: the commercial and government complement each other and do not oppose. Often at international fora, researchers are asking: But are governments ready to face university reform? Yes, most governments are facing the finished product; they require immediate and measurable results, and thus lead a rigorous accounting, and thus governments, wishing or not, promote supervision, accreditation, standardization, audit, which are sometimes excessive. In countries where public funding of universities is below 50% (US, Australia, etc.), or is a bit more than 50%, the university experienced strong sales, they (universities) are involved in processes of generating profits. For example, in Sweden the funding of universities is carried out based on the number of students enrolled in degree studies, i.e. as the number of enrolled students is higher, and the amount of public financing is greater. In recent years, funding for higher education in China, South Korea and many countries in Latin America, the Pacific, where the share of this funding in GDP is 1%, significantly increased.

Massification of higher education requires, certainly, quality of education, which is a joint responsibility of both the university and all its social partners. Universities, teachers, students, public authorities etc. must

define implementing quality in higher education as a priority objective of learning, teaching and research. Bologna Process requires from universities a re-orientation towards employment and training of specialists based on skills. This development raises new issues relating to the internal organization of the university, its place in a society is increasingly extensive. In this context, it becomes the current concept of integrity.

University and scientific community has been and must always remain a model of consistency, coherence and moral dignity. Mostly, public image of the institution depends on moral verticality of all making it up. That is why universities, first, must promote and stimulate intellectual work, scientific creation and professional obligations that are freely assumed. Each member of the university community must act fairly, honestly, without deceiving colleagues directly responsible for the obligations of the incumbent. Academia largely resembles the rest of society and prints certainly all society's ills. However, this environment is often viewed with less severity than other beneficiaries of public funds are. When we talk about corruption, in particular, trading in influence, abuse of office, protectionism, theft of means, bribery, nepotism, etc., we tend to focus more on state institutions. For the lack of effective public control system has given way, in some cases, to the transformation of some institutions into personal fiefdoms that are headed discretionary, under patronage rules, that confuse personal relationships with those of the institution.

Another problem is that the state, being a lazy monopolist, is interested only in strategic control over the university and academic world, and not the operation of the system, its performance and competitiveness. Specifically, lacking accountability system, public scrutiny over academic as it is overly bureaucratic and centralized. Consequently, universities are not left, are not encouraged to develop their own mechanisms of self-regulation, they do not have arbitration tribunal / neutral and efficient mediation in case of conflict or block with state authorities and other institutions. It should be noted that the responsibility belongs not only to the guardianship forums, but to the members of the academic world as well, who should behave as a cohesive community interested in self-regulation. It happens sometimes that group interests, opportunism, conformism and cowardice create a certain tolerance of abuse that takes place in academia. The responsibility lies with the larger universities and is that they, through internal quality assurance process must define their own instruments, procedures and standards for internal evaluation, conduct ongoing evaluation programs and develop a quality culture within the institution.

Another aspect, not less important, of our research domain is that all universities are public and should be organized by a number of principles of university autonomy, public accountability, ensuring academic freedom.

Solid foundation of this process is the knowledge. Today, universities are called to help build a new humanism, a new university in which: teaching, scientific and organizational autonomy; freedom of thought and research; democratic participation and social responsibility; innovation, transparency, ethics etc. constitute its essential values. The main feature of the university today is generosity, it does not only own honour and glory, and its objectives are linked to the interests of society and the community where it operates. In education, universities have a duty of leading the society. They educate especially young people and influence societies through research and innovation. Mostly university depends on the people who come up with new ideas and who often have different opinions. Universities are dependent on diversity: scientists from different fields work together; train students and teachers differently, which makes the existence of different perspectives possible; cultural and linguistic diversity facilitates learning through comparative and distinctive approaches.

In the knowledge society, characteristic of the developed states, to which other European countries tend, the departments of the intellectual sphere, the intangible assets of education, especially higher education that has the major role, produce the main economic effects. The concept of academic integrity meets practical needs of the universities to provide quality services to various social groups. More broadly, the concept of integrity means honesty, probity, sense of dignity, justice and conscientiousness that serve as a guide to human conduct. In turn, moral integrity is prohibition to request, accept or offer, directly or indirectly, any advantage or benefit in the performance of duties / obligations or abuse of their position in any way, or tasks performed. European intellectuals' scientific discourse is focused on interpretation / understanding and assimilation of Keywords: cooperation, participation, integrity, legitimacy, dialogue and respect, designating the attitudes required for all people, especially the younger generation. From this perspective, higher education institutions are obliged to take appropriate measures to cultivate new values, to promote the values of ethical conduct, with particular emphasis on integrity and prevention of corruption in academia developing a participatory civic culture. Intellectual transition is a prerequisite and pillar for all other components of the transformations taking place in the country. In the XXI century education, particularly the university, must represent and represents a priority for all governments. Intellectual transition includes several elements such as strategic thinking, perceptions, opinions, attitudes,

beliefs, habits, values etc. that need to be changed through education and training.¹²

XXI Century University teaches people of all ages and experience to acquire, process, apply in production and produce new knowledge. Knowledge in the knowledge society has a significant value; it is an important resource group activity, its outcomes. University educates, forms scientific management skills required. At least one member of the founding team of enterprise / organization / institution must be informed, to be able to store information in a database, systematize and use all this information. To achieve the goal, the manager must be knowledgeable in the field, even if not skilled, he must understand the interaction between art and market. It is essential for knowledge manager to be aware of training model of the human persuasion, communication with them, knowledge of the laws and customs of the working group. For this reason, the manager has to continuously learn to adapt to particular situations.

Information is intelligible to every receiver, which adds his knowledge, he charged. Knowledge is defined as cumulative stock of knowledge and skills of using information generated by the receiver. Knowledge reflects the perception and judgment processes in the human brain with the material received as information. Information and knowledge differ in that man's intellectual capacities depend on the competence with which he perceives, understands and uses the information. The same information for different people may have significantly different values due to major differences in perception and ability to use their knowledge generating different part. Intellectual capacity of people and the knowledge they possess in a given field are certain to turn data and information into knowledge particularly valuable or not to generate knowledge.¹³ At the level of knowledge are found in enterprise workforce (human capital), the requirements and preferences of customers, products, processes, capabilities and its systems (structural capital). As a result the value of knowledge assets significantly exceed the value of tangible assets. Overall, the stock of knowledge grows more quickly than in the past. Along with increased knowledge, there is a reduction of classical resources additions, controlling the primacy of knowledge, as of the company's capital. Within each undertaking three major processes related to knowledge are produced: acquisition and production of knowledge, which is achieved by learning processes of employees; knowledge production as innovations; use

¹² L.Roșca, C. Lazari, *Etica și integritatea universitară: experiențe, realizări, probleme*. Monografie. IRIM – Chișinău: Tipogr. "Print-Caro", 172 p.

¹³ Radu Mihalcea, Armenia Androniceanu, *Management. Fundamente. Interferențe. Studii de caz. Soluții*. – București: Ed.Economică, 2000, 464 p.

knowledge through their adopted decisions and actions, which in their turn are translated into products, services, new knowledge, which are marketed in terms of profitability.

In the 80s of the last century, the OECD provided a definition of the knowledge economy: "economy based directly on production, distribution and use of knowledge and information". This definition has been taken over by those skilled in the art to foreshadow economic future. A culmination of this was the EU summit in Lisbon, where it was settled as a fundamental objective for countries: building knowledge-based economy. At present, the knowledge economy is characterized by:

- Priority of knowledge in all areas of economic activity due to the decisive impact they have on the functionality and performance. In production processes, knowledge is an important input than land, money or work.

- Concentration of economic activities, not on the production of goods but on treating information, knowledge accumulation and producing knowledge-goods.

- Substantiation of economic activities, not primarily on tangible resources (land, buildings, equipment) but on intangible resources, knowledge and requirements posed by competent people.

- Capital knowledge is a special, intangible, fluid capital, whose tenure, exclusive one, is difficult to achieve and that can be retrieved and reused.

- The proliferation of symbolic equipment and products, while reducing the relative physical products; symbolic products are based on information, whose value is independent of the physical characteristics of these goods. Money was the first form of symbolic capital, through it replacing system based on barter exchange. Cards, electronic commerce, electronic banking, computer software packages etc. are symbolic product categories that will prevail in the knowledge economy.

- Mass production, in the sense of eliminating the need to focus large amounts of physical and human resources in a unit to generate economic performance. The first steps have been made by systems "just in time", based on the integration of computer processing etc.

- Gradual disappearance of borders between the organization and activities of undertakings at sectorial, regional, national, international levels. The organization focuses on division of labour and hierarchy gives place to organization founded on teamwork, the ability of a manager to replace employees between them, to ensure interdepartmental functionality. It gradually diminishes differences and boundaries between various fields and schemes in the context of internationalization of activities.

- Creation, exploitation activities and improvement of technologies become widespread and important, subject for survival and performance.

- Share majority, in continuous rise, of the services sector in economy, to the detriment of the manufacturing sector.

- Development and growth of the exports, due to the decrease of the differences between national markets and the gradual elimination of institutional, time and space boundaries between countries.

- Rapid multiplication of small businesses along with relative reducing of large firms because they are simple and can adapt more quickly to changing circumstances. It is an important response to changes in the business environment. This ensures attainment of the objectives targeted.

- The proliferation and diversification of the economic association between the organizations, strategic alliances, business networks, clusters, industrial parks etc. - to capitalize on a higher-level knowledge and other resources available. Underlying forms of collaboration there is a new type of knowledge, integrative and computer links, and modern communications.

The new organization and management model is based on the principles of economic activity:

- The value of intangible assets. Mainly company employees who have professional studies represent the value. It is also important to recognize the value of tangible assets, without which no enterprise can operate. In this context, it is important to realize that the company's assets structure is changed, the values created, requiring both types of assets: tangible and intangible. The maximum value is achieved by combining them in certain proportions, which varies depending on the industry, firm size, the context in which it acts etc.

- Mitigation of geographical distances on business performance. Traditionally, the geographical location of a country or businesses, constituted a decisive factor in shaping national economies and companies in obtaining economic performance. Currently, connection with customers and suppliers, wherever they are placed on the globe, can be done instantly. As a result, except for some sectors, such as mining, oil, strategic share of the geographic factor has diminished considerably.

- Considerable reduction of time penetrating innovation. The rate of renewal of knowledge, products, technologies, etc., greatly accelerated. Current possibilities for instant connection to new information, statements etc. often enable a prompt response, increase capacity for innovation and adaptation to market needs, tending towards progress in real time. Accordingly, innovations occur much faster and run with a higher speed, diminishing the importance of the time factor. For meditation: web adoption of 50% of world population took five years, while the spread of computers - 30 years, electricity - 40 years, steam power - 100 years.

- Holders of knowledge become the supreme value of the country, undertaking. Valuable ideas were instrumental in the development of enterprises, national economies, and therefore their carriers are invaluable. The detention of these persons in the enterprise using a variety of means, including transforming them into co-owners, has become a necessity.

- Accelerate the development and growth by using networks (networking). Making networks in the economy that integrates economic agents of different sizes, oriented around value vector is generating rapid economic growth. Through these networks, technical, human and economic flow rates greatly amplified, often generating "explosive" economic effects.

- The value of products increases exponentially with value market segment occupied. Traditionally, the rare a product was, the higher value it had. Currently, there is a situation contrary to proliferate, in the sense, that the higher the volume of amplified products of some sort is, as these have a greater market share, the value increases. Example are telephones and faxes. As they have diversified their usefulness and value increased due to the network effect.

- The importance of intermediate levels in the economy increases. In traditional economy, distributors and other intermediaries were constantly in uncertainty due to the development of economic links, which facilitated direct links between producers and consumers. Specifics of the current transition to the knowledge economy is the emergence of a class of intermediaries, called "info-intermediaries" that contribute to transforming data into useful information and even knowledge. Amplifying the volume and complexity of information and knowledge determines rapid growth of the info-brokers and their impact on the functionality and performance of the company.

- Purchasers acquire more power, and sellers - new opportunities. The ability to quickly get buyers using intelligent software, through a simple "click", the information regarding the best products, lowest prices, best relations "price-quality" of products give them a high capacity to choose and quickly get the product and service they want. They obtained a significant upward on sellers, reversing the traditional trade relations. At the same time new opportunities for producers and sellers are created as possessing detailed information on market situation, know very well what to produce and what prices to sell to be profitable.

- Trading products and services are becoming increasingly personalized. A quick and cheap information on specific customer requests is reflected in the manufacture and sale of products under the express requirements thereof. This provides a growing supply product customization, resulting in a substantial reduction in inventories and waiting times in the course of economic processes. The economic effects of this change, although difficult to assess, are undoubtedly immense.

- Availability of any product everywhere. Given the rapid access to information on products, large distance often separates desire to buy an effective opportunity to do so, is substantially reduced, tending to reach numerous products from scratch. The explanation for this development lies in the possibility of making instant orders via e-commerce "online" of their desired products and their fast delivery. The situation tends to be similar to listening to a song you like. To have it, there is no need to go to the store, being able to order it and get it immediately via computer.¹⁴

University of Oradea is located in Bihor county, in the area called West Gate of Romania. This institution meets the needs of the knowledge society, which supports the continued growth and satisfies everyone's needs, who want to improve their skills. The academic community of the University of Oradea is involved in national and regional development, promoting the tradition of free thought and democratic values in integration circuit. Department of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication fully serves the interests of the academic community, supporting an atmosphere of collaboration, cooperation, based on the rules and principles of professional ethics. The research directions of the three chairs History, International Relations and European Studies, Political Science and Communication are: Study of identity and migration in the EU; Cooperation to combat trafficking; History of international relations; Euro-regional studies and cross-border cooperation; European neighborhood Policy; European regional policies; The history of local media in Romania; Ethics and media law; Romanian Western history; Historical Anthropology etc.

After signing the Agreement on collaboration between the Institute of International Relations of Moldova with the University of Oradea, especially with the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Studies, we participated in five international scientific conferences, in the program Erasmus + academic mobility, activities in the period of 2013-2016. Communication with colleagues from the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Studies is built on the principles of professional ethics, deontology. Exchange of experience, carried out with goodwill, mutual trust, work atmosphere, always allow us to come back to Moldova with new ideas, projects of collaboration, research, more active involvement in society, in the municipality of Chisinau, in the institution. The Dean of the Faculty of History, International Relations, Political Science and Communication Studies - University Professor Ioan

¹⁴ L. Belohiow, The Evolving Competitive Paradigm// Business Horizon, nr.2, 1996; E. Abrahamson, Management Fashion// The Academy of Management Review, vol.21, nr.1, 1996; J.Camilus, Reinventing Strategic Planning// Strategy & Leadership, nr.3, 1996.

Horga, in my opinion, is the model of a university professor, authentic, modest, principled, a big patriot of Bihor, Romania, active supporter of the idea of rebuilding the European Union, professional manager with a busy agenda, but with clear daily priorities. The team that he created, via activities well planned and managed, outlines a visible impact on the social life of the city Bihor, of Oradea, of the University. Using conclusions from the work "Energetic Personalism" signed by Professor Constantin Radulescu Motru, it is worth mentioning with firmness: Professor Ioan Horga is an energetic personality who managed to refine, ennoble the place. Only by such academics, University of Oradea fulfills de facto its mission, serving the knowledge society, where knowledge manifests itself as a driving force for social progress.

Conclusion

For the transition from the traditional economy to the one based on knowledge it is necessary to assimilate the paradigm of competitiveness. According to it, the knowledge economy establishes a high-level production culture and customer service for communication between producers of goods and agents providing services, for relations between the public and private sectors of national economies. Compliance with these principles becomes a reality in conditions when all the people involved speak the language of business, send clear, cohesive messages, and assumes responsibility for performed actions.

Abstract

In the article "University mission in the knowledge society", the author relates two complex social phenomena: the university and economy based on knowledge. The author revived definitions / interpretations of education, academic, professional training, popular in the twentieth century, the author highlights requirements of contemporary society, defined as knowledge society, stressing that the university, from the need to preserve its own status, is obliged to reform / reorganize so as to provide services to the population, irrespective of their age. Knowledge-based economy calls for educating competitive managers, able to observe and react appropriately to changes in social practice, to the situation of the enterprise / organization / institution.

At the level of European Council there are no events, actions, which would have addressed the need to increase the performance of national training and education. European higher education reform is dictated by the imperative of increasing the quality of services provided by universities, competitiveness. In the contemporary world, higher education is seen as a strategic area because the power of a state can be enhanced through the efficient functioning of the system of training and education. Massification of higher education requires, certainly, quality of education, which is a joint responsibility of both the university and all its social partners. Universities, teachers, students, public authorities etc. must define implementing quality in higher education as a priority objective of learning, teaching and research.

Keywords: *university, university mission, knowledge society, economy based on knowledge, scientific management, education, globalization, reform, university integration.*

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Effects of the Natural Environmental Components on Sports

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Introduction

In recent times, an increase can be observed in the economic, social and political role of sports, and as a consequence of that the representatives of the various disciplines pay more and more attention to the demonstration of the relationship between their own disciplines and the sports. From the position of settlement geography, one of the options for the complex study of the activities related to sports is the tetrahedron model of settlements which indicates that „a settlement should be interpreted in a given geographical environment living in intensive interaction with its elements as a system of economic, social and technical structures¹”. The aim of the paper is to illustrate the impacts of the natural sphere from among the spheres mentioned with sharing the conclusions drawn in the international literature, and to demonstrate the effects of certain environmental components on sports.

Effects of the natural environmental components

From among the elements of the natural environment, relief and climate should be mentioned on the first place as influencing factors. These bring certain settlements into favourable and other settlements into unfavourable position, and they also make adjustment to them necessary. From the aspect of the relief, the slope conditions of a given surface is very

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
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¹ József Toth, "A településhálózat és a környezet kölcsönhatásának néhány elméleti és gyakorlati kérdése", in *Földrajzi Értesítő*, 1981, p. 267-292.

important which must be faced while creating sports infrastructure. Horizontal surface is essential in the case of stadiums and sports halls hosting athletic competitions and various ball games, while the varied relief is preferred for the investments related mostly to winter sports (e.g. ski-jump, downhill courses).

The other very important aspect of the relief is the altitude which is mainly taken into consideration in the organisation phase of the sports events and in the outcomes of the competitions. On the one hand, with the height of the sea level the number of snowy days per year increases, making the given area more suitable for practising winter sports. On the other hand, the oxygen content of the air is lower in the higher altitudes which actually may cause certain problems, such as decline in performance, for the professional sportsmen. According to the results of the survey carried out during the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa² the general running performance of the football players during the games played at lower altitudes was better. (Figure 1)

Figure 1 Teams’ total distance covered at different altitudes in the 2010 World Cup matches.



Source: George Nassis, "Effect of altitude on football performance: analysis of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Data", in *The Journal of Strength & Conditioning Research*, no. 3, 2013, p. 705

² George Nassis, "Effect of altitude on football performance: analysis of the 2010 FIFA World Cup Data", in *The Journal of Strength & Conditioning Research*, no. 3, 2013, p. 703-707.

The third very important impact is in close relation with the previous one: the trainings regularly conducted at higher altitudes has a positive effect on the production of red blood cells. Consequently, after returning to lower altitudes, the sportsmen attending training camps at higher altitudes had a one or two weeks advantage in comparison with the players training at lower altitudes. The detailed surveys³ suggested that the highest advantage is meant by “the living high-training low” method (high meaning 2500 metres, and low meaning 1300 metres), and called attention to the fact that the actual perfection depends on several other factors (e.g. preliminary training conditions of the athletes).

The fourth key impact is related to the phenomenon that with the increase in the altitude the resistance of air decreases which actually means a significant advantage in the sports requiring rapid moves/sprint. The conclusions of the research (Table 1) reveal that in the case of speed skating, if all other terms are identical then the model presupposes 2.5-5.0% improvement with the increase in the altitude (in our days, for example, all speed skating world records were achieved in two cities – Calgary and Salt Lake City – in the case of the adult men and ladies, and the same applies for the juniors except for one distance⁴). Similar tendency may be observed in the case of athletics as well: in the mid-2000s six of the best twenty results in the 200 metres sprint running were achieved on tracks located 1000 metres above sea level (by today this is true only for two results). As a consequence of the above, the settlements concerned play a very important role in sport tourism, also meaning economic advantages for them.

Table 1 Computer simulation of the effect of altitude on long-track speed skating performance time.

Race distance	Location (altitude above sea level)				
	Hamar (126 m)	Nagano (375 m)	Inzell (690 m)	Calgary (1035 m)	Salt Lake City (1305 m)
500 m	39.70 s	39.49 s	39.25 s	38.98 s	38.81 s
1000 m	1 min 18.53 s	1 min 17.24 s	1 min 17.02 s	1 min 16.15 s	1 min 15.56 s
1500 m	2 min 04.41 s	2 min 03.05 s	2 min 01.43 s	1 min 59.69 s	1 min 58.55 s

Source: Chapman, R. F.; Stickford, J. L.; Levine, B.D. (2010), “Altitude training considerations for the winter sport athlete”, in *Experimental physiology*, no. 3, p. 415

³ James Stray-Gundersen, Robert F. Chapman, Benjamin D. Levine, “«Living high-training low» altitude training improves sea level performance in male and female elite runners”, in *Journal of applied physiology*, 2001, p. 1113-1120.

⁴ See <http://speedskatingresults.com/index.php?p=9>

The other important component of the natural environment is climate whose effects may be experienced in the case of the outdoor sports events. In the first considerable publication related to the topic, Thornes⁵ emphasised that weather conditions are important not only from the aspect of the athletes but also from the aspect of the audience – and the latter, in fact, also influences the economics of the sport events. Moreover, the author divided the sports into three categories:

- specialised weather sports: the events are dependent on certain weather conditions (e.g. sailing, gliding, hot-air ballooning),
- weather interference sports: the most suitable weather conditions have no extreme values; nevertheless, extremities have the same impact on all participants (e.g. football, American football, rugby),
- weather advantage sports: the changing weather conditions can afford advantage for some participants (e.g. golf, athletics, cricket).

Table 2 Subjective assessment of influence of meteorological parameters on a range of sports

	air pressure	Temperature	wind	Precipitation	fog	average
sailing	1	4	5	3	4	3,4
ice sailing	1	5	5	4	4	3,6
downhill skiing	1	4	3	5	4	3,4
spring skiing	1	4	5	5	5	4,0
cross country skiing	2	5	4	5	2	3,6
bob-sleighbing	1	5	3	4	4	3,4
cycling	3	3	5	4	1	3,2
football	1	2	4	5	1	2,6
parachuting	2	3	5	4	4	3,6
athletics (jumps)	2	4	5	3	1	3,0
athletics (track)	3	3	5	3	1	3,0
shooting	1	1	5	3	4	2,8

1 – slight, 2 – little, 3 – noticeable, 4 – important, 5 – large

Source: Allen Perry, "Sports tourism and climate variability", in: A. Matzarakis, C. R. de Freitas and D. Scott, *Advances in Tourism Climatology, Berichte des Meteorologische Institute der Universität Freiburg*, Nr. 12, Freiburg, 2004, p. 176

When carrying out detailed studies of the weather components, the researchers pointed out that their effects vary by sports, and the different sports are affected by the effects of adverse weather to varying degrees (Table 2). Wind, temperature and precipitation are the most influential

⁵ J. E. Thornes, "The effect of weather on sport", in *Weather*, 1977, p. 258-268.

weather parameters, and the winter sports are the most intensively affected by the weather conditions from among all sports⁶.

A considerable part of the studies analysing the effects of wind were conducted in the field of athletics mostly focusing on the jumping and running contests. The outcomes (Table 3) suggest that wind direction and wind speed significantly influence the performance of the athletes, which could explain why the world records achieved in tailwind of more than 2 m/s are not certified. Wind speed, however, belongs to the unpredictable factors (though there are regions where windy periods occur more frequently than the annual average), and consequently its effect can be taken into preliminary account only to a limited extent in the organising activities related to sports.

Table 3. Effects of wind speeds on the performance of the athletes (lost and gained time in seconds)

		wind speed (m/s)				
		5.0	4.0	3.0	2.0	1.0
head wind	men's 100	-0.340	-0.262	-0.189	-0.121	-0.058
	women's 100	-0.378	-0.291	-0.209	-0.134	-0.064
tail wind	men's 100	+0.217	+0.183	+0.145	+0.101	+0.053
	women's 100	+0.231	+0.196	+0.156	+0.110	+0.058

Source: Quinn, M. D., "The effects of wind and altitude in the 200-m sprint" in *Journal of Applied Biomechanics*, no.1, 2003, p. 54.

Temperature can be taken as the second most important factor which – in comparison with the wind – is a much more stable weather component, and therefore its effects are much more predictable. The importance of its consideration results from the fact that sporting under too high temperature does not only result in performance deterioration but due to overheat and water loss it is also harmful to health. This is especially frequent in the case of the regions (and thus cities) located along the middle latitudes which (1) belong to the economically more developed regions, and thus have advanced sports life (e.g. major world events – Olympic Games, world championships), and (2) – mainly in the summer periods – are highly subject to the above discussed climatic threats. For the mitigation of risks the organisers apply various methods: on the recommendation of the International Olympic Committee, it is necessary to provide separate

⁶ Allen Perry, Perry, "Sports tourism and climate variability", in: A. Matzarakis, C. R. de Freitas and D. Scott, *Advances in Tourism Climatology, Berichte des Meteorologische Institute der Universitat Freiburg* Nr. 12, Freiburg, 2004, p. 174-179.

facilities (e.g. air-conditioned locker rooms) within the establishments, and it is practical to prefer later hours to begin a sports event when fixing the specific time. (Table 4)

Table 4 Scheduled start times in the Spanish championship on 30 August 2015 and 28 February 2016.

start time	30 August 2015	28 February 2016
12:00	0 match	1 match
16:00	0 match	2 matches
18:15	0 match	3 matches
18:30	2 matches	0 match
20:30	4 matches	3 matches
22:00	1 match	1 match (22:05)
22:30	3 matches	0 match

Source: <http://www.eredmenyek.com/foci/spanyolorszag/primeradivision/eredmenyek/>

Precipitation can be regarded as the third most important weather parameter which basically has a dual effect. On the one hand, precipitation in the form of water is regarded as a rather significant hindering factor: in certain sports (e.g. tennis) rain makes it impossible to organise the contest, while in other cases (e.g. football) it makes difficult to play continuous football to a great extent. Those sports can be listed into a separate category (e.g. golf, cricket) in which the contestants take part at varying times on the same day and the changing conditions (and this is especially true for rainfall) may produce unexpected results.

The other element of the effects of precipitation is constituted by those sports where the organisation of the contest could hardly be imagined in the lack of a proper amount of precipitation (namely snow). This category, naturally, includes the skiing related winter sports (e.g. cross-country, alpine). In this context, its role in mass sports and tourism is also considerable (according to researchers, a basic criteria for winter tourism is minimum 100 days of reliable snow cover). For the sake of the above considerations, the uphill shift in the snow line resulting from the climate change may be regarded very dangerous⁷ with an estimated value of 120-150 metres/°C (although, the phenomenon is primarily due to the increase in temperature but regarding its effect it is discussed here).

⁷ Michael Hantel, Christian Maurer, "The median winter snowline in the Alps", in *Meteorologische Zeitschrift* 3, vol. 20, 2011, p. 267-276; Andreas Gobiet, Sven Kotlarski, Martin Beniston, et. al., "21st century climate change in the European Alps – A review", in *Science of the Total Environment*, vol. 493, 2014, p. 1138-1151.



Figure 2. The relative number of artificial turfs accepted and recommended by FIFA in different European countries (turfs/10 million inhabitants)

Source: <http://quality.fifa.com/en/Football-Turf/FIFA-recommended-pitches-worldwide/#/index>, downloaded: 23.07.2016.

In Europe, the phenomenon causes a really serious problem in the Alps where, according to the 2007 OECD Report (Agrawala et al. 2007), the number of snow reliable ski resorts will drop under 500 if there is a temperature rise of 1°C, and will drop to 404 if there is a temperature rise of 2°C (the case of Germany is especially sensitive where even a temperature rise of 1°C would result in a decline of 60%). Subsequently, all those

settlements where winter tourism plays an important role in economy, the economic life would be jeopardised (artificial snow could reduce the risk but it does not afford a real solution). The seriousness of the threat is supported by the fact that in the case of many Winter Olympic Games the snow necessary for the competitions had to be transported to the locations from great distances in the past period.

In many cases, the effects of the above discussed weather components can be also observed in a complex way. From the aspect of infrastructure, it may be established that adverse weather conditions (too frequent rainfall, lower sunshine duration due to northern location or covered roof) make the maintenance of natural grass cover very difficult, and consequently matches are played on artificial turf (if its quality is appropriate then it is also approved by the FIFA). Though there are no detailed statistics available on the number and regional distribution of the artificial turfs worldwide but in Europe the northern and southern countries are dominant with respect to the fields approved and recommended by FIFA (Figure 2).

With regard to the events, the complex effect is felt in a way that in the winter periods of the northern hemisphere the weather conditions offer only limited opportunities for competitive outdoor sports, and consequently the interest in the locations in milder areas, mostly with Mediterranean weather, significantly increases. This may be experienced especially in the case of football where January and February are the chief periods for spring and summer seasons (however, the rainfalls characterising this period often caused problems). Therefore, many of the teams choose the Mediterranean Basin for the training camps which brings – in a period that theoretically counts as dead season from the aspect of tourism – significant income from tourism for the regions concerned⁸, and therefore specialised infrastructure (e.g. high number of training grounds) have been already constructed for the visitors on the settlements concerned (Figure 3).

⁸ Nicos L. Kartakoullis, George Karlis, "Developing Cyprus as a sport tourism destination: the results of a swot analysis", in *Journal of Sport Tourism*, vol. 7, 2002, p. 3-17; Erdogan Koc, "New product development in the Turkish tourism market: the case of football tourism", in *Journal of Sport and Tourism*, vol. 10, 2005, p. 165-172.

Figure 3 The location of training camps of Bundesliga football clubs in 2015/16 winter break



Source: <http://www.bundesliga.com/en/news/Bundesliga/blmd17n-infographic-the-bundesliga-clubs-winter-schedules-2015-16.jsp>

The third area of the complex effects of the environment is interference with the results of the sports events. In this respect, the researchers usually mainly refer to the “home advantage” phenomenon (Courneya and Carron, 1992) which is supported by various factors (e.g. audience support, acquaintance with sports facilities, judicial partiality). The explanations, nevertheless, in certain cases may also include the climate: the weather conditions of the Brazilian Belém or the Turkish Van (e.g. Belém – wetter and hotter climate) are difficult to adapt for the teams arriving from the other parts of the country and this means a significant advantage for the home teams⁹.

⁹ Richard Pollard, Cristiano Diniz da Silva, N. C. Medeiros, „Home advantage in football in Brazil: differences between teams and the effects of distance travelled”, *Brasilian Journal of Soccer and Science*, 2008, p. 3-10.

Aylin Seckin, Richard Pollard, 2007. „Home advantage in Turkish professional soccer”, *Journal of Sports Science and Medicine Supplement*, 2007, p. 203-204.

Conslusions and Recommendations

Summing up the study it may be established that although the society in the past period took significant steps to cut itself adrift from the effects of the natural environment with regard to the sports events but this causes considerable extra costs and certain risk elements can be never cancelled.

Abstract

Nowadays sports have gained a more and more important role in the economic, social and political life, as well as being an important tool in sustaining the health of the population. One of the options for the complex analysis of the sports related activities is the tetrahedron model of settlements which indicates that "a settlement should be interpreted in a given geographical environment living in intensive interaction with its elements as a system of economic, social and technical structures". The aim of the paper is to illustrate the effects of the natural sphere from among these spheres sharing the conclusions drawn in the international literature. The study discusses the most significant elements of the relationship system of two of the most important environmental components – relief and climate – and sports, the peculiarities in the differences between the settlements, and the settlements characterised by the most advantageous conditions. The importance of the similar studies lies in the fact that the regions with advantageous conditions can exploit their advantages for sport tourism which is today becoming more and more substantial and thus can create economic gains for themselves.

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The Valencian Linguistic Conflict: Dialect or Regional Language? Instrument or Argument for the Catalans independence?

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The Valencian linguistic conflict, often called by the sociolinguist Rafael Ninyoles i Monllor in his book *Conflicte lingüístic valencià*, the Valencian sociolinguistic conflict, is an expression that has to do with the conflict between the use of Valencian language and Catalan language on the territory of the *Comunidad Valenciana* in Spain. Otherwise, this expression it refers to the controversy regarding the identity of Valencian language and its relation with the Catalan language. There is a theory which supposes that the Catalan was imported in the region of Valencia and so the Valencian is just a dialect of the Catalan language and not a language. As in every sort of conflict, there are two oposed ideas and conceptions: the Valencian Nationalists who want to preserve and to promote the linguistic and cultural personality of the Valencian Language and the pro-Catalans which ideals would be to consider the Valencian as a dialect and to unify it with Catalan in order to constitute a unique language. Without any doubt, this linguistic conflict can and has to be related with the process and the desire of independence of Catalan people.

1. General aspects. Legal overview

Looking at the Spanish Constitution from 1978, where the status of regional languages is mentioned, in the Article 3.3 the linguistic diversity in Spain is recognized: “*La riqueza de las distintas modalidades lingüísticas de España es un patrimonio cultural que será objeto de especial respeto y protección*”¹. Even if the Regime of Franco tried to unify the languages spoken by the Spanish people and to impose the Castilian for all the inhabitants of the country, the

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¹ The richness of the linguistic varieties in Spain is a cultural heritage that will receive special respect and protection, Spain Constitution, p.2

speakers of regional languages continued to use their languages at home and among close friends and to transmit their culture to the children. As a result, due to the activity of some private institutions, that continued studying and promoting their use, the regional languages in Spain survived and were preserved.²

Officially, several Autonomous Communities in Spain have legal statutes providing protection to a number of different languages in Spain. Between them we should mention: the Principality of Asturias whose language is Bable, or Asturian dialect³, the Autonomous Community of Aragon, whose language is Aragonese or the Aragon language⁴, the Valencian Community whose language is recognized to be the Valencian⁵, the Balearic Islands where is very common the Balearic dialect, very similar to Catalan.

In the Principality of Asturias, even if Bable is not recognized as an official language, it is protected by their Statute of Autonomy. This language isn't spoken only in Asturias, but also in the regions of Leon and Zamorra, reaching Miranda do Douro in Portugal.⁶ Regarding the Autonomous Community of Aragon, in their Statute is mentioned that all linguistic variation of Aragonese should be protected, as they are part of the cultural and historical heritage of the region. In the Statue of Valencia Autonomous Community (which includes the provinces of Alicante, Castellon and Valencia) it is mentioned that the two official languages are Valencian and Castilian. However, a linguistic conflict exists between the Valencian and the Catalan Languages, because the Valencians insist their language is a unique one, while the Catalans insist that the Valencian language is simply a regional dialect of Catalan. Even more, the Catalan Statute recognize the Aranese, a variety of the Occitan language spoken in the Northwest of Lleida, as a dialect of the people living in the area. On the same path, the Catalans would like that the Valencian Language has the same statute. This is why the topic is delicate and has more points of view.⁷

² „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015,

<http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain>

³ „Estatuto de Autonomía del Principado de Asturias”, Article 4.1, accessed May 25, 2015, http://www.congreso.es/consti/estatutos/estatutos.jsp?com=65&tipo=2&ini=1&fin=9&ini_sub=1&fin_sub=1

⁴ „Estatuto de la Autonomía. Estatuto de Aragon”, Article 4.1”, accessed May 25, 2015, http://www.estatutodearagon.es/estatuto_de_autonomia

⁵ „Estatuto de Autonomía de la Comunidad Valenciana”, Article 6.1, accessed May 25, 2015, <https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-1982-17235>

⁶ „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015,

<http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain>

⁷ Ibidem

There is another curious case in Spain, that of the Castúo language, spoken in some parts of Extremadura. This language has influences from the dialects spoken in the regions of Leon and Rioja, but also from the regions of Aragon and the Basque County.⁸

Another interesting aspect, in addition to the linguistic variation in Spain that enriches the country, is the fact that the Castilian language has different dialects that have developed their own features. This is most obvious in different parts of Andalusia. For example, in the Western part of Andalusia, the language spoken shares many characteristics with the Spanish language spoken in the Latin America. An explanation could be the fact that the majority of the Spanish settlers to the New World were from this region. The case of the Canary Island is also interesting, because there is evident the linguistic influence of the Spanish from Western Andalusia, Portuguese and English. This mixture of influences remembers the history of these islands and their overseas travel between America and Europe.

In Spain, the linguistic situation is very rich and diverse. However, it is important to note that, despite all of these variations, Castilian is still the most commonly used language and it is the unifying language of the whole Spanish territory.⁹

1.1. The Catalan Language

The Catalan Language is one of the regional languages spoken in Spain, in the region named Catalonia, and it's one of the most spoken regional languages in Europe, with approximately 7 million speakers.¹⁰

During the time, the evolution of this language was curious, but flourished at the same time. The first text in Catalan dates from the 12th century and it is called *Homilies d'Organya*. Later, in the 13th, 14th and 15th century, the Catalan literature flourishes, first under the Provençal literature and later as the producer of its own thematic and formal resources. Later, from the 16th to the 18th century the Catalan literature underwent a period of decline in which the royalty and the political class of the time imposed different restrictions. In the 19th century it emerged again with the movement called *Renaixença*, or Renaissance. Later, Pompeu Fabra was the first grammarian who effected the regulation and grammatical

⁸ "El Castúo", accessed May 27, 2016, <https://sites.google.com/site/lacastua/el-castuo>

⁹ „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, <http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain>

¹⁰ "Catalan Language. General Overview", accessed May 28, 2015, <http://www.orbilat.com/Languages/Catalan/Catalan.html>

systematization of the Catalan language and unified spelling standards for its use.¹¹

The Spanish Constitution from 1978 recognizes the use of both Castilian and Catalan languages as official in Catalonia, and since 1983 Catalan language is official in Balearic Islands as well. Catalan is also spoken in other areas of Spain and outside of the country. It is spoken in some parts of Aragon and Murcia, in Spain, but also in the French region Roussillon, in the Principality of Andorra and in the Italian city called Alguer, in Sardinia. It is the mother tongue of some 5 to 6 million people.

1.2. The Galician Language

Together with the Catalan Language, the Galician language is another Romance Language spoken on the Spanish territory and recognized by the 1978 Constitution as a regional language. It is spoken in Galicia, a territory in the North-Western Spain and was carried by the Christian conquerors outwards to present day Portugal.

The begging of the Galician dates from the 12th century, when the language was called Galician-Portuguese. Later, on the 14th century, after producing a body of literature, the language split into Galician and Portuguese, for historical and political reasons.¹² However, the true renaissance of this language came in the 19th century, when there is a notable production of literature, especially poetry. The language it's not spoken only in Galicia, where is co-official together with the Castilian language, but also it is spoken in some areas of Asturias and Castile-Leon.¹³

Today, there are about three million people speaking Galician, but it's very difficult to make an exact calculation due to its similarity to Castilian and the multiple interferences derived from a practically universal bilingualism. To this figure we must add the Galician communities living in Latin American countries that use it.

1.3. The Basque Language

The Basque Language or the Euskera is the language spoken in the northern central area of Spain. Euskera is the name of the language in the Basque language. Today, there are about 600 000 speakers in Spain, but the language is not spoken only in Spain, because the Basque Country includes

¹¹ "Pompeu Fabra", accessed June 1st, 2015, <http://www.lletres.net/pla/fabrapla2.html>

¹² „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015, <http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain>

¹³ “Galician (Gallego)”, accessed June 1st, 2015, <http://www.omniglot.com/writing/galician.htm>

also some territory from France, called the French Basque Country, with approximately 100 000 speakers.¹⁴

The Basque language is the only one which beginnings are not really traceable and who has a number of hypotheses. It has been suggested that the forerunner of the Basque language was introduced into this part of Europe by immigrants from Asia Minor at the beginning of the Bronze Age, but we know as well that the Basque and Castilian entered history together, since the first text preserved in Castilian, is also written in Basque.¹⁵ Also, it is known the fact that the Basque it's not a Romance language as the others regional languages in Spain.

Since the 1978 Constitution, the Basque Language it's recognized as official language in the Basque Country, together with the Castilian. The mountainous landscape of the region has contributed towards maintaining linguistic diversity, leading some linguists, based on the intercommunicative difficulties found, to claim the existence of seven different Basque languages. To overcome this fragmentation the Royal Academy of the Basque Language was created in 1919, and in 1968, a standardized Basque grammar called *batúa* was adopted for official purposes.¹⁶

2. The Catalan language's origins and history

The legal basis of the language in Spain has been stipulated in the 1978 Constitution, mainly by Article 3 and in the Catalonia, Valencia, The Balearic Islands and Aragon Statutes of Autonomy. In Catalonia is implemented in 1998 by the law of the common languages (which replaces the law of 1983). In accordance with this legislation, Catalan is a specific language of Catalonia, Balearic Islands and Valencia and it is also an official language of these regions together with the Spanish. In the Andorra, in accordance with the Andorra Constitution, the Catalan language is the only official language.¹⁷

While speaking about Catalan's dialects, even if in the Middle Ages there is no evidence that the dialects existed, starting with the sixteenth

¹⁴ "Basque (Euskara)", accessed June 1st, 2015,
<http://www.omniglot.com/writing/basque.htm>

¹⁵ „Other Languages in Spain”, accessed May 25, 2015,
<http://www.donquijote.org/culture/spain/languages/other-languages-in-spain>

¹⁶ Iñigo Urrutia; Xabier Irujo, „The Basque Language in the Basque Autonomous Community (BAC)” in *The Legal status of the Basque Language today: One Language, Three Administrations, Seven different Geographies and one diaspora*, ed. Gloria Totoricagüena and Iñigo Urrutia, 2008, p.171, accessed June 1st, 2015,
http://www.euskoneews.com/0463zbbk/ene_120.pdf

¹⁷ „Cultura Catalana. Lengua” accessed June 1st, 2015,
http://www.llull.cat/espanyol/cultura/llengua_catala.cfm

century, dialects of Valencia and the Balearic Islands begin to be differentiated from the central area of Barcelona. However it has kept a certain degree of uniformity in the literary language which has continued to flourish.¹⁸

There are two main dialect groups in modern Catalan: Occidental, subdivided into North-West Catalan and Valencian; and Oriental, subdivided into Central dialect, Balearic, Roussillonais and Alguerese (the dialect spoken in Alghero, Sardinia, where Catalan was introduced in the 14th century). Each of these dialects, except for Alguerese, is in turn divided into subdialects, of which up to eighteen have been identified. These various dialects differ only in minor respects (details of pronunciation, vocabulary, and verb conjugation) and are easily mutually intelligible. The dialectal differences are not usually reflected in the written language. The Institute of Catalan Studies is responsible for establishing and updating the standard language, which is based on the Barcelona dialect with some admixtures from Valencian. No one spontaneously speaks the standard, but it is used in writing and by the media.

Valencians - except for the intellectual elite - are inclined to consider their speech a separate language. For a number of historical and other reasons, a sector of the Valencian people are deeply distrustful, if not overtly hostile, to Catalans. The ultra-rightist party *Unió Valenciana* supports this sentiment, and among other things it called for linguistic secession by establishing a separate orthography.¹⁹

Looking back in the history, by the end of the 10th century, the Catalan was already a formed language, with Latin origins. During the 13th and 14th centuries Catalan reached its high point of geographical expansion in the Iberian Peninsula through the conquest of the kingdoms of Valencia and Murcia. The language also spread around the Mediterranean through victory over the kingdoms of Majorca, Sicily, Sardinia, Naples, Athens and Neopatria in Peloponnese. Catalan came to be spoken, even if not always as a first language, in five states around the Mediterranean which were governed by Catalan dynasties. Due to the Royal Chancellery, whose style was strongly influencing for all Catalan writing, the prose of the 14th and 15th centuries was marked by a high degree of uniformity.

Catalan retained its vigor until the union of the Aragonese and Castilian crowns in 1474. After that, although mainly grammatical works appeared, it gradually entered a period of decline. Following the War of the Spanish Succession (1705-1715), Philip V abolished all the government

¹⁸ „Catalan Language. General Overview”, accessed May 28, 2015,
<http://www.orbilat.com/Languages/Catalan/Catalan.html>

¹⁹ Ibidem

institutions then existing in Catalonia and implemented Spanish laws. Catalan went through various periods of prohibition and even of repression. The Catalan renaissance began in the late 19th century with the economic progress of Catalonia.²⁰

3. The Valencian language's origins and history

The Valencian language derives from the Latin language, brought in the area by the Christians colonists in the former kingdom of Valencia. There are three theories related with the origins and the evolution of the Valencian language.

The Mozarabist hypothesis or the Valencians theory, which it's based on the thesis that Valencian is an independent language, issued from the vulgar Latin, as a result of an isolated evolution. That romance language was diversified by Arab elements and influenced by the Spanish language - Aragonese and were precisely the Mozarabs who kept this language during the Arab domination, practicing the use of Arabic for official business and Romance at home. There are proofs that demonstrate that when Valencia was reconquered by the king Jaime I, the language still had vitality and the inhabitants, even if they were converted to Islam, they were still practicing the bilingualism.²¹

The second theory is the Repopulation theory, or the Pancatalan theory, which is totally oposed to the previous one. The followers of this theory consider the Valencian a variety of Catalan, brought to the Valencian lands during the *Reconquista* by the Catalan resettles. In this opinion the Islamic invasion caused the complete loss of the roots and the existing culture before and therefore of the language. In favor of this theory are some Catalan institutions, such as the Institute for Catalans Studies.²²

The third theory, called the Occitan theory don't have to many followers. The main hypothesis of this theory consists in the assertion that the Valencian language is part of a set of Occitan languages, romances, interrelated, which have a number of similarities. According to this theory, the medieval poets imposed their culture on the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Valencia.²³

Probably the origin of Valencian language is a mixture of these three theories. Suposing that the Valencian language is an Arabic dialect influenced by the Occitan language and the Romance language, which are

²⁰ Ibidem

²¹ „Origen del valenciano”, accessed June 2nd, 2015,
<http://www.idiomavalenciano.com/origen-del-valenciano.html>

²² Ibidem

²³ Ibidem

dialects of Latin language, it is probably the most as close to reality as possible.

Until the XIII century, the term valencian meant inhabitant of the Romanian Colony *Valentia*, founded in 138 B.C., when the Muslim domination recalled it *Balànsiya*. Today's Community of Valencia derives from the Kingdom of Valencia which had been united with the Kingdom of Aragon in a third realm independently driven by King Jaime I of Aragon, along with the Reconquista of 1238. During this time, the region of Valencia enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. This is due to a clever system of institutions and laws, adopted in 1240. In the sixteenth century, the inhabitants of the Muslim faith have been obliged to convert to Christianity or to leave the province. The new inhabitants of this region were mainly Catalans. Along with them they brought as well their language, which spread in the area of Valencia and has become known as Valencian.²⁴

The Kingdom of Valencia has lost its autonomy in 1707 by the decree *Nueva Plant*, during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), when King Philip V of Spain subordinated all federations of Aragon Kingdom directly to the Castilian Crown. As a result, the system of laws adopted in 1240 has been abolished, and valencian language has been prohibited at an official level and in education. Spanish becomes the official language and has been accepted by the local elite. The Valencian was still used at informal level, but remained widespread. Ethnic identity of the valencian population has started to change in the nineteenth century in a regional identity. This new identity was not in conflict with the national Spanish identity, and it was a fair competition from a political point of view for the Spanish nation.²⁵

During the second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) there have been different attempts to restore the autonomy, but these have been stoped by the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). In March 30, 1939, after the fall of Catalonia and the majority of the territory of the Republic, Valencia surrendered in front of Franco, and this meant the end of the war. Franco started his dictatorship. For Valencia, as well as for the rest of Spain, has followed a tough period. Although the anti-separatist measures were quite easy in the area of Valencia, there were economic difficulties due to isolation of Spain, and political and economic issues, for its connections with the fascist regimes. After a dictatorship of 36 years, Spain has become a decentralized state as a result of the establishment of democracy. Spain was

²⁴ Höfer, Karel (2012): *Valencian Identity, Language and Language Policy*, alpi.vedeckecasopisy.cz/publicFiles/00186.pdf, accessed June 10, 2015

²⁵ "Historia del Valenciano", accessed June 10, 2015, <http://www.idiomavalenciano.com/historia-del-valenciano.html>

divided into 17 autonomous regions, one of them being the Valencian Community.²⁶

4. The Valencian Linguistic Conflict

In spite of the definition of Valencian as the language of the Valencian Community, its linguistic enclosure is a controversial issue. Because it is similar to the Catalan, the majority of the linguists considered it as a dialect of this last one. In the Valencian Linguistic conflict, the inhabitants of Catalonia maintain their opinion that Valencian and Catalan are two versions of the same language and plead for the use of the same standard with three variants (Catalan, Valencian and Balearic), based on the fact that Valencian and Balearic are subordinated to Catalan.

This way of thinking is not common with the majority of the Valencian speakers, which shall consider their language as unique and independent from the Catalan. But, neither the Status of Autonomy from 1982, nor the Law 4/1983 regarding the use and teaching of Valencian language, gives the freedom of the recognition of the status of the Valencian language as an independent one. This legal problem gave birth to the conflict between the two models of standardization of the language, conflict which has continued until 1998, when the Valencian Government has aproved the setting up of a new body, The Valencian Academy of Language, which purpose was to establish a set of rules for the use of Valencian language.²⁷

It is difficult to establish accurately the degree of similarity between the Valencian and Catalan. The general idea is that the fact that the Valencians can understand Catalans and vice versa. Finally, the idea of this conflict is a political one. Apparently very recently, some political “nationalist” movements with a strong desire to be independent from the Spanish State, they have started to make their voice heard in some of the autonomous communities in Spain. Catalonia is one of them, where there is a significant presence of separatist nationalist movements.

The Catalan Nationalism tries to build a political project called “The Catalans Countries” (Països catalans). For many years, the Catalan Nationalism has invested large sums of money in the propaganda, inside and outside of Spain in order to make the rest of the population to believe that the valencian language is a dialect of Catalan and consequently, the Valencian society and its territory are part of the “Catalan nation” and are also part of the so called “The Catalans Countries”.

²⁶ Ibidem

²⁷ “Conflicto político de la lengua valenciana”, accessed June 10, 2015, <http://www.idiomavalenciano.com/conflicto-politico-de-la-lengua-valenciana.html>

The Catalan nationalists try to promote this project as being an exclusively linguistic one, hiding the real political meaning. They want a social and political absorption of the Valencian Community inside Catalonia in order to give it a higher political, social and territorial force to the ambitions of Catalan nationalism.²⁸

This concept of "Catalan countries" can have different meanings depending on the context. Broadly, can be divided into two groups: linguistic or politic. The political definition of the concept is larger, because it includes by default the linguistic sphere. From the politically points of view, it refers to a number of projects endorsed by supporters of Catalan independence. They argue, on the basis of the linguistic fact for the creation of a common identity that goes beyond territorial limits of Catalonia and for political cooperation between the regions that are part of "Catalan Countries".

Thus, the cultural term used narrowly by Catalans philologists became highly controversial, more in the Valencian Community, since 1980. Some Valencians tend to believe that the concept was meant, in fact, to increase the strength of Catalonia in order to be able to win the independence, and to have the possibility to "annex" Valencia. But, because in Valencia there is a certain sense, even if not very strongly expressed, of their own identity, and it's not linked to Catalonia, they are in great disagreement with the possibility of establishing the so-called "Catalan Countries", political project.

5. Conclusions

The sociolinguistic situation of Valencia is, in many ways, unique: the Catalan is spoken in the most part of its territory since the thirteenth century, after being conquered by the Christian settlers and occupied by the Catalans (and other peoples less numerous). Until 1970 the Valencian language was used only familiar context or in a colloquial way, despite the fact that its use and teaching have been officially banned since 1707.

In 1977, Spain became a democracy and for many people it seemed that this is a good opportunity to reactivate the question of Valencian identity and language. Although the official use of language and the teaching were reintroduced in Valencia in 1983, this language has lost its speakers constantly, not so much in absolute terms as in relative. Surveys show that today - thanks to the introduction of the Valencian language in the education system - more and more young people can write, speak and read in Valencian, than before, although very few uses the Valencian language.

²⁸ Ibidem

Between 1980 and 1990, the right-wing parties and the media insisted that there is a plan for the replacing the genuine Valencian identity and Valencian language with a version of "Catalan". In what followed, "to be a good Valencian" meant to resist such a plan, and therefore to be completely against Catalonia, where possible. Of course, being against those whom language you share can hardly be "sensitive" if you aspire to "reborn" such a language - or simply to help her survive. Even worse, opposing yourself to this plan of "catalinisation" of Valencia meant, in fact, to be opposed to all efforts to "revive" the traditional language, such as standard modern language was discredited because it would be inauthentic. This prevented the spread of the language.

In theory, this conflict ended in 1998 through a compromise between the Spanish right-wing party (People's Party) and the Catalan parties who ensured the unity of language, although the Valencian politicians were careful to never recognize explicitly any unity of language. As a result, currently two thirds of the Valencian believe - or want to believe - that Valencian and Catalan are not the same language.

On the other hand, the Spanish State also opposes to the Catalans desire to earn independence and would not want their numbers to grow, just for this reason. If the unity of Catalan / Valencian is recognized, the "Catalan Countries" project becomes a political one and having an official base, then the Valencian Community would be part of it, and the Catalan force would increase considerably.

Abstract

One of the controversies in the Spanish Culture is about the status of the Valencian Language. There are a few of politicians which affirm that the Valencian is a regional language, independent and unique. There are others that state that the Valencian is only a dialect issued from the Catalan. The aim of this article is to stress both parties and to express our point of view about the problem. Not less important is to see this question in relation with the everlasting wish of Catalans for independence.

Keywords: *Spain, Catalan, Valencian, the culture of region, regional languages, dialect*

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II. European Borders and Integration Process

The Portuguese Outermost Regions and the 30th anniversary of Portugal's accession to the European Communities

*Isabel Maria FREITAS VALENTE**

1. Brief contextualization

In contemporary times¹, Nation, rather than “region”, has been the engine of History.²

Until recently, arguments for regionalization were not very well received and had an uncertain future in Europe. In fact, the creation of the European Communities in the 1950s took place in a context where, with the exception of Germany, centralization was the common feature of the states that were the driving force of the Community. Hence, the founding treaties barely mention regions.

Nowadays, the historical, political and social changes have finally given credence to those who found it necessary to create and strengthen region as an “entity with political power”³ and to help it play a part in the European integration process. A quick glance at reality makes it possible to say that, in line with the deepening of the European integration process, many of its participating states have undergone a process of political decentralization, creating a new level of government that is closest to citizens.

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¹ The need to participate in this rightful tribute to Professor Ioan Horga and my inability to write an original text on time, due to a number of setbacks, made me republish part of a short text, with a few changes, on a subject I know is dear to him. See “A propósito dos trinta anos da adesão de Portugal à Comunidade Europeia um percurso histórico a partir da ultraperiferia portuguesa” / Concerning the 30 years of the Portuguese accession to EEC, in R: I Relações Internacionais, no. 48, December 2015, p. 43-59.

² Valente, Isabel Maria Freitas - *As Regiões Ultraperiféricas Portuguesas – Uma perspectiva histórica*. Autonomous Region of Madeira, Funchal: CEHA, 2009.

³ See: Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheco – *Do Estado Soberano ao Estado das Autonomias – Regionalismo, subsidiariedade e autonomia para uma nova ideia de Estado*. Oporto: Ed. Afrontamento, 1998.

As a result, it can be said that regionalization and integration are not contradictory processes but rather two faces of the same phenomenon: the crisis of the State when seen as the only level of government capable of solving all problems affecting society. While we press forward in the “adventure” of the single currency or in the common foreign policy, fields such as education, culture, research, regional planning and agriculture, among others, are usually most frequently discussed by entities closest to citizens and with which they share a high degree of self-identification, at the crossroads between representative democracy and participatory democracy: region *as an individualizing marker of diversity*.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) reflects this reality and, for the first time, presents region as an «entity with political power, acknowledging its mechanisms of participation in the decision-making process»: the *European Committee of the Regions* was created. On the same subject, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) grants a higher degree of participation to regions at a European level, in general. With regards to the outermost regions, this treaty reinforces their coordination and participation abilities in the European policies.

Within this context, it is worth citing the following quote from an article titled *Autonomia Regional e Liberdade. 25 Anos de Integração Europeia dos Açores* by Carlos Eduardo Pacheco do Amaral: «Regions have means at their disposal to present themselves as and experience their status of autonomous agents by participating in the decision-making processes of the European Union and adapting the EU’s general legal framework to their specific conditions and needs. The old dream of a Europe of Regions seems to be coming true at the moment».⁴

We cannot but agree with this statement, since it is becoming clear that Europe has become a Europe of Regions, as argued by Carlos Amaral.

2. The Affirmation of the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands in the European Community

Against this background, it is both useful and important to highlight the fact that the EU’s third enlargement, including Portugal and Spain, brought a new geopolitical dimension to the European integration process, allowing, for the first time, Europe to no longer be viewed as “from and for States” only.⁵ This enlargement should guarantee the drafting of both general and unified policies for the entire Union and also of specific and distinct policies for the EU regions or communities with varying needs and levels of

⁴ See. Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheco – “Autonomia Regional e Liberdade. 25 Anos de Integração Europeia dos Açores”. In *Portugal-Europa, 25 Anos de Adesão*. Coimbra: Almedina, 2012. p.59-72.

⁵ In this respect, it is recalled that, during the first EU enlargement, the Danish and English Autonomous Regions chose not to join the European Communities.

development such as, for example, mountain regions, rundown industrial regions, and islands. Among these islands, some would benefit from a specific status - the outermost regions.

In fact, some regions reflect a very specific geographic, political and historical reality within the European Union (EU) – the Outermost Regions (ORs). The French overseas departments, the Portuguese islands of Azores and Madeira, and the Spanish Canary Islands all feature a number of similarities and differences placing them under a special legal framework within the EU. Despite a number of specific characteristics common to all these regions and which hamper their development and the bridging of the gap between them and other regions of the EU, such as their great distance from the European continent, insularity, small area, difficult topography and harsh climate, undiversified economy and economic dependence on some products and energy sources, as well as their political and administrative regimes, it may be concluded that most of these regions have their own particular regime and different economic regimes and tax systems, as well as different statuses with regards to their accession to the EU.

Following the democratization processes experienced in the mid-1970s, Portugal and Spain would adopt a policy of greater autonomy for their islands. Portugal remained a unitary state. Nevertheless, it granted political and administrative autonomy to the insular regions of Azores and Madeira. In turn, Spain became a multi-regional state comprising seventeen autonomous communities with balanced autonomous statuses.

Hence, the Portuguese Government is a unitary state structured on the principles of the autonomy of local authorities and the democratic decentralization of the public service. The archipelagoes of Azores and Madeira constitute autonomous regions with their own political and administrative statutes and their own institutions of self-government. Each archipelago has its own Regional Assembly, elected for four years by direct universal suffrage, and a Regional Government comprising a President and Regional Secretaries. The Regional Assembly exercises legislative power, votes the State Budget and monitors the regional government, which exercises executive power.

Concerning the Canary Islands, their institutional organization is based on a Legislative Assembly elected by universal and proportional suffrage and on a Governing Council that exercises executive and administrative functions, with a President elected by the Assembly and appointed by the King of Spain. It should also be mentioned that the Spanish Constitution is based upon the indissoluble unity of the Nation, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards. It recognizes and guarantees the right to the autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the solidarity amongst them all.

One conclusion that can be drawn is that autonomy, on one hand, and European integration, on the other hand, make up the two fundamental cornerstones of the struggle against internal disparities, also serving as vehicles for the political unification of these regions. On this subject, Avelino de Freitas Meneses, in an article titled “As Ilhas de Portugal na Construção da Europa” wrote the following: «For the Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira, autonomy is the main achievement of the Revolution of April 25, 1974 but the European Union is also indispensable. Indeed, today’s Europe is no longer the Europe of Nations. Instead, it is increasingly becoming a Europe of Regions. Hence, together with the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, the European Union is one of the main supports of autonomy as an expression of democracy and a tool for development».⁶

It should also be borne in mind that the presentation of Portugal’s application for EEC membership (on March 28, 1977) posed a huge challenge, from an executive and administrative point of view, to the recent autonomies of Azores and Madeira. Hence, during the period of the accession negotiations, the Regional Governments of Azores and Madeira appointed a member responsible for European integration who, in representation of the corresponding region, followed the negotiations with the European Commission.

Within the scope of the new institutional framework, on the part of the Azores, the negotiations for accession to the EEC were coordinated by the Regional Committee for European Integration, presided by the Government member responsible for this process. In the case of Madeira, in 1978, the Regional Decree No 13/78/M of March 10 created the Regional Committee of Studies for European Integration, replaced in 1981 by the Regional Committee for European Integration (Regional Decree No 6/81/M of April 20), which followed the whole negotiation process for this region’s accession to the EEC. In 1986, Government Council Resolution No 273/86 of March 13, created the Regional Committee for EEC Affairs. In other words, within the framework of the negotiations for the integration of Portugal in the European Community and of the measures needed to safeguard the region’s specific particularities, the Regional Government of Madeira followed the negotiation process from its beginning, appointing its own representative in the Committee for European Integration.⁷

Considering the goal of this reflection, it should be highlighted that

⁶ Meneses, Avelino de Freitas – “As Ilhas de Portugal na Construção da Europa”. In *As Ilhas e a Europa. A Europa das Ilhas*. Funchal: CEHA, 2011, p. 398-411.

⁷ Created in the Presidency of the Council of Ministers by Decree-Law no. 306/77, of August 3. RAM - *Regional Directorate of European Affairs and External Cooperation/Regional Committee for European Integration*. Last accessed on October 13, 2015. Available at: file:///C:/Users/Isabel%20Valente/Downloads/file874.pdf

the process of integration of the Portuguese and Spanish outermost regions followed different directions from the moment when those territories were integrated in the European Community. Thus, Madeira and Azores opted for full membership⁸, which, from the beginning, enabled them to benefit from all European structural assistance. In turn, the Canary Islands opted for a more eclectic regime, with special conditions, namely as regards to customs and economic and fiscal union, established in the Protocol attached to the Accession Treaty, which curiously mentions the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla.⁹

Within this framework and as part of the accession process concerning Azores and Madeira, it is important to emphasize the immense political scope of the incorporation of the “Common declaration concerning the economic and social development of the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira” in Portugal’s Accession Treaty by its signatory states¹⁰. It should also be noted that this declaration acknowledges the economic and social disadvantages of the two Portuguese archipelagoes, which result from their geographic location (far from the European continent), difficult topography and severe lack of infrastructures. As a result, the permanent constraints of the Atlantic islands were, for the first time, identified and would later be used in the drafting and definition of the concept of outermost region.

3. The Concept of Outermost Region

The principle of economic and social cohesion assumed a critical importance since the Single European Act came into force (1987). From that moment onwards, this principle formed one of the key pillars of the European project, «viewed as the guarantor of the implementation of the very clear goal of territorial harmonization of Europe, from an economic and social viewpoint. Europe can only ensure a smooth and healthy accession for candidates if it preserves its economic and social cohesion, with no postponements that may raise doubts to new members with regards to the resolve in the implementation of their goals».¹¹

⁸ Nevertheless, it benefitted from special regimes in fiscal matters.

⁹ Protocol no. 2 concerning the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla, attached to the Accession Treaty of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the EEC, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 302, November 15, 1985, p. 400.

¹⁰ Common declaration concerning the economic and social development of the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira, annexed to the Accession Treaty of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the EEC, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, L 302, November 15, 1985, p. 479.

¹¹ Amaral, Carlos Eduardo Pacheco; Castro, Pedro Faria and – *As ultraperiferias na Europa do futuro*. Ponta Delgada: University of Azores, 2004.

Hence, within an expanded Europe with a more diversified level of development, the principle of economic and social cohesion must be preserved through a Community policy favoring the less developed regions and states.

In this light, it is worth recalling the words of European Commissioner Michel Barnier: «The cohesion policy must not neglect the regions of the present Union, where real needs remain. Cohesion in Europe is not only a question of economic balance – it is also a political matter. Above all else, the European Union also means solidarity and cooperation between states and regions. It is not meant only to produce standards, regulations or directives».¹²

It is both useful and important to recall that, since the 1970s, regions had been lobbying the European Communities to fully integrate their interests into the European construction process. This joint strategy began in 1973, in Saint-Malo, with the creation of the EEC's Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), comprising the regions of the Member States and of the states presenting their applications for EEC membership.

Within this context, Jean-Didier Hache poses the following question: «Almost all member states have implemented special provisions for their islands. Why does not Europe do the same?»¹³

This marks the beginning of a long and arduous journey, though a relatively fast one, before Europe adopted a legal and unifying concept for these specific regions – the ORs, which, nevertheless, took place from the mid-1980s onwards, on the initiative of the Portuguese authorities.¹⁴ In fact, the establishment of the status of outermost regions for these islands is the result of the determined and enthusiastic action of the Regional Governments of Madeira and Azores, in strict coordination with the Government of the Portuguese Republic. There is no question that, thanks to Alberto João Jardim (President of the Government of the Autonomous Region of Madeira)¹⁵ and

¹² Barnier, Michel – «L'élargissement de l'Union européenne et politique de cohésion». In *Europa :Novas Fronteira*. Lisbon, Principia, 2001, p. 11-13.

¹³ See. Hache, Jean-Didier - «Quel Statut pour les Îles d'Europe?». In *Quel Statut pour les Îles d'Europe?/What Status for Europe's Islands?* Paris : L'Harmattan, 2000, p. 30.

¹⁴ On this subject, see Fortuna, Mário - «A problemática das regiões ultra-periféricas». In *Compêndio de Economia Regional*. Coimbra: APDR, 2002, p. 596-622.

¹⁵ It is worth remembering that Alberto João Jardim stood out in the Community context for his role as a leader of the European regionalist movement. Between 1987 and 1996, he served as President of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of the European Union and is currently serving as its Honorary President. He served as a representative of Portugal in the former EEC's Advisory Council on Regional and Local Policies, later replaced by the Committee of the Regions. He is Vice-president of the EU Committee of the Regions. He is one of the Portuguese

João Bosco Amaral¹⁶ (President of the Government of the Autonomous Region of the Azores), the Portuguese Autonomous Regions were able not only to set the negotiating agenda in the framework of the ORs, but also to gather a considerable degree of the international support necessary for the approval of the said framework.

Though its origin is still a matter of dispute, it is believed that the term *ultraperiférica* (outermost) was first used in October 1987, during the CPMR's General Assembly¹⁷, held in Réunion and directed by then President of Azores, João Bosco Mota Amaral. Attempting to highlight nuances within the conceptual framework, then President of Azores spontaneously used the expression «more than» later replacing it with the prefix «ultra» to describe the concept of remoteness applicable to the situation of the islands located far away from the European continent. Thus, in Patrick Guillaumin's words, «the outermost islands and regions were born, having been created by the Regions themselves».¹⁸

It is true that attempts were made to create a political space covering these regions and enabling their economic and social development - a project that had been cherished in the late 1950s. This would later happen in a more formal manner at the Rhodes European Council, in 1988.¹⁹ «The member states had a clear political motivation: to grant a special status to the seven regions – Azores, Madeira, Canary Islands, Réunion, Guadeloupe, Martinique and French Guiana – ensuring that the European Communities would adopt measures to mitigate the detrimental effects of the Internal Market, given the insularity of those regions».²⁰

representatives at the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe. Finally, he was both a founder and a member of the Bureau of the Assembly of European Regions.

¹⁶ In turn, João Bosco Soares Mota Amaral stood out in the Community for his work as a Member and President of the Portuguese Delegation to the Permanent Congress of the Local and Regional Authorities of Europe (1979/1995); as President of the Islands Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of the EEC (1994/1995); as a Member of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of European Regions; as a Chief of the Portuguese Delegation in the Committee of the Regions and as Vice-President of the Committee of the Regions (1994/1995).

¹⁷ The ORs host the CPMR for two consecutive years: First in Réunion, in 1987, and later in Madeira, in 1988. In this way, the CPMR certainly contributes to transform a «community of approach» into a «community of destiny». See GUILLAUMIN, Patrick - «La Dimension Ultrapériphérique de l'Union Européenne». In *Quel Statut Pour les Îles d'Europe?* Paris: Harmattan, 2000, p. 108.

¹⁸ Patrick Guillaumin, *art. cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁹ On the initiative of then Portuguese Prime Minister, Aníbal Cavaco Silva.

²⁰ Carlos Eduardo Pacheco Amaral and Pedro Faria e Castro, *op.cit.*

Once again, the Portuguese regional politicians played a significant role. In 1988, the President of Madeira invited his colleagues of the ORs for a working session to address issues of common concern, at a time when the project of the separate program of specific actions to deal with the remoteness and insularity of the French overseas departments²¹ (POSEIDOM) was being discussed in the Community bodies. Thus, the group of Outermost Regions of the EU was born.²² At the request of Portugal and Spain, the Committee proposed that the Council create two new programs based on POSEIDOM: the POSEIMA,²³ dedicated to Madeira and Azores, and the POSEICAN,²⁴ concerning the Canary Islands. Ceuta and Melilla were not the subject of any POSEI framework program because Spain did not apply for any change of status. Moreover, these two cities are not as distanced from the European continent as the regions benefitting from those framework programs. Within this context, the POSEI programs attempt to give substance to the goals set at the Rhodes European Council.

In the context of the reform of the Structural Funds, all these regions are classified as *objective 1*, a wording referring to all regions lagging in development.²⁵ It should be remembered that recourse to Structural Fund action is one of the two engines that «should propel the economic take-off of these regions». The second engine «consists in shaping the implementation of certain common policies, in order to better align them with reality».

Indeed, it was amidst this scenario that the «concept of outermost region, designating the regions benefitting from the three programs and based on the particularities common to these regions and which set them apart from

²¹ The Posei programs began in 1989 with the adoption of the program of specific options meant to fight the remoteness and insularity of the French overseas departments (Poseidom). Programs dedicated to the Canary Islands (POSEICAN) and Azores and Madeira (Poseima) were approved in 1991. In terms of their nature, policy actions under Posei can be classified in six major groups: financial, sectoral, relating to agriculture and fisheries, fiscal, customs, regional cooperation and state aid.

²² In fact, as a result of the constant informal meetings following Alberto João Jardim's historic initiative, the seven regions signed a Cooperation Protocol, in 1995, in Goubeville (Guadeloupe), creating the Conference of the Presidents of the ORs.

²³ Decision of the Council of the European Communities no. 91/315/CEE, of June 26, 1991, concerning the Program of specific options to combat the remoteness and insularity of Madeira and Azores (Poseima), OJEC no. L 171, June 29, 1991.

²⁴ Decision of the Council of the European Communities of June 26, 1991, concerning the Program of specific options to combat the remoteness and insularity of the Canary Islands (Poseican), Official Journal of the European Community (OJCE) no. L 171, June 29, 1991.

²⁵ Ireland, Greece and Portugal fall entirely within this category of regions where the per capita GDP is lower than 75% of the EU average.

other EU regions»²⁶ was pushed to the forefront.

With a view to the development of the concept of outermost region, on one hand, and to obtaining a greater number of measures of positive discrimination for the ORs, on the other hand, the Parliamentary Days Madeira-Azores-Canary Islands were first held in 1991 and have since taken place on a regular basis.

1992 marks a fundamental and decisive point in the acknowledgment of the structural handicaps coupled with the remoteness, insularity, difficult topography and harsh climate foreseen in Declaration no. 26²⁷, a proposal made by France and enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Though this is a mere action attached to this Treaty it should be viewed as a unanimous agreement of the Member States to adapt Community law to these territories. In fact, it was possible to accommodate «specific measures in their favor, in so far and as long as there is an objective need to take such measures, with a view to the social and economic development of those regions. Those guidelines should refer objectives both to achieve the internal market and to recognize the regional reality, so that those Outermost Regions may reach the average economic and social level of the Community».²⁸

Hence, this declaration is a first step towards the acknowledgement, by the EU countries, that there are regions with specific and peculiar characteristics which justify the existence of specific policies directed to the ORs and that these policies should be different in nature or, better said, have a more permanent character, requiring a stronger commitment by the EU countries.

In political terms, this strengthened the principle of the territorial harmonization of Europe from an economic and social viewpoint, hence the Resolution of June 29, 1995²⁹ on the Commission document «Europe 2000 – Cooperation for European Territorial Development», which called for the creation of a special legal status for the Outermost Regions of the EU.

It is quite clear that the declaration was meant to offer legal and constitutional support to the initiative represented by the POSEI programs. However, Declaration no. 26, annexed to the Treaty, would prove insufficient in view of the «strict understanding of the legal services of the European Commission on the need to act, as determined by the POSEI regulations,

²⁶ AZZI, Giuseppe Ciavarini – “Etapas por Etapa. O Caminho que Conduziu ao Estatuto das Regiões Ultraperiféricas.” In *Economia & Prospetiva, Economias*. Lisbon, no. 13/14 July/December 2000, p. 49-60.

²⁷ Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht, on February 7, 1992; the Declaration concerning the EEC's Outermost Regions, *Official Journal of the European Communities*, C 191, July 29, 1992, p. 104.

²⁸ Mário Fortuna, *op. cit.*, p. 598-600.

²⁹ OJEC 183, July 17, 1995, p. 39.

under a mandate properly clarified in the aforementioned Treaty. It was in this respect that the outermost regions began to take action with a view to hold an intergovernmental conference, in 1996, to revise the treaties».

It should also be noted that the Strasbourg Conference of March 16, 1995 restated the need to obtain from IGC '96 the legal safeguards allowing the EU to take the necessary measures to compensate for and adjust to the regional reality and specificities provided for in Declaration no. 26 of the Treaty of Maastricht, in line with the goal of economic and social cohesion. According to the representatives of the regional governments, the inclusion of new articles in the Treaty of Amsterdam should be invoked next.

To this end, it was necessary to add to the Treaty an article encompassing the whole of the ORs to replace Article 227(2), which only mentioned the overseas departments and whose wording was outdated.

On March 14, 1996, the ORs, gathered in Funchal, Madeira, for the 2nd Conference of OR presidents, requested a new wording for Article 227(2) of the Treaty of Rome. They decided to go even further by examining the matter and drafting a common project to be inserted in the new Treaty. This reunion marked the creation of a Monitoring Committee for the ICG. This committee held several meetings in 1996. In Gozo, during the meeting of the Islands Commission; in Brussels, in April, on the occasion of the meetings of the Committee of the Regions; and in Tenerife, in October 1996, on the occasion of the CPMR's meeting. In all these meetings, the Presidents of the ORs reiterated in a Joint Declaration the need to strengthen the status of outermost region and also clarified the goals that should be enshrined in the articles.

At the same time, all Member States began to realize that this matter could be ignored no longer.

The European Council of Turin, held on March 29, 1996, stated in its conclusions that the Intergovernmental Conference should examine the status of the ORs. Within the scope of this Conference (IGG '96), the regions fought to be recognized as fully fledged ORs, thus benefitting from a framework better adjusted to their economic and social development in light of the objectives guiding the cohesion policy³⁰. It is worth mentioning the interest and support given to this matter by the Portuguese Government³¹

³⁰ In the same year (1996), deputies Sánchez García, Mendonça, Vieira, Costa Neves, Sierra González and Fernández Martín tabled a motion for resolution (B4-0721/96).

³¹ The Autonomous Region of Madeira has always put pressure on and made demarches to the central government regarding the notions and discussions about the concept of outermost region, as well as the need for a legal and political basis. In this regard, see Motion no. 1/96/M, adopted by the plenary session of the Legislative Regional Assembly of Madeira, on May 8, 1996, where «the government of the Portuguese Republic is requested, within the framework of the negotiations taking place at the ICG, which began on March 29, in Turin, to pay particular and

during IGC '96. Portugal advocated the setting of measures leading to a policy of support to the European social model, with a view to a social and economic cohesion that is a «key element of intra-Community solidarity». In this regard, Portugal has sought to make the «revised Treaty on European Union pay greater attention to the issues of the Outermost Regions.»³²

In September 1996, at the Dublin European Council, Spain formally presented to the Intergovernmental Conference a far-reaching project. In December 1996, it would be replaced by a different project jointly presented by Spain, France and Portugal³³, with a view to: 1) strengthen the concept of outermost region, as defined in Declaration no. 26 of the Treaty on EU; 2) carry on with the priority assistance agreed by the EU in the framework of economic and social cohesion; 3) admit the possibility of adjusting EU policies to the regional realities, in order to address development needs.³⁴ In this way, the ORs hoped to reach their goals by including in the Treaty a provision that would recognize their *Special Status*, allowing Community institutions «not only to adopt specific measures favoring the ORs but also to lay down special conditions for the application of the Treaty to these territories».³⁵ As set out in the conclusions of the aforementioned Summit, the Council took note of this proposal and passed it to the ICG for further analysis. The subsequent presidency (Netherlands) committed to continue to look into this dossier. It was on this basis that, during the first half of 1997, the Conference carried out its work on the status of the ORs.

It is also worth remembering the reunion of the representatives of the ORs, held on February 3 and 4, 1997, in Funchal, within the framework of the cooperation projects between the islands. It is also important to note the common position of the Presidents of the ORs, delivered to the European Parliament on February 26, 1997. Alongside these considerations, many others can be pointed out. In fact, the concept of outermost region involves both the recognition of the structural particularities of certain regions of the EU, as well as the response given by the Community policies to the same particularities, in order to enable a full integration, on an equal basis, of these regions in the European space.

The 3rd Conference of the Presidents of the ORs was held in Saint

permanent attention to the special and unfavorable situation of the island region of Madeira and its extreme remoteness from the European continent».

³² See *Portugal e a Conferência Intergovernamental para a Revisão do Tratado da União Europeia*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, March 1996, p. 30.

³³ See CONF/2501/96; CONF/3999/96.

³⁴ See. JARDIM, Alberto João - «A Região Autónoma da Madeira», in *Eipáscope*, Institut Européen d'Administration Publique, no. 1997/1, p. 19-35.

³⁵ Alberto João Jardim, *art. cit.*, p. 22.

Denis, in Réunion, on April 17, 1997.³⁶ On this meeting, the Presidents spoke with Commissioner Wulf Mathies, responsible for regional policy, and were able to raise her awareness to the specific problems of the ORs, namely the inclusion of the new article in the Treaty of Amsterdam, the organization of the banana market and the WTO rules, as well as regional policy and derogations favoring the ORs³⁷.

In fact, the three Member States were strongly supported by the Commission, which defended the project. In turn, in March 1997, the European Parliament voted a resolution³⁸ fully endorsing the text, after finding a compromise between the legitimate needs of the ORs and the safeguarding of the coherence necessary to Community integration.³⁹

This was how, forty years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the ORs became an integral part of the Treaty on European Union. In fact, the new article has a broader scope of application than Article 227(2). Henceforth, in addition to the «French overseas departments, the archipelagoes of Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands would also be covered. » This new Article 299(2) provides a clear and strong legal basis for measures favoring the ORs⁴⁰.

³⁶ During this Conference, it was decided to draft a “memorandum” or “White Paper” of the ORs, with the goal of identifying, in practical terms, the priority axes that underpin Community policy with regards to the ORs, on the basis of the new Article 227(2) of the Treaty on European Union. Within the scope of the Monitoring Committee, the regions of the Canary Islands and Réunion were instructed to organize the drafting of the mentioned document.

³⁷ On the same meeting, it was also decided to mandate the Technical Committee to press forward with the preparatory work for drafting a joint memorandum of the seven regions. This document should be presented to the European Commission after the ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam.

³⁸ Resolution A4-0128/97; Resolution on the development problems of the European Union’s ORs, *Official Journal no C150 of May 19, 1997*, p.0062.

³⁹ Still on the subject of the negotiation process, the importance of the protocol initially requested by Portugal and Spain, and later by France, should also be noted. This legal instrument gave these three Member States some room for negotiation, which proved to be extremely useful in safeguarding their interests. In the adopted proposal, the protocol is mentioned in summarized form on the third paragraph, taking the form of a EU action program concerning the ORs.

⁴⁰ The text of the Treaty of Amsterdam, signed on October 2, 1997, is in the interest of the Portuguese ORs (Azores and Madeira) since, assuming the overall Community regime applies to the ORs, it provides for the possibility of the Council adopting positive discrimination measures which, by taking into account the particularities of the ORs, constitute a permanent exemption system for those regions. In this respect, the Technical Committee, gathered in La Rochelle, in October 1997, defined the methodology and timetable for the drafting of the joint memorandum.

This excerpt is very clear. Article 227(2) is replaced by the following:

«2. The provisions of this treaty apply to the French overseas departments, Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands.

However, taking account of the structural social and economic situation of the French overseas departments, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary islands, which is compounded by their remoteness, insularity, small size, difficult topography and climate, and economic dependence on a few products, the permanence and combination of which severely restrain their development, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, shall adopt specific measures aimed, in particular, at laying down the conditions of application of the present Treaty to those regions, including common policies.

When adopting the relevant measures referred to in the previous paragraph, the Council shall take into account areas such as customs and trade policies, fiscal policy, free zones, agriculture and fisheries policies, conditions for supply of raw materials and essential consumer goods, State aids and conditions of access to structural funds and to horizontal Community programs.

The Council shall adopt the measures referred to in the second paragraph, taking into account the special characteristics and constraints of the outermost regions without undermining the integrity and coherence of the Community legal order, including the internal market and common policies».

As seen above, this article introduces three aspects which are worth highlighting.

1) The new Treaty emphasizes the political commitment of the Union in identifying solutions for the problems of the ORs.

2) Since this is a new article of the Treaty and not a Declaration, it provides a legal basis for concrete actions.

3) This article commits the EU to pursue and strengthen its action involving the concerned countries through specific measures adjusted to the economic and social development of these regions.

To summarize, as we saw earlier, the concept of outermost region represents a special status for certain regions of the European Union sharing certain common characteristics. In fact, this is a legal status that gives political guarantees concerning the participation of these regions in the process of European integration.

To clarify this point, it should be kept in mind that the Treaty of Lisbon, which amends both the Treaty on European Union and the founding treaty of the European Community, now renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), strengthens the legal status of the outermost regions and restates the model for their full integration through Articles 349 and 355.

There are currently nine outermost regions:

- Five French overseas departments — Martinique (in the Caribbean Sea), Mayotte, Guadeloupe and Réunion (in the Indian Ocean), and French Guiana (an enclave in the Amazon forest);
- One French overseas collectivity — Saint Martin (in the Caribbean Sea);
- Two Portuguese autonomous regions — Madeira and Azores (in the Atlantic Ocean);
- One Spanish autonomous community — the Canary Islands (in the Atlantic Ocean).

It should be mentioned that, until the end of 2011, the French overseas collectivity of Saint Barthélemy was also an outermost region of the European Union. However, due to its remoteness from mainland France, its special legal status, its close economic relations with partners in the American continent and a focus on tourism, France requested a change in the status of Saint Barthélemy, converting it into one of EU's overseas countries and territories (OCT). This amendment came into force on January 1, 2012.

The OCTs comprise 26 countries and territories (including, until the end of 2013, Mayotte) — most of them small islands — outside the European continent, which maintain constitutional ties with the following Member-States: Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

Article 355 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides that the European Council may change the status of the OCTs of France, Denmark or the Netherlands to the status of ORs, without changing the Treaty.

4. “From Problem region to Region of opportunity”

However, one should not think that the importance of the ORs can be limited to their demographic weight, agriculture or the number of visiting tourists. The value and richness of the ORs lies also in their extraordinary cultural legacy, their varied geographical contexts and the strategic role they play in protecting Europe's sea routes and defending EU's external borders.

Therefore, the ORs should be defined not only by their remoteness from Europe but also by their proximity to third countries.

It is worth noting that, in an article titled “La actualización del marco normativo europeo específico para la ultraperiferia”, Carlos Português Carrilo and Júlían Zafra Díaz stated the following: «It is safe to say that the ORs serve as real European bridgeheads in their environments, fostering cooperation in other regional fields and enabling a real and close presence of Europe in geographic areas far from the European continent».⁴¹

⁴¹ Carrilo, Carlos Português; Zafra, Júlían Díaz - “La actualización del marco normativo europeo específico para la ultraperiferia.” In *Movilidad y Gran Vecindad en*

In other words, in the context of globalization, the European Union is the only continental entity with a presence in the heart of the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, as well as in South America, thanks to its ORs. These serve as privileged platforms for the EU to develop its policies across its own borders and within their corresponding geographical scopes.

In 2004, this new intellectual paradigm inspired the so called “European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)”, whose main goal was precisely to: «prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors, and strengthen the prosperity, stability and safety of all. This policy is based on the values of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, and applies to 16 of the EU’s closest neighboring countries: Algeria, Armenia, Palestinian Authority, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldavia, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. The ENP is basically a bilateral policy between the Union and each third country, which is complemented by regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean».⁴²

Since then, emphasis has been placed on the role of the ORs as regions of opportunity, active frontiers of Europe and territories of European influence in non-European areas. This new understanding is reinforced through the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy in the ORs.

These regions build real bridges between the EU and Africa, MERCOSUL (an agreement signed between the Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Uruguay, on March 26, 1991), and the USA.

The ORs represent a European presence in their geographical environment, giving it a global dimension and constituting its furthest frontier. They also serve as “Europe’s bridgeheads” in the development of trade relations with their respective neighbors, as well as privileged sites for implementing certain high-tech activities (for instance, the European Space Agency, in French Guiana, and the Astrophysics Institute, in the Canary Islands).

In terms of sea area, the ORs make up more than half of the EU’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), with a potential reserve of marine resources of approximately 15 million km². This represents a unique deep-sea laboratory, which the EU can explore in fields such as food safety, the fight against climate change, energy and biotechnology. Thus, on account of the ORs, the European Union has the world’s largest maritime territory, with an economic zone

las Regiones Ultraperiféricas de la Unión Europea. Tenerife: Cabildo Insular de Tenerife. Área de Empleo, desarrollo Económico, Comercio y Acción Exterior, 2014, p.17.

⁴² *European Neighborhood Policy*. Last accessed on August 30, 2015. Available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/cape_verde/what_eu/neighbourhood_policy_eastern_partnership/index_pt.htm

covering 25 million km². This territory is of vital importance due to its rich resources and great potential. Thanks to their exceptional natural and cultural environments, the ORs are also valuable assets in terms of tourism opportunities. The ORs harbor a variety of unique species and ecosystems of great importance to Earth's biodiversity. Along with the overseas countries and territories, these regions are home to more endemic animal and vegetal species than those found in the whole of continental Europe, including more than 20% of the world's coral reefs and lagoons. Their biodiversity holds a potential to be developed in the fields of health, biomedicine and biopharmacy, cosmetics and many others, such as the industries of timber and ecological building materials. Several regions also offer conditions for the development of renewable energy sources, from biofuels to wind, solar, geothermal or photovoltaic energy. In terms of human capital, the ORs have a more qualified and educated workforce, as well as more advanced public services and know-how than their neighboring countries, which gives them the possibility of providing services and expertise in high added value sectors.

Hence, the ORs constitute a European territorial presence in strategic areas of the globe and have exceptional geographic and geological features that make them privileged laboratories for research and innovation in forwards-moving sectors, such as biodiversity and the terrestrial and marine ecosystems, pharmacology, renewable energies and space sciences, for example.

Consequently, it can be said that the specific features of these territories must translate into the exploitation of their potential for integration in the EU. Moreover, these specific features must be seen as added values for the European Union in various fields and recognized and assumed as such by the Member States. In essence, it is necessary to acknowledge the richness of these regions' diversity and the unique contribution they offer due to characteristics paradoxically associated with difficulties.

Thus, it is necessary to reinforce the Community strategy for the development of these regions, in an effort to create synergies and coherence between several Community policies focusing on the ORs. Above all, this strategy should maximize the originality of the ORs and take advantage of their unique position.

5. Conclusion

For all these reasons, it can be inferred that the European integration significantly changed the development of the outermost regions.

In the case of the Portuguese ORs (Azores and Madeira), this model of development and change is based on two key facts of the Contemporary Portuguese History: the achievement of the status of Autonomous Regions, in 1976, and the accession to the European Community, in 1986. These two

moments left a decisive mark on the history of the Portuguese autonomous regions, both in the Portuguese and in the European frameworks.

In fact, nowadays, the EU offers the best framework for the autonomous island regions, both concerning their political theory of decentralization, arising from the principle of subsidiarity, as well as with regards to their financial autonomy and their own economic development, which result mostly from Community policies and actions directed to the outermost regions and from the side-effects of the principle of European economic and social cohesion coupled with the economic and social cohesion inscribed in the Portuguese Constitution.

The socio-economic development and progress of the ORs contributes to the defense of the concept of outermost region. On one hand, by signaling its existence within the formal framework of the European Union and due to the need for balanced and creative solutions satisfying the requirements for real practical effects and reinforcing the spirit of solidarity, which has always been a key element of the Community spirit. On the other hand, by acting boldly so that the ORs may also present themselves as a unity within a political dimension, with an active involvement and a voice in the Community bodies.

Additionally, the specific nature of these territories can and should drive the exploitation of their potential. The ORs should be seen as added values for the EU and assumed and recognized as such by the Member States, as highlighted by the European Council in March 2011.

In light of this panorama, and within a globalized world, the ORs are Europe's outposts «called upon to fully participate in the role the EU aspires to play at a global level»⁴³ Their geostrategic locations make them real *active frontiers* of the EU from which the latter can develop its external action.

Abstract

Portugal and Spain's accession to the European Communities in the 1980s opened up a new geopolitical dimension within the process of European construction. As a result, on account of the Autonomous Regions of Azores and Madeira, and the Autonomous Community of the Canary Islands, the European Community gained a privileged position in the Atlantic (at the crossroads between the European, American and African continents). This article proposes a reflection on the importance of the Atlantic outermost regions within the framework of the EU, particularly through their role as furthestmost frontiers of the European project. In particular, the European integration process of the Portuguese outermost regions will be also outlined.

⁴³ See. COM (2009) 647.

Keywords: *Portugal; European Communities; Outermost Regions; European integration*

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BREXIT Case – from Individual Idiosyncrasies to a Collective Answer

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I. Introduction

When I first thought of writing this article I was intended to analyze the idiosyncrasies of the British decident David Cameron, as the risky leader who played – for personal electoral purposes - the EU membership of his country, in a dangerous game named BREXIT – which suposed to be the tangential earthquake for the European leaders with a sort of a “hapy ending” (meaning the victory of the REMAIN suporters). In both situations, I was almost sure that I will analyze the idiosyncrasies of the PM David Cameron and the important messages from Brexit campaign, from the view of European integration and in both situation I was wrong. Today I have to speak also about the new-to-come PM – Theresa May and of the challenges left by BREXIT on European agenda, especially on European integration perspective, and that means that instead of speaking about “whether” we will have to speak in terms of “when” the 50 Article of Lisbon treaty will be activated. And maybe, the most emblematic idiosyncrasy is the song that David Cameron was humming after he announced his successor.

But my final decision was to analyze the context and the factors which determined the results of Brexit referendum.

We are living tormented times, in which European Union is reconfiguring, relaunching and reloaded. More than ever, Europe needs its elites involved in European construction. The result of Brexit showed the failure of European political elites and the fact that we have to apeal to the values that keep us together (unity, responsibility and vision). We have to see how we reached to this point and how we will find our way forward.

Brexit demonstrated the crisis of trust, and the fact that Europeans are less apreciative toward what European Union brought them – free movement, stability, peace – and more apreciative toward what European

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Union could take from them – solidarity. Wherever European Union is redrawing, there is a vacuum that could be filled with dangerous elements, such as greed and lack of perspective. It is time to see what the causes were in order to find better solution for the European future.

II. European Integration - British Contribution

We could mention three main areas in order to evidence the British contribution to the European construction: *European Policies*, *Parliamentary scrutiny* and *Constitutional differences*.

Regarding the first one, the *European Policies*, going from a historical perspective, the relation between Great Britain and European Union/Community was not an easy one. The accession from 1973 was shadowed by two sets of events: the decision not to join as a founder member in the 1950s and the “humiliation of the vetoes!” by General de Gaulle in the 1960s. Both events had negative consequences: economic, political and psychological; at economic level on agricultural and budgetary policies, at political level regarding the participation in European decision-making process and at psychological level (maybe with the most influence on the British European behavior), flowing from political one, the image of an outsider, who is not for real at the decision-making table, contesting in this way everything which came from Brussels bureaucrats, who are not taking into consideration the British interest. So, it was a matter of controlling the decisions with consequences on British citizens. This psychological explanation could be one of the reasons for which the slogan from Brexit campaign for the LEAVE camp, “Take back control”, had success instead of the slogan of REMAIN camp, which was saying about the advantages of being part of a project, of European values.

The first important British contribution to the European integration was on Single Market: “from the early 1980s onwards, when Margaret Thatcher took up the cudgels on its behalf, and with the notable leadership in the Commission of Arthur Cockfield and in the European Parliament of Basil de Ferranti and his Kangaroo Group”. Of course that there is plenty of space for Single Market reforms and improvements, but we have to mention the British contribution to the Single Market services, in framing the digital economy, the energy union and a capital market union³.

¹ David Hannay, “Britain's contribution to the EU: an insider's view”, in: Graham Avery, Robert Cooper (et al.), *Challenge Europe, Issue 23, Britain and Europe: a new settlement?*, European Policy Center, Bruxelles, 2016, p. 12.

² *Ibidem*.

³ *Ibidem*.

One of the most affected areas of European reconfiguration is the Enlargement Policy. In a recent study, the prestigious Graham Avery⁴ said about the Enlargement Policy that “it results from the magnetism of the integration process and the wish of outsiders to join”. Britain, as any other European state applying for EU membership had economic and political interest, and the former EU negotiator for Britain, Edward Heath, assumed this political importance. At that time it was clear for everybody that the Community will create a common market, from which UK cannot miss and the British leaders understood that. Avery appealed to the words of Margaret Thatcher from 1975: “The European Community is a powerful group of nations. With Britain as a member, it is more powerful; without Britain it will still be powerful⁵”. And that mean to have a prospective leader, who knew which the country’s interests were, and who was not directed by personal desires.

It is to be mentioned the British questioning of Greece admittance too soon and without the domestic reforms, foreseeing at that time the dangers that could come after that. And they were right about it. But Britain supported the enlargement and was “an active and effective leader⁶” of Spain, and Portugal, Austria, Finland and Sweden, the twelve countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and Croatia.

The British attitude to enlargement results “from a desire to weaken and dilute the European project: 'widening' has been pursued because it was seen as an antidote to 'deepening': with the addition of new members the intergovernmental method would defeat the supranational method⁷”. But not the British were the ones who intended to weaken the EU decision-making process and integration. We have several examples that focused our attention: referendums in France, the Netherlands and Ireland that “killed the European Constitution and delayed the Lisbon Treaty⁸”.

The main arguments in sustain the European enlargement (especially for neighboring countries) by the Brits were its geostrategic interests on enhancing European security and the transformative power of EU membership “as the best way of ensuring stability and prosperity for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe⁹”. Practically, the British were the ones who understood the responsibility to security for this part of Europe (between the EU and Russia).

⁴ Graham Avery, ”The European Union and the wider Europe”, in Graham Avery, Robert Cooper (et al.), *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

⁶ David Hannay, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

⁷ Graham Avery, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

Another British argument in favor of Enlargement was the moral one: “We must make Europe not only in the interest of the free countries, but also to be able to welcome the peoples of the East who, freed from the subjection that they have suffered until now, will ask to join us and request our *moral support*¹⁰”. Another argument in favor of the previous one was the expression “closed club”, introduced by Graham Avery in 1992, in the report *Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement*, underlying the fact that Europe has the duty to include the states from the East. The expression used by Graham Avery was borrowed from a speech of Queen Elizabeth II and became a “common-place of the rhetoric of EU enlargement¹¹”.

British support for European construction was present in the elaboration of Neighboring policy. The reason was, again, geostrategic, aiming to improve European security by “creating a circle of friendly neighbors¹²”. This was another instrument of encouraging European economic integration, but without a prospect of accession. There were a lot of failures who putted aside for the moment the Neighboring Policy.

And then Hannay¹³ is asking for attention on future enlargement challenges: Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina, all of them in need for “a positive response if that region on the European Union's doorstep is not to risk slipping back into nationalist and ethnically-fueled instability and even conflict. Nor should Turkey be abandoned [...]” Hannay thinks that without a Britain support, “the EU's enlargement agenda is all too likely to languish¹⁴”.

Another important British contribution was on Trade Policy¹⁵, on multilateral trade liberalization (Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds), which increased the international trade for Europe. The British contribution was on the framing the negotiating position for these agreements. On the European agenda now there are bilateral agreements: agreements with South Korea and Canada - negotiated; agreements with the US, Japan, India, Australia, New Zealand and Mercosur are in the offing.

Great Britain was the one who pressed Brussels for the development of aid budget, committed to allocate 0.7% of its Gross National Income to aid, earning in this way a leadership role.

The climate change and the framing of Environment policies were on the British preoccupations and their contribution to the limitations of carbon emissions and of the negotiating position on climate change were substantive.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Graham Avery, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹² Graham Avery, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹³ David Hannay, *op.cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

Even though we are not so positive in evaluation of European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is good to mention the British contribution in negotiations with Iran to roll back its nuclear programs. The negotiations conducted on a European-sponsored template initially facing the US resistance. Then, the European economic sanctions on Russia on Ukraine issue was "a key element in quelling Russia's new assertiveness¹⁶".

The above mentioned author presents other ways of British contribution to the European integration: Competition Policy (for example: roaming charges, cheaper air fares and less compartmentalized energy market), consumer protection and animal welfare with British advocacy, reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy.

Despite all of the positive arguments of British support of European construction, the inflow of migrants generated by the post-enlargement and the bad management of the Migration Policy was the on the top of popular concern and one of the main topic of debates during the referendum. Instead of following its role of defender of European Union and architect of Enlargement and Neighboring Policy, British people felt the urgency of assuring their own security in their homeland.

The second main area of British contribution to the European integration, *Parliamentary scrutiny*, Hannay¹⁷ mentioned two important committees: *European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons* and the *European Select Committee of the House of Lords* and their activity. The first one has a limited mandate - it can only recommend that an EU policy or proposal be debated by the whole House and was dominated by eurosceptists, "focused its efforts mainly on harassing the government of the day" and done little to work with European institution (Commission and Parliament) or the national parliaments of the other Member States. Instead, the second committee - *European Select Committee of the House of Lords* has a flexible mandate and influenced the shaping of EU policies and legislation. It set-up 6 sub-committee (economic affairs, external affairs, home affairs etc.) which worked on of the main sectors of EU policy making, having as results valuable report which were taken into consideration by Brussels.

The third important British contribution to European integration was in the sphere of *constitutional differences*. It is referring to the contribution to the institutional change, even though the attitudes were sometime hesitant or hostile. British attitude regarding the institutional reform and on focusing on European policies, asking all the time "It will work?", was different than the one

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ David Hannay, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

of Brussels when they were speaking all the time about federal or quasi-federal structure for the EU, about an institutional response to all problems and challenges and about more powers to institutions. Hannay¹⁸ was speaking about a tendency of being labelled as *un-European* because of the British approach of favoring pragmatic, incremental solutions. But this comes from British historical legacy (a contribution to European legacy) in which, from 17th century, they were accommodating the two approaches: pragmatism and incrementalism and European Union has to face now the ways in which it could accommodate these two ways.

III. Cognitive Approach on Decision-Making and Idiosyncrasies – Framing the Context

Psychological approaches challenge the concept of rationality in the decision-making process¹⁹ because they focus on human factors and the influences that shape the responses that the decision-makers use for the outside world²⁰.

Jackson and Sorensen, showing the approaches used in the analysis of foreign policy, identify the psychological and cognitive processes approach²¹. This is done individually, with particular attention to the psychological aspects of the decision-makers, especially the perception of the actor. Working on the research of Jervis, from 1968 and 1976, and Margaret Hermann, from 1984, the authors point towards important elements to consider in the analysis of foreign policy decision-making: the misunderstanding of the intentions and actions of other actors and the underlying reasons—actors seeing what they want to see, not what is really going on, being guided by pre-existing beliefs (hence the tendency to perceive other states as more hostile than they really are); their engagement and confusion of desires with reality (wishful thinking)²². Margaret Hermann studied the personality characteristics of fifty-four prime ministers, claiming that factors such as leadership experience in foreign affairs, political style, political socialization and a broader view of the world must be taken into

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Gabriela Ciot, *Negotiation and Foreign Policy decision Making*, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2015, p. 135; D.R. Kinder, J. A. Weiss, "In Lieu of Rationality: Psychological Perspectives of Foreign Policy Decision-Making", in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 22, no. 4, December 1978, p. 708.

²⁰ Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 135; R. Saikaly, *Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy: Applying Kingdon's Multiple Streams Model to the 2003 Iraq Crisis*, doctoral thesis, Kent, Kent State University, 2009, p. 11.

²¹ Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 133; R. Jackson, G. Sorenson, *Introduction to International Relations. Theories and approaches*, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 234.

²² Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 134; R. Jackson, G. Sorenson, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

account in the decision-making process to truly understand how leaders conduct foreign policy²³.

The *cognitive approach* explores the effects of beliefs and perceptions on the individual and the impact that these have on the decision-making process²⁴.

Cognitive psychology has shown the importance of the differences between the desires of rational decision models and the awarding, estimating and reasoning processes used frequently by the individuals²⁵. It explains these differences by the need for simple rules for processing information and reasoning, necessary for making sense of uncertainty and a complex environment. The human mind has a preference for simplicity. Also, individuals are against ambiguity and want, in exchange, consistency. Moreover, they misunderstand the essence of probability²⁶, being weak estimators. Finally, individuals have a risk profile that moves them away from rational choice models, and as a result, we are more averse to loss than to gain. All of these four attributes compromise the ability of rational choice, being the key factors that influence the decision-making of foreign policy.

Jackson and Sorensen²⁷, addressing the individual level of the decision-making process, draw attention to the influences and constraints that they need to cope with, suggesting different modes of analysis. Quoting Holsti²⁸, the authors state that among the cognitive constraints of rationality are also included limitations on the ability of the individual to receive, process and assimilate information about a situation, the inability to identify the entire set of alternative policies and insufficient knowledge connected to the consequences of each option²⁹. Basically, these limitations are related to how individuals perceive and process information. The aforementioned authors resort to the research results of George, according to which each individual acquires during his development, a set of beliefs and personal constructs

²³ Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 135; M. G. Hermann, *Defining the Bush presidential style*, Ohio, Ohio State University, 1989, p. 57.

²⁴ Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

²⁵ J. S. Stein Gross, *Foreign Policy decision-making: rational, psychological, and neurological models*, in: S. Smith, A. Hadfield, T. Dunne, (eds.), *Foreign Policy. Theories, Actors. Cases*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 104.

²⁶ P.E. Tetlock, *Expert Political Judgment: How Good is It? How Can we Know?*, Princeton University Press, 2006; R. Dawes, "Behavioral Decision-Making and Judgment", in: D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, G. Linzey, (eds.), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol I, 4th edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1998, p. 497.

²⁷ R. Jackson, G. Sorenson, *op. cit.*

²⁸ O.R. Holsti, *Theories of International Relations*, 2004, www.duke.edu/~p.feaver/holsti, accessed on

²⁹ Idem, p. 27.

about the physical and social environment³⁰. These beliefs provide for the individual a relatively consistent way to organize and make sense of what the world would otherwise be—a series of signals and clues collected from the environment. Basically, these beliefs and constructs simplify and structure the outside world.

Knowledge is at the heart of international relations³¹ and emphasizes the importance of concepts such as power and interest. But despite the importance, the methodologies of systematic psychological analysis of knowledge have only recently been developed. In research conducted by the authors mentioned above, they attempted to identify the role that knowledge plays in international politics, the challenges raised by the need to assess knowledge and how technology supports the use of these challenges. The essence of their study focuses on operational code analysis, conceptual maps, the theory of the image and conceptual theory³². Each area is examined, taking into account the theoretical developments, methodological approaches and the correspondence of predictions with the observed behavior. The two researchers advocate for understanding the role of knowledge in international phenomena.

Saikaly believes that cognitive approaches take into account the definition of the situation by the leaders, how they perceive the outside world and how they receive and transmit information, all affecting the decision that they will make³³. Leaders can have deeply rooted beliefs, and lives full of experiences that influence how they perceive the outside world³⁴. Rosati criticizes the rational actor model and argues that states are made up of individuals who develop foreign policy. Individuals are those who act, not the states, what matters is human knowledge and the psychological characteristics of decision-makers, with a profound impact on policy outcomes³⁵. He suggests several ways in which human cognition (addressed as the process of acquisition of knowledge through the use of reasoning, intuition and perception) and the beliefs of policy-makers matter.

³⁰ A. George, *Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy*, CO Westwood Press, 1980, p. 57.

³¹ M. Young, M. Schafer, "Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in International Relation", in *Mershon International Studies Review*, no. 42, 1998, p. 63.

³² Idem, p. 64.

³³ R. Saikaly, *Decision Making in U.S. Foreign Policy: Applying Kingdon's Multiple Streams Model to the 2003 Iraq Crisis*, doctoral thesis, Kent, Kent State University, 2009, p. 212.

³⁴ Th. S. Mowle, "Worldviews in foreign policy: Realism, liberalism, and external conflict", in: *Political Psychology*, vol. 24, no. 3, 2003, p. 562.

³⁵ J. A. Rosati, "The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics", in: *International Studies Review*, vol. 2, no. 3, 2000, p. 53.

In the study he made based on Kingdon's multiple stream model, Saikaly considered three important elements of the cognitive approach: beliefs, perceptions and contextual interactions³⁶. Some scholars tend to understand the content of beliefs as operational codes, which provide a perspective image of the outside world³⁷. Other researchers are trying to understand the content of beliefs as a conceptual map that provides a small set of representations for a specific situation³⁸, or are trying to address beliefs as tools for knowledge or an understanding of the social and psychological functions of the action³⁹. In addition, some scholars organize beliefs in schemes that provide mental images, shortcuts and simplifications about other players⁴⁰ or personal meanings of social and historical events⁴¹.

Perceptions are cognitive mechanisms which relate to stereotyping, simple causal inferences and historical analogies that create patterns of thought to help leaders in the decision-making process⁴². Contextual interactions are able to show that the perceptions and beliefs of the leader towards the contextual factors, rather than individual factors, make the difference in the interpretation of the situation by the leader. Hermann suggests that predominant leaders are either insensitive to context, guided by their own beliefs and predispositions, or sensitive to context, guided by pragmatism and contextual factors⁴³. Keller states that different leaders have different interpretations of the same internal constraints: some respect

³⁶ R. Saikaly, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

³⁷ S.G. Walker, "Psychodynamic processes and framing effects in foreign policy decision-making: Woodrow Wilson's operational code", in: *Political Psychology*, no. 16, 1995, p. 697; B.G. Marfleet, "Symposium at-a-distance psychological assessment: The operational code of John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis: A comparison of public and private rhetoric", in: *Political Psychology*, vol. 21, no. 3, 2000, p. 546.

³⁸ A. H. Eagly, S. Chaiken, *The psychology of attitudes*, Harcourt Brace, New York, 1993, p. 78.

³⁹ R. Jervis, "Understanding beliefs", in: *Political Psychology*, vol. 27, no. 5, 2006, p. 642.

⁴⁰ S. T. Fiske, S. E. Taylor, *Social cognition*, 2nd edition, Random House, New York, 1991, p. 16.

⁴¹ L. E. Duncan, "Personal political salience as a self-schema: Consequences for political information processing", in: *Political Psychology*, vol. 26, no. 6, 2005, p. 965.

⁴² O. R. Holsti, "Cognitive Process Approaches to Decision-Making – Foreign Policy Actors viewed Psychologically", in: *American Behavioral Scientist*, vol. 20, no. 1, septembrie/octombrie 1976, p. 11; Y. F. Khon, *Analogies at war: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam decision of 1965*, Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 17; K. L. Shimko, "Metaphors and foreign policy", in: *Political Psychology*, vol. 15, no. 4, December 1994, p. 655.

⁴³ M. G. Hermann, "Leaders and foreign policy decision-making", in: Dan Caldwell, and Timothy J. McKeown, (eds.), *Diplomacy, force and leadership*, Westview Press, San Francisco, 1993, p. 78.

constraints and therefore lead a peaceful foreign policy, others accept the challenge and lead a more aggressive foreign policy⁴⁴.

In addition to the above, Holsti adds a socio-psychological perspective, represented by public attitudes, images and stereotypes, but also by the effect of travel, personal contacts or other forms of interactions between the states⁴⁵.

The cognitive approach to the foreign policy decision-making process opens a new perspective. Considering personal elements such as the personality traits of the decision-maker, his belief system, images, stereotypes, prejudices, values, but also socio-emotional elements, related to the environment in which he was reared and educated, influence decision-making and explain the decisions which cannot be analyzed through the rational actor model and its alternatives. It adds the explanation of the influence of irrational beliefs, creating a link with the idiosyncrasies involved in the decision-making process. Knowledge of these elements contributes to an increase of the predictive power of decisions to be made⁴⁶.

The role of information processing, as well as classification and idiosyncrasies, have indicated the need for a psychological approach to foreign policy decision-making⁴⁷.

The psychological elements that may influence foreign policy decision-making. Specialists bring to our attention factors such as the personality, beliefs, leadership style, emotions, images, intelligence and how they influence decision-making and the results expected. These factors call into question the power of the rational model⁴⁸. But this does not mean that decision-makers are irrational⁴⁹, but rather, that they are limited by their abilities to follow through all the stages of the rational model. The presence of idiosyncrasies (personal and social factors)⁵⁰, influencing decision-making can lead towards more complex-realistic approaches of decision-making, which are

⁴⁴ W. Jonathan Keller, "Leadership style, regime type, and foreign policy crisis behavior: A contingent monadic peace?", in: *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 49, no. 2, 2005, p. 206.

⁴⁵ O. R. Holsti, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁴⁶ Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁴⁷ A. Mintz, K. Jr. Rouen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 97.

⁴⁸ A. Mintz, K. Jr. Rouen, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁰ F. Campanale, B. Shakun, *Behavioral Idiosyncrasies and How They May Affect Investment Decision*, 1997, p. 13, www.aaii.com

different from the "classical" rational model⁵¹. Fagen mentioned two styles of decision-making in foreign policy: calculated and emotional⁵².

The idiosyncrasies refers to the personal characteristics, made and influenced by internal and external factors (social)⁵³.

Goldstein and Pevenhouse mention the levels at which individual idiosyncrasies may occur: the first level is that of misperceptions and selective perceptions (when the filtering of information is performed); the second is that of affective idiosyncrasies (emotions felt by the consequences of actions related to the like or dislike of a person) and the third level, that of cognitive idiosyncrasies (cognitive balance and cognitive dissonance)⁵⁴.

Thompson, Neal and Sinauceur organize the psychological factors (idiosyncrasies) that influence decision-making (those that occur during a negotiation) in four categories: cognitive, social, motivational and emotional idiosyncrasie⁵⁵.

Cognitive idiosyncrasies are systematic deviations from the normative models which prescribe rational behaviour, as articulated in game theory and other normative principles⁵⁶. They result from heuristic information processing, such as framing, anchoring and overevaluation⁵⁷. The authors mentioned above identify two approaches which have characterized research on the presence of cognitive idiosyncrasies in the processes of negotiation. The fundamental argument identified by them is that the decision-maker/negotiator suffers from perceptive errors or misperceptions when assessing risk, the value of a game or other circumstances. This approach identifies the economic model of expected utility. The second approach derived from the concepts of schemas or cognitive maps⁵⁸ or from the cognitive-

⁵¹ A. Mintz, K. Jr. Rouen, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

⁵² R. F. Fagen, "Calculation and emotion in foreign policy: the Cuban Case", in: *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. VI, no. 3, 1962, p. 214.

⁵³ D. Meams, B. Thorne, *Person-Centred Therapy Today: New Frontiers in Theory and Practice*, Sage, 2000, p. 15.

⁵⁴ J. Goldstein, J. Pevenhouse, "Foreign Policy", in: *International Relations*, no. 7/E, Pearson, Longman, 2006, p. 145, www.pearsonhighered.com/.../samplechapte.

⁵⁵ L. Thompson, M. Neale, Sinauceur, "The evolution and Biases in Negotiation Research. An examination of cognition, social perception, motivation and emotion", in: M. J. Gelfand, J.M. Brett, (eds.), *The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture*, Standford University Press, 2004, p. 8.

⁵⁶ L. Thompson, M. Neale, Sinauceur, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

⁵⁷ M. A. Neale, M. H. Bazerman, *Cognition and rationality in negotiation*, Free Press, New York, 1991.

⁵⁸ T. Gilovich, "Seeing the past in the present: The effect of associations to familiar events on judgements and decisions", in *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, no. 40, 1981, p. 797.

mental models developed by cognitivist psychologists⁵⁹. These structures (schemas, maps and models) operate directly on information processing, including attention, categorization and withdrawal.

IV. Conceptual maps

Axelrod brings conceptual maps to the attention of the foreign policy decision-making process, with a different meaning from the traditional, psychological one⁶⁰. A cognitive map (conceptual) is a graphical deployment of the system of beliefs, using figures or numbers⁶¹. In other words, cognitive maps are diagrams of individual decisions and causal assertions. The arrows represent causal directions that connect points within the cognitive maps. Maoz⁶² provides the example of Kissinger's conceptual map, with its two nodes: "the Soviet concept of the balance of powers" and "foreign policy leadership". Causal arrows go from the first to the second node. The value of this conceptual map is in influencing Kissinger's belief system on the Soviet Union and the overview it offers on the structure of the decision. Conceptual maps support decision theory by exposing the nexus between what the decision-maker states as a choice and the results it expects from these choices.

Conceptual maps are applicable in the following situations: (1) decisions that are vital to national security, such as those involving situations of war, (2) decisions that are made at the highest level by leaders unconstrained by bureaucracy, (3) long-term policy planning, with a high degree of uncertainty, (4) decisions made in ambiguous or uncertain situations, resulting from inadequate information, and (5) where decision-makers are constrained by stress⁶³.

Conceptual maps enable a determining of the most satisfactory strategy or other strategic decisions by the decision-makers. The greatest benefit provided by this technique is a "glance" into the structure of beliefs of the participants involved in making a decision.

⁵⁹ J. S. Evans, "The cognitive psychology of reasoning: An introduction", in: *Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Experimental Psychology Special Issue: The Cognitive Psychology of Reasoning*, no. 46, 1993, p. 561.

P. Tabossi, V. A. Bell, P. N. Johnson-Laird, "Mental models in deductive, modal, and probabilistic reasoning", in: G. Rickheit, C. Habel, (eds.), *Mental Models in discourse processing and reasoning*, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1999, p. 299.

⁶⁰ R. Axelrod, "The Cognitive Mapping Approach to Decision Making", in: R. Axelrod, (ed.), *Structure of Decision*, Princeton University Press, 1976.

⁶¹ Z. Maoz, *National Choices and International Processes*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 116.

⁶² Idem, p. 117.


⁶³ O. R. Holsti, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

Valuable research by Findlay and Thagard has identified emotional change, using a new method of graphic representation, *the cognitive-affective map* to analyze emotional changes occurring during the negotiations in 1978 at Camp David, which led to an agreement between Egypt and Israel. The two authors have used this technique to model the mental states of the two negotiators Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin, based on details provided by the memoirs of Jimmy Carter. This account has enabled the measurement of the emotional states of the Israeli and Egyptian leaders, generating maps that showed how Sadat's and Begin's attitudes changed during deliberations, eventually leading to a settlement of the major conflict. This method for facilitating the recognition and reconciliation of emotional differences between the disputants can contribute to peaceful agreements. Selecting the concepts which drew the cognitive-affective maps have followed this method:

1. Identifying the main concepts, beliefs, goals and emotions of the person who will be analyzed;
2. Identifying these elements as emotionally positive or negative and representing them through ovals or hexagons. The ovals are positive emotional elements and the hexagons negative ones. The rectangles are neutral elements or those having positive and negative aspects;
3. Identifying the relationships between elements that are complementary, mutually supportive (thicker lines) or conflicting and incompatible (dashed lines);
4. Introducing the resulting cognitive-affective map to others, to see if they understand the presentation of the situation.

The figure below renders these conventions by graphic representation:

Fig. 1: Conventions for the cognitive-affective map⁶⁴




⁶⁴ S. D. Findlay, P. Thagard, "Emotional Change in International Negotiations: Analyzing the Camp David Accords Using Cognitive-Affective Mapps", in: *Group Decision Negotiations*, DOI 10.1007/s10726-011-9242-x, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2011, p. 5, cogsci.uwaterloo.ca/.../Findlay-Thagard.inte...

Cognitive idiosyncrasies filters are some of the theoretical filters for the study of the behavior of the decision-maker. The cognitive approach is the individual approach to an inherent social situation⁶⁵

V. Conceptual maps for BREXIT Case

Much has been said or written on Brexit in the attempt of explaining the unprecedented of the situation, and much will be said and written in the future. For us, specialists in the international relations and European studies it is important to see the relevance of the emotional factors that contributed to this collective decision.

Figure no. 2: The cognitive-affective map of Brexit decision



From a winner of political game (May 2015), David Cameron exit the post-war political scene with an emblem that will follow him his whole life. From the intention of winning the internal election, the promise of organizing a British referendum on the apurtenance of EU proved to be the sign of improving the political process of decision-making and the sign on putting much more importance of the effect of personal idiosyncrasies of individual decident. In today title of politico.eu, *David Cameron's gift to May: A Dominant Tory Party*, Tom Mc Tague was speaking about a success of an internal politics

⁶⁵ Gabriela Ciot, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

example, saying that Cameron “suicide to save the party”. Quite ironically....It seems that an internal politics issue (of winning the general elections) tormented the whole European Union and now the circle is closing and we are speaking again about an internal politics issue. It is a signal that the British citizens are trying to frame their future position in the tough negotiations that will come. And, of course, “Brexit means Brexit”, and the psychological training is started....First, by appealing to the figure of reformist Margaret Thatcher and her discourse from 1988 and then with comparison with the new PM Theresa May. For sure, we are living tormented times, and it is important to learn from our past mistakes and to improve our behavior in order to reduce the intensity of the effects on future generations.

The aim of cognitive-affective maps is to underline the importance and role of certain factors that acted in favor of a certain individual decision. In this article, we will try to configure a cognitive map for the context that lead to the result of LEAVE.

VI. Conclusions

The present study tried to underline the importance of emotional factors that determined individual actions of an individual decident (in our case David Cameron) and the emotional effects on his/hers action (Brexit referendum and the collective answer – LEAVE result). The individual idiosyncrasies of David Cameron – desire to win with any price and keep the power, ambitious to be an emblematic leader, doubled by un-prospective capacity, wrong emotional slogans and lack of pragmatism in appreciation of the real political internal and external climate lead to an unexpected result: the victory of the LEAVE camp. He should took into consideration the uncertainty factor that put him in a winning position, in order to explain the lack of public listening to his messages during the Brexit campaign.

The subchapter dedicated to cognitive approach of decision-making process tended to rise a signal for all political analysts and decidents to pay more attention to their own personalities, and to their idiosyncrasies. By taking into account the internal and external climate, future leaders will know how to deal with the interdependence of today’s world.

Above all, the British contribution cannot be contested and the subchapter dedicated to it tried to emphasize that briefly. In the end, the words of Hannay⁶⁶ are synthetizing the efforts that British experts, diplomats, officials had put years and years for the European construction and there is not a better way to conclude this study: “Since I first became involved in European matters in the run-up to and during Britain's accession negotiations I have from time to time examined my conscience and asked myself whether

⁶⁶ David Hannay, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

Britain should not be ashamed of the amount of trouble it has given its partners over the years, asking them to make space for British exceptionalism. I do genuinely regret some things: the way in which the vagaries of our domestic party politics have imposed two renegotiations and two 'In/Out' referendums; the raucous and disrespectful tone towards the EU and its institutions in our press; the lack of interest in and understanding of the workings of the EU which matter so much to us. But I do not regret, nor am I ashamed of, the contribution Britain has made and is still making to the European Union, of which I have attempted to give some account in this essay; and I am very sure that we would all be worse off without it⁶⁷.

Abstract

The present study is trying to emphasize the role of individual idiosyncrasies in the decision-making process. The particular case for it is the BREXIT case. After framing the interdependent context of the particular event and underlying the British contribution to the European integration, the study is focusing on the cognitive aproach of decision-making process and on cognitive-affective map, as one of the cognitive idiosyncrasies. The innovative element of the study is the elaboration of cognitive-affective map of BREXIT.

Keywords: *cognitive aproach of decision-making, cognitive idiosyncrasy, cognitive-affective map, BREXIT*

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⁶⁷ David Hannay, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

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EU and Cyberspace - a Plea for the Fifth Freedom of Movement

*Mirela MĂRCUȚ**

1. Introduction

The European Union has undergone several process of deterritorialization and reterritorialization across its six decades of existence. The cornerstone of this evolution was inscribed in the Treaty of Rome as such: “The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively aproximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it”¹. The essence of the Common Market, as it was called then, was the freedom of movement of goods, services, labor and capital. The Common Market has evolved, transformed into an Internal Market and, finally, into the Single Market. However, it has become evident in the past three decades that the initial Common Market project requires a boost. This was done in 1985, when then president of the Commission, Jacques Delors, streamlined an initiative to complete the Internal Market. It was also done in 2011 and 2011, when Mario Monti delivered two important papers on the future of the Single Market. These documents have one important thing in common: a realization by their authors that the freedom of movement is paramount to the economic and social development of the European Union, but that it does not function properly. Monti called this “market fatigue”, as “suport for the market economy has become less broad and less deep than it had been since the Eighties”².

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¹ “The Treaty of Rome,” 1957, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.

² Mario Monti, “A New Strategy for the Single Market. At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society” (European Commission, May 9, 2010), 24,

So, why would we need another freedom of movement, if the European Commission has asked for a report concluded that there is market fatigue and the Single Market is not functioning properly? What other freedom of movement do we need to establish? The four fundamental freedoms have created a new type of space, but its functioning suffers. We must talk about the erection of a new type of space where information resides, namely the digital space. Information travels freely in the World Wide Web, but we shall see in this paper that this is not always the case for the European digital space. Hence, the need for the regulation of a new freedom of movement, the freedom of movement of information. In the context of the rethinking of the make-up of the European Union due to terrorist threats and migration, borders are reanalyzed. Their existence is not questioned anymore, but new types of borders are erected. The answers to the question from above seem rather problematic given the hard threats existent in the European Union. Thus, it also seems redundant to discuss about the need to regulate the freedom of movement of information. This should come as a given, but information does not travel freely and users suffer from geo-blocking, while digital content is mapped according to its point of origin. The main point of this paper is to emphasize the need for a top-down initiative in this sense in order to enable the proper functioning of the European virtual space entitled now the Digital Single Market.

Hence, both the Single Market and the Digital Single Market (established by the Digital Agenda for Europe) do not function properly. One of the triggers of the change of paradigm in the functioning of the Single Market is the information and communication technology revolution, because it was never really fully accounted for in the original design of the Common Market, or in the 1985 White Paper. Statements by European bureaucrats claiming that this revolution is changing our world and that ‘data is the new oil’ seem to provide us with enough proof to show that the Internet is a major influence in the development of the Single Market ³. But how are these new economy, new oil and ways of communicating specifically working in the European Union? How is the Single Market coping with this challenge? Such an answer can be found directly in one of the most recent policy documents discussing the influence of the Internet in the European Union, namely the Digital Agenda for Europe: “Europe is still a patchwork of national online markets, and Europeans are prevented by solvable problems from enjoying the benefits of a digital single market.

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf.

³ Neelie Kroes, “Digital Agenda and Open Data From Crisis of Trust to Open Governing Bratislava,” *European Commission - Press Release*, March 5, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-149_en.htm.

Commercial and cultural content and services need to flow across borders; this should be achieved by eliminating regulatory barriers and facilitating electronic payments and invoicing, dispute resolution and customer trust”⁴. Essentially, the Digital Agenda and this quote show that the Internet does not create a fully-functional digital economy and change out of scratch, but rather it only creates the conditions for development and growth, the virtual space where more and more activities are taking place these days. We also see that it does not function properly, given that Europe is considered a patchwork of digital markets and information and content do not travel freely.

2. The evolution of territoriality – cyberspace in the European Union today

“Cyberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot. It is an act of nature and it grows itself through our collective actions. Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live”⁵. This rather optimistic description belongs to the founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, who issued a declaration on the independence of cyberspace in 1996, aimed at countering any initiatives of governments to try to control the cyberspace. However unrealistic this endeavor might have been in its day as well as today, it does point to some useful information regarding the definition and the evolution of cyberspace. This is useful to understand how the European Union has been dealing with this new type of space determined by the evolution of territoriality due to globalization.

Firstly, cyberspace grows itself “through our collective actions”. More specifically, users working together in a network to build the cyberspace. So, the more users partake in this space, the more it grows and develops, so we can conclude that it requires not only collective action, but also individual initiative.

Secondly, he marks the consistency of cyberspace, as it is created of transactions, relations and thought. The latter refers to information, which

⁴ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe,” August 26, 2010, 5, [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R\(01\)&from=EN](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R(01)&from=EN).

⁵ John Perry Barlow, “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” *Electronic Frontier Foundation*, 8 1996, <https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence>.

we consider to be the cornerstone of this space and which also is the basis for the transactions and relations. Here, Barlow points to the fact that the cyberspace has social – represented by relationships – and economic – represented by transactions – connotations.

Thirdly, cyberspace “is a world that is both everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live”. Barlow clearly differentiates between the real and virtual worlds, as the latter is everywhere surrounding individuals with the ability to connect, but it also does not exist when users can’t or are not able to connect to it. In asserting this difference, he proclaims the independence of the virtual world, claiming that “bodies” should not have authority here. The difference between real space/territory and the virtual space, the cyberspace is emphasized poignantly in the first sentence, claiming that cyberspace does not lie within borders. Here, Barlow refers to the traditional meaning of borders, as separations between different territories. He means to say that cyberspace is free from real world constraints related to territory. However, by using the marker ‘your’ before ‘borders’, he does open a new discussion. We might ask: if cyberspace does not exist between ‘our’ borders, does it have its ‘own borders’? This is the essence of this interpretative discussion on the evolution of territoriality towards cyberspace. Like in the case of the real space, digital space also has its barriers and borders, either created individuals or by political or economic entities trying to hinder access to cyberspace and hence to information. However, the markers of cyberspace – collective action and its socio-economic potential for growth – fight against these constraints.

Barlow brings up an interesting point in the discussion on controlling and designing the cyberspace, namely regarding the initiatives by states to regulate the functioning of the cyberspace. He emphasizes that this is not necessary, given that it is built on the basis of the collective actions of individuals and only they are in charge of what happens: “You have not engaged in our great and gathering conversation, nor did you create the wealth of our marketplaces. You do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already provide our society more order than could be obtained by any of your impositions”⁶. In his view, cyberspace has its own logic of functioning and it is naturally free from constraints, bottlenecks and infringements. His view deeply contrasts what has happened in the past years in relation to Internet censorship, especially in countries like China or Turkey, to mass surveillance in the USA and perhaps all over the world. Of course, we have seen that this is not entirely accurate, given that the logic of cyberspace has changed deeply once the Internet has developed across the world and billions of people have been using it.

⁶ Ibidem

What is clear is that there is indeed a new type of space, the digital space, which was created on the basis of the real space, given that hardware and infrastructure are real life constructs. It is also influenced by real life socio-economic conditions that ease access or make it difficult and this gap has been called 'the digital divide'⁷. In a sense, the cyberspace mirrors the real space and this is evident in Sir Tim Berners Lee's speech on the idea of a Magna Charta for the web: "What I want one which is not fragmented into lots of pieces, as some countries have been suggesting they should do in reaction to recent surveillance. I want a web which has got, for example, is a really good basis for democracy. I want a web where I can use healthcare with privacy and where there's a lot of health data, clinical data is available to scientists to do research. I want a web where the other 60 percent get on board as fast as possible. I want a web which is such a powerful basis for innovation that when something nasty happens, some disaster strikes, that we can respond by building stuff to respond to it very quickly"⁸. The inventor of the World Wide Web, who created the new type of space where information travels with the speed of light and communication is enhanced, advocates for a free and open cyberspace, which "is not fragmented into lots of pieces", as the basis for freedom, democracy and innovation. Such figures, like Tim Berners Lee and Barlow, represent the private sector side of the argument with regard to the future of cyberspace.

What is the view of the public entities, in this case the European Union and European states, with regard to cyberspace? This view is evident in the EU's cyber security strategy published in February 2013, where the principles of cyber security and hence cyberspace are enshrined: "the EU's core values apply as much in the digital as in the physical world, protecting fundamental rights, freedom of expression, personal data and privacy, access for all, democratic and efficient multi-stakeholder governance and a shared responsibility to ensure security"⁹. Firstly, the EU acknowledges the existence of the digital world, which mirrors the physical one considering the principle claiming that its core values apply in the former. Moreover, it

⁷ Mirela Mărcuț, "Social Inclusion and Social Frontiers in the Digital Age - How Can EU's Digital Agenda Help?," in *EuroTimes*, vol. 17, 2014, 53–67.(

⁸ Tim Berners-Lee, *A Magna Carta for the Web*, 2014, https://www.ted.com/talks/tim_berniers_lee_a_magna_carta_for_the_web?language=en.

⁹ European Commission, "Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace," 2013, 4, http://ec.europa.eu/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf.

promotes “access for all”, which correlates to the feature of the cyberspace drawn from Barlow’s declaration of independence, according to which cyberspace grows through collective action. There can be no collective action, if the expansion of Internet access is not actively pursued and the principles enshrined by the EU emphasizes this: “limited or no access to the Internet and digital illiteracy constitute a disadvantage to citizens, given how much the digital world pervades activity within society. Everyone should be able to access the Internet and to an unhindered flow of information ¹⁰”. This last phrase evokes the need for a free space where information should flow freely and that is the essence of a functional cyberspace that can work in favor of democracy, of the citizens and of the economy, as Tim Berners Lee envisions it.

The issue of free flow of information is central to the Digital Single Market. The next section will focus on the architecture of cyberspace in the European Union and how it can and should function.

3. Shortcomings of the Digital Single Market

Before discussing the idea that the Digital Single Market is flawed, we must analyze the basic features and its functioning across Europe. The Digital Single Market builds on the heritage created by the architecture of the Single Market, which is the cornerstone of the European Union as we know it today. The emergence of online service and e-commerce moves the focus on cyberspace, which has become a more and more important market, where commercial and information flow must travel without any barriers. At first sight, such an approach might seem redundant and totally unnecessary, given the inherent ability of the Internet and its information to transcend borders. Indeed, the Internet is a global communication network, but we connect to it willingly and we take advantage of its benefits depending on our socio-economic context and state. Thus, we can assert that, in the European Union, the Internet creates a digital economy divided into a series of digital markets, where users who connect voluntarily are the main players. The mechanism of this market is similar to traditional markets, where there are supply and demand for finite resources.

The Digital Single Market is based on the freedom of movement as is the Single Market, as it is emphasized also in the core principles of the cyber security strategy, whereas the core values of the European Union apply also to the digital world. In order to adequately define the Digital Single Market, we must emphasize the apparent paradox within this term created by bringing together the qualifiers “digital” and “single”. Essentially, the digital market manifests entirely in cyberspace, in a space with no apparent barriers,

¹⁰ Ibidem

borders or other types of roadblocks for movement of information. Information is the main good. The qualifier “single” emphasizes the idea that there is one space without roadblocks. In this context, we must emphasize again that the digital market is deeply rooted into territory and depends on the socio-economic context. The European space is still marked by barriers, but they manifest at the level of the digital market. This idea was acknowledged by several policy documents issued by European institutions with regard to the socio-economic influence of information and communication technology in Europe, but the Digital Agenda for Europe was the first to propose the term “Digital Single Market” in an attempt to promote the need to truly unify the digital space. So, the Digital Agenda emphasizes that there are more digital markets, one for each Member State¹¹. The new Commission emphasizes the need for the Digital Single Market in the 2015 Digital Single Market strategy in the following manner, considering the challenges between “the immense opportunities for innovation, growth and jobs” and the lack of policy coordination at the EU level and adequate means at national level: “All Member States are wrestling with similar problems but on a national basis which is too limited to allow them to seize all the opportunities and deal with all the challenges of this transformational change. For many issues the European level offers the right framework”¹². The strategy goes on to offer the first proper definition for the Digital Single Market that is “one in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured and where individuals and businesses can seamlessly access and exercise online activities under conditions of fair competition, and a high level of consumer and personal data protection, irrespective of their nationality or place of residence”¹³. So, place of residence and nationality should not be key factors when participating in the Digital Single Market, as is the case for the Single Market nowadays.

Still, we must discuss about shortcomings of the Digital Single Market, especially regarding the paradox existing between the idea that the Internet does not recognize borders and the fact that digital markets are fragmented. There is a basic principle of the Internet entitled ‘net neutrality’, defined as such “the idea

¹¹ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Agenda for Europe,” 5.

¹² European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” 2015, 3, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52015DC0192&from=EN>.

¹³ Ibidem

that Internet service providers (ISPs) should treat all data that travels over their networks fairly, without improper discrimination in favor of particular apps, sites or services”¹⁴. While this is upheld and it is actually how the Internet works nowadays and regulates the relation between users and service providers, its basic idea of fairness should also be upheld in the relation between sites, services, governments and citizens, users. However, we shall see that the Digital Single Market suffers in this respect mainly because of geo-blocking.

While this was not a specific target of the initial Digital Agenda for Europe strategy, geo-blocking has become one in the Digital Single Market strategy, defined as “practices used for commercial reasons by online sellers that result in the denial of access to websites based in other Member States. Sometimes consumers are able to access the website, but still cannot purchase products or services from it”¹⁵. When analyzing this issue in connection to the principle of net neutrality, we can’t help notice this is a serious network issue, but it does not depend actually on users or on the specific architecture of the Internet as is the case for net neutrality, but on specific service providers. However, the principle of fairness enshrined in the net neutrality principle should also be the basis for the specific way in which information, data, services, apps and content travel across the markets. Territorial bias in the age of the Internet is not justified, especially in a common, internal and single market created in the European Union. The danger posed by this bias is explicitly stated in the strategy: “by limiting consumer opportunities and choice, geo-blocking is a significant cause of consumer dissatisfaction and of fragmentation of the Internal Market”¹⁶. It takes three specific forms, the first referring to blocking access to a website based on the location from where the user accesses it. The second entails the automatic redirection to a local website that might contain limited options for content for users and the third is price related, namely when users cannot buy products or pay higher prices for some goods, services (such as car rental) and content depending on their physical location. This is a serious shortcoming to the architecture of the Digital Single Market, which was built on the core values of the European Union and also on the model created by the Single Market. Geo-blocking is the digital age equivalent to the maintenance of physical borders well after the establishment of the Common Market in the decades following the Treaty of Rome, because it

¹⁴ “Net Neutrality,” *Electronic Frontier Foundation*, accessed May 11, 2016, <https://www EFF.org/issues/net-neutrality>.

¹⁵ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” 6.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*

does not respond to the basic architecture of cyberspace as it was envisioned in the first place.

With this in mind, the Commission has held a consultation on geo-blocking aiming to “gather opinions on unjustified commercial barriers which prevent from buying and selling products and services within the European Union”¹⁷. Geo-blocking related to copyright is not covered, however the Commission aims to investigate this discrimination as it considers that “there are indications that businesses themselves establish barriers to cross-border online trade, with a view to fragmenting the EU's Single Market along national borders and preventing competition”¹⁸. The initial results of this consultation have confirmed that “geo-blocking is widespread across the EU [...] due to unilateral decisions by companies not to sell abroad but also contractual barriers set up by companies preventing consumers from shopping online across EU borders”¹⁹. Geo-blocking works, according to the study, in two ways. Firstly, it is enforced by an official decision of a content or service provider on the Internet and, secondly, it is also manifested by a contractual obligation posed by content suppliers to providers. The methods used to apply geo-blocking depend on the retailers vary from complete refusal to allow access to the website to refusal to accept payment or delivery of the ordered goods²⁰.

Geo-blocking is the root of the shortcomings of the Digital Single Market because the relation between users, goods and services providers and intermediaries is riddled with roadblocks, when in fact this situation should not happen in cyberspace. This brings forth new types of barriers that further fragment the Digital Single Market. This situation mirrors the difficult evolution of the Common Market to the Internal Market, whereas frontier controls were kept in place years after the establishment of this new space. In 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, the authors specify that “most of our citizens would regard the frontier posts as the most visible example of the continued division of the Community and their removal as the clearest sign of the integration of the Community into a

¹⁷ European Commission, “Press Release - Have Your Say on Geo-Blocking and the Role of Platforms in the Online Economy,” September 25, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5704_en.htm.

¹⁸ Ibidem

¹⁹ European Commission, “Press Release - Antitrust: E-Commerce Sector Inquiry Finds Geo-Blocking Is Widespread throughout EU,” March 16, 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-922_en.htm.

²⁰ Ibidem

single market”²¹. Like in the case of the Internal Market in the 1980s, the first things to be eliminated should be divisions on the Internet according to geographical location, because they are the most obvious marker of fragmentation in cyberspace. Moreover, the 1985 benchmarking initiative for the elimination of barriers in the Internal Market emphasizes that these physical barriers “continue to exist mainly because of the technical and fiscal divisions between Member States”²². Not only was this a serious economic shortcoming of the Community back then, but it was also a symbol of the failure to actually unite.

Getting back to cyberspace, it is engulfed in the same crisis, as fragmentation has been linked to losses in the digital economy and cross-border e-commerce, which we consider to be the true measure of the success of the Digital Single Market. According to the Commission reports, “in 2015, more than 50 per cent of the EU population shopped online, but only 16 per cent shopped online from a seller based in another EU Member State”²³. These numbers do not point to a functional European digital market, but rather, as the Digital Agenda put it, to a patchwork of digital markets. This fragmentation has other ramifications to other types of barriers, similar to the ones existent in the 1985 White Paper. Cyberspace also has technical and fiscal barriers, mirroring the evolution of the Internal Market, but these barriers which point also to legal and social issues. These barriers are further detailed in Table no.1, based on the types of barriers identified in the 1985 White Paper for the Internal Market²⁴.

Technical barriers refer to the architecture of the Internet across Europe, starting from the need for a secure cyberspace in order to help build user trust to the need to create actual European content platforms that can be accessed by users from every corner of the European Union. The latter is complicated by the intricate statute of intellectual property rights in cyberspace, which can also result in geo-blocking content for some users in the European Union.

²¹ Commission of the European Communities, “Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the Council,” 1985, 6, http://europa.eu/documents/comm/white_papers/pdf/com1985_0310_f_en.pdf.

²² Ibidem

²³ European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Document. Geo-Blocking Practices in E-Commerce. Issues Paper Presenting Initial Findings of the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry Conducted by the Directorate-General for Competition,” March 18, 2016, 7, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/ecommerce_swd_en.pdf.

²⁴ Mirela Mărcuț, “Permeabilitatea și Impermeabilitatea Frontierelor Socio-Economice În Uniunea Europeană. Studiu de Caz: Frontiera Electronică” (Babeș-Bolyai University, 2015), 134.

Table no.1 Types of barriers for the Digital Single Market

Physical barriers	Technical barriers	Fiscal/economic barriers
Lack of Internet infrastructure, especially in remote areas	Lack of adequate security in cyberspace leading to low trust in e-commerce, e-government	High costs of data roaming
Lack of uniform high speed Internet infrastructure across Europe	Lack of online European-wide content platforms	Higher fees in cross-border e-commerce and higher shipping costs
Geo-blocking as blocking access to content for some Internet users from some EU Member States	Complicated statute of intellectual property rights, which does not allow for the uniform movement of content across Europe	
Geo-blocking as higher prices of failure to deliver goods based on users' geographical location	Uncertainties related to consumer and user rights in cyberspace	

Apart from geo-blocking, roaming was another marker of the fragmentation of cyberspace in the European Union. Every time a user left national territory and left the space of the national communication carrier, s/he connected to another carrier from the country of destination. Roaming triggers high fees, especially when connecting via mobile to the Internet and, which, according to the European Commission, “are a market distortion with no rational place in a single market”²⁵. This issue was tackled by the former Commissioner for the Digital Agenda, Neelie Kroes, who campaigned for the removal of roaming fees and a single tariff for communication within the Digital Single Market. In 2015, the European Parliament voted to end roaming charges and a transitional calendar was put in place with June 15, 2017 as the end point for all roaming charges. The current Commissioner for the Digital Single Market praised this success by saying that “this is not only about money; this is about bringing down barriers in the Digital Single Market”²⁶. These barriers are starting to get

²⁵ European Commission, “Roaming - Digital Single Market,” April 29, 2016, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/roaming>.

²⁶ European Commission, “Press Release - Bringing down Barriers in the Digital Single Market: No Roaming Charges as of June 2017,” October 27, 2015, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-5927_en.htm.

down, helping cross-border communication, online startups and businesses, but also reducing costs in the Digital Single Market.

Speaking of costs, cross-border e-commerce perpetuates a fragmented Digital Single Market because users ordering from other EU Member States are forced to pay higher shipping fees or higher transaction fees. The Commission acknowledged this state after performing certain states with regard to the fragmentation of digital markets. One of the conclusions was that consumers “do not have equal access to cross-border offers: for consumers in some countries it is highly unlikely that they will find foreign shops that are prepared to accept an order. While offers are technically accessible to consumers who are searching for them online, at some point during the ordering process, websites will terminate the transaction”²⁷. The same report cites also other types of barriers that derive from the actual geographical location of the consumer or user, such as different languages, culture, “demographics, individual preferences, technical specifications or standards, internet penetration or the efficiency of the postal or payment system”²⁸.

4. A plea for the freedom of movement of information

The previous section referred to barriers that hinder the proper functioning of the construction entitled Digital Single Market. However, we must notice that there are several initiatives aimed at removing the roadblocks, such as the elimination of roaming charges. The previous section also highlighted the need for further action in preserving the freedom and neutrality of the cyberspace when users come into contact with it. If net neutrality refers mainly to “no blocking or throttling of online content, applications and services”²⁹, then why doesn’t it fully work in the Digital Single Market?

The answer lies in the debate between the regulation of cyberspace and the emphasis on the fact that the Internet and the World Wide Web are creations of private individuals and they should remain out of governmental and public sector intervention. Other researchers on the subject even

²⁷ Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Cross-Border Business to Consumer E-Commerce in the EU,” October 22, 2009, 6, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/consumer_research/market_studies/docs/COM_2009_0557_4_en.pdf.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, 2.

²⁹ European Commission, “New Rules on Roaming Charges and Open Internet,” *Digital Single Market*, October 27, 2015, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/new-rules-roaming-charges-and-open-internet>.

emphasize a basic question: can cyberspace even be regulated or rather is there a model for its regulation?³⁰ Considering the fact that cyberspace and the Internet that created this new space are extremely different than anything the governments have ever know, the answers for these questions are quite problematic, “given the increasingly complex and rapidly changing commercial and social usage patterns of the Internet, with the World Wide Web being their trans-border platform, we cannot even expect to find a tightly-knit web of regulatory rules.”³¹ The same article emphasizes that currently there are “patchworks of partly complementary, partly competing regulatory elements in the form of legal rules and ordinances, mandatory and voluntary technical standards and protocols, international and national contracts and agreements, and informal codes of conduct and ‘netiquette’”³². These patchworks of regulatory elements are present in the European Union that have been put in place in the past two decades as the influence of the Internet has increased in society and economy. In the beginning, the emphasis of the regulatory issues was mainly economic, culminating with the adoption of the Directives on Data Protection in 1995 and on eCommerce in 2000, currently the focus is on privacy and security due to terrorism risks and surveillance issues, as well as on fragmentation of the digital markets. Privacy, security and fragmentation are some of the reasons for the advocacy on regulation of cyberspace, in this case the Digital Single Market.

While the European Union has proclaimed that the core values of the EU apply also in the digital world, the Union has indeed focused on building user privacy and security in order to strengthen the cyberspace. A poignant example is the “right to be forgotten”, which was upheld by the Court of Justice of the European Union and which claims that “individuals have the right - under certain conditions - to ask search engines to remove links with personal information about them”³³. Another similar regulation is the ePrivacy Directive, where the main provision “requires prior informed consent for storage or for access to information stored on a user's terminal equipment. In other words, you must ask users if they agree to most cookies and similar technologies (e.g. web beacons, Flash cookies, etc.) before the

³⁰ Jürgen Feick and Raymund Werle, “Regulation of Cyberspace,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Regulation* (Oxford University Press, 2010), 524, <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560219.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199560219-e-21>.

³¹ Ibidem, 525.

³² Ibidem

³³ European Commission, “Factsheet on the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling,” 2014, 1, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf.

site starts to use them”³⁴. Users should constantly be informed about the collection of their data and this comes into contradiction with counter-terrorism efforts such as the initiatives to store passenger data across the European Union space. Privacy initiatives in relation to the regulation of cyberspace are welcomed by users, but this does not do enough to mitigate the challenges that they face in the Digital Single Market.

In light of the recent revelations on mass surveillance of communication on the Internet, privacy has become the mainstream issue to discuss in the equation between the Internet, users and governments. The framework for regulation in the cyberspace created by the Digital Single Market tries to balance these privacy concerns with the need to encourage innovation and remove barriers ³⁵. The latter part of this equation is the basis for this plea for guaranteeing the freedom of movement of information across the European Digital Space. However, the obvious question to be asked beforehand is the following: why guarantee such a freedom, like the other four freedoms, which were not respected for decades after implementation? The answer lies in the example brought about by the 1985 program to complete the Internal Market, which perfectly streamlined the barriers hindering the functioning of the Internal Market. Establishing freedom of movement of information contributes to the exact streamlining of the barriers existent in the digital space within the European Union, which brings together all the relevant issues, rather than scattering them under the umbrella of the Digital Single Market. This name does not exactly fit the functioning of the digital space within the European Union, given the geo-blocking and legislative barriers still prevalent between EU countries. Discussing these barriers under one single initiative that would have the freedom of movement of information as a terminus point provides a clearer picture of the situation of the Internet and ICT in the European Union.

5. Conclusions

This study has been focused on portraying the evolution of territoriality in the European Union and has explained the current situation of cyberspace in terms of barriers and opportunities for development both for society and economy. Given this situation, we have offered a point of view in favor of declaring freedom of movement of information as one of the fundamental freedoms of the European Union, which is the basis of the

³⁴ European Commission, “Cookies,” February 16, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/ipg/basics/legal/cookies/index_en.htm.

³⁵ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,” 9.

Single Market. This is especially valid, considering the points of view expressed by the European Commission on the Fourth Industrial Revolution whose aim is “to leverage differences between the physical, digital and biological sphere”³⁶. Digitization has been the subject of recent initiatives of the European Union and this justifies the urgent need to provide new momentum to the freedoms of the European Union, which should contain the freedom of movement of information.

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the performance of the European Union in terms of harnessing the power of digital technologies. Using the example posed by the 1985 White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, this paper analyzes the barriers existent in the European digital space and uses this to offer a plea for a new freedom of movement in the European Union, namely the freedom of movement of information.

Keywords: *European Union, cyberspace, Digital Single Market, Single Market, barriers, information*

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³⁶ European Commission, “The Fourth Industrial Revolution - Digital Single Market - European Commission,” *Digital Single Market*, 2016, <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/fourth-industrial-revolution>.

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Beyond the Minimum Common Denominator between the EU and Russia. Study Case: Ukraine

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Introduction

The present article aims to analyse the concept of rationality as a possible generator of predictability in what regards the behaviour of EU member states and Russia in the case of the Ukrainian crisis. A special emphasize is dedicated to the second level sanctions that the EU imposed against Moscow, since they were seen as more than the minimum common denominator that was traditionally achieved in what concerned Russia. In terms of research question the article intends to respond to the following: Did the Ukrainian crisis change the behaviour of EU member states regarding Russia? In terms of methodology there will be developed a conceptual analysis using the concept of rationality, its characteristics and limitations, and the role of perceptions over it. Moreover, the analysis will be developed on the basis of variables set analysis. Also, there will be used document analysis (primary and secondary sources). Regarding the limits of the paper, the analysis will concentrate of the sanctions that the EU imposed against Russia after the Ukrainian crisis erupted and on the relation between the EU, the EU member states and Moscow.

The variables that are going to be used are: the geographical characteristic, historic relationships and the characteristic of the regional dynamics- crisis or peace. The first variable refers to the fact that the position of a country/ organisation is important since always it develops its external relations by relating first to the region that it is placed in and afterwards to the international, global level. Moreover, the first aspect that is generally taken into consideration when developing a foreign policy strategy is referring to the neighbourhood since the region sets its security agenda because the regional level may be the place where the immediate threats may emerge. This variable is also important especially in the case of the EU,

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since both the Southern and the Eastern neighbouring regions are characterized by instability and insecurity, these dynamics putting pressure on the security of the EU (e.g. Ukrainian crisis and the migrants' crisis). The second variable that will be taken into consideration is the historical aspect, more specifically the history of relations between, on one hand the EU and Russia, and on the other, the relations between the EU member states taken individually and Moscow. The choosing of this variable is due to the fact that predictably states tend to be bound by their previously relations, in the sense that states that cooperated in the past have higher chances to cooperate in the future and states that developed relations based on enmity or competition may choose to defect more often, or at least to trust each other less. In the case of the EU member states, the future cooperation between Lithuania and Russia for example may differ from the cooperation between Russia and Germany, since the authorities from Vilnius tend and will tend to defect or be against agreements that may favour Russia due to their historic enmity based relationship. At the same time Germany has more than once shown its willingness to be more cooperative. Thus, the shadow of the past is equally important as the shadow of the future¹, since the previous behaviour may influence the future one. The last variable that will be taken into consideration is referring to the regional dynamics, in the sense that players that are part of a heterogeneous group and that have different interests tend to defect more when there are no external threats since their general agenda is pursued and tend to cooperate more within the group when an external threat emerges and changes their security agenda in order to exclude that threat.

The research represents the beginning of an extended analysis over the relationship between the EU and Russia and the constant behaviour patterns that may emerge from the Russia's international behaviour, thus reaching to the predictability of the Ukrainian crisis. The present article will analyse as the theoretical framework the concept of rationality and will apply it on two international events that changed the behavioural pattern of the EU towards Kremlin: the Geneva agreement and the second level sanctions that the Union imposed against Russia, taking into consideration the traditional divided policy of the EU member states vis-à-vis Moscow. Further I will put the basis on the theoretical approach that is going to be used in order to extract the possible predictability patterns regarding the aforementioned relationship.

¹ The term defines a situation in which cooperation can emerge due to the belief that the two players will meet in the future. For more information Robert Axelrod "The Evolution of Cooperation" available from http://www.cultureofdoubt.net/download/docs_cod/evolution%20of%20cooperation,%20axelrod.pdf, accessed in 20 September 2015, 4.

The concept of rationality

Theoretically, given the fact that ultimately the international system is anarchic², the units of analysis will be the member states of the EU and the Russian Federation and to an extent the organization seen as a whole, but also as the result of the sum of its member states' strategies. Of particular focus will be their interests, how do they perceive other states (especially non-EU member states like Ukraine and Russia), how they are perceived by other states, which is the Union's strategy regarding the Eastern European region, which are the partners' assets (political and economic ones), how can their interaction with other players from within, but also from outside can be characterized (it may consist of: combat, rivalry, trade, communication, and partnership³).

In order to see how and why states develop and maintain their interactions with each other, we must address first the concept of rationality, an element that gives predictability and meaning in states' behaviour. Thus, a rational player has mainly three characteristics:

1. It has its own interest which is individually and selfishly established and pursued. Additionally, a state is not automatically interested in other players, in the sense that it does not have as its objective to deliberately harm others, but to achieve its interests. At the same time it has no interest and will to accomplish others' interests⁴. Keeping this characteristic at abstract level, then states' interests would not collide and create conflicting situations between them, but empirically speaking, the international system is characterized by a high level of interdependence among its units, thus it is practically impossible to have interests that do not intersect (both in terms of cooperation and competition), generating a situation in which one cannot accomplish its interests without influencing other states'. At the same time the case of the EU is rather unique in the sense that over the years it has developed supranational competences that may influence states' interests, like for example the economic sector. The EU is entitled to sign trade agreements with external players, fact that influences the behaviour of its members, element that puts UK in a rather difficult position after the

² Andrei Miroiu, Simona Soare, „Realismul”, in: *Manual de Relații Internaționale*, coord. by Andrei Miroiu, Radu-Sebastian Ungureanu, Bucharest, Polirom Publishing, 2006, p. 103.

³ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, New York, Basic Books Publishing, 1984, http://www.cultureofdoubt.net/download/docs_cod/evolution%20of%20cooperation,%20axelrod.pdf, accessed in 20.09.2015, p. 3.

⁴ Adrian Miroiu, *Fundamentele politicii. Vol. al II-lea. Raționalitate și acțiune colectivă*, Iași, Polirom Publishing, 2007, p. 11.

referendum results regarding its trade agreements with US. At the same time, regarding the foreign and security policy, the organization has limited power, since it still is an intergovernmental area.

2. It has at its disposal perfect information and it is a perfect rational actor. This is the perfect scenario characteristic in which a state does not only suppose that others are rational actors as well, but it has at its disposal all the information in order to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and decide the best conduct for itself. At the same time it knows that others have the same information about them and about itself, thus generating a predictable behaviour⁵. At the same time, empirically speaking, a state is not a perfect rational actor, since it is practically impossible to have the entire information at its disposal all the time, the level of interaction at global level being too high and the sources of information too many. Moreover, the policies are done by political figures that depend of the voters' choice, thus altering the objectivity of the cost benefit analysis.

Moreover, the characteristic of being rational, although it confers predictability, it is seen also as an impediment for the development of a relationship based on cooperation. The most common example in this sense is the Prisoner's Dilemma⁶. Although it could be easily solved if neither of the parties defect, the common situation is in which both defect⁷. Analysing the empirical level, let us suppose the prisoner's dilemma among all the EU member states and Russia. Within this situation if one state is rational it would not cooperate with other states so that they all reach a common solution, which can be seen as a compromise that will be beneficial for all (a win-win solution). It will not cooperate, not in order to impede the other reach a suitable solution, but for its own interest if the others' success will influence its interests. Thus, it tends to see for example security in relative terms, which means that the other's gain is its loss (a zero sum game). This is an often met perception because as Prisoner's Dilemma reveals there is a conflict between the individual/national rationality and the rationality of a group, making this characteristic an impediment for the emergence of cooperation⁸. At the same time, a state's interest is not an objective and non-changeable fact. Rather than that, it is based and defined by perceptions

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Barry Krusch, „The Prisoner's Dilemma”, 2010, <http://www.krusch.com/articles/Dilemma.pdf>, accessed in 12.03.2015

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ Adrian Miroiu, *op.cit.*, p. 44.

upon one self and the others. In this sense Axelrod and Keohane⁹ wrote that ultimately “*beliefs, not realities... conduct*”. This outcome is reached especially since there is no perfect information available, hence the actors are not perfect rational players. Seen in this light, the Dilemma reveals that “*the greater the conflict of interest between players, the greater the likelihood that the players would in fact choose to defect*”¹⁰. Therefore, if we are in a conflictual situation, the expected and predictable result would be defection by at least one player. Moreover, where there is a situation in which the number of the players is large, the likelihood of someone defecting or free raiding is higher. But at the same time, the mutual interest can also be met, as prisoner’s dilemma is not a non-exit situation or it should not be especially in the case of international relations. Nevertheless, the framework of interaction can be changed at certain levels. For example, although it is an anarchical international system, the EU is a regional organization that developed punishment mechanisms for those that may choose to free raid or defect in certain areas like the economic market or implementation of treaties. As aforementioned, in the case of the common foreign policy, it still pertains to the intergovernmental level, meaning that there is no institutional mechanism that can make states cooperate more among themselves, than with the outside. This does not mean that the cooperation between the member states cannot emerge for cooperation occurs in a context of shared norms and principles among players¹¹, elements that are very developed in the case of the EU. Cooperation can be achieved for example if the costs of defection are too high. Relating to the relationship between the EU and Russia, we could say that the game is played on two levels simultaneously. The first level is the relationship that each state has developed with the Russian Federation bilaterally and the second one is referring to the relationship of all member states within the EU umbrella therefore between the organization as a whole and Moscow. In this sense rationally if a state has a bilateral conflicting relationship with Russia, predictably it would not cooperate with the other states that have bilateral strategic partnerships with it if the negotiation at the EU level generates a benefit for Russia or in the case of Ukraine a compromise that results in the non-punishment of Russia’s behaviour. At the same time, given the fact that Ukraine is at EU’s Eastern frontier, its security can affect the security of the entire organization, even those that have a strategic partnership with Russia, thus making Moscow a possible threat to them. In this situation, the EU parties

⁹ Robert Axelrod, Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions” in: *World Politics*, vol. 38, No. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Publishing, 1985, p. 228-229.

¹⁰ Idem, p. 228.

¹¹ Idem, p. 226-238.

would more likely cooperate among themselves under the EU's umbrella in order to balance the perceived external threat, the costs for defection within the EU framework being too high.

The EU and the Russia: beyond the minimum common denominator?

If in its 2003 Security strategy, the EU proclaimed itself as a global power¹², thus the accent being on the outside of the Union, in the Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy the EU¹³ the approach is very different, the internal level being more accentuated as it can be seen from the first pages of the strategy: "*We need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve, this is what the wider world expects. We live in times of existential crisis, within and beyond the European Union. Our Union is under threat*". Although the title of the document is referring to the global approach suggesting that the EU must have and is entitled to be a global player, the approach is rather from within to outside, recognizing the crises through which the EU is currently passing, the Eastern European security dynamics, namely the Ukrainian crisis, being the first threat to the EU security. At the same time, the relationship with Russia is acknowledged as a "key strategic challenge"¹⁴. Moreover, Moscow is viewed as a revisionist player that does not follow anymore the international laws and principles, in front of which the EU must maintain "*a consistent and united approach*"¹⁵, thus indirectly pointing to the fact that the organization's behaviour was not always united, or unique, its member states adopting different approaches in their relations with the Eastern power.

Regarding the Ukrainian crisis, as in the case of the Georgian war from August 2008, the EU's first reaction consisted in a minimum common denominator, due to the fact that its member states kept their distinct preferences relating to Russia. The common decision was represented by the Geneva Agreement, which as it can be seen below, did not have binding

¹² European Security Strategy, *A Secure Europe in a Better World* 2003, 12 December 2003, Brussels, p. 1, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed in 23.03.2015

¹³ European Union Global Strategy, *Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy*, June 2016, p. 14, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf, accessed in 30.08.2016

¹⁴ Idem, p. 33.

¹⁵ European Union Global Strategy, *Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe A global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy*, June 2016, p. 33, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf, accessed in 30.08.2016

actions against Russia. Even more, OSCE was nominated as the suitable regional actor that will play a leading role in settling the crisis, although Russia has maybe the biggest negotiation power within the organization. Last but not least, Russia was not seen as the sole responsible player in the Ukrainian crisis, since the agreement condemned both parties, hence both Moscow and Kiev were seen on equal positions regarding the violent events. Last but not least, the agreements make references to the constitutional changes that were to be implemented but at the same time it failed to deliver clear methods through which this reform would have been conducted.

“The Geneva meeting on the situation in Ukraine agreed on initial concrete steps to deescalate tensions and restore security for all citizens.

All sides must refrain from any violence, intimidation or provocative actions. The participants strongly condemned and rejected all expressions of extremism, racism and religious intolerance, including anti-semitism.

All illegal armed groups must be disarmed; all illegally seized buildings must be returned to legitimate owners; all illegally occupied streets, squares and other public places in Ukrainian cities and towns must be vacated.

Amnesty will be granted to protestors and to those who have left buildings and other public places and surrendered weapons, with the exception of those found guilty of capital crimes.

It was agreed that the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission should play a leading role in assisting Ukrainian authorities and local communities in the immediate implementation of these de-escalation measures wherever they are needed most, beginning in the coming days. The US, EU and Russia commit to support this mission, including by providing monitors.

The announced constitutional process will be inclusive, transparent and accountable. It will include the immediate establishment of a broad national dialogue, with outreach to all of Ukraine’s regions and political constituencies, and allow for the consideration of public comments and proposed amendments. The participants underlined the importance of economic and financial stability in Ukraine and would be ready to discuss additional support as the above steps are implemented.”¹⁶

The division between the EU member states regarding Russia can be viewed more like a traditional behaviour that they adopt in their relationship with Moscow. Some of them have developed strategic partnerships based on economic gains due to their natural gas needs like

¹⁶ The European Union External Action, *Geneva Statement on Ukraine 2014*, doc no. 140417/01, Geneva, 17 April 2014, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/224957.htm>, accessed in 05.05.2015

Germany or Italy¹⁷. Other member states have developed an antagonistic view although there are net importers of gas like the Baltic States¹⁸ due to their historic negative relations with Moscow and an antagonistic political factor like for example is Lithuania. Moreover, the geographical factor is also important in settling the relations that the EU member states have with Russia, in the sense that Western countries tend to develop firstly economic preferences towards Kremlin and to be more cooperative, while the Eastern ones which are also frontier states and closer to the Russian borders tend to develop more political-strategical grounded preferences¹⁹. Keeping these constant types of behaviour in mind, we will take into consideration the fact that states are rational players, in the sense that they ultimately follow their own national interests, but at the same time they have limited information at their disposal. Although it would be better for the group if the European Union has a united position regarding Russia in general, thus increasing the negotiating power of the organization, and ultimately of all its members in relation with a difficult partner as it is Russia, the general trend is following the logic of the prisoners' dilemma.

In order to develop a veridic analysis we must add the regional context since the game is not played on an abstract level. At regional level, as predictably the Geneva agreement was not the suitable form to settle the crisis from Ukraine, especially since Crimea remained annexed to Russia. Since then the situation in Ukraine soon depreciated and culminated with the downing of the Mh17 in July 2014, turning the economic gains from the relationship with Russia in political losses, since Russia was perceived as a perpetrator to the European security and stability. Ultimately, *"states felt threatened by Russia's expansionist moves; therefore the EU's preference stopped reflecting the diversity of state's preference and the political driven ones took the leadership in establishing the common view of the entire organization. For the first time since the crisis erupted, the EU went further and passed beyond the minimum common denominator that reflected the will of the most powerful state"*²⁰ and for the first time the EU, as a whole, adopted in September economic sanctions against Russia and extended the list of persons²¹ although these actions would have economic

¹⁷ Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, *A power audit of EU-Russia relations*, p. 30, 36-37, http://www.frider.org/uploads/file/A_power_audit_of_relations_eu-russia.pdf, accessed in 05.01.2015

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

¹⁹ Ana-Maria Costea, *East versus West: When Politics collide with Economics*, Tritonic Publishing, Bucharest, 2015, p. 179-180

²⁰ *Idem*, p. 175.

²¹ "Council Regulation (EU) No 959/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of

repercussions against some member states. Taking into consideration these actions and the traditional divided strategies of EU member states towards Russia, why this change in the pattern of behaviour? Being under the logic of rationality that was previously analysed and taking into account the context, we could say that the EU member states still acted rationally. Although they might have registered economic losses, they needed to limit the political image losses given the fact that the EU was and still is a unique organization that has through its member states the capacity and will to be a global player and that Russia was perceived as an external security threat that may disturb the status-quo of the group, since alone neither of the member states would have internationally a status that it holds under the EU umbrella. At the same time adopting sanctions against Russia is a clear signal for the authorities from Kremlin that the organization is ready to balance it although some costs were to be registered. *“On the other hand, given the multitude of national preferences towards Russia, the EU umbrella played a disruptive role, since it delayed the emergence of a common and comprehensive answer before and after the violent acts erupted in Ukraine²²”*.

Conclusions

Thus the EU succeeded in passing beyond the minimum common denominator is its relationship with Russia, one of the most active and unpredictable actors of the current international scene. The economic sanctions proved to be a suitable solution in the case of Iran, at the same time they are not for North Korea and it remains to be seen how much time they will be maintained given the fact that there are some member states that are in favour of lifting them due to economic losses. Regarding Ukraine the sanctions may prove to come too late in the sense that the Minsk Agreement is still breached by Moscow and the annexation of Crimea seems to be a non-reversible act from Moscow's part. At the same time the multitude of crises that the EU is passing through may pose additional pressure on its unity, affecting its international behaviour especially in relation with external regional powers.

Ukraine” and “Council Regulation (EU) No 960/2014 of 8 September 2014 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine”, Official Journal of the European Union, 12 September 2014, available from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2014:271:FULL&from=EN>, accessed in 20 September 2015

²² Ana-Maria Costea, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

Abstract

The article tackles the issue of rationality in the context of the relationship between the European Union and the Russian Federation with a special emphasis on the Ukrainian crisis, namely the second level sanctions that the Brussels imposed against Moscow since they were seen as more than the minimum common denominator that was traditionally achieved. In terms of research question the article intends to respond to the following: Did the Ukrainian crisis change the behaviour of EU member states regarding Russia? In terms of methodology there will be developed a conceptual analysis using the concept of rationality, its characteristics and limitations, the role of perceptions. In terms of methodology there will be developed a conceptual analysis using the concept of rationality, its characteristics and limitations, the role of perceptions. Moreover, the analysis will be developed on the basis of a variable set analysis. Also, there will be used document analysis (primary and secondary sources).

Keywords: *the EU, predictability, rationality, Russia, Ukraine*

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Leadership debate in the United Kingdom as a result of the Brexit vote

*Constantin – Vasile ȚOCA**
*Bogdan POCOLA***

Introduction

The need to develop this subject further is given by the implications of the Brexit event on a larger scale, within the European Union. It is for the first time that an EU member state decides, through popular vote, to leave the EU in order to pursue a future outside of it. During its membership of the EU and up until 2016, the United Kingdom has been perceived as Eurosceptic, showing various degrees of inflexibility towards European policies.

The referendum for Brexit has defined a very crucial debate for Britain on an internal level given the leadership scenario during the campaign and the very close score at the poles. We can safely assume that the Brexit vote has divided the UK population on matters such as EU membership and control over national legislation.

Changes in the British political scene. Succession of the Labour and Conservative governments

The political landscape in Britain has suffered a number of changes over the last 15 years, mainly in terms of political succession of different forces in executive power. The most extended period of political leadership in these years is represented by the Labour governments between 1997 and 2010, a period of relative stability, both in terms of ideology as well as leadership. The effects of this period as well as its relevance on the larger scale has had an influence on the result of the Brexit vote.

During this period the longest continuity was held by prime-minister Tony Blair between 1997 and 2007. Blair's policies before the

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attacks on 11 September 2001 resonated with the party policies of New Labour, the party he helped steer since 1994: an emphasis on ethical foreign policy through the doctrine of the international community, as well as unity and consistency in external affairs. Since the terrorist attacks Blair has created a closer bond with the US, giving the UK's foreign policy specific themes such as fighting against terrorism. More specifically to this situation, Tony Blair pushed for immediate action in Iraq arguing that the UK needs to enforce independence and rule of law as part of its foreign policy attempts. This emphasis on Iraq brought into question a new theme in Blair's foreign policies, the international community: the state is no longer the only entity responsible for building the international system, creating durable partnerships that are defined by complex relationships and interactions push the state towards a less regulatory role and more towards being a part of the exchange system¹.

The overall context during Tony Blair's terms as prime-minister aided in developing a strong relation between the UK and the US and as such focused much of Britain external politics towards building this partnership and less so towards the EU. This redirection in the UK's external policy comes at a time of significant changes within the EU as during this period the biggest expansion happened with new states becoming members in 2004 and 2007; at the same time Tony Blair's image as prime-minister started to suffer as a result of the war efforts, determining a significant erosion in the party's image as well. Some authors also attribute this erosion of New Labour to its interaction with the previous Conservative governments, most notably that of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s². In their attempt to reposition the party on the political scene, Labour leaders made a series of concessions, bringing the party closer to the right. This rearrangement of the party is not representative of something new in the British system given the alternation of Labour and Conservative governments, each having more than one mandate, sometimes more³. Tony Blair is held responsible for the way he influenced the ideology of the Labour party: by accepting some of the changes implemented by Thatcher, Blair reinterprets issues such as public property – by embracing part of the Conservative stance on public property, Blair effectively moves the Labour party closer to the right⁴. These attempts at repositioning parties in the political scene have left plenty of room for other movements to make

¹ Marie - Claude Smouts - “*Some thoughts on international organizations and theories of regulation*”, International Social Science Journal, 138/1993, p. 443-451

² Richard Heffernan, *New Labour and Thatcherism: Political Change in Britain*, Palgrave, New York, 2001, p.132-133.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 147.

⁴ Richard Heffernan, *op.cit.* p. 164.

their way to occupy the space left by big parties in their transition towards a more centrist ideology.

The Thatcher government had been harshly criticized for the way it implemented its neo-liberal ideology, having impacted traditional Labour – voting communities, especially in the northern part of Britain. At the time of the Conservative governments in the 1980s, the economic model for the UK made a transition from Keynesianism. The new macro-economic priorities of the Thatcher leadership showcased this transition: budget balancing and fiscal policy became more important than addressing unemployment rates. Monetary policy replaces fiscal policy as a macro-economic tool, with emphasis on boosting monetary rates⁵. The argument used by Conservatives in favour of this change relates to the increased frequency of economic anomalies in the Keynesian model (the inexplicable increase of inflation and unemployment rates)⁶.

Labour governments that succeeded have adopted this economic model pushed forward by Thatcher, with a willingness to improve on it but not change it all together. This willingness to embrace central politics as well as criticism that addressed Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (prime-minister between 2007-2010) as leaders of the executive have started to erode party backing by the beginning of 2010. After two terms as prime-minister, Tony Blair steps down amongst heavy criticism for engaging the UK in the Iraq war. His successor, Gordon Brown presents much of the same ideas that Blair had, but tries to temper criticism by detaching himself and his cabinet from some of the actions of Blair (he institutes an inquiry on the actions of the UK as part of the Iraq war effort). In terms of foreign affairs, Brown remains a loyal supporter of the strategic partnership with the US and also encourages reform within the EU, being a supporter of the Lisbon Treaty. Gordon Brown's limitations as a prime-minister as well as the long term erosion caused to the Labour party lead to changes in the British Parliament at the 2010 elections. Although apt to become prime-minister, Gordon Brown lacked some of the qualities needed to keep the power for the Labour party: changes in British politics in the last 20 years makes it almost impossible for an unpopular candidate to remain in power, an issue that plagued Brown's term quite heavily (he was perceived as being stubborn)⁷.

What followed after was a coalition government lead by the Conservative party. The results of the 2010 election meant failure for the

⁵ Peter A. Hall, Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the State. The case of Economic Policymaking in Britain, in: Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993, New York, p. 284.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 285

⁷ Kevin Theakson, Gordon Brown as prime minister: political skills and leadership styles, in: British Politics, 6 (1), p. 30.

Labour party: Conservatives get 36.1% of the votes, Liberal-Democrats 23% and Labour 29%⁸. The coalition government that takes power is formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal-Democrats, with David Cameron as prime-minister.

In the public space we can also see a resurgence of a Eurosceptic movement, given the rise in popularity of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party). This movement can be associated throughout the period the UK has been part of the EU, with varying degrees of intensity, as the relation with Brussels has sometimes been difficult. David Cameron also used this sentiment in order to garner support for his party; being a self-confessed Eurosceptic, Cameron advertised the idea of renegotiating Britain's stance within the EU by leveraging a "in-out" referendum⁹.

The Brexit ideal

The origins of the Brexit movement can be traced to different sources within the last 30-40 years. In 1994 the Referendum Party emerged, created by Sir James Goldsmith, a party that wanted a serious debate on the relation between the UK and the European Communities (at that time), beyond the debates on the Euro that were going on at that time¹⁰. This movement encompassed a lot of the Eurosceptic movements that were mostly in the Conservative party at the time. Even before 1994, authors like Alan Sked were pleading for a less Eurocentric approach of Britain in terms of foreign policy and more emphasis on Atlantic partnership and market economy beyond the scope of the EU¹¹. It is worth noting that the Eurosceptic sentiment from within the Conservative party grew during the Thatcher years, as focus was given towards internal politics and the economic model of neo-liberalism which needed to succeed.

The rift among Conservative MPs on the topic of Britain and the EU was speculated by Alan Sked who created a movement called the Anti-Federalist League, to stop further EU integration attempts. The first elections where this movement takes part in end in failure and in 1993 the movement is relaunched under the banner UKIP, a political construction that will last in time¹². Under this iteration the party will coexist with the Referendum Party

⁸ BBC Election results, see: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/election2010/results/>

⁹ Britain and the EU. David Cameron: we eurosceptics are only trying to help, *The economist*, 14.11.2011, see: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/bagehot/2011/11/britain-and-eu-0>

¹⁰ Anthony Heath, Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party, in *British Elections and Parties review: the 1997 general election*, p. 95.

¹¹ Richard Seymour, UKIP and the Crisis of Britain, in: *The politics of the Right: Socialist Register 2016*, p. 25.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 26

and would have the same electorate base for a while. Most of the members of these movements at the time were considered as conservative (with some members being actual ex-Conservative Party members), but their ideas were more along the line of protectionism for the UK in face of a growing European Union.

Table 1: Euroscepticism in the UK electorate (1992, 1994, 1997)

EUROSCEPTICISM IN THE ELECTORATE (COLUMN %)			
<i>% agreeing that ...</i>	1992	1994	1997
Britain should leave the EC	9	10	14
Reduce its powers	35	39	52
Leave as is	13	14	16
Increase its powers	29	21	9
Work for single European govt	11	11	5
Don't know	4	6	4
Replace pound	25	20	16
Have both ECU and pound	24	21	26
Only have pound	49	58	55
Don't know	3	2	3

Source: Anthony Heath, *Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party*, in *British Elections and Parties review: the 1997 general election*, p. 98.


The UKIP movement starts to gather some momentum by the 1997 elections, the moment when leadership changes: Nigel Farage becomes the UKIP leader. The party keeps its doctrine intact even though the merger with the Referendum Party happens at around the same time. The party will continue to push further away from EU integration.

The 1997 elections need to also be viewed in terms of the level of Euroscepticism amongst the electorate. As we can see at the time of the survey represented by the table above there was an ambivalent perception of the UK and EU relations: very few citizens were warm to the idea of leaving the EU, but there were quite a few that voiced concerns about the implications of the Maastricht Treaty and the push for further integration. At the time there were growing levels of Euroscepticism present amongst the electorate.

Under the new leadership UKIP works to strengthen its presence towards the public and their members as during Alan Sked and Nigel Farage's leadership the party grew in numbers. They also managed to speculate on the weak state of the Conservative Party between 1997 and 2010, being a constant presence as the opposition. In this way they managed to sway conservative voters towards the movement. Their plea was also aided by the move set in motion by the EU with the 2004 and 2007 expansion towards central and eastern Europe; the biggest extension of the

EU, the concern for immigration started to grow and as such gave greater importance to protectionist ideas that were heralded by Eurosceptics¹³.

Table 2: Distribution of votes amongst British parties in 2010, 2015



Sursa: The Economist, A background guide to Brexit from the European Union, see: <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-britain-s-referendum-eu-membership>

While the growth of the UKIP movement didn't manage to translate into effective acts in power, some of the issues that they raised were taken up by the Conservative government that came to power in 2010. David Cameron as prime-minister for two terms (part of a coalition and then as leader of an all-Conservative government) embraced some of the themes of UKIP. The Scottish independence referendum from 2014 gave a bigger impulse to these ideas, ultimately culminating with Cameron's proposition for an "in-out" referendum as part of the Conservative campaign from 2015. Through this political move Cameron hoped to gain greater support from members of UKIP and their electorate base in order to remain in power. The support for the referendum was conditioned by a bid to renegotiate part of the deals with the EU.

The referendum from the 23rd of June 2016 comes as a result of this plan. Before the actual referendum, prime-minister David Cameron opens up negotiations with the EU in exchange for supporting the "remain" campaign. What follows this move is characteristic to the lack of cohesion between the UK parties system, its members and the electorate: two campaigns are organised, backed by various fragments of MPs, parties – one for "leave", one for "remain".

¹³Richard Seymour, UKIP and the Crisis of Britain, in: The politics of the Right: Socialist Register 2016, p. 30-31.

Table 3: The perception of the EU by the UK electorate

Sursa: The Economist, A background guide to Brexit from the European Union, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-britain-s-referendum-eu-membership>

It is worth noting the effects that opposition and the rise of the Eurosceptic movement has had on the Labour party as well. After the more recent failure at the 2015 election, the competition for new leadership came into full swing in the Labour Party. Ed Miliband resigned as party leader and there was a surge of new membership from the population in support of a new leader: Jeremy Corbyn. The success of this movement within the Labour party is very relevant as the policies and ideology proposed by Corbyn transitions the party back towards the left of the political spectrum. The leadership election saw 4 candidates out of which Jeremy Corbyn came first with quite a margin over his competition (251 000 votes over the 80 000 in second place)¹⁴. The leadership debate in the Labour party was exceptional given the high number of young voters and supporters, disillusioned with traditional party politics, who supported Corbyn's ideas and his authenticity¹⁵. This repositioning of the party towards the left has come into conflict with many Labour MPs, more accustomed to the centre politics of Tony Blair.


UK collaboration with the EU in the future

At the moment of writing this article the formal procedures for the UK to leave the EU have not started. After the failure of the "remain" campaign, the resignation of David Cameron spurred a leadership debate in the Conservative as well as Labour parties. Given the history of the UK with the EU it is uncertain what the next step will be.

¹⁴Peter Dorey, *The longest suicide vote in history: the Labour Party leadership election of 2015*, *British Politics*, Macmillan Publishers, 2016, p.16.

¹⁵*Ibidem*.

Table 4: Evolution of British GDP / person since 1957



Source: *The Economist, A background guide to Brexit from the European Union*,
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/02/graphics-britain-s-referendum-eu-membership>

It is interesting to note the position taken by the EU leaders in response to Brexit: there is a consensus towards starting procedures and negotiations as soon as possible, but there is also an urge to have a strong hand in negotiating with Britain. The issues raised by this vote also put into perspective plans for a reform within the EU, with leaders pushing for further political and monetary integration¹⁶. These points have been highlighted even during the first meeting of national and EU officials without the participation of Britain in Slovakia in the middle of September.

As show in Table 4, the evolution of the UK as part of the EU has been positive in the most part especially after 1990. The favourable situation presented in the last 15 years of evolution have been irrespective of the changes in politics and economy on an international level (with reasonable economic effects due to market crash in 2008). We can safely assume that any future negotiation between the EU and the UK government in the future will need to address the topic of free market and free movement of people, an issue that might undermine the efforts of the “leave” campaign in terms of their goal of limiting and controlling immigration.

Abstract

The results of the Brexit vote in Britain has launched a powerful public debate both internally and externally. The European Union leaders fear that similar movements to Brexit will

¹⁶ Bloomberg, How the EU leaders should think about Brexit, 15.09.2016, see: <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-15/how-the-eu-s-leaders-should-think-about-brexit>

gain exposure in other countries and thus want to limit the effect of spill-over. On an internal level, the United Kingdom is going through an acute leadership struggle after prime-minister David Cameron resigned and the country is in need of a firm plan post-Brexit. The options available to the UK at this point in time are unclear as leaders of the Brexit campaign would have wanted to start informal negotiations; these were promptly rejected by the EU leaders. Once article 50 TEU is invoked it's expected that EU leaders would rather close the chapter on Britain's membership sooner rather than later.

Keywords: Brexit, leadership, European Union, economic model.

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The Social - Economic Reasons of the Hungarian Peripheral Regions' Formation

*Istvan SÜLI-ZAKAR**

Introduction

The regional development has been started by the European Economic Community in the 1960s, when the leaders of the Common Market realized that the global economic structure changes had a negative effect to the rural areas and their population. The more and more industrialized agriculture had less and less demand for man hours (in the most of the Western European countries the ratio of the agriculture means less than 1-2% on the labour market). So the agriculture had less and less role in the maintenance of the rural settlements. The price gap between agricultural and industrial products widened, therefore the European Economic Community (the predecessor of the European Union) has started to build-up a conscious agricultural supporting policy¹. The possible problems urged the specialists of the EU to consider the regional development as a complex activity. The regional development was drawn up as a new territorial policy, and the agriculture is only one component of this. The rural areas have nature protection, culture land protection, recreation roles, which have been appreciated. During the building-up of the social market economy, significant funds were deprived from the urban areas, and were forwarded to rural development².

According to the Hungarian scientific literature, the regional development means those economic, social, cultural and ecological factors, which develop the whole nation via the rising of the economic, cultural and living standard in the area. At the same time save and protect the natural

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¹ I. Süli-Zakar, A magyar területfejlesztés az EU regionális politikájának tükrében, In: Társadalomföldrajz – Területfejlesztés I.-II. (Szerk.: Süli-Zakar I.) Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó Debreceni Egyetem, Debrecen, 2003, p. 639-666.

² GY. Enyedi, Falukutató a falufejlesztésért, In: Földrajzi Közlemények XXIII. 3-4., 1975/a, p. 269-276.

resources, the environment, the landscape as well as the local cultural heritage³. The aim and also the tool of the rural development is the integration between the sectors, the back-to-back developments, the cooperation of the local entrepreneur, civilian and self-governmental sectors, and building up an active, viable rural society⁴.

In the last centuries, the regional inequalities of Hungary became more and more determined, and as a part of this, the rural areas dropped behind faster in socio-economic sense⁵. Presently, there are pronounced territorial differences in the country. The different parts of the country adjusted to the varied circumstances in different ways, and it resulted that the regional differences became more and more conspicuous⁶. In spite of this, in the Hungarian public life, the territorial policy does not get enough emphases, however a number of scientists tried to call attention to the serious signs of the crisis and the regional problems⁷.

On the basis of the investigation of the Hungarian society and economic life, we can observe a deeper and deeper gap between the capital (and its surroundings), the northern part of Transdanubia and the other parts of the country. Thus the country was divided into two or three parts in the daily media and in the scientific literature and this has its own basis⁸. Those areas which lie south and east of Budapest and the centrum area (especially the rural areas without the cities) have a deeper and deeper territorial crisis. The socio-economic backwardness of the rural Hungary is not new problem, but its acceleration and generalization is more and more

³ A. Buday-Sántha, Agrárpolitika- vidékpolitika, Kiadó: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 2001, 464 p.

⁴ GY.Enyedi, A magyar falu átalakulása, In: Földrajzi Értesítő XXIV. évf. 2. sz., 1975/b, p. 109 -124.

⁵ I.Süli-Zakar, Mélyülő szakadék két országrész között, In: Juss IV. évf. 2. szám, Hódmezővásárhely, 1991, p. 18-23.

⁶ J. Rechnitzer, Szétszakadás vagy felzárkózás (A térszerkezetet alakító innovációk) MTA RKK, Győz, 1993, 208 p.

⁷ J. Nemes Nagy, Centrumok és perifériák a piacgazdasági átmenetben, In: Földrajzi Közlemények CXX. (XLIV.) kötet, 1. szám, 1996, p. 31-48; R. Mészáros, A falusi átalakulás alapvető térfolyamatai a Dél-Alföldön, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1982, p.141; I. Süli-Zakar, Kelet-Magyarország társadalmi-gazdasági leszakadása, In: Regionális politikák és fejlesztési stratégiák az Alpok-Adria térségében, XXXIV. Georgikon napok (Szerk.: Ligetvári F.-né), Keszthely, 1992, p. 97-110.

⁸ P. Beluszky, Területi hátrányok a lakosság életkörülményeiben. Hátrányos helyzetű területek Magyarországon, In: Földrajzi Értesítő XXV. évf. 2-4. sz., 1976, p. 301-312; GY. Barta, GY. Enyedi, Iparosodás és a falu átalakulása, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1981; I. Bartke, A regionális válság és a piacgazdaságra való átmenet, In: Válságtérsegek Magyarországon, (Szerk.: Lackó L.), Budapest, 1991, p. 79-84.

perceptible nowadays. By the end of the 1980s, the economy of the Hungarian Great Plain, the southern part of Transdanubia and the Northern Hills depreciated in the competition⁹. The areas of the crisis areas became bigger since 1920. The “victims” of the redistribution, the rural areas of the county-borders, the internal peripheries and the market towns of the Great Plain are connected to the frontier peripheral areas, which lost their centres.

The earlier small trade and agricultural trade roles of the market towns of the Great Plain eclipsed, and the industrial investments of the last decades also preserved their backwardness¹⁰. If we consider the structure and the technological composition of the industrialization, the policy of the rural industrial investments of the 1960s and 1970s strengthen the backwardness. The infrastructure development of Hungary was determined mainly by the demands of the heavy-industries, thus the infrastructural backwardness of our agricultural areas was preserved. It affected the life-conditions of the population negatively, so this and the collectivization generated a significant migration – demographic erosion in the underindustrialized areas¹¹.

The leaders of the regional policy in the Rákosi and Kádár regimes considered that the socialist industrialization (which absorbs the rural unemployment) and the socialist transformation of the agriculture can solve the development problems of the whole country satisfyingly. Under the pressure of necessity, the leaders of the country observed in the 1980s, that the socio-economic problems didn't decrease in the mass of the rural areas of Hungary. Thus the leaders of the Party and later the Council of Ministers were forced to admit the existence of the backwardness of rural areas, or “accumulated disadvantageous areas”, as it was declared¹² a little bit mannered (Figure 1).

⁹ A. Böhm, A hátrányos helyzetű térségek helyi társadalmának néhány időszéri vonása, In: Válságtérségek Magyarországon (Szerk.: Lackó L.), Budapest, 1991, p. 67-70; I. Süli-Zakar, Mélyülő szakadék két országrész között, In: Juss IV. évf. 2. szám, Hódmezővásárhely, 1991, p. 18-23; J. Tóth, Az Alföld elmaradottsága, In: Tisza-klub füzetek 1. (Szerk.: Rakonczai J.), Békéscsaba, 1991, p. 16-18.


¹⁰ I. Bartke, Az iparilag elmaradott területek ipari fejlesztésének közigazgatási kérdései Magyarországon, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1971; GY. Barta, GY. Enyedi, Iparosodás és a falu átalakulása, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1981.

¹¹ R. Andorka, I. Harcsa, A községi népesség társadalomstatistikai leírása, In: A falu a mai magyar társadalomban, (Szerk.: Vágvolgyi A), Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1992, p. 179-236; Z. Dövényi, Munkanélküliség az Alföldön, In: Alföldi Társdalom IV. kötet, Békéscsaba, 1993, p. 107-121.

¹² L. Laczkó, A területi fejlődés jellege, In: Területi Statisztika XXXVI. 3., 1986, p. 205-220.

Over the agricultural areas, the “rust areas” were also in a very bad condition. The industrial areas of Borsod and Nógrád – they were the pride of the socialist industrialization – ran into a very hopeless situation by the years of the transition. If the structure change is delayed – on the basis of European instances – the significant budget aids are also ineffectual, this caused mainly by the difficultly modifiable the structure of the employment of the heavy industry areas and the mining districts¹³. The crisis of the state-owned industry was very spectacular in the case of the territorial “contraction” of the industry of Hungary, when the industrial enterprises of the eastern part of the country went bankrupt and stopped their production first. The collapse of the “giant factories” of the “rust areas” and the outworker industry of the market towns of the Great Plain caused significant unemployment firstly in the counties of the eastern part of Hungary and Southern-Transdanubia¹⁴.

Figure 1: Accumulated disadvantageous rural areas in the middle of the 80s



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The pauperizations of the peripheries of Hungary

As a result of the transition, the collective farms were liquidated, the individual farming was started again. However, in conjunction with the

¹³GY. Enyedi (szerk.), Társadalmi-területi egyenlőtlenségek Magyarországon, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1993.

¹⁴ I. Süli-Zakar, A mezőgazdasági kisvállalkozások szociálgeográfiai hatásai Kelet-Magyarországon I.-II., In: Comitatus, Önkormányzati Szemle II. évf. 4-5. szám, 1992 a, p. 19-23;35-38.

collapse of the Soviet Union, the CMEA has also collapsed, so the Hungarian agriculture ran into a serious distributive crisis. The problems were piled on, because the large-scaled unemployment and pauperization – caused by the transition – meant a drastic decrease the inner consumption. (The Hungarian agribusiness lost their market, its 40% was caused by the decrease of the inner consumption) On the other hand, the fast extension of the transnational store chains – they marketed the accumulated food supplies of Western Europe on a dumping price – caused that the pauperized consumers preferred the cheap import goods.

Naturally, the Hungarian agribusiness, which was deprived from the donation, couldn't compete with the dumping prices. However, a significant part of the Hungarian food industry has been privatized by foreign companies; the food industry activity was stopped in the factories and the buildings operate as logistic, cooling and warehouse bases. The privatization of the Hungarian food industries and the closing of the factories (for instance, only one sugar factory produces in Hungary nowadays) increased the rural unemployment significantly¹⁵. More the three-fourth of the area of the country became internal or external periphery after the transition, and the rural population had less agricultural incomes there, and they became inactive members of the society as a retired, unemployed or assistance¹⁶. By the middle of the 90s, the spatial structure has been changed in Hungary: the earlier "industrial axis" has disappeared; an exact formation of external and internal peripheries was noticeable in a conclusive part of the country (Figure 2).

The future development significantly depends on the state, initiativeness and innovation-sensitiveness of the local society. According to some opinions, the achievement of middle-class status in the market towns was built upon the autonomic peasant-properties in the past, so the middle-class traditions can be regenerated quickly after the transition, and the societies of the market towns can adapt the changes very quickly. However, after 1990, the Hungarian smallholder culture and lifestyle couldn't be able to regenerate and reborn. Nevertheless, a new farmer level – in western or American sense – also couldn't be able to emerge¹⁷. Namely, after the collectivization, rural masses lost their affection for the agriculture; they worked in the household farming and cooperated with the collective


¹⁵ I. Süli-Zakar, L. Komarek, A Kárpát-medence élelmiszer-gazdasága, In: A Kárpát-medence földrajza (Szerk.: Dövényi Z.) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2012, p. 562-602.

¹⁶ M. Molnár Nagyné, A területi egyenlőtlenségek főbb összefüggései, In: Regionális gazdaságtan (Szerk. Káposzta József), Szent István Egyetem, Gödöllő, 2012, p. 200-250.

¹⁷ S. Kopátsy, Nagyüzem Kisbirtok Farmergazdaság, In: Társadalmi Szemle XLVI. évf. 11., 1991, p. 24-34.

farms¹⁸. However, they did not follow a multi-coloured small-scale farming, but they contracted solely for one production – mostly for fattened pigs. The collective farms assured the feeding stuff and the young animals to them. Basically, the earlier small-scale farming went on only in the household farms, also the small- and middle-class farming had been almost totally disappeared. The peasant lifestyle remained only in those small areas, which were avoided by the collectivization and were peripheries almost in the second half of the 20th century. They are mostly hill-country areas with small settlements or fragment farms, which are absolutely disadvantageous in social and physical geographic sense¹⁹.

Figure 2: Centrum and peripheries of Hungary in the middle of 1990s



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Among the circumstances of the market economy, the direct intervention of the state is small-scaled; it doesn't take place directly in the economy, and not through the public administration, but with the integration of banks, development institutions. The intensive development of the infrastructure has to be the primary aim of the intervention of the state. It undoes the insolation and creates the human basis of the uprising


¹⁸ I. Süli-Zakar, A vállalkozás-élénkítés agroökonómiai, szociológiai és szociálgeográfiai problémái hátrányos helyzetű alföldi térségekben (Szerk.: Süli-Zakar I.) KLTE Társadalomföldrajzi Tanszék, Debrecen, 1994, 119 p

¹⁹ L. Faragó, L. Hrubí, Az elmaradott falusi térségek felzárkóztatásának lehetőségei, In: Tér és Társadalom 4., 1987, p. 72-80.

with the help of the educational and retraining preparation²⁰. The forming of a network of small- and middle-scaled growing centres has to be accelerated with the help of government subsidy and the foreign capital. These “oases” catch and transmit the innovation impulses, mobilize the local sources and undo the insolation (Figure 3).

The transformation created a new situation in Hungary, as a result of that, the peripherization of the rural areas has accelerated. The loosening of the internal and external markets, as well as the liquidation of the producer collective farms resulted significant changes. There are some positive phenomena, for instance the decreasing amount of the used toxic chemicals, but the commodity production of the cultivation and livestock production declined drastically in the 1990s. This recession hardly appeared on the surface, because the Hungarian agriculture had a huge loss of markets after the transition. The western European agricultural goods outplaced the Hungarian products from the post-soviet states, the impoverished Hungarian customers bought cheap, western European foodstuff²¹.

Figure 3: Development types of the settlements in Hungary



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In the years of transition an intense impartiality appeared toward the agricultural activity. The croplands were very cheap, and it was evident from

²⁰ Z. CSéfalvay, A modern társadalomföldrajz kézikönyve, Ikva Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1994.

²¹ I. Süli-Zakar, L. Komarek, *op.cit.*, 2012.

the inflation of the compensation coupons. The offspring of the peasant economies practically wasted the compensation coupons. It can be experienced, that particular urban intellectual or upstart entrepreneur groups abused this inflation, and a real landlordism formed in a few years in the Hungarian rural areas. As a result of this the fate of the Hungarian village and the agriculture was divided. The villagers lost their industrial jobs (they reached it by commuting), but simultaneously the croplands around them got out of their hands. The owners, who live far away, frequently in cities, adopted extensive agricultural monocultures (maize, wheat, etc.) on their latifundia, which can be cultivated effectively with intense mechanization. On these latifundia, the demand for living-labour is extremely low because of the modern agricultural machines, i.e. the manpower of the villagers is unrequired²².

Nowadays, the cultivation reached again – moreover, concerning some grains (maize, oil-seeds) it exceeded – the crop of the 1980s. However, the achievements of the livestock production decreases for the present day, thereby projects an extremely unfavourable image. Compared to the livestock of cattle in the 1980 (about 2 millions), this number is didn't reach the 700 thousand in Hungary in 2010; and the poultry stock decreased to its two third. The decrease of the pig population is really drastic: it was 8.330 thousand in 1980, nowadays it is 3.169 thousand. In 2013, the Hungarian agriculture closed a successful year. The cultivation exceeded the preceding year with 17%, still the livestock production decreased with 3%. In comparison with the field cultures – this can be cultivated extensively with a maximal mechanization – the demands for living labour of the livestock production and the greengrocery production is much bigger. Also the real answer can be the large-scale development of these sectors from the point of view of unemployment. The real tragedy for the future of the Hungarian rural areas is the disinvestment, since the profit, which produced here, isn't utilized significantly in the rural areas, because of the not local owners.

A considerable ethnic exchange has been proceeding in the geographical peripheries of Hungary. The villages have been emptied, and Roma population moved there, mainly because of the low house prices. This ethnic exchange meant a deeper pauperization for the rural peripheries, and it raised the level of the poverty.


Aspirations of the regional development for the liquidation of the poverty and the peripheral situation

The local society became one-sided and its structure depreciated in the villages of the peripheral areas and the former so-called socialist

²² I. Süli-Zakar, *op.cit.*, 1994.

industrial towns. Masses become resigned to their fates, wait for the social benefits from the state and vegetate in the rural Hungary. The only employer is the local authority in our small villages in the hilly countries in the north-eastern and South-Transdanubia areas. In these villages, the public work-program means the sole job opportunity.

Figure 4: Spatial structure of Hungary (2016)



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The level of the Hungarian labours falls behind from the requirements of the global economy. Nowadays, at least 1,2 million people (are in working age) live in Hungary, who don't have that abilities and chances, which can help them to produce the sources of their subsistence. Excluding some ghettos in the cities, these people live in the rural peripheries. Not only the lack of work, but also the lack of ability to work hinders the development on the most underdeveloped peripheries. Consequently, this means that if there is (or could be) capital for job creation, there won't be real receptiveness on the major part of the settlements. The idea of the free enterprise zones (also known as special economic zones) emerged in Hungary in June 2012 in the Ministry of National Economy. According to the original plans, the companies – operates in the enterprise zones – can obtain tax concession on very easy terms. The extramural government meeting decided about that in 23rd January, 2013 in Vásárosnamény (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County). The earlier plans contain 903 settlements, but finally, further 177 settlements became favoured (Figure 4). With the help of law-defined provisions, the government want to participate in the economic development of the free

enterprise zones by the provision of development resources for the employment and investments²³.

Radical changes occurred in both the educational system of the globalized world and Hungary in the near past. These changes in the school education and higher education move on generally the international trends. The certain countries and their regions/settlements are colourful, so they are heterogeneous also from educational geographical point of view. We can declare that the level of the education and the real chance of taking part in it, significantly determine the competitiveness of the people and their geographical surroundings. By the progress of the technical-technological development, it became more and more true.

The government see clearly the key role of the education in the uplift of the rural areas. The investments in the education means a special activity, which return long time, and the positive proceeds occur sometimes 15-20 years later.

Summary

The essential say of our study is: a deep and serious regional crisis and poverty emerged in Hungary, mainly in the peripheral territories. Because of the decades of the redistribution, the peripheral territories' economy and society has a degraded and unhealthy structure. After the change of regime high number of regional differences in development plans and measures have been taken. Naturally, the ideas were doomed without long-term political and financial support, in the storms of the Hungarian Parliament rotation. It shouldn't be forgotten that the maintenance of rural cultural landscape is a national interest, but it should be recognized that rural Hungary's political weakness is also responsible to enforce their interests that the regional differences and the social divide are growing in our country from year to year. It can be concluded that in order to uplift the rural areas the system of regional preferences should be applied, and especially strengthen the fundamentals of human advancement through the education. The geographical peripheries should have a development path, where the higher economic level of the expected socio-economic sustainability would be effective. We have to consider the decisions of the Government Program of Vászárosnamény as the most important new phenomenon, but the next few years will decide that the regional development, and the "work instead of grants" program, as well as education reorganization how much will be able to help the uplift of the disadvantageous masses of poverty people.

²³ B. Tafferner, *op.cit.*, 2012.

Abstract

In Hungary the socialist industrialization of systems of Rákosi and Kádár absorbed the surplus of rural labour, but the industrialization meant the redistributive exploitation of the agricultural areas and the further impoverishment. After the transition, the rural Hungary could not be the "pantry of the CMEA", and the final crisis of Hungarian agricultural sales finalized the deformation of the three-quarters of Hungary, the major part of the rural areas in Hungary. In the recent decades the brain drain worked in the Hungarian peripheries, the disinvestment and the pauperization. The emerging of the new latifundia and the monoculture commodity production operate independently, separated from the Hungarian rural people in the sense of ownerships and production. As a result of these negative processes a significant part of the peripheral areas of the society declassed. In this hopeless situation awareness only a conscious regional policy and above all, a very well-considered education is only able to offer a chance for break.

Keywords: *geographical periphery, multiply disadvantageous situation, rural areas, brain-drain, pauperization, poverty, segregation, Roma integration, human resource development, regional politic.*

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Ukraine-Romania Dialogue: Moving ahead from Distrust and Suspicions

*Anatoliy KRUGLASHOV**

Introduction

It is very important to discuss widely and timely vital issues like all-European security, European ethno-cultural dialogue and interrelations of the neighboring countries from different points of views. The fruitful dialogue of Romanian and Ukrainian Societies is critically important for the sake of regional stability and overcoming the threats which are plenty of for now. Taking into account the historical experience, Romanians and Ukrainians have a lot in common. They both belong to nations which for a long time lacked their statehood and national unity. They are more or less peripheral nations in the framework of European policy and politics. They had been peripheral also for the central imperial authorities, which grabbed up their territories once upon a time in History. They seemed not to be central for the world of Grand politics and European civilizations key stone events like Renaissance, Reformation etc. Dealing with the project of Greater Europe they are rather peripheral too, despite the fact that Romania is included in the EU and NATO but hardly as an important actor there as yet. Ukraine fights for this inclusion, but still is far away of reaching the goal of European and Euroatlantic integration.

Threatening beginning of bilateral relationship

Thus, there are many near identical or very similar aspects of their history and culture, including the spiritual life of both neighboring nations. It does not mean that they are quite similar. But they are very close to each other not only in a sense of the territorial and geographical proximity. Moreover, it's worthy to stress that Ukrainians and Romanians have been cooperating friendly and complimentary for ages and it's the most valuable

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and solid foundation of their mutual perception. Nonetheless there are same historically determined issues, making images of both nations in each other conceptions corrupting or threatening. I'd like to place as the first of them territorial claims inherited from the period, when Romania was called "Romania Mare" or "Great Romania" and where the territories' acquisition made many of Romanians to be proud with the borders of their country. Still, this period had been pretty short indeed, since 1918 till 1940 and again since 1941 till 1944. But for some Romanians this time being imprinted in collective memories regarding Bessarabia and Bucovina shaped some kind of collective trauma and phantom pains for the lost felling of somewhat Greatness. Discussion on the belonging of these territories clouded a lot Ukrainian-Romanian, and Romanian-Ukrainian relations, sometimes overweighting centuries of the good neighborhood and cultural cooperation. Ukraine does not claim any territories from Romania as well as any other countries. But Romanian political elite did it. Especially it was very hot issue in national discourse when to consider the aftermath of the Ceausescu regime brake-down in Romania and the early period of Ukrainian independence.

For Romanian side in my opinion an attempt to revise existing state borders was very important instrumentally in order to consolidate Romanian society upon 'Grand narrative' of National Unity political goals. It's not specific to Romania only. Many of European nations claim the same, moving back to their Ideal, imagined Golden Age of the History. Thus wide-spread nostalgia for the lost 'historical homelands' could be easily converted into some actual political claims to regain them back from their "illegitimate" possessors. Let us recall conflicts and tensions of Lithuania and Poland in XX century, for instance. They look at their history and discovered their 'Golden age', but in the very same frontiers. More bloody and dangerous mix of claims on territories is lands and countries of former Yugoslavia. For Romania is golden age was the Great Romania. Despite a very short existence this period has been perceived collectively as the best one in the National History. The Big and the Best of the country past suddenly intertwined and eclipsed each other in public perception.

After the bloody collapse of Communists rule in Romania in the very end of 1989, the country faced with a deep and all-comprehensive economic and political crisis. It had affected negatively both the Society and political elite, opening up the Pandora box of mutual distrust and mass-protests, threatening domestic stability. Lack of the positive consensus on some principal issues of country's further prospect encourages part of intellectual and political elite to look back in the History. They were trying to mobilize resources of symbolic capital as the reconciliation instrument for ideologically split down Romanian people. While the positive image of

European and Euroatlantic future remained unclear, the Society had been seduced with the spirit of National Might, excavated under ruins of Glorious past time. So, instead of granting ordinary people with the solution of their everyday life problems, this form of political elite communication via the Great Romania ideals' restoration was set in force¹.

So, the President of Romania I. Iliescu, Parliament of the country had questioned existing borders and territorial integrity of both Ukraine and Moldova in spite of all previous international documents signed up and repeatedly tried to mobilize public support under the new Reunification process flag. And at very least partially these ideas and ideals were echoed with some public support, Romanian Orthodox Church including. So, nationalist sentiments got certain momentum in Romania public agenda and political discourse. Of course, it made Ukrainian relations with Romania worsened and fueled them alongside with some other factors radical answers from some Ukrainians². So far, for Ukrainians it was rather a marginal discourse on the territorial issues, including a kind of 'Greater Ukraine' project with some territories of Poland, Russia, Belarus and Romania included. Sure, in Ukraine the breakdown of the USSR unleashed political radicalism also. Social disorder and moral crisis affected ordinary people of Ukraine also. It led towards appearance of such formation like UNA-UNSO, Socialist-Nationalist party and some else radical right-wing political forces. As usually, they proclaimed this ideal of 'Greater Ukraine, meaning Ukraine from Lublin to Kuban, because once upon a time they were ethnically Ukrainians. Still, this course did not happen to be the official one in Ukraine? There are some other minor or marginal political forces, but none of the official declaration and official support for this Greater Ukraine idea has been protracted by Ukrainian Presidents, Parliament and Government for the years of Independence.

Fortunately, this debates about 'questioned' territories and borders became diminishing in the official language of Romania on the eve and resumed after 1997 Treaty, which settle down these territorial issues in general. After having this Treaty ratified, Romania and Ukraine's images of the neighboring Other subsequently underwent gradual transformation

¹ Tatiana Bezeha, "Ukraino-Rumun'ski territorial'ni superchnosti: istorychnyi analiz ta suchasnyi stan" [Ukraine-Romania territorial disputes: historical analyses and current situation], in *Naukovyi visnyk Uzhgorod'skoho Universytetu: Seriia: Istoriia*, t. 29 [Scientific herald of Uzhgorod University, History, ed. Mykola Vegesh (Uzhgorod: Goverla, 2012): 36 - 42.

² Anatoliy Kruglashov, "Troublesome Neighborhood: Romania and Ukraine Relationships", *New Ukraine. A Journal of History and Politics*, 11 (2011): 114 - 125.

toward less negative and unfriendly one³. I would state it did not undergo complete betterment but went out of some previous extremes. If to recall the dominant tone of Romanian media while Ukraine and Ukrainians were being concerned, they often tended be very negative. Ukrainians got not so welcome perception on newspapers and TV as a kind of troublemakers for Romania itself or for Romanians in Ukraine⁴. They had been portrayed either as criminals in Romania, or supressors of Romanians who live in Ukraine. Subsequently, many of stories, narrated by then-time newspapers or TV (radio), should they anyhow mention Ukraine tended to blackmail neighbors of were biased towards them. Yet, the Ukraine and topic related were not a mainstream for Romanian media. The latter is true about Ukrainian media. They were not concentrated on Romania's fabulous most and foremost. The topics regarding the Romania and Romanians were rather rare guest on the front pages of national newspapers or headlines of Ukrainian TV. There prevailed also negative information about Romania territorial claims towards Ukraine. Reports and other texts calculated threats of such an unfriendly positions of Bucharest towards Ukraine, contain counter-replays against Romanian' accusations on Kyiv mistreatment of Romanian minority with vise-verse accusation towards Bucharest policy regarding Ukrainian minority in the country and so on, and so forth.

Much more attention to Romanians topics could be observed into neighboring with Romania regions of Ukraine, like Chernivtsi, Transcarpathia and Odessa oblast. This media picture in general mirrors fears about neighbors as they existed in Romania. Here one could state a much greater concern and suspicious about Romanians territorial claims against Ukraine. It could be explained with the historical memories in the regions as well as the fear of military conflict between two countries should the conflict would go too far. In the same time, one might acknowledge that some of the regional newspapers had occupied alarmist position with regard to Ukraine-Romanian relations, making sometimes any problem in bilateral relation a reason to portrait the neighbor in overtly negative, dark colors. This kind of practice from both sides of the border did not suit well

³ Nataliya Nechayeva-Yuriychuk, "Coping with the Challenges of Ukrainian-Romanian Border Security Issues", in *Eurolimes 15, A Secirity Dimensions as Trigger of Frontiers Modifications*, Edited by Guliana Laschi, Alexis Vahlas and Dorin I. Dolghi, Oradea: Oradea University Press, Spring 2013: 117.

⁴ Teophil Rendiuk, "Ukrains'ka tematyka u ZMI postsotsialistychnoi Rumunii (1990-2007 rr.) [Ukrainian topics in post-socialist media of Romania]", in *Visnyk Kamianets-Podil'skoho natsional'noho universytetu imeni Ivana Ohienka: Istorychni nauky* [Herald of Kamianets-Podilski National University, History], 4 (Kamianets-Podil'sky: Vydavnytstvo Universytetu, 2011): 141 - 149.

the necessity of approaching better mutual understanding and overcoming distrust accumulated for the previous confronting period of relations.

Rapprochement and beyond

So, while the bilateral Agreements, which came into forth on the threshold of XX – XXI centuries between Romania and Ukraine made the rapprochement of their relations possible, the wholesale atmosphere of the bilateral relations, popular opinions included, remained somewhat tense and contradictory for much longer period of time after this diplomatic regulation. The very important fact is that these agreements had been attacked in Romanian Parliament and Society and a kind of treason as far as National Interests of the country are concerned. For instance, it is the position of Greater Romania party which won a good deal of MPs seats in Romanian Parliament then time. Thus, an important part of Romanian Society did not accept the diplomatic solution of disagreements with Ukraine as fair and just for the country's sake. When Romania got some important profits in sea shore after the International arbitrage on the Snake Island⁵, it hapened to be a turn for the considerable part of Ukrainian Society a sort of disillusionment and frustration about the territorial lost⁶.

With the current of time and mainly because of going in-depth Euroatlantic⁷ and European integration of Romania, the political tensions of both countries gradually but steadily become less visible and determining their actual mutual perception⁸. The ghost of History grasp upon public mind has been making less tough and suffocating year by year. Luckily, it

⁵ Galina Kopachnyska, "Political-Geographical Features of the Ukrainain-Romanian marine border definition and establishment within the Black Sea", *Revista Română de Geografie Politică*, Year XV, 1, Oradea, Oradea University Press, May 2013: 35 - 42.

⁶ Tetiana Sylina, Akhylesiv ostriv [Achilles' Island], *Džerkalo tyžhnia*, 17 –23 liutoho 2007, №6(635), accessed 1 December, 2016, <http://www.zn.ua/1000/1030/55906>

⁷ Stefan Purich, "Rumunia-NATO: v ocikuvanni prazhs'kykh rishen'" [Romania-NATO: anticipating Prague's decisions], in: Bezpeka ta stabilnist' krain postsotsialistychnoi Evropy v konteksta rozhyrenna NATO; illiuzii ta realii, [Security and stability of post-socialist Europe in the context of NATO Enlargement] (Chernivsti: Zoliti Lytavry, 2003): 63 - 70.

⁸ Alina Zadorshnia, "Dialoh mizh Ukrainoiu ta shkidnoevropeis'kymy derzhavamy v umovakh evrointegratsii: analiz suchasnoi politychnoi dumky" [Dialogue of Ukraine with Eastern European countries under conditions of European integration], in: *Mizhnarodni vidnosyny ta polityka derzhav v umovakh global'nykh transformatsii: analiz suchasnoi politychnoi dumky* [International relations and States' policy under the conditions of Global transformations: analyses of contemporary Political Thought] (Odesa: ONU, 2016): 136.

seems that for now it's not a key factor of our bilateral relations as for recent years⁹. I do hope for years to come too.

Another level of communication of Ukraine with Romania does exist in the sphere of inter-regional relations and Cross-border cooperation. Despite the political dimension it is a problem of this kind of cooperation to be developed and contribute into the betterment of both States relations and their Society's reciprocity. Hereby it's worthy to limit the observation of the CBC mainly with the case of Euroregions activity, which does some activity alongside Ukraine-Romania borders. The very idea of establishing Euroregions like Uper Prut and Low Danube belongs to the initiative of Bucharest¹⁰. That was a suggestion this Euroregions would serve the kind of communicating channels for local peoples, making their everyday existence more comfortable, and cooperation more effective. In the same time, Bucharest nourished plans of Euroregion usage as a tool of promoting Romanian culture, language and influence, taking into account that the major part of compatriots are leaving right in the border region, included into both Euroregions territorial framework. Ukraine hesitated certain time with the positive decision on the Euroregion establishment but finally decided to move forward with this type of cooperation. Amidst other speculation it would be provable of expecting that images of both nations could benefit from the success of new CBC form¹¹.

However, as it's widely recognized in many papers on the Euroregions topics these expectations and precipitations hardly came true in general¹². It might be too strong to say about them that they are dead born children" but what is for sure true they didn't work properly. This is

⁹ Anatoliy Kruglashov and Marin German, "Problemni pytannia suchasnykh ukrains'ko-rumun'skykh stosunkiv" [Debatable issues of contemporary Ukraine-Romania relations], accessed at 30 November, 2016, <http://dc-summit.info/proekty/ukraina-rumuniya-moldova/1356-problemni-pitannya-suchasnykh-ukrainskorumunskiv-2>.

¹⁰ Sergiy Gakman, "Evrورهion "Verkhniy Prut: vid idei do konstruiuvannia" [Upper Prut Euroregion: from idea towards establishment], in *Transkordonne spivrobitnytstvo u polietnichnykh rebionakh Skhidnoi ta Pivdenno-Skhidnoi Evropy* [Cross-border cooperation in the multiethnic regions of South and East-South Europe], (Chernivtsi: Zoloti lytavry, 1999): 105.

¹¹ Pavlo Molochko, "Current Trends of Cross-Border Cooperation of Ukraine and Romania", in *Eurolimes 16, Cross-border Governance and the Borders Evolution*, Edited by Alina Stoica, Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, Istvan Sulli-Zakar, Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2013: 179.

¹² Anatoliy Kruglashov, "Euroregion Upper Prut: Studies and Activities", *Eurolimes 16 Cross-border Governance and the Borders Evolution*, Edited by Alina Stoica, Carlos E. Pacheco Amaral, Istvan Sulli-Zakar, Oradea: Oradea University Press, Autumn 2013: 27 - 39.

routinized construction of certain agreements and papers, delegations and meetings but in the fact they don't affect anyhow the borderland people from two countries. It is rather a platform for acquiring some more status and prestige for regional leaders engaged, and it helps of promoting a sort of local and regional diplomacy. Both types of activity are of certain importance and should not be overtly degraded and neglected. Still, all of these elitists' movement and communication change not elite, nor the so-called ordinary people in the administrative units comprised with the abovementioned Euroregions.

Putting aside economical and social benefits of CBC, which is another topic to discuss, let's mention some new institutional incentives in Uper Prut Euroregion. The regional elite of Romanian and Ukrainian side try of developing some new ideas like joint sessions of Regional Council. The precedent had been laid in Chernivtsi and Suceava, consequently. That was the idea of meeting regional representatives (deputies) every year in order to discuss the agenda of CBC and promote closer cooperation in the regions. Of course, this form of institutionalizing the cooperation of the representatives' bodies bears more symbolic than practical value, but it makes both regions more opened each other and images of neighbors improving. One could notice another shape of executive power and regional elite communication, called "Bukovynian Dialogue". There were three sessions: one in Chernivtsi, another in Suceava and one in Vienna. It's certain flavor of intrigue, that this dialogue is being sponsored with Austria. Maybe because this country inherited positive reputé for both parts of former Bukovyna and it make possible to renew this traditional moderator role.

Ukraine and Romania uniting while facing common challenges

Now after the political crisis of 2013 - 2014 and War in Ukraine, enflamed with Kremlin direct and indirect interference new regional and local initiatives are not observed as yet. But the common threats unite most urgently and effective. It might be stated that dangerous political currents in Ukraine, provoked with Russian accession of Crimea and so-called hybrid war in Donbas, seems to be united factor for both Nations and States, Ukraine and Romania.

After making Russia's pretence on Great power role obvious as ever, many of Romanians reconsider the concept of Ukraine and Ukrainian perception in Romanian official discourse and media became evolved to more sympathetic and friendly. Romanians, especial political elite and intellectuals first of all, had to think carefully who could be the next victim of aggression and annexation. Nobody wants to be next and therefore

Romania itself has to think about the replay to these new challenges¹³. That is not specifically Ukrainian threat and challenge, but dangerous situation for the whole region, the EU, and Europe by large¹⁴. While Mr. Putin cherishes his ambitious plans, he has to keep in his mind the fate of some more famous and talented predecessors. For instance, a case of Napoleon could be a case. He indeed united Europe, but against himself. Suddenly, nowadays Russia appears as uniting factor, even for some countries with complicated history of their relationship. But the united response still is on the way to be not invented in the EU¹⁵.

Comparing attitude of Romanians towards Ukrainians and vice-versa we have to take into consideration a factor of European and Euroatlantic integration also. The situation on Ukraine is not the same as in Romania with regard to this process¹⁶. While major part of Ukrainians does support European integration as the National strategic goal, still the solid agreement on the necessity of Euroatlantic integration is not reached in the country. The Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 has been forcing many Ukrainians to reconsider their previous indifference to National security issues and stimulate them to apprehend the NATO importance as well. But this process seems to be incomplete for now and need much more attention of the Government and Civic Society in the country. The case of Romania is much more favorable for the country geopolitical stance and domestic mutual consent on both aspects of foreign policy priorities. If in the previous years, authorities plus political elite sometimes filled themselves in the upper position vis-à-vis Ukraine, from the point of view of countries NATO and the EU membership, now they look more pragmatic and less arrogant on this aspects of Romania international status. Bucharest is persistent with the support of Ukrainian claims to be the

¹³ Aureescu Bohdan, "Romania and security challenges at the limits of the European and Euro-Atlantic area. Risks, opportunities and diplomatic actions", in *The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, 10, No. 2. Issue 19, Bucharest, NUPSA, December 2015: 138.

¹⁴ Ioan Horga and Ana-Maria Costea, "The Ukrainian Crisis: Between National Preferences/interests of EU Member States and EU Security", *EuroTimes* 18, *The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Member States National Preferences*, Edited by Dorin I. Dolghi & Octavian Tacu, Oradea: Oradea University press, Autumn 2014: 190.

¹⁵ Bernard Barthalay, Olivier Dupuis, "Ukraine – let's think European", in *GeoPolitica* 57, Bucuresti, 2014: 85 – 86.

¹⁶ Viktor Pavlenko, Sergey Sveshnikov, and Victor Bocharnikov, "An Analysis of Romania's Foreign Policy Relations in the Context of Ukraine's European Integration", in *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review* 31, (2014), accessed at 2 December, 2016, <http://lfpr.lt/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LFPR-31-Sveshnikov.pdf>

member of the EU in the future and member of NATO¹⁷. And Romania makes some steps forward realization of these promises. Here is the new and promising prospect for closer cooperation and, thereafter the space where the image of the Other might be reconstructed and filled in with more positive content.

Another problem worthy to attend is the underestimated potential of economical cooperation between two countries. It's noticeable that after the break-down of Communist regimes, both Bucharest and Kiev weren't eager to promote effective economic cooperation. Romania while marching westward did not see a preferable economic partner in Ukraine, and Ukraine overtly ignored Romania as a good economic partner. Sure, the lack of common interests in the field of economy and trade led to the estrangement of neighboring States and their business elite. It contributes negatively into mutual trust and understanding of each other. Now seems to be coming into existence some new ideas and different project of economic cooperation, including energy security and some aspects o CBC. Should they succeed, both countries will be more consolidated in front of some common challenges and chances of getting involved into making new platform for their better communications and joint partnership actions.

Considering the role of policy, politics and economy I would like to mention also briefly the media importance. If to touch upon the media content one might observe that Ukrainian and Romanian media for the period after Communist regime breakdown did not contribute in a systematic manner into rapprochement of both countries relations and better understanding amidst neighboring States. As usually stories told there are colored with rather a negative tone, containing sometimes provocative statements, making accent on criminal cases etc. Many of them are biased and kept on unbalanced approach towards rather complex mutual relations. It's true especially, when the quality of some regional media are concerned. I want our journalists to be more accurate with labeling some dangerous and disgusting but statistically miserable facts as the 'true image of the Other'. For instance, I ask them in Chernivtsi to avoid reporting that police officers detained Romanian or Moldavian smuggler (in ethnic sense of the word). One can say that the violation of the border's regime has been made of Rumanian, Ukrainian or Moldavian citizen. Please, don't mark as Romanian or Moldavian by stock, because it characterizes the image of nation and neighborhood. Nevertheless this practice is wide spread, so no wonder is that negative publications and video records are prevailing in the media, and

¹⁷ Mihaela Buse, "Romania's External Relations in terms of Status of EU Member country", *The International Annual Scientific Session Strategies*, XXI, 1 (2013): 267.

they do not try to analyze or systematically balance the image of another country.

So, as for recent years media didn't play important role in the process of reconsideration of Ukrainian-Romanian relations and they do not tend to organize their professional cooperation in order to overcome existing estrangement and lack of mutual trust and appreciation. For instance, in the framework of Uper Prut Euroregion activity took place some initiatives on creating some new forms of media-cooperation like bilateral or trilateral web-site for regions and thus make possible regular exchange of news and other information, promoting cross-border journalism and building-up professional networking inside bordering regions of Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. Unfortunately, these ideas and moves remain unrealized till now. So, the cooperation of journalists and media across States bodies is very ineffective and in very best case episodic.

Conclusions

And finally what one could conclude of Ukraine-Romania cooperation in general? Both countries got faced with several confrontations periods, which left behind them dubious legacy of distrust and suspicions. It is another task to define who is wrong, and who is right of them, when one would like to come to the well-balanced opinion on the origin of these conflicts. Gradually, this confrontation approaches has been diminishing and now seemed to be disappearing off the political agenda for both countries. However, the potential of both countries to cooperate closer and establish effective partnership is far away of being reached and used adequately from now. Alongside with some inertia and ineffectiveness in the sphere of their political and economical cooperation, there are a lot of joint projects successfully realized, especially with the support of the EU. And there two sectors which might be labeled as the locomotive of their further advancement, namely Civic Society sector and some academic institutions. For instance, some promising results might be observed in joint projects and actions, implemented with Chernivtsi Jury Fedkovych National university and Suceava Stefan cel Mare University, Chernivtsi and University of Iasi, some Odessa's Universities and Iasi, Uzhgorod and Satul Mare etc. Hopefully, the network of regional political and administrative leaders from both sides seems to be more and more growing up and paying some more attention towards CBC cooperation.

Of course, there are other problems behind the scene of this cooperation. I mean first and foremost a problem of heavy dependency on European funds support, which remains unbalanced with the contribution of Romanian and Ukrainian partners into making the overall evolution of their relations a true success story. There are a lot of good projects and

atmosphere of cooperation and a good reason to expect them getting much better in the near future. In fact, the current situation of Ukraine-Romania relations contrasted with the one existed two decades ago. But still a lot of problems have to be resolved too. For instance, we have to deal with a long-standing discussion on some humanitarian issues, like comparison of our countries minorities' protection¹⁸. Previously these disputes revolved around where minorities are protected better. Every party tries to use the arbitrary selected criteria on what is good and wrong with them. Any attempt to organize the same survey all around the borderland territories, where the minorities are situated, to make a poll with the same questions, the same methodology and so on failed. We operate with different and incompatible approaches, with different standpoints and so far we have clear ground to compare objectively the problems of minority and National and regional resources of granting better protection to them. So, it looks like each other of us is a kind of mirror, and this mirror could be right and plane and nevertheless even the best mirror make the one damage of the image, because right and left should be alternate to the objective reality. So, we have not just to mirror each other but make the common optics available and applied them to the common problems resolution.

Finally, we have to overcome a lot of stereotypes which obstruct the way of our cooperation¹⁹. It's worthy to mention that Ukrainians' stereotypes about Romanians are predominantly not negative. Not now but generally for the period after acquiring Independence, some of Ukrainians regarded Rumania from the very absurd position embodied into public opinion in USSR. That stance has been grounded on the assumption that Romania is minor state and Romanians perceived as a kind of less important nation. The similar situation occurred when Romanians entered NATO and the EU. Identifying themselves with those Global actors they become seeing Ukrainians from the positions of certain superiority. So far we have now different political and other conditions in our countries and the perception and self-perception of our citizens differ a lot sometime. It means a lot of issues are to be discussed by the experts, politicians and civic activists, and a lot of instruments, mechanisms and chances could be invented or applied for the sake of making this perception of each other

¹⁸ Serhiy Gakman, "Derzhavne rehulivannia entonatsional'nykh protsesiv na ukrains'ko-moldov'sko-rumunsk'omu prykordnonni) [State regulations on the Ukraine-Moldova-Romania borders regions], in: *Vlada ta upravlinnia* (Administration and Management], ed. Mykola Jarmystyi and Anatolii Kruglashov, Vol. 3, (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2014): 260 - 275.

¹⁹ Oleksandr Parfenov, "Ukrains'ko-Rumun's'kyi dialoh: bez prava na pomylku" [Ukraine-Romania dialogue: without a right to make a mistake], 4, *Politychnyi menedzhment* (Political management), (Kyiv, 2005): 141 - 147.

better, less corrupted with some previous historical suspicious, fears and stereotypes. We have to keep our dialogue up opened and proactive. I hope the way we are going now seems to be very promising and we are able to move to the right direction away of the bad time. I am sure that not only Kremlin dangerous wrong-doings make us united for now. There are many of regional, national and supranational interests, which prompt Ukrainians and Rumanians work together and overcome the negative impact of some former distrust and suspicions.

Abstract

This article considers the stages of Ukraine-Romania dialogue since the breakdown of Communist rules. It is outlined main problems, which clouded both countries relations, making them estranged and suspicious towards each other. European and Euroatlantic integration of Romania contributed a lot into the process of cleaning up mutual relations out of territorial disputes and challenging existing state borders legitimacy. It has been opening up a new prospect to closer cooperation and mutual trust.

However, there are some problems unattained for both countries elite and societies. The actual level of partnership of Romania and Ukraine remains inadequate with their potential and expectations. Humanitarian dimensions of inter-state relations, cross-border cooperation are outlined and some steps forward has been proposed with the author of the article.

Keywords: *Ukraine-Romania relations, legacy of distrust, common threat, Russia, the EU.*

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Intellectual Elites, European Spirit and Interethnic Cultural Collaboration on the Western Border of Interwar Romania. Case Study: The Main Editorial Concerns of the Great Cultural Reunion “Cele Trei Crișuri” in Oradea

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The interwar spiritual landscape has recently become a fertile research field, a fully justified fact, since it is the most prolific period of Romanian culture, art and science. We are assessing a distinctive historical period, with defining features and elements, comprised between the years 1919 and 1940, when Bihor, a western region in Greater Romania, became part of the mutual flow of national culture, a reality on which both people and institutions worked together, in an ardent impetus to progress, an unprecedented phenomenon in our national history. Alexandru Dima spoke, in the pages of *Familia* review published during the interwar period, about the *creative localism* that animated both the spiritual efforts made by the Transylvanian society and the political ones in order to survive and for cultural-historical assertion¹.

The release of creative energies was marked by the unification of Transylvania with the motherland as a milestone for the cultural, literary and artistic emancipation of the Romanian people living in the reunited territories, and - in this case - in Bihor County. Then followed the disputes on cultural, literary ground, fuelled by creative effervescence, the so-called “conflicts between generations”, which had a common goal at that time, namely, the advancement, the cultural and, implicitly, the social and economic progress. All acts of culture complemented one another to create here, at the western gate of the unified Romania, a cultural centre that disseminated humanism and peaceful spirituality, with successful attempts to

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¹ Alexandru Dima, *Localismul creator*, în „Familia”, 1935, nr. 2, p. 3-5.

connect to the great movements of ideas of the interwar period². As a result, the interwar realities made the Romanian cultural life more dynamic, thus entering a new phase of its existence, with the declared intention to modernize and enlighten more and more substantial strata of society. Gradually, this purpose was taken on and amplified by the intellectual groups in Bihor, and especially the ones in Oradea. During the entire period between the two world wars, through ongoing connection with the national cultural bodies, these groups struggled to practice a spiritual opening towards all the inhabitants, irrespective of their social status, this way representing a recipe for widespread dissemination of cultural activities. Thus, a new cultural structure emerged that had to withstand a rather large range of obstacles, among which the most prominent was the financial one.

The historical moment of 1918 made it possible the active, unrestricted and immediate participation of Bihor County to the Romanian cultural life. From the beginning, the general trend was that of asserting and developing the national culture, especially in urban centres, of turning them, and particularly Oradea, into hearths of Romanian culture. This natural trend had to surpass the preponderance of Hungarian expression culture that had never experienced obstacles in its goals until 1918, and neither would it encounter any after the Union. Only afterwards, through a sustained and diverse cultural life, the transformation of cities into strong Romanian cultural centres was to be achieved, thus raising the cultural status of the village. The Great Union Generation was aware of this necessity, as well as of the fact that the Union had to be strengthened in all the cultural, economic, social and political fields.

Outstanding associative events were held in Oradea and Bihor County as a result of free expression meant to state the spiritual availability of the inhabitants who had constantly been harassed by the authorities of the dualist state in the period before the First World War. Moreover, a simple comparison between the activity of the Romanian cultural associations throughout the modern era and the one carried out during the interwar period is definitely favourable to the latter, both from a qualitative perspective and, especially, from a quantitative one. It is essentially about the most important cultural traditions that were continued, in a favourable climate, by the residents of the western regions of the country during the interwar period.

As a result, the Great Cultural Reunion “Cele Trei Crișuri” founded in the autumn of 1919 in Oradea, aimed at conducting, with the help of the

² Olimpiu Boitoș, *Progresul cultural al Transilvaniei după Unire*, Editura Cartea Românească, Sibiu, 1942, p. 26; Grigore Georgiu, *Istoria culturii române moderne*, București, 2002, p. 223-225.

most representative intellectuals, an important activity of “national restoration” in the Romanian territories united with the Old Kingdom in the memorable year of 1918³.

The Reunion in Oradea brought its contribution to the promotion of Romanian culture by an intense activity of printing some magazines, propaganda brochures and books, written both by some leading members and personalities of the cultural life in the capital city or university centres of Greater Romania⁴.

Undoubtedly, the Great Reunion best expressed its views, in the interwar editorial landscape of Bihor County, in the *Cele Trei Crișuri* review, which became its cultural propaganda organ starting with its appearance on April 15th, 1920. George Bacaloglu, the manager, stated his intention to publish the review in the tradition of *Familia*, edited by Iosif Vulcan⁵.

Since its foundation, the publication presented its cultural creed to the readers: “In such difficult times when everyday needs and problems increase, *Cele Trei Crișuri* review will continue to conduct its Romanian and Latin activity, to further impose the consciousness of a fulfilled good work, of an achievement that is felt to be increasingly urgent day by day”⁶.

The perseverance with which it was led by George Bacaloglu turned *Cele Trei Crișuri* into an elite review well appreciated at national and international level. The most various topics were addressed in its columns. Several historical and literary articles were published, complemented by illustrations drawn from everyday life and from the interwar Romanian landscape. The review did not neglect political, social and cultural events that had taken place in the country and abroad, which were grouped under the title “Today’s News”, the emergence of various cultural reviews in Romania, the printed books of some Romanian and international publishing houses, all the information being analyzed and commented on in a balanced and professional spirit⁷.

Each issue of the review contained a specific topic, held and supported by articles signed by writers from all across the country. Thus, it

³ Viorel Faur, *Contribuția Reuniunii „Cele Trei Crișuri” din Oradea la configurarea unor semnificative tradiții muzeistice*, în „Revista Muzeelor și Monumentelor”, 1982, nr. 5, p. 50-51.

⁴ Ion Bradu, *Reuniunea „Cele Trei Crișuri” din Oradea*, în „Contribuții culturale bihorene”, Comitetul de Cultură și Educație Socialistă al Județului Bihor, Oradea, 1974, p. 190.

⁵ Viorel Faur, *Contribuții la istoricul bibliotecilor românești din Crișana (1830-1940)*, Editura Fundației Culturale „Cele Trei Crișuri”, Oradea, 1995, p. 101.

⁶ „Cele Trei Crișuri”, 1936, nr. 3-4, p. 55.

⁷ *Ibidem*, nr. 9-10, p. 155.

foreshadowed a spiritual emulation, which not only the population on the western border, but also the rest of the country benefited from⁸.

At first, the editorial staff consisted of only a few personalities willing to revive the cultural atmosphere in Crișana region. The name of the initiators (Roman R. Ciorogariu, Gh. Bacaloglu and Al. Pteancu) intermingled with the destiny of the review.

During the two decades of its existence, one can highlight two periods: the first one lasted from 1920 to 1933, while the other took place between 1933 and 1940. The review appeared sporadically in Bucharest in January-February 1941, respectively March-April 1944. Starting with 1933, the review was marked by the transformation of its profile into *Cultural Annals* as its rubrics had been specialized in problems requiring only scholarly interventions. However, excerpts of literary fragments and folk poetry were published during 1933-1940.

The first stage is definitely the boom period of the review. In a very short time, the number of collaborators became impressive. We mention here only the most recognized names in the cultural life of the time: Lucian Blaga, Ion Agârbiceanu, Mihail Dragomirescu, Eugen Lovinescu, Gala Galaction, Victor Eftimiu, Cincinat Pavelescu, Emil Isac, Emanoil Bucuța, Constantin Rădulescu-Motru. Among the local collaborators were Aurel Lazăr, Eugeniu Speranția, Gh. Tulbure, Gh. Ciuhandu. Thus, the review got the look of a land where ideas and artistic formulas were debated, opinions were approached, all in a balanced environment.

When this publication reached its peak in 1933, although the review had been published in Craiova in the previous year with some difficulty in writing materials, articles signed by other prestigious names were published in its pages: I. Al. Brătescu-Voinești, Gh. Bogdan-Duică, I. Bianu, Ovid Densușianu, D. Gusti, Cezar Petrescu, Sextil Pușcariu, Ion Pillat, George M. Zamfirescu, Elena Farago etc⁹. Moreover, since its establishment, the Reunion had been acting so as to attract writers from across the country to its most important publication - *Cele Trei Crișuri*. This fact emerges from a document issued on 16 September 1920 and sent to the officials in Bucharest, from which it follows that the desire of the cultural society in Oradea was to popularize all the writers in the country¹⁰.

⁸ *Ibidem*, 1931, nr. 5-6, p. 75.

⁹ Viorel Horj, *Semicentenarul revistei „Cele Trei Crișuri”*, în „Crișana”, 1970, nr. 80, p. 2 ; I. Hangiu, *Dicționar al presei literare românești (1790-1982)*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1987, p. 74; Nae Antonescu, *Scriitori și reviste din perioada interbelică*, Editura revistei „Convorbiri literare”, Iași, 2001, p. 42.

¹⁰ Lucia Bieltz, *Un document inedit referitor la Marea Reuniune „Cele Trei Crișuri” din patrimoniul Muzeului Național de istorie*, în „Crisia”, 1987, p. 353-355.

As a result, the editorial office received, from various parts of the country, works that belonged to different genres such as novels, stories, poems, along with folk songs, articles on geography, history, literary criticism, philosophy, technology and medicine. Cultural information from all over the country was grouped into suggestive categories: *Letters from Banat, Maramureș, Sălaj* and even *Bucharest*, reviews from *Satu Mare* etc¹¹.

The review established an editorial office in Bucharest as well (on 18 Royal Street) after having gained greater momentum and noticing its readers' increasing need for culture. In this way, it managed a faster connection to the cultural life that throbbed in the capital city, hence the review reached Cernăuți and Chișinău in a shorter time¹². Glimpses of life all across Bukovina and Bessarabia were mirrored in the pages signed by the most authorized names¹³.

In a relatively short time, *Cele Trei Crișuri* managed to become one of the most advanced reviews, both as form and substance, not only in the country but also abroad. The review, which aimed to strengthen the spiritual life on the western border of the country, tackled the fate of Romanians abroad and, in particular, that of the Transnistrian Romanians, besides Romanian matters of national interest. The publication had spread its influence in that region since 1928, primarily due to local socio-political factors, which prevented the normal development of Romanian cultural life¹⁴.

On 28 January 1926, the review received from Prague another offer of cultural cooperation between the review in Oradea and a Czechoslovakian Press Agency, with branches for the countries in Central Europe and the Balkans. This also had a Romanian division, established on 15 November 1925, which edited a daily newsletter for the Romanian newspapers, which had been sent to *Cele Trei Crișuri* review ever since the first issue. This section also gathered the propaganda news from the Romanian newspapers, which was then published in the press of the foreign countries. To this end, the news agency called for "the newspaper (review – our note) regularly"¹⁵.

Despite some shortcomings and financial difficulties, the Reunion continued to become conspicuous in the Romanian cultural landscape. Thus, when commemorating 60 years since the foundation of the *Universul* newspaper, the review and the Reunion from Oradea sent a congratulatory

¹¹ Arhivele Naționale-Serviciul Județean Bihor, *fond Reuniunea culturală Cele Trei Crișuri*, dos. 23, f. 220.

¹² „Cele Trei Crișuri”, 1930, nr. 3, p. 50.

¹³ *Ibidem*, 1937, nr. 7-8, p. 152.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, nr. 11-12, p. 238-239.

¹⁵ AN-SJBh, *fond Reuniunea culturală Cele Trei Crișuri*, dos. 23, f. 3.

telegram to the oldest Romanian newspaper, which was the bearer and promoter of national ideals¹⁶.

The review was also “sensitive” to the official paper of the Romanians living in the United States and Canada, which celebrated 30 years of existence in 1935. Enlivened by this festive event, the review devoted a special issue to the Romanian newspaper *America*¹⁷.

The review stood by its readers in difficult moments as well, disseminating the belief in a better future. When it came to the events of 1932 related to the Hungarian revisionist claims, the editorial staff took a firm stand against the status quo, criticizing Hungary’s unjustified political riotousness. The great anti-revisionist demonstrations on the western border and Bucharest were widely presented in its columns. The Reunion did not reject the idea of working together with the minority element on a common cultural platform, but the revision of the Trianon Treaty could not be discussed. The attitude of the review remained firm in this respect: “... peace must be respected and it can only live by obeying the Treaties ... which fulfilled the holy law of nationalities”¹⁸.

The international media also acknowledged the efficiency of the activity on national ground carried out by *Cele Trei Crișuri* review. After 16 years, following the articles devoted to international events, the assessments of the foreign countries were as expected: in a letter sent to the editor, the bookshop *Plon* in Paris requested an exchange of publications and expressed its desire to tighten relations with the review and the cultural institution in Oradea; the newspaper *Il Messaggero* in Rome highlighted in an article the propaganda of the Reunion for spreading Italian culture in Romania. In its turn, the University of California (Los Angeles) asked that the review be sent to the United States, stating its readiness for collaboration between the two institutions¹⁹.

We should also mention the special issues dedicated by the review to the Latin and Interparliamentary Congress, to France, the watchmen, the Romanian theatre, the Romanian Pavilion and Exhibition in Paris, and to other cultural events²⁰.

The Reunion was greatly appreciated in the country, as well. Numerous Romanian political and cultural personalities visited the offices of the Reunion and of *Cele Trei Crișuri* review, as a sign of recognition of the role played by the cultural institution of Bihor in Transylvania and in the national cultural landscape. Among the most prestigious guests we mention:

¹⁶ „Cele Trei Crișuri”, 1933, nr. 5-6, p. 71.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, 1935, nr. 7-8, p. 114.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, 1932, nr. 11-12, p. 110.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, 1935, nr. 7-8, p. 116.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, 1938, nr. 3-4, p. 77.

Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, Constantin Angelescu, Nicolae Iorga, Gh. Crișan, Ștefan C. Ioan, Gh. Bogdan-Duică, Victor Antonescu, Iosif Pop, Titu Constantinescu, Maria and Cella Delavrancea-Lahovary, C. Naumescu, members of a Czechoslovakian choir, C. Bacaloglu, etc²¹.

A particular significance in the media landscape of Bihor during the interwar period was played by *Aurora* review in Oradea. It is actually the fruit of the endeavours made by the leadership of “Cele Trei Crișuri” Cultural Reunion, among which, besides Colonel George Bacaloglu, there were figures of two great fighters for the Union: Aurel Lazăr and Nicolae Zigre. They got involved with generosity in an extremely current issue, that of knowledge and rapprochement between the Romanians and Hungarian. Moreover, they were joined by significant names of the time, such as George A. Petre, Keresturi Sándor, Salamon László, Tiron Albani and Korda Béla.

Thus, on 24 December 1922, the literary, artistic, theatrical and social review *Aurora* appears in Oradea. The manager was G. Bacaloglu and the editors were A. Petre, Keresturi Sándor and Salamon László²².

The enthusiasm of this initiative is reflected in the first issue of the review: “... We are setting off ... We are young, but we are scions grafted on the common core of Eminescu and Petöfi. We will sip food for both nations from the roots of this trunk. Being convinced of the new purposes of the time, we faithfully saw the seed of brotherhood and mutual understanding. May this seed germinate and bear fruit in a human field without any soul ...”²³.

Open to all serious collaborations, as the manager of the review stated in the article-program at the beginning, the publication aimed at publishing as many translations as possible from both literatures and social life as a whole was within its area of interest.

In the socio-cultural and historical post-war context, the emergence of the review in Oradea correlates with a realistic political guidance from both the Romanian intellectuals and the Hungarian ones. It was becoming clear to both sides that, in the new conditions created by the Union in 1918, only a sustained and principled interethnic dialogue could solve the conflictual situations. The humanist approach of the group of *Aurora* is part of the ensemble of outstanding cultural achievements of the interwar period that aimed at getting a Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement. The review wanted to be a communication bridge and the motivation of that endeavour

²¹ *Ibidem*, 1935, nr. 1-2, p. 40-41.

²² „Aurora”, 1922, nr. 1, p. 1.

²³ George, A. Petre, *Novi orizonturi*, în *Ibidem*, p. 2.

is understandable in a time when people's memories still keep alive the memory of the horrors of war that had just ended.

The intellectuals of the time were naturally concerned with the issue of Romanian-Hungarian relations and the columns of *Aurora* review graciously hosted their positions. Thus, Daday Loránd believed that "what can be noted about this problem is not the establishment of some mutual spiritual relations, but the mutual gift giving without any particular explanation"²⁴. Sending the editorial office a reply to the questionnaire launched by *Aurora* and *Cele trei Crișuri* reviews, Gömöry Jenő considered that "cultural proximity was a priority", because it is the only solution in the first stage.

In the grouping *Opinions about closeness*²⁵, some personal letters addressed to one of the editors are published, and the reason of their publication, explained in a note to editors, lies in their quality as "interesting documents, almost historical, on the formation of mentality". The signatories of the letters were Cezar Petrescu, Franjo Zoltan, Benedek Elek and Emil Isac. The penultimate, which was proposed to be the Hungarian chairman of an association of Hungarian and Romanian artists, replied warmly: "This step hapened according to my heartbeats. But for me to be the Hungarian chairman of this society? Brother, do you not know that I would not be a good president? I have never been the president in my life ... But still, if you force me, your work will be done. I will do it for the holy cause". Cezar Petrescu, editor of *Gândirea* review in Cluj, also believed, in his letter, that "great writers and great artists, in addition to their homeland, have humanity as a second home". Franjo Zoltan, prestigious poet, translator and publisher, Herder prize laureate, responded promptly to the request for collaboration, sending several translations of Romanian poetry. The article titled *Vicinity*²⁶ pleads with conviction for the joint efforts of all those who understand the opportunity of building a united international front of the "Red Cross soul", that would complement the political struggle for peace. The intellectuals were seeking solutions noticing the explosive political situation of interwar Europe.

A consequence of the fact that *Aurora* was firmly involved in the complex process of efforts to achieve knowledge and Romanian-Hungarian rapprochement is the publication of some opinions that, overcoming a declarative and convenient level, are realistic and - beyond reserves - suggest solutions. It is the case of the article *Difficulties about the Romanian-Hungarian Rapprochement* of the writer Legeni Ernő accompanied by the

²⁴ Daday Loránd, *Observări inoportune apropierii româno-maghiare*, in *Ibidem*, nr. 9, p. 1.

²⁵ „Aurora”, 1923, nr. 8, p. 12.

²⁶ Pál, Simandi, *Apropiere?*, in „Aurora”, 1923, nr. 9, p. 5; Mircea Popa, *Apropiieri literare și culturale româno-maghiare*, Editura Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1998, p. 144-149.

editorial office comments: "His opinions seem rather pessimistic and that is why we, Romanians, must review our cultural policy towards minorities, because, with some indifference, we might throw some intellectuals like him in the camp of those who fight against rapprochement. Mr. Ligeti Ernő finds some healthy proposals of interest; we are drawing the attention of competent people"²⁷.

The review was trying to be on an equidistant position, and so was the protest note which considered void the order to put an end to the review *Tűz* from Vienna, a publication that "encouraged the rapprochement program from the beginning"²⁸. On the other hand, *Aurora* either disapproved the propaganda that was made in Budapest for a luxurious anthology of Hungarian irredentist poetry or expressed its bewilderment towards ignoring the valuable translations of Octavian Goga's and Șt. O. Iosif's poetry, by the *Petőfi Company* in Budapest. In order to organize a show of poetry, the society had collected all translations into foreign languages after the work of art by "the great man who had disappeared from Sighișoara"²⁹.

Representing a natural option in cultivating the exchange of values, translations have a high share in the columns of the review. Thus, *Venus and Madonna* written by Eminescu appeared in the first issue, having been translated by Keresturi Sandor and next to it *I feel a fear in my soul that would spread*, by Petőfi Sándor, translated by O. Goga. They also published translations of works by Arany Janos, Biró Lajos, Szép Ernő, Győni Géza, Babits Mihály, Reinhand Piroška, Szombati Szabo István, especially Jokai Mór and Ady Endre.

From the Romanian literature, poems by Lucian Blaga, N. Crainic, Al. Vlahuță, Adrian Maniu, Șt. O. Iosif, Panait Cerna, Victor Eftimiu, and Ion Pilat were published in the pages of this review, many of them for the first time. Of the Romanian novelists, the following were translated into Hungarian: Al. Brătescu-Voinești, I. L. Caragiale, Liviu Rebreanu, C. Moldovan, Constanța Hodoș, Eugen Speranța, I. Slavici, I. Agârbiceanu. The original literature is scarce and of no special value. The poems belong to G. A. Petre, Salamon Laszlo, Ioan Sângeorgiu and the poetess Keresturi Diamandi Victoria, and published with parallel texts: in Romanian and Hungarian. The poetess signed a special column, which addressed topics about fashion, marriage or moral conduct, interesting in terms of the study of mentality at that time.

Aurora review represents an exemplary experience in itself, still valid today, to the extent in which it exceeded its era, and was the expression of

²⁷ „Aurora”, 1923, nr. 7, p. 1.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, nr. 2, p. 9.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, nr. 4, p. 1.

the most sincere and open aspirations of social and ethnic peace and harmony. Half a year later (in June 1923) its publication was ended, not so much because of financial difficulties, but because of mistrust and suspicions coming from both sides.

Undoubtedly, the experience of the review published in Oradea was not isolated. There were other bilingual publications particularly in the interwar Transylvania: *Culisele* (Cluj), *Cimbora* (Satu Mare), but apparently *Aurora* review became known by its program that was applied constantly. It was not its fault entirely, but the circumstances of the moment.

After this brief presentation of the publishing activity of the Reunion, it is necessary to formulate some comments on the role of *Cele Trei Crișuri* review in the cultural interwar landscape, being a veritable means of literacy for all Romanians.

What *Familia* review, edited by Iosif Vulcan, represented in the Romanian modern society, a source of strengthening national consciousness turned into, in another time and from a different respect, *Cele Trei Crișuri* review under the unified Romania.

When social sterile unrest captured the interest of the great public eager for sensational, the review knew how to open its columns to the many problems of the Romanians in the western parts of the country, demonstrating with facts and figures that there were national vital issues that needed to be solved beyond political ephemeral interests³⁰.

The chronicles of the review supported the cultural movement on the western border, where “the fiercest battle was fought between what was and what was supposed to be”. They represented newsletters trying to stimulate the Romanian public opinion in the sense formulated by the new requirements of the time³¹.

The emergence of *Cele Trei Crișuri* review brought the power of example in the interwar area of Bihor and it proved that a cultural program could be achieved where deep and tenacious belief pursues a noble ideal³². The review was not only a Romanian arena in the western part of the country, but also, a Romanian book with good teachings for those who must remember their nation and culture, but especially for those called to get to know and adjust to the realities of the Romanian national unitary state.

To be more convincing, the review inaugurated a series of numbers on a single issue, giving the reader the possibility to penetrate into the depth of national spirituality manifested in art, literature, politics, economics etc³³.

³⁰ „Cele Trei Crișuri”, 1939, nr. 9-10, p. 183.

³¹ *Ibidem*, 1927, nr. 5, p. 89.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 182.

³³ *Ibidem*, 1938, nr. 1-2, p. 3.

Although the tragic events of the year 1940 led to a decrease in the activity of the editorial staff, the review continued to appear, but with some irregularity.

In the new political conditions, the columns of the review presented the most diverse foreign regions. It was a strategy applied by *Cele Trei Crișuri* review in order not to attract the adversity of those who held political power, hostile to Romanian interests.

When north-western territories of Romania were freed (in the autumn of 1944), the review returned to Oradea³⁴.

The Reunion and the review stood out for two decades by the desire firmly expressed and applied to embrace and support everything that was feeling, thought and Romanian letter on the western border of the country.

Intellectuals and peasants found a moral guide in the pages of the review, but also a powerful means of promoting national culture on the western border of the country³⁵.

The cultural discourse of the intelligentsia was subsumed to the national desideratum, with double purpose, that is: to culturally enlighten the population, and to disseminate political ideas. A fully justified accent was laid on the need to improve the living conditions of the peasantry, to increase the education level, etc. The cultural elite at the western border of the country understood its aim, and therefore it acted to promote the national language and culture through some cultural associations meant to unite the interwar Romanian society around some viable cultural projects.

Simultaneously, a significant aim was also to raise the overall development level of the Romanian society according to the time requirements, its adjustment to the social-economic and cultural developments of Western Europe, from which it was separated by a significant gap. In such context, of relentlessly "burning" some sequencing gaps, great emphasis was placed on cultural and material emancipation of society. This phenomenon manifested itself with features and defining elements also in the interwar Bihor, a western region of the unified Romania, which became part of the mutual flow of national culture, a reality that worked together both people and institutions in a ardent start toward progress and synchronization, an unprecedented phenomenon in our national history.

³⁴ Eugeniu Speranția, *50 de ani de la întemeiere - Cele Trei Crișuri*, în „Familia”, 1970, nr. 4, p. 17.

³⁵ „Cele Trei Crișuri”, 1940, nr. 1-2, p. 3.

Abstract

The local authorities realized that after 1918 they had begun a new stage of the national history requiring a rapid connection of the Bihor County space – regarded from a political, social, economic and cultural point of view - to the realities of the Great Romania, and implicitly to the European ones. During the entire inter war period, the local authorities had to “burn the stages” of discrepancy as against the West in a fast rhythm so that the Bihor County’s Romanian society to reach a stage of development being in concordance with the time exigencies.

Founded at the end of the 1919, the “Cele Trei Crișuri” Cultural Reunion aimed from the very beginning to enlighten the areas from the Western border of the country. The reunion was conscious of the importance of a cultural co-operation with the other similar societies and with the values of the minority cultures (especially that of Hungarian expression). Only under such circumstances they could gain the local spiritual aptitudes going to guarantee the success of the actions initiated to perform the enlightenment.

Thus, the Reunion attended to carry out an immediate contact with Europe, especially by means of the “Cele Trei Crișuri” review -, being already read in Rome, Paris, Berlin, Prague, Sophia and even on the American continent as a result of the co-operations concluded by the above mentioned reunion with the European cultural associations and institutions.

Keywords: culture, inter war, associations, co-operation, literature

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European integration and the new frontiers of Europe

*Luminița ȘOPRONI**

Introduction

The research perspective considering the region as the growth nucleus in contemporary international relations, is part of "new regionalism", which is defined as a "complex process of change involving states and non-state actors and is produced as a result of the action of global, regional, national and local forces"¹. Regarding the actors involved in the regional process, if the nation-state played the main role in case of old regionalism, the new regionalism entails actions and interactions of several players, such as regional and local authorities, civil society, along with actors in the business world and non-governmental organisms.

The concept of "region" was frequently used in association with notions such as "frontier" or "limited space", given that most of the attempts to define it emphasized "territory", "functionality" and "leadership". Research has been focusing on determining which types of regions are the most functional and efficient, considering the region as a natural given, which already exists and is defined by particular political, institutional and administrative frameworks. The constructivist and reflectivist doctrines have changed the approach, considering the region as a process, an entity in continuous evolution, with frontiers that are constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed from the inside and the outside, as a result of collective actions of people and the identity formation process².

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¹ Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, „Theorising the rise of regionness”, in Shaun Breslin, Christopher W. Hughes, Nicola Phillips, Ben Rosamond (eds.), *New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy*, Routledge, New York, 2002, p. 33

² Fredrik Söderbaum, „Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism”, in Mary Farrell, Björn Hettne and Luk Van Langenhove (eds.), *Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice*, Pluto Press, London, 2005, p. 90-91

The European Frontiers

Professor Iordan Bărbulescu states that the frontiers of Europe "are not defined by physical geography, but by human geography, as they are represented by common values and world views. Thus, frontiers are determined by a series of norms that must be respected in order to enter the European Union"³. Fabienne Maron also considers that the definition of EU frontiers is tied to the "sense and essence of the European project", as they express the values and the finality of the Union⁴. In their analysis on European frontiers, Anderson and Bort talk about "invisible frontiers, founded on historical experiences and cultural values", which play an important role in forming the image of Europe⁵.

Starting from these interpretations, we consider that integration into such a macro-region with unique features and history, entails the fulfillment of several categories of criteria, some imposed by European institutions; some coming from the tradition, as well as the cultural and historical evolution of Old Europe nations. Thus, *economic, political, and judicial norms* are intertwined with *cultural and democratic values* promoted along the European construction process. These structural components contribute to *the definition of European frontiers as dynamic, permeable lines, which limit a space permanently reconstructed by the interdependencies and interactions between its members* (we are framed into the spirit of the *constructivist and reflectivist doctrines* that define the region as a process).

The complex system of norms and values mentioned above actually forms the European identity, which ensures regional cohesion, but at the same time determines the fragility of the connections between its members and functional imbalances (generated by incompatibilities, overlaps or even conflicting speeches and actions from regional or state actors). Even so, the entirety of European principles and policies express the idea that the frontiers of Europe, be they internal or external, "are limits of cooperation and not of separation"⁶, they are "open" frontiers with important implications on the nature of the EU as a political community⁷.

The definition and analysis of European frontiers are based on a complex and multidisciplinary approach, given that frontiers influence economic development, security, freedom and justice in the European space

³ Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, *Uniunea Europeană. Politicile extinderii [European Union. The policies of enlargement]*, Tritonic, București, 2006, p. 499

⁴ Fabienne Maron, „Les nouvelles frontières de l'Europe: repenser les concepts”, in *Eurolimes*, vol.4/2007, p. 112

⁵ Malcolm Anderson, Eberhard Bort, *The Frontiers of the European Union*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, p. 15

⁶ I. Gh. Bărbulescu, *op.cit.*, p. 450

⁷ M. Anderson and E. Bort, *op.cit.*, p. 113

and integrate aspects tied to European diversity, intercultural dialogue, deepening or enlargement processes⁸. If we take into account the consumer habits, national legislation or signed bilateral or multilateral agreements, we uncover new sectorial frontiers, which are reconstructed or are diluted: judicial, administrative, commercial, monetary, fiscal or budgetary ones⁹.

In this paper, we will only focus on the way in which economic norms define the European frontier and space, conditioning access to the Union and shaping the behavior of states with regards to economic policy.

The EU's economic frontier is shaped by the norms and criteria that limit and, at the same time, build the European economic space, namely:

- the economic criterion for EU accession (a functional market economy, capable to endure competitive pressures and markets forces within the EU),
- convergence criteria conditioning access to the monetary union (representing the economic test of evaluating the preparedness of an economy to participate in the Economic and Monetary Union)
- common economic policies governing the behavior and actions of Member States.

Considering the criteria defining the impermeable character of a frontier, we assert that the economic frontier is the most permeable of all forms, continuously generating interdependencies between economic actors, a fact which forms the uniqueness of the European market and shapes the economic space of the community.

To exemplify, we will analyze the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)/Euro zone accession process, which entails certain conditions to prove the economic stability of state actors and their ability to maintain a healthy economic environment. These criteria follow economic convergence, which must be accomplished on two plans, the nominal and the real one.

Nominal convergence refers to the fulfillment of monetary and budgetary convergence conditions that were introduced as part of the Maastricht Treaty, which impose the following: government deficit should be not more than 3%; the consumer price inflation rate should be not more than 1.5 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member States; the long-term interest rate should be not more than 2 percentage points above the rate of the three best performing Member States in terms of price stability; the exchange rate should remain within the

⁸ F. Maron, *op.cit.*, p.112-113

⁹ Rémi Colliat, Fabien Labondance, „Européanisation des frontières économiques: le cas franco-allemand”, in *Trajectoires*, 2 (2008) - *Frontières en question*, <http://trajectoires.revues.org/196#ftn7>, accessed August 8, 2015

ERM II for at least 2 years without severe tensions. All these criteria lead towards a common objective: a high convergence rate of economic and monetary policies of Member States to strengthen the credibility of the European economic system.

Real convergence aims to accomplish a high level of cohesion of the structure of the states wishing to integrate in the EMU by diminishing the gaps between countries in terms of prices and productivity, implying the growth of the income of the developing countries to the level of developed countries. Thus, real convergence expresses "the convergence of life standards of the real GDP per capita towards the Euro zone level"¹⁰. Real convergence, as a component of the EU specific economic norms, is measured with the following criteria: the degree of openness of an economy (expressed in the share of imports and exports in the GDP), the share of the bilateral trade between the EU Member States in the total of external trade, the structure of the economy (expressed in the share of different sectors in the make-up of the GDP) and the GDP per capita.¹¹

The convergence criteria mentioned above support the idea that the creation of the UEM was based on the desire to coordinate the European economic policies in order to reduce or eliminate the externalities between the Member States¹². Thus, the hypothesis stated in the beginning is confirmed, namely that the European frontier is *open*, forming a dynamic economic space based on collaboration and interdependencies between state and non-state actors. Within this space, the structural and macroeconomic policies are defined by the *Broad Economic Policy Guidelines of the European Union*, which aim to increase the compatibility between different European policies through the coordination of Member State policies. At the same time, the guidelines support the objectives of the *Europe 2020* strategy, whose main instrument is the *European Semester*¹³ – a coordination cycle for budgetary and economic policies within the EU, which aims to align the budgetary and economic policies of the states to EU-wide objectives and norms.

¹⁰ Mugur Isărescu, „Convergența nominală versus convergența reală” [„Nominal convergence versus real convergence”], București, aprilie 2015, p. 22, http://ec.europa.eu/romania/images/20042015_mugur_isarescu.pdf

¹¹ Mugur Isărescu, „România: Drumul către Euro” [„Romania: Road to the Euro”], 2007, p. 6, http://www.ugir1903.ro/download/BNR_Drumul_catre_euro.pdf, accessed February 28, 2008

¹² Andrew Brociner, *Europa monetară. SME, UEM, moneda unică*, [Monetary Europe. EMS, UEM, Single currency], Institutul European, Iași, 1999, p. 65

¹³ European Parliament/Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), *Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and Employment Guidelines*, [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/542652/IPOL_ATA\(2015\)542652_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2015/542652/IPOL_ATA(2015)542652_EN.pdf)

The European Semester covers three blocks for economic policy coordination: structural reforms (focused on the promotion of economic growth and employment in accordance with Europe 2020); budgetary policies (to ensure the sustainability of public finances in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact) and prevention of excessive macroeconomic imbalances¹⁴.

The economic policy guidelines are part of the guiding and monitoring process within the European Semester. The national reform programs, presented to the Commission every spring, are based on guidelines, which are references for the adoption of country specific recommendations as a result of the program evaluation. In case the Commission sees incompatibilities between the economic policies of a Member State and the EU economic guidelines or sees threat to the functioning of the EMU, it may issue a warning¹⁵. Thus, the guidelines constitute an additional instrument in order to ensure economic cohesion and cooperation between European actors.

Another instrument part of the framework of norms defining the EU economic frontier is the *Growth and Stability Pact* (GSP), formed of a set of norms meant to guarantee that the EU Member States do due diligence to have solid public finance and coordinate fiscal policies. This has two components: a preventive one (mandating EU Member State governments to respect the commitments made regarding the application of solid fiscal policies and coordination measures, establishing a budgetary objective for each of them) and a correction one (aimed at correcting excessive budgetary deficits or excessive public debt)¹⁶.

Convergence criteria, Economic policy guidelines, the European Semester, the Growth and Stability Pact, they all converge to the idea of a dynamic economic frontier, aimed at ensuring the cohesion of members instead of separating different regional and national economic spaces. The economic frontier of Europe gains a new and novel function, namely that it is the main convergence instrument of the EU's economic policies and a defining one of the economic identity specific to this macro-region. It contributes to the creation of the external image of the European Union, as major regional bloc, with a well-built and clear external trading policy that integrates and sustains intra-Community economic policies. Furthermore,

¹⁴ European Council, Council of the European Union, *European Semester*
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/european-semester/>

¹⁵ European Parliament/Economic Governance Support Unit (EGOV), *Broad Economic Policy Guidelines...*

¹⁶ European Commission, *Growth and Stability Pact*,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm

the EU's role as a prime global economic actor is one of the strengths in the studies on the perception of the macro-region in the external environment.

The European model of economic integration

The European Union is a successful project in the field of economic integration, which followed the model of regional organization focused on the common market (unlike NAFTA, which adopted the free trade agreement model), characterized by the complementarity between the negative integration mechanisms (liberalisation of markets) and those of positive integration (coordination and harmonisation of policies). The European integration is considered by many a model of economic coordination, characterized by a closed and powerful institutional coordination¹⁷. And the EU enlargement rhythm differentiates it from the other integration areas, being considered as a really fast one¹⁸.

The European model of regional organization followed a progressive path (representing a variation of the linear integration model suggested by Balassa¹⁹ in 1961, with different levels of integration - free trade area, customs union, common market, economic union and complete economic integration), passing through the following steps: customs union (that requires the removal of the tariff and non-tariff barriers from the trade relations between Member countries and the adoption of a common customs tariff in the relations with the third countries); common market (a customs union in which all restrictions on the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital are eliminated); economic union (characterized by a high level of coordination of the economic policies of the Member States); monetary union (an economic union with a common currency for all Member States).

The uniqueness of the European Union's regional governing system is insured by the following characteristics:²⁰

- a political system with own legislative, executive and judiciary structure;
- a lower autonomy of the Member States, as a result of the legislative harmonization determined by the adoption of the "Community acquis";

¹⁷ Jan-Erik Lane, 'The European Union and NAFTA as Models of Regional Organization', in Nikolai Genov (ed.), *Global Trends and Regional Development*, Routledge, New York, 2012, p. 47

¹⁸ Willem Molle, *Economia integrării europene* [The Economics of European Integration], Editura Epigraf, Chișinău, 2009, p. 37

¹⁹ Bela Balassa, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, 1961, p. 2

²⁰ J. E. Lane, *op.cit.*, p. 51

- the implementation of a decision-making system within which each Member State exercises a considerable influence using *soft* and *hard* coordination methods;
- the clear identification of regional competences;
- the determination of the States' influence degree at government and parliamentary level;
- the distancing from the principle of humanity, which generates very high transaction costs in the case of other regional organizations.

Today, the European Union represents the largest trading bloc in the world, having 28 Member States, a functional single market with over 500 million people, making approximately 30% of the global GDP and 20% of the worldwide trade²¹. Its influence on the global trade is considerable, since it is the biggest importer and exporter of the world. EU's evolution as global actor also influenced its policy in the field of the external trading, ranking it not only as a global economic superpower, but also as an important player in the multilateral trade system²².

The European Union uses within the external trading policy three major types of trade agreements²³, through which it offers to partner countries special access to the EU market for most non-agricultural products:

- *Preferential agreements* (concluded with the Maghreb countries- Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia - with the Mashreq countries - Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria - and Israel) that grant trade concessions on the basis of reciprocity. Through these agreements the common external tariff is eliminated or significantly reduced for industrial goods, except for textiles. Most agricultural products are not included in these agreements, not being object of the trade liberalisation between EU and these countries.
- *Association agreements* (concluded with Turkey, Israel, Moldova, Ukraine). These agreements allow the access of industrial goods from the signatory countries on the European market. In many cases these agreements have represented the first step for the accession of different states to the EU, and subsequent to these countries' accession to have complete access to the European single market.
- *Trade relations*, which occur between EU and former colonies of Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, being regulated through the Lomé

²¹ European Commission, *Economic and financial affairs*,
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/international/index_en.htm

²² Megan Dee, *The European Union in a Multipolar World: World Trade, Global Governance and the Case of the WTO*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015, p. 46

²³ Phil Harris, Frank McDonald, *European Business and Marketing*, Sage Publications, London, 2004, p. 56

Convention of 1975. These agreements involve the liberalisation of trade with industrial products (except for textiles) and free access to the single market of agricultural goods not included in the Common Agricultural Policy. Many other developing countries are subject of the Generalised System of Preferences of the WTC, which grants them preferential access to the EU market.

Western Europe countries that are not EU members concluded special agreements with the Union by means of which they undertake to comply with the community provisions on the free movement of goods and services for most products, except the agricultural ones that are covered by the Common Agricultural Policy.

The agreements which the EU concluded with third countries prove its will to expand its influence and to promote globally its economic interests. At the same time, we note (especially in recent years, in the international context marked by the financial crisis) the distancing from the multilateral negotiation framework and the multiplication of the bilateral initiatives in the relations with the outside. The exact and individual approach of the non-member states is preferred by the officials from Brussels not only in the economic field, but also in that of the neighbourhood policy or communication actions.

If initially the European Union was constituted as a response to globalization, out of the wish to profit from its advantages and to counteract the power and influence of other regional poles, through the characteristics, structures and relations it has created on the path of its evolution, this transformed in a powerful stimulus of the globalization process, representing a symbol of liberalisation, a global actor at economic, social and political level. The strategic position of the UE on the global stage is one of "power beyond power", associated to the concepts of "civil" or "normative" power, according to which it uses the forms of civil or normative influence to convince the others and to determine them to act in accordance with its purpose and actions²⁴. The instruments used by the EU in order to accomplish this role at international level are persuasion and communication, and its style in the multilateral negotiations is a *soft* one oriented towards consensus.

In the negotiations from the trade policy field, when the position of key-actor is recognized at global level, EU has in most cases a proactive role²⁵: it actively follows the objectives to be negotiated, most times it makes the first step, it formulates requests that can establish the tone of the negotiations, and when necessary, it works together with the others to reach

²⁴ M. Dec, *op.cit.*, p. 33

²⁵ *Ibidem*, 35, 42

a consensus so as to successfully complete a negotiation and to conclude the agreement. Thus, the EU pro actively defends its internal interests (especially in the agricultural field) and at the same time has initiatives that circumscribe to the promotion of its reformist objectives for continuing trade liberalisation. However, in recent years the EU evolved progressively from the pro active position to a reactive one, noticed by the experts within the Doha Round of the WTC's multilateral trade negotiation. Having in sight the new global context marked by multipolarity and the positions of the new emerging countries within the international negotiations, the role of the EU within the WTC underwent changes, the union changing from a reformist and pro active leader into a spectator or observer (roles specific to the negotiation reactive strategy). Now, its approach includes elements characteristic to both orientations (pro active and reactive), in order to meet the new geopolitical realities of the world²⁶.

EU's position and image in the world still is the subject of lively debates. Due to the fact that the European Union is not an ordinary state, but a complex and multidimensional organization, its structure, policies, actions and strategies can create confusion for the outside environment. In her analysis related to the measure in which the EU is perceived as leader in world politics, Sonia Lucarelli presents the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's global leadership²⁷. The author considers as positive the perceptions of the EU as model of regional integration, global economic power and promoter of human rights, development and multilateralism (thanks to its own values), while the negative perceptions are related to the inconsistency between EU's policies and attitude in the diplomatic negotiations (being perceived as having a subordinate position to the USA). Its *soft* style of negotiation is appreciated in some cases, but at the same time it is criticised, being considered much too weak or denoting a condescending attitude. According to Lucarelli, there is an obvious discrepancy between recognizing EU's leadership potential (from the economic perspective and that of the values) and the perception of leadership that manifests itself in real life, the EU being perceived as unable to transform itself from a potential leader into a real one.

Conclusions

The emergence of the regional blocs, as growth poles of global economy, represents a new step in defining and structuring the economic

²⁶*Ibidem*, 91-92

²⁷ Sonia Lucarelli, 'The EU's Leadership in Global Governance: Perceptions from the Others', in Natalia Chaban and Martin Holland (eds.), *Communicating Europe in Times of Crisis*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2014, p. 45-64

frontiers, especially in the era of instantaneous communication and of capital market liberalisation, which generated serious issues regarding the governance model both of the states, as well as of the organisms that undertake global governance.

If initially the European Union was constituted to counteract the effects generated by globalization (the increase of the power and influence of some regional poles), through the structures and relations it has created on the path of its evolution, this transformed into a powerful stimulus of the globalization process, representing a symbol of the liberalisation, a global actor at economic, social and political level.

The dynamic and fluent economic frontiers of the European Union define a macro-regional structure with unique characteristics in the world, which has enough power to globally promote its economic interests, but encounters problems at political level regarding the capacity to exercise leadership.

The economic frontier of Europe is the main convergence instrument of the EU's economic policies and a defining one of the economic identity specific to this macro-region. It contributes to the creation of the external image of the European Union, as major regional bloc, with a well-built and clear external trading policy that integrates and sustains intra-Community economic policies. Furthermore, the EU's role as a prime global economic actor is one of the strengths in the studies on the perception of the macro-region in the external environment.

Abstract

The dynamic economic frontiers of the European Union define a macro-regional structure with unique characteristics in the world, which has enough power to globally promote its economic interests, but encounters problems at political level regarding the capacity to exercise leadership.

The economic frontier of Europe is the main convergence instrument of the EU's economic policies and a defining one of the economic identity specific to this macro-region. It contributes to the creation of the external image of the European Union, as major regional bloc, with a well-built and clear external trading policy that integrates and sustains intra-Community economic policies.

Keywords: *region, economic frontiers, European Union*

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Identity as frontier in Central and Eastern Europe. The case of the Republic of Moldova

Mircea BRIE*

Beyond the many facets of the identity, the one perspective of the identity cleavage in Central and Eastern Europe often appears to be very real and proven time and time again by more or less recent historical realities. Identity, be it that of an individual, of a group or of a community can generate both convergence and divergence in a rapport with the other. The other one, a true dichotomy, becomes the expression of the “one beyond” - - beyond what is specific to me, to my identity. A border, be it symbolic or ideological, can thus be identified around such identity constructions. The region of Central and Eastern Europe not only is no exception to this rule, but in our assertion it is the space that requires perhaps the most among all European states such identity frontiers.

Methodologically, the focus of our analysis falls primarily on the borders of identity arising from ethno-religious or cultural specificity, but also on the nature of mentalities specific to this area. Theoretically and methodologically we must emphasize the fact that our attention is drawn by both general European identity together with the more particular one, that of the national, regional or local identity. The conceptual perspective gives a clear demarcation and establishment of policy analysis, just to make the operationalization of concepts easier and more useful in terms of *achieving the set overall objective*.

Our analysis undertakes, from a spatial standpoint, to consider the realities of identity recorded in the area of Central and Eastern Europe, with an emphasis on identity aspects from the Republic of Moldova space.

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1. Identity at European, national and regional level - conceptual perspective¹

Starting off from the general aproach of the social sciences concerning the identity as being the description of features and the expression of the individuality of a person affiliated with a group or community, we find the existence of a construction both subjective and objective in relation to the common identity. This assertion involves aspects which are both universal and specific, introduced by the particular, often by the local-regional mentality constructions, so important in defining identity. Identity construction aparently placed on the same level of analysis can have different connotations.

Identity, irrespective of the level (European, national or regional/local), is reflected as a form of public expression despite the universalist trends, despite globalization or uniforming the values, the characteristics or the expressions of a community. Ethno-religious identity elements are found in the public global space and also in forms multiplied through the channels of propagation of the global. So not only the global multiply, but also the particular the specifics. The latter, often taking forms of extremism, nationalism, ethno-religious violence, are multiplied by gaining followers at thousands of kilometers away. Then the national and ethnic state associated to the national territory, has managed not only to survive the pressures of “global society”, but has demonstrated a greater affiliation capacity. The *identity globalization* has proven proved to be stronger in urban and industrialized societies; where there are consistent rural areas with rich cultural heritage and traditions a strong resistance to globalization has developed². Thus the local identity, the one at national-cultural level, is preserved stronger within rural-agrarian areas and within the areas of proximity to cultural reference sites. Such a fact does not preclude parallel development and strengthening of a supranational European identity. Conceptually, we witness this relation seemingly antagonistic: European identity versus national/local identity. A causal relationship, seen in both directions, can be observed regarding the deepening of European identity construction and in connection with economic development, social welfare, with confidence in the economy. The period of prosperity and economic growth at the beginning of the process of European integration *has strengthened the European identity and the feeling of European belonging*. In response,

¹ See for further details the chapter *Image of identity in Europe. Antagonism of interpretations* din studiul *Identity rematch in the European space* elaborat împreună cu Daniela Blaga (2015), various references have been made to the cntents of this study.

² Florin Poenaru, *Republica Moldova: complexul de superioritate al României*, <http://www.criticatac.ro/18342/republica-moldova-ca-sindrom/>, accesat în data de 26.06.2015

in the context of current economico-social and geopolitical crises we have been witnessing the „*identity rematch*” and „*the feeling of returning to the historical, national and cultural identity*”. The perspective can be catalogued as rigid and difficult to prove as long as both the European Union and the nation states are interested in the welfare and prosperity within the EU. But the discussion makes room for political and media elements. The theory of „scapegoating” quickly finds its aplicability while *the other* is to blame for the decline in living standards, for the high unemployment (in these circumstances it may be the guilty EU, the guilty nation states, other peoples, immigrants, etc.). Or this is precisely here where we identify the potentially negative effect on the European identity building process³.

The equation of debates on European identity can be extended to analyze European interests versus national interests of countries that make up the union. Common interests can bring to the discussion table national states. The European construction, also in terms of identity, can benefit from the negotiations and compromises between states. When the discussion reaches issues related to the vital interests of the states everything⁴ can change, and the common edifice begins to falter. The effect can be both positive (in the sense that states are more conciliatory and cooperative when their primordial interests are threatened from outside). „National interests combine usually security with material concerns, on the one hand, and moral and ethical concerns, on the other hand”⁵. Beyond national or European interests, the question can open to national preferences or the EU’s preferences, as an international organization. Andrew Moravcsik makes reference to the three levels of analysis (internal / domestic, inter-state and supranational) and proposes a model regarding the

³ Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space...*

⁴ For more details, see the typology of national interests done by Hans Morgenthau, who proposes to group them on vital interests (geered on the existence, security and survival of the state) and secondary interests (political, economic, cultural, social, human, ethno-religious or environmental). Hans Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni. Lupta pentru putere și lupta pentru pace*, Iași. Polirom. 2007; Apud Petre Duțu, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Interesele naționale și folosirea instrumentelor de putere națională pentru promovarea și apărarea acestora. Cazul României*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare „Carol I”, București, 2010, p. 8-13. Anastasia Cujba, Cristina Ejova, *Repere istoriografice și teoretico-conceptuale ale cercetării interesului național*, in *Studia Universitatis Moldaviae, Revista Științifică a Universității de Stat din Moldova*, 2013, nr.3(63), p. 32-38.

⁵ S. Huntington, *The Erosion of American National Interests*, in *Foreign Affairs*, Published by: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, vol.76, no.5, p. 28-49.

impact of national preferences on economic realities⁶, which can be extended to a wider framework, that of the decision-making⁷.

Beyond the economic realities, we propose three levels of analysis in regard to the concept of identity: the European level, the national level and the regional level. A European citizen can be Italian, German or Romanian. At the same time an Italian citizen can be Sicilian, Neapolitan, Venetian, Piedmontese, Tuscan etc. A German citizen can be a Bavarian, Saxon, Prussian or Austrian. Likewise, Transylvanians, Oltenians, Banat or Moldovans can together express the feeling of Romanian belonging.

The specialised literature captures the dispute over establishing the identity of a person or community. The process consists of two dimensions: self-identification and hetero-identification. In both cases, own identification and the identification done by someone else, the debate on the identity involves elements which are both objective and subjective. Unlike the concept of *national origin*, which refers to something given, inherited by birth, *national identity* is, above all, the expression of the awareness of belonging to a cultural community that is defined as a political community. This is the reality to which Ernest Renan refers when characterizing nation, suggestively, as a „daily plebiscite”⁸. National identity in this case is linked to the concept of nation, the latter understood as a population which shares a territory (to which it reports through the historical dimension), shared myths and historical memory, a mass culture, a common economy, and rights and legal liabilities common to each member (the latter making reference to the state political organization).

This analysis supposes the existence of: 1. a segment of population living on a certain territory; 2. a certain type of relation that expresses the awareness of identity and belonging, a real “community space”⁹. such a perspective on the nation is in agreement with the Westphalian state philosophy that places at the core the idea of a state-nation-territory.

Conceptually, the whole edifice identity comprises at least two specific elements from the time of its construction:

- National identity born of ethnicity

⁶ Andrew Moravcsik *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1993, vol. 31, issue 4, p. 497-498.

⁷ For more details, see Ana Maria (Ghimiş) Costea, “*National Preferences of the EU and NATO Member States at the Eastern Border. Study Case: Romania and Poland*”, doctoral thesis, Babeş-Bolyai University from Cluj-Napoca, 2015.

⁸ Apud Gábor Flóra, *Identitate şi ideologie naţională: o perspectivă socio-istorică*, in Balogh Brigitta, Bernáth Krisztina, Bujalos István, Adrian Hatos, Murányi István (coord.), *Identitate europeană, naţională şi regional. Teorie şi practică*, Editura Partium, Oradea, 2011, p. 114.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 115

- National identity born of civic affiliation / citizenship

In the first case, the national identity serves a particular ethnic group often found in competition with other ethnic groups (most often present in the same space reference). The prospect gives rise to expressions of nationalist-tribal expressions that may involve exclusion of representatives of other ethnic groups.

In the second situation, the civic dimension serves the state, often leading to patriotism (a rather positive outlook if compared against the first situation when we are dealing with a negative connotation perspective!).

The analysis of the two dimensions lead some analysts to identify the major differences in the conceptual debate about the identity in Central and Eastern Europe versus the USA. The essential difference is that the European national identity answers the question of who is Romanian, Hungarian, Slovak etc. (so what makes us different from one another), while the American national identity seeks to identify those elements that are common to citizens (what makes citizens who are different in various situations in ethno-cultural contexts be Americans?)¹⁰. This conceptual dispute between national identity / European and American nation can be extrapolated to the European space as well. The idea of nationality is perceived differently in the Western Europe and Central Eastern Europe. In most Western countries the national identity has been built mainly around the idea of citizenship, and the state territory of the term has become therefore the fundamental reference for “national territory” - the *civic dimension of national identity*. Eastern Europe took a different path of development, in which *ethnicity* has had a fundamental role in building the national identity - the *ethnic dimension of national identity*¹¹. Thus, the western model of nation stresses the centrality of national territory or homeland of the nation, while the Eastern model is concerned with ethnicity and cultural ties. A fundamental characteristic of state construction of the Eastern European type is permanent lack of *legitimacy* or rather, their incomplete legitimacy. By identifying the state with a single national identity, other national communities inevitably found themselves outside this process of legitimization, which was a *fundamental source of inter-ethnic tension*. This reality has led to the sacralisation of the state territory considered *national territory*¹² (property of the one nation / nationalities!) and the cultural-historical philosophy is to un-legitimize as much as possible the contribution of other national community¹³. Reported to the European level of analysis on the concept of European identity, the legitimate question is whether we are talking about a common European identity or, in contrast, about the

¹⁰ István Bujalos, *Identitatea personală și națională în filosofia americană*, în Balogh Brigitta, Bernáth Krisztina, Bujalos István, Adrian Hatos, Murányi István (coord.), *Identitate europeană, națională și regional. Teorie și practică*, Editura Partium, Oradea, 2011, p. 79-91.

¹¹ Gábor Flóra, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 118-128.

¹³ Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space...*

presence of identity borders in Europe. Some identity cleavage can be observed between western and eastern Europe. This reality is given by the historical, cultural, religious and political heritage.

The borders of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) today are the result of a complex process carried out in recent decades after the fall of communist regimes in this part of Europe. During the Cold War, Europe was divided in two by the two military blocs (NATO and the Warsaw Pact). The line between the two military blocs emerged as a *hard* border, *closed*, called the Iron Curtain. Subsequently, the enlargement of the EU and NATO's eastward through the integration of most former communist states in this part of Europe, led to the disappearance of this *barrier* that separated Europeans from Europeans. This process did not remove the distinct identity of the West against the East¹⁴. Moreover, in our opinion, the last decades of the communist period and the post-communist transition exposed a separate identity of Central Europe compared to western and eastern European continent¹⁵. The possible identity cleavage in the European space can be extended to an analysis such as north versus south. The current context of financial crisis, the sovereign debt crises, exposed to the media and public opinion, a European North more rigorous and more attentive with their money, more interested in accumulating, more protestant if we are to refer to the Weberian theory¹⁶, and an European South more spendthrift, indebted, more wasteful, more catholic and orthodox (in its east part - with direct reference to the Greek state to state that has been in the public attention in recent years)¹⁷.

Without claiming to exhaust all conceptual disputes regarding the European identity, the regional-European or national identity, we conclude by referring to the diversity recorded in Europe, and to the distinct manner, sometimes antagonistic, in which the European identity has evolved as a east-west or north-south dichotomy, with particular emphasis in Central Europe. This space, in relation to identity, acquires specific meanings given its location between Catholic Europe, Protestant Europe and Orthodox Europe; between Germanic, Latin and Slavic Europe.

¹⁴ Mircea Brie, *European enlargement and new frontiers Central and Eastern Europe*, in *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea, Cluj-Napoca*, LIX, 1, 2014, p. 113-130.

¹⁵ For more details on this topic we recommend consulting the doctoral thesis signed by Alexandra Tieanu, *Europa Centrală, 1989-2004: perspective culturale și geopolitice*, Cluj-Napoca, 2012.

¹⁶ See the main theses of Max Weber from his famous work *Etica Protestantă și spiritul capitalismului*, published in Germania in 1904.

¹⁷ Mircea Brie, Dana Blaga, *Identity rematch in the European space...*

2. Identity realities on the eastern border of the European Union

Positioned in the eastern part of the EU, the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe have faced problems arising more often from the presence of a wide variety of ethno-confessional diversity on their own territory. This structure of the population, with numerous and consistent minority communities, has been the center of debate regarding not only the socio-economic balanced climate, but also the societal or even existential security of these countries. Most often minorities are seen as factors of instability and less as integrators.

Ethnic and cultural boundaries do not overlap with those of the states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). We identify symbolic “frontiers” of the identity type that separate more or less human communities on ethnic or cultural criteria.

The Euro-Atlantic integration of these countries has led to political cooperation and openness in the management of minority-majority relations. A key element of the accession agreements of most states in Central and Eastern Europe was linked to the treatment of national minorities, including the management of the “border” between minority and majority¹⁸.

The Roma issue, or the issue of the Russians in the Baltic countries, the “inheritance” left by former multinational empires present in past centuries in this space are just some of the sensitive issues. The EU has identified these problems acting both before and after the accession of CEE countries to the EU.

The attachment of these states to the EU is strongly linked to the development of a strong European identity to these people. Most often this feeling does not come into opposition with the attachment to the national or regional / local identity; this is despite the fact that over the last decade we could see an oscillation demonstrating close links between the three types of identities (strengthening of one weakened the other and viceversa).

Amid crises that have become structural, during in the last decade the European identity of EU citizens, linked to the attachment to the Union has been steadily eroded. In parallel, the European citizens have found refuge in national or regional identities. Unfortunately for the EU, these new

¹⁸ For more information, see Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Le frontiere europée – espressioni dell'identità*, in *Transylvanian Review*, ISI Journal, vol. XXIII, supliment nr.1, 2014, p. 202-216; Mircea Brie, *European enlargement and new frontiers Central and Eastern Europe*, in *Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai, Series Europaea, Cluj-Napoca*, LIX, 1, 2014, p. 113-130; Mircea Brie, Ioan Horga, *Europa: frontiere culturale interne sau areal cultural unitar*, în *Moldoscopie*, nr. 3 (I), 2010, Chişinău, p. 123-143; Alina Stoica, Mircea Brie, *The Cultural frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study*, în *The Cultural frontiers of Europe, Eurolimes*, vol. 9, volum editat de Alina Stoica, Didier Francfort, Judit Csoba Simonne, Oradea, 2010, p. 5-8.

ways of expressing identity have lead to the strengthening of Euroskepticism, to the development of extremism, nationalism and xenophobia.

The ethno-religious identity brings more cleavages -- borders -- between people.

In what follows we propose an analysis of the influences that various crises have had during the last decade on European, national or local attachment¹⁹.

If in 2007 the average commitment of European citizens towards the EU was 53%, in 2014 it dropped to 45%. With few exceptions (including Poland and Romania - two countries in the East, one in which there has been economic recession during the crisis and another, Romania, where its citizens have got to have more confidence in Brussels to tackle corruption and poverty only its own state institutions), in European countries the proportion of those who feel attached to the EU declined. It is interesting to note, however, how this decline has occurred in some states. In 2007 we have a high level of adherence to the EU for citizens of countries like Italy, Spain, Belgium, Hungary and Poland. By 2014, the citizens of this state attachment evolved very differently. Poland is the only country where the EU attachment is on the increase slope. Hungary and Belgium are two states which show similarities because although knowing a significant decline in the level of attachment to the EU, they do not seem to be cases concerned to transfer that attachment to their countries or places of residence (see comparative Annexes 2-4). Of these five countries, Spain and Italy constitute a special group. In these countries, which have benefited greatly from membership of the European Union, there is a very strong local and regional identity, but also with significant immigrant communities. The drop in devotion to the EU is very steep in Italy (from 62% - 2007 39% - 2014) and Spain (from 62% - 2007 46% - 2014). In these countries, hit hard by the recession, with serious problems of over-indebtedness, where large communities of immigrants accept jobs poorly paid, with high levels of unemployment among natives, attachment citizens are not transferred even to own countries (the attachment in one's country is among the lowest in the EU) but in places of residence, at local or regional level. The strong local or regional identity captures the citizens' attachment to these countries (see Annex 4).

By comparing the two times (2007 and 2014) we found that the attachment to the European Union moves to two categories of states: states in a geographically central axis and to Eastern states. This group of states includes France, Belgium and Germany (central states in the process of European

¹⁹ This study develops ideas and conclusions previously shown in the study *Identity rematch in the European space* (2015), elaborated together with Dana Blaga.

construction), to which, in the same central axis, we would place also Poland, accompanied from the eastern axis by Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic States. The logic compels us to accept that in crisis situations, countries such as Germany, France and Belgium and their citizens understand the meaning, role and importance of the European Union. In this equation of confidence in the Union we can place the newly entered EU member states from the east. We wonder, is this the same in the case of identity? The essence and the future support of Europe lies in the New Europe?

By comparison with the attachment to the European Union, the attachment to their own country reveals a different behaviour of citizens of European states. Note that this attachment is high in all European countries, the EU average being 91% in 2014. In the group of countries with a higher share of the population who feel attached to their country except for Austria, the other countries are geographically positioned at the EU's periphery, in the west, north, south and east. We note the geographical distribution of these countries compared to the somewhat compact middle position of countries where the population feels attached to the European Union (2014).

A strong attachment to home settlements, to local or regional area, is obvious in the countries of southern and eastern flanks. Together with Portugal, Poland, Austria, Slovakia and Greece, whose populations are proving to be very attached to their country, the group of countries with the population attached to the local factor lie countries like Italy, Bulgaria and Romania. These latter countries are found to be related to the local community also because of the failure of national policy.

CEE countries generally prove to be attached to the EU now than in 2007. The national and local attachment, even if it strengthens the most part, they are influenced by realities related to domestic politics, to the public confidence in the governing act etc.

3. Identity realities in the Republic of Moldova

Without proposing to analyze the full spectrum of identity in Moldova, during this study we wish to identify *possible identity cleavages* that shape the borders of identity.

Our *hypothesis* is that in this state there are realities that converge towards the daily expression of community and identity frontiers. These frontiers can be identified both in terms of ethno-national identity, and in terms of religious identity. In both situations the political and geopolitical implications are very important and acquire the value of critical factors in the development of identity.

Methodologically, we mention that during this study we do not aim to resolve fundamental issues in any way, nor to clarify possible existential dilemmas of identity or controversy, older or newer. Our *objectives* are to

analyze possible identity realities that can generate at the societal level some cleavages which take the form of identity borders. As such, our debate is geared towards *identifying* these borders, to argue them through the possible cleavage they produce. The fact remains that in our assumption, the existence of a border identity does not necessarily mean a dislodging, a discontinuity, but can be interpreted as a contact area for cultural identity. Such contact area can generate not only a multicultural expression but also the development of an intercultural society in which cleavages fade.

During this analysis, we propose a *general discussion on issues of identity*, often of great sensitivity in the area of the Republic of Moldova. As it is understandable, such an analysis could stir emotions born of latent manifestations in the public space. From the beginning, we highlight the fact that we do not intend to find truths or answers, but to identify possible identity borders. We do not wish to position ourselves on one side or another of the debates (the existence of identity borders requires the presence of at least two identity construction that meet, often located at opposite ends!).

Each of the general themes identified as generators of identity borders/frontiers have constituted in themselves fundamental thesis that require complex analyses, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

3.1. National identity, or about being Moldovan

A controversy arises, like the case of Macedonia, in regard to the very name of the state east of the Prut. The Principality of Moldova, by the Treaty of Bucharest between the Ottoman and Tsarist Empires lost the east bank of the Prut. After this date the state continued to exist only in the west of the river, and then by uniting with the Romanian Country (1859) that statehood was transferred to the Romanian state.

The territory between the Prut and the Dniester, called Bessarabia (indeed, more by the Romanians from Romania) recorded several steps in the period following the Russian annexation: 1. till 1918, belonging to the Tsarist Empire; 2. the period from 1918-1940, when Bessarabia was part of the Greater Romania; 3. period 1940-1991, the Soviet period; 4. aftermath of the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Moldova.

The symbolism of the Moldovan statehood, despite the more recent rhetoric, goes back to a glorious early Middle Ages of the first Moldavian rulers (claimed to be Romanian by the Principality of Moldova which was not occupied by the Russians in 1812).

Being Moldovan, as an identity construct, has brought many polemics and controversies regardless of where it was viewed and analyzed. But it was used each time for political or geopolitical reasons. The controversy lacks clarification at home, without having to extend this debate

in other geographical areas whose geopolitical interests do not converge towards the same goals. The *Moldovenism* versus *Romanianism* debate has ignited spirits east of the Prut often fueled more or less from the west to the east. The two perspectives seem to be diametrically opposed. The Romanian perspective includes the Moldovans together with Transylvanian, Oltenians, Muntenians, among Romanians (being Moldavian is not an ethno-national-linguistic identity, but a regional and geographical one!). The Moldovenism perspective excludes the common identity, of nation and language, or any superimposed identity like the Bavarians are Germans, and Germans are Europeans (to be Moldovan means de facto not to be Romanian and viceversa!).

Without much importance that moldovenism was created and fed by the Tsarist or Soviet partisans, it massively served the political interests of the government from Chisinau after the proclamation of independence .

Initially it tried to create a nation-state in which the Romanian language was recognized as the official language and the doctrine of “one nation, two states” was officially accepted by both sides of the Prut. The national minorities, with intense external suport reconciled hard with this reality and reacted. “Imaginary dangers” of the union between the young Moldovan state with Romania and discrimination according to ethnic or linguistic criteria generated the beginning of a dual secession process in the eastern and southern regions of the republic, a process that culminated in the outbreak of armed conflict on the left bank of the Dniester”²⁰.

The Moldovan President Mircea Snegur officially renounce this doctrine on 29 July 1994 with the adoption of the new Constitution²¹. The thesis regarding the Moldovan identity, different from the Romanian identity, is repeated and amplified. Used by Tsarist and Soviet partisans to justify separation from the Romanian state, now it serves political interests that talk about national interest, namely preserving the Moldovan statehood that would be threatened.

In theory, the moldovenism as identity construct is used in the sense of developing a national identity of civic-related citizen. Its new identity aims to pull together all Moldovan citizens regardless of their ethno-national or linguistic options.

Even if the new authorities who took power in Chisinau from the Communists after 2008 changed the logic of argument identity, the

²⁰ Radj Cărbune, Identitatea națională a Republicii Moldova, <https://radjcarbune.wordpress.com/2010/12/02/identitatea-nationala-a-republicii-moldova/>, accessed in November 8, 2016.

²¹ See the text of the new Constitution adopted by the Moldovan state in 1994, <http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/mo/md/md046mo.pdf>, accesed in November 10, 2016.

moldovenism remains a factor that generates controversy. While some Moldovans proclaim their ethno-national identity and language to be Romanian, others with minorities present in this space, support the moldovenism, as distinct from the Romanian identity which they see as a threat of undermining the Moldovan statehood. So, in one country, the Republic of Moldova, we talk about Romanian Moldovans and the Moldovan Moldovans.

3.2. The Romanian language versus the Moldovan language

This controversy hinges on promoting the moldovenism as identity. The Moldovan language, as a language distinct from the Romanian language, serves the same political or geopolitical interests and objectives. Whatever the origin of this dispute, the Moldovan society is divided not only in relation to linguistic minorities, but also in relation to the language options of the ethno-national majority group.

The process of Russification of the tsarist and soviet periods was served by the implementation of the doctrine of two different languages: “Romanian” and “Moldovan”. Imperial multinational states, they in turn pointed fingers at the Romanian “imperialism” on to other people: the Moldovan people speaking another language, the Moldovan language.

The Moldovan Declaration of Independence (1991)²² makes clear reference to the “establishment of Romanian as a state language”, language that Moldovans used it and felt that it was identical to theirs.

For reasons explained briefly above, promoting the Moldovenism has become the official policy of the Chisinau authorities after 1994, deepening the confusion and controversy. The official language of Moldova is according to the new constitution, the “Moldovan language” in Latin script²³.

The contradiction has continued despite the attempts made by the new government to restore the rights of the Romanian language as the official language.

Only on 5 December 2013, the Constitutional Court of Moldova solved this dilemma and interminable dispute regarding the official language. Judges, in discussing the text of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution decided that the text of the document take precedence over the Constitution and “the state language of Moldova is Romanian”. “The Declaration of Independence is the legal and political fundamental of the Constitution so that no provision of the latter can exceed the Declaration of

²² See the text of Law no. 691 from 27.08.1991 on the Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Moldova, http://istoria.md/articol/573/Declara%C5%A3ia_de_Independen%C5%A3%C4%83_a_Republicii_Moldova, accessed in November 10, 2016.

²³ Constituția Republicii Moldova din 29.07.1994, art. 13.

Independence. The Court concluded that, in case of divergence between the text of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, the constitutional text of the Declaration of Independence primarily prevail. The decision is final and can not be subject to any appeal”, according to the president of the Constitutional Court, Alexandru Tanase²⁴.

Beyond the intervention of the Constitutional Court, controversy and disputes regarding the Moldovan identity are able to perpetuate this symbolic border, often used for ideological purposes.

3.3. Being a Romanian in the Republic of Moldova

Identifying an individual in Moldova as “Romanian” requires some nuances. Specificity given by the realities of this country make this identification to highlight several categories of “Romanians”.

The dispute between Moldovans and Romanians is based on the need to find an identity for residents east of the Prut. They are Moldovan citizens naturally. But there are ethno-national Romanian? Who are those who declare themselves to be Romanian? Naturally for many of them to identify as Romanian does not conflict with their status as Moldovan (civic identity, regional and geographic identity and so on).

We identify at least for categories of “Romanians” in Moldova:

a. those born in Romania, Romanian citizens or not, who have chosen to settle in this state for various reasons but preserve their identity as Romanians

b. those of Moldovan citizens who believe they are ethno-linguistic Romanians and asked for Romanian citizenship (the Romanian state has encouraged and promoted in the last decade the policy of granting dual citizenship to Moldovans)

c. those of Moldovan citizens who believe they are ethno-linguistic Romanian, but have not the Romanian citizenship (did not ask for it or did not get it!)

d. Moldovans who have received Romanian citizenship, although they identify as something other than Romanians (in this case to obtain Romanian passports has rather a socio-material motivation).

For a long time, long after the declaration of independence, a person declaring themselves Romanian may have been classified as unionist and as someone who attempted to destroy Moldova’s statehood.

²⁴ Curtea Constituțională: Limba de stat a Republicii Moldova este limba română, în *Timput.md*, 5 Decembrie 2014, <http://www.timput.md/articol/curtea-constituionala-limba-de-stat-a-republicii-moldova-este-limba-romana-67053.html>, accesat în data de 10 noiembrie 2016.

Then, being Romanian was not being part of an elitist group that represents power, a group that is extending a state's grand power. Instead, there are many nostalgic imperialist dating back to the Soviet era, when Moldova - always called "the poorest European state", was part of a global superpower.

The subject is broader and more complex. The Moldovan citizens' opinions are often able to give way to disputes and controversies regarding identity. During the documentation for this study we have had the opportunity to read various reviews posted on various forums to which we have access today thanks to globalization. For a better understanding of the nuances that we do not afford to analyze during this study, we recommend a forum where Moldovans were called to answer the question "Why are we not Romanian?" where there are over 2,300 comments pro and con to Moldovenism / Romanianism²⁵.

3.4. Being a Russian in the Republic of Moldova

The Russian community in Moldova was formed and developed in the years following the Treaty of Bucharest with the Moldovan territory east of the Prut being annexed by and to the Czarist Empire. From just a few thousand in 1820, the Russian community had grown to over 550,000 members in 1989, for a later decrease mainly due to migration to the Russian Federation. The census from 2004²⁶ (the latest made public) recorded the presence of a number of 201,218 Russians in Moldova (5.9% of total population), not including Transnistria (with the Russians here, this community adds up to 369,896, representing 9.4% of the population). This community, where the natives declared themselves Moldovan (with some declaring themselves Romanians) and Ukrainian, is the third in size and weights.

The Russian community became increasingly influential during the Soviet period, favored by Moscow's policies, including the "transfer" of people from one side to another of the USSR. Newcomers to Moldova, many originating from various Soviet republics had in common with the others the Russian language, which in time they adopted as their mother tongue. Most of them identified themselves as Russians.

The Russian language was a swinging factor in the identity in Moldova.

²⁵ <http://www.moldovenii.md/md/forum/posts/topic/179/page/1>, accesat în data de 10 noiembrie 2016.

²⁶ Biroul Național de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, *Recensământul Populației 2004*, <http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234>, accesat în data de 11 noiembrie 2016.

Moreover, the phenomenon is still ongoing. Many individuals who have declared Moldovan nationality (63,290 people) and Ukrainians (89,853 people), even Romanian (571 people) chose Russian as their mother tongue²⁷.

Russian is selected as the mother tongue of 380,796 people while the Russian nationality was chosen by only 201,218 people²⁸. A significant difference between those who declare themselves Russians and those who choose Russian as their mother tongue -- that is without counting the fact that a large share of the population (Moldovans, Ukrainians, etc.) currently use Russian in everyday life.

Our debate is not about the Russian language, but about being Russian in Moldova. The Russian language made many of them feel like they have Russian identity.

The Russian minority in Moldova, as well as other former Soviet states was not like other minorities. Collective mind, various templates and stereotypes often lead us to position some communities on higher pedestals compared to other groups. The Russian community has benefited greatly from the fact that it was not only a minority, but the extension of a majority, more or less discontinued.

This was and is an extension of power, of a symbolism, an imperial voice, an identity considered superior even through the privileged position that was fortunate enough to occupy. Or, all peripheral and marginal communities have always been tempted to aspire to a better societal position. See the case of the Gagauz, but also of the Ukrainians (the latter despite the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine) which, under the influence of the Russian media obviously tend towards an approach to Russian identity.

Trends have not been recorded in only one direction, many Russians accept the realities of the last quarter century or new statehood, the new language etc.

3.5. Orthodoxy in the Republic of Moldova: between Bucharest and Moscow

*The law on freedom of conscience, thought and religion*²⁹ provision preserves the old religion law in Moldova, which makes the state to register any religious organization that has at least 100 members. This reality has led to the emergence of parallel Orthodox religious organizations, each claiming

²⁷ *Ibidem*

²⁸ *Ibidem*

²⁹ Law No. 125 din from 11.05.2007, *Legea privind libertatea de conștiință, gândire și de religie*, published in 17.08.2007 in Monitorul Oficial nr. 127-130, art. 546, available at <http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view=doc&id=324889&lang=1>, accessed in 11.11.2016.

their authenticity and legitimacy. We do not intend on this occasion to discuss those “autocephalous” communities which have a small number of parishioners³⁰, but we would like to bring forth the largest:

- the Moldovan Orthodox Church (also called “Moldovan Orthodox Church”), affiliated to the Moscow Patriarchate
- the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Exarchate realms, independent church, part of the Romanian Patriarchate

The former, with most parishioners registered in Moldova in 1993 is claimed to be the successor of the Diocese of Chisinau founded in 1812 by the Russian Church³¹.

The latter is declared successor to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia which existed between 1918 / 1924-1940 and 1941-1943, heir to the Romanian Orthodoxy that existed in Bessarabia from start till 1812³².

The two churches often challenged themselves, while maintaining strained relations which were transmitted down to the parishioners. Moreover, this organization has reflected geopolitical trends from Moscow and Bucharest. In Moldova, the two churches bore the banners of a fight that the two patriarchs do not allow them to show.

3.6. The Gagauz community - an identity on the border

An issue of a high sensitivity in Moldova is the Gagauz community. Beyond their controversial origin, their identity carries over significant nuances of historical stages which marked their existence. Increasingly this community identity was transformed into what today is a russo-oriented community, systematically supported by Moscow.

Without being very large (according to the 2004 census, the community had 147,500 members, of whom 127,835 were living in the

³⁰ The website ortodoxia.md, which introduces themselves as “an Orthodox community” from the Republic of Moldova, in the study *Câte Biserici Ortodoxe avem în Moldova?*, <http://www.ortodoxia.md/2011/04/cate-biserici-ortodoxe-avem-in-moldova/>, accessed in 10.11.2016, identifies 5 parallel jurisdictions which each pretend to be canonical. To them it also adds the Cultul religios Ortodox pe Stil Vechi din Republica Moldova (Old Style Orthodox religious cult in Moldova).

³¹ See the official website: <http://mitropolia.md/>.

³² For more details of its history, we recommend the documentary material prepared by Stelian Gomboș regarding the Romanian Orthodox Metropolis of Bessarabia, <http://www.crestinortodox.ro/religie/mitropolia-ortodoxa-romana-basarabiei-122930.html>, accessed in 11.11.2016.

Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia³³), this community is distinguished by the importance that had in the history of Bessarabia.

The most accepted theory concerning their origin is that they are descendants of Turkic tribes, or even possible Oghuzii Seljuks. Other historians speak of Cuman origin, Peceneg or Bulgarian³⁴. Of certainty are their still Turkish origin of their language and the fact that they were Christianized, giving up Islam under the influence of Byzantium³⁵. Their presence in Bessarabia space is linked to the migration from Bulgaria to Dobrogea and Bessarabia areas at the end of the eighteenth century. The annexation of Bessarabia by the tsarists and their transformation in their dispute often with the Turks but also for the control of the new province, turned them into the Orthodox Christian allies increasingly willing to accept cultural and political proximity. In turn, the Russians granted them privileges, exemptions from taxes and military service and so on³⁶. The Soviet period drew them closer to the Russian identity because the Russian language is now assumed collectively. After gaining state independence by the Republic of Moldova, the Gagauz along with other minorities have campaigned for the creation of an autonomous region of Gagauzia, culturally backed by Ankara which opened here a Turkish Cultural Center and Turkish Library .

All this transforms this community into a border identity, into one of contact between culture and identity.

In addition, Moldova faces and the so-called Transnistrian crisis. Tiraspol officials are also involved in a process of constructing an identity, also on the border.

Identity dilemmas and controversies in Moldova, as well as others in the area of Central and Eastern are determined / fueled by geopolitical

³³ Biroul Național de Statistică al Republicii Moldova, *Recensământul Populației 2004*, <http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=ro&idc=295&id=2234>, accessed in 16.11.2016.

³⁴ The Bulgarian historians consider them as simple Turkish Bulgarian who maintained their religious identity as Orthodox Christian, <https://romaniabreakingnews.ro/cine-sunt-de-fapt-gagauzi-cei-folositi-azi-de-rusia-pe-post-de-unealta-geostrategica-si-amenintare-permanenta-la-adresa-suveranitatii-integritatii-teritoriale-a-r-moldova/>, accessed in 16.11.2016.

³⁵ Nicu Pârlog, *Găgăuzii: rădăciți prin istorie*, <http://www.descopera.ro/cultura/9145873-gagauzii-rataciti-prin-istorie>, accessed in 16 .11.2016.

³⁶ *Ibidem*.

interests of some states / powers they have used for purposes of extending or maintaining influences.

Identities, only occasionally were able to establish divisions in the true sense of the term. Borders were given identity or symbolic form of ideological frontiers.


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Annex


Annex 1. Attachment towards the European Union (2007)



Source: Eurobarometer 67. Public opinion in the European Union, April - May 2007, p. 85³⁷

³⁷ http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf, p. 85, accessed in 28.06.2015


Annex 2. Attachment towards the European Union (2014)



Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 10³⁸

³⁸ http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_citizen_en.pdf, p. 10, accessed in 29.06.2015


Annex 3. Attachment towards own country (2014)



Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 7³⁹

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 7

Annex 4. Attachment towards the locality of residence (2014)



Source: Eurobarometer 82. European Citizenship, Autumn 2014, p. 6⁴⁰

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 6

III. Security and cooperation in the Europe

Les Relations Diplomatiques et Consulaires comme Partie des Relations Internationales

*Iordan Gheorghe BĂRBULESCU**

*Modest hommage à mon ami et distingué collègue,
Professeur des universités, docteur Ioan Horga à l'âge de 60 ans*

1 Préambule

Cet article ne veut pas être une analyse des relations internationales en général, mais se concentre uniquement sur les relations interétatiques qui visent l'acteur international classique, l'État et ses relations avec d'autres États (interétatiques) ou avec d'autres acteurs non étatiques (transnationales). Même ainsi, il faut faire une nouvelle démarcation utile, en disant que ce que nous analysons dans ces quelques pages représente la relation interétatique officielle et formelle entre les États, c'est-à-dire les relations diplomatiques actualisées par l'intermède des missions diplomatiques et consulaires, un sujet qui mérite plus d'attention étant donné son importance dans la vie internationale, d'une part, et de l'autre, étant donné le grand nombre de Roumains vivant à l'extérieur de la Roumanie et qui ont besoin de savoir ce qui peuvent et ne peuvent pas faire pour eux les représentations diplomatiques nationales. Certes, et sans représenter le sujet de notre étude, dans le cas des citoyens roumains, ceux-ci peuvent bénéficier, avec l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Lisbonne, de l'assistance diplomatique de l'UE dans les pays tiers où l'UE a également des missions diplomatiques (appelées Délégations de l'UE) ou de l'assistance diplomatique de tout État membre de l'UE, si notre pays ne dispose pas de mission diplomatique ou consulaire dans ce pays¹.

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¹ Conformément à l'art. 20 et 23 TUE, respectivement art. 221 TFUE, in Union Européenne, *La version consolidée des Traités. Charte des droits fondamentaux*, OPUE, Luxembourg 2010.

2. Les relations interétatiques et la place des missions diplomatiques et consulaires des Etats

En l'état actuel de l'étude des relations internationales², il est généralement entendu que celles-ci représentent la multitude de relations des différents types qui dépassent les frontières territoriales ou les domaines de compétence des entités juridiques internationalement établies. Dans la littérature de spécialité, ce type de réseau est connu sous le nom «d'un complexe de relations internationales» ou simplement de «la vie internationale»³. Truyol y Serra⁴ définit les relations internationales comme «des relations entre les individus et les communautés humaines qui, dans leurs origines et leur but, ne se terminent pas au niveau d'une communauté différenciée et considérée comme un tout unitaire, qui, essentiellement, est la communauté politique ou de l'État, mais dépassent ces limites».

En d'autres termes, les relations internationales, comme le témoigne la réalité et la doctrine, comprennent, d'une part, les relations interétatiques, et d'autre part les relations transnationales⁵.

Ainsi:

- Les relations interétatiques sont établies par les États entre eux, perçus comme sujets du droit international, par le biais de leurs institutions spécialisées;

- Les relations transnationales sont, au contraire, celles établies entre les entités privées, les individus ou les groupes - perçus comme toute entité qui n'est pas sujet du droit international - de nationalités différentes, qui se rapportent à d'autres entités privées, individus ou groupes et ne sont pas soumis à l'autorité de l'État.

Ou, autrement dit:

- les relations interétatiques sont représentées par les relations diplomatiques et consulaires, ainsi que par les divers contacts ou réunions officielles entre les diverses institutions ou les responsables de

² Un ouvrage de référence par le biais duquel nous pouvons comprendre la problématique des relations internationales et la théorie des relations internationales reste, après presque 10 ans depuis sa première édition, Miroiu, A., Ungureanu, R. S., *Manuel de Relations Internationales*, Polirom, Iasi, 2008; en ce qui nous concerne, nous avons fait un examen de la doctrine des relations internationales dans le chapitre 2, intitulé «Grands courants de pensée en relations internationales», de l'ouvrage Barbulescu, I. Gh., *«Nouvelle Europe. Identité et modèle européen*, Polirom, Iasi, 2015.

³ Merle, M., *La vida internacional*, Tecnos, Madrid, 1965

⁴ Truyol Y Serra, A., *La sociedad internacional*, Alianza, Madrid, 1993

⁵ Reuter, P, Combacau, J., *Institutions et relations internationales*, PUF, Paris, 1980.

l'administration des États ainsi que, encore, par la participation de ceux-ci à des organismes d'intérêt⁶ commun;

- à leur tour, les relations transnationales sont diverses, allant d'un mariage entre deux personnes de nationalités différentes, jusqu'aux contrats commerciaux entre des entités appartenant à des différents États ou des relations établies entre des organisations sportives, culturelles, scientifiques, artistiques, humanitaires, religieuses en provenance des différents États, directement ou par le biais des fédérations internationales, et, en fin, les relations entre un État et une entité se trouvant en dehors de ses frontières.

De toute façon, comme le disent Reuter et Combacau, tant dans les relations interétatiques que transnationales, l'État continue à occuper une place centrale dans les relations internationales, parce qu'il est:

- d'une part, à travers ses institutions, l'instrument principal et unique de relations officielles interétatiques;

- d'autre part, l'organisme de réglementation globale de celles-ci, l'État étant celui qui fixe les règles en vertu desquelles les individus exercent leurs libertés indispensables pour l'établissement des relations internationales, tout en déterminant ainsi les limites et les conditions de leur déroulement. En d'autres termes, les États les contraignent à recourir à leurs institutions et leur système juridique. Ou, comme le disent Reuter et Combacau⁷, «il est très difficile pour relations transnationales de se situer dans un monde juridique totalement indépendant du droit des États»

Il est tout aussi vrai que les relations internationales ne se terminent pas avec les États⁸, mais ceux-ci demeurent toutefois un élément essentiel de la société internationale et, en fin de compte, l'acteur international qui peut prendre des décisions majeures pour soi-même, indépendamment de la capacité de décision d'un autre ou de plusieurs États, de même que l'État peut prendre des décisions qui le concernent sans qu'il puisse être influencé

⁶ Nous nous trouvons ici dans le domaine des acteurs internationaux multinationaux, tels que les organisations internationales, parmi lesquels, ici et maintenant, nous citons l'UE, l'ONU, l'OTAN, etc. qui organisent de nombreuses réunions auxquelles participent les représentants des États qui ont des intérêts communs, à savoir en sont membres ou membres associés.

⁷ Reuter, P, Combacau, J., idem.

⁸ Un autre type de relations internationales sont celles établies entre les États et les organisations internationales ou seulement entre ces dernières, mais nous ne nous proposons pas d'examiner la diplomatie multilatérale, comme on l'appelle, mais de rester dans l'analyse de la coopération bilatérale.

ou conditionné par d'autres acteurs⁹. De toute évidence, nous parlons de conditionnements formels, stipulés par le droit international ou les traités internationaux et non pas de ceux circonstanciels que les États, notamment les grandes, utilisent dans la vie réelle afin d'imposer des idées et des actions.

Cette présence de l'État dans la réalité de la société internationale rend difficile la démocratisation de ladite société, les autres acteurs de la vie internationale ne parvenant pas encore à être aussi important que les États. C'est ainsi que, de façon générale, lorsqu'on parle de la démocratisation des relations internationales, c'est toujours aux États qu'on fait appel, soit directement, soit indirectement. Ainsi, dans le cas de l'UE on ne peut pas parler d'une organisation internationale régionale démocratique sans faire mention de la démocratisation de ses membres. De ce fait, la progressivité de l'adhésion à l'UE de nouveaux États provenant de l'ancienne zone d'influence soviétique qui, au fur et à mesure qu'ils répondaient aux normes démocratiques, aux valeurs de l'UE¹⁰, pouvaient démarrer le processus de rapprochement et d'adhésion à l'UE. Autrement dit, nous ne pouvons pas parler d'une société internationale démocratique sans l'existence d'États démocratiques.

Les relations interétatiques peuvent ou non être pacifiques. Si les relations non-pacifiques impliquent l'utilisation de la force, les autres sous-entendent la coopération politique et économique, culturelle, scientifique, etc. À leur tour, celles-ci peuvent toutefois traverser des périodes positives, ou, tout au contraire, tendus, sans toutefois aboutir à des conflits militaires. Les relations interétatiques pacifiques sont diverses et peuvent aller de la délimitation des frontières ou des cours d'eau frontaliers jusqu'à l'établissement des relations formelles bilatérales à caractère permanent. Tel est le cas des missions diplomatiques et consulaires, qui représentent la forme suprême des relations interétatiques établies entre les sujets de droit international. À l'exception de la guerre, qui était aussi, comme je le disais, une expression des relations interétatiques, les relations diplomatiques entre les États renforcent l'idée générale que l'État continue d'être le principal instrument pacifique de la vie internationale et des relations entre les États. Autrement dit, jusqu'à un certain point, les relations internationales se confondent avec les relations diplomatiques, étant donné que le réseau des missions diplomatiques et consulaires est devenu indispensable pour la

⁹ Voir par exemple le cas de la Grande-Bretagne qui a décidé de quitter l'UE suite au référendum qui a eu lieu cette année.

¹⁰ Union Européenne, *La version consolidée des traités. Charte des droits fondamentaux*, OPUE, Luxembourg 2010, art. 2 et 3.

transmission d'informations, la négociation permanente et les actions mutuelles des États, du moins depuis l'apparition de la diplomatie permanente. C'est en ce sens que Merle dit que «les relations diplomatiques et consulaires sont essentiels dans les relations internationales»¹¹.

Les relations diplomatiques et consulaires sont par conséquent des relations officielles et formelles que les États établissent avec d'autres sujets de droit international, développées par l'intermède des institutions spécifiques pour le domaine des relations extérieures telles que:

- les ministères des affaires étrangères en tant qu'institutions centrales;
- les missions diplomatiques permanentes ou temporaires et les bureaux consulaires, en tant qu'institutions domiciliés à l'étranger.

Ces missions diplomatiques ou consulaires sont ouvertes et, respectivement, fermées, sur la base d'accords bilatéraux spécifiques ou d'accords plus généraux, tels que les traités bilatéraux de nature politique qui traitent également ce type d'aspects. Il y a aussi d'autres relations interétatiques entre les différentes institutions des États, qui, quoiqu'officielles, elles n'engagent pas au même niveau que les ministères des affaires étrangères ou les missions diplomatiques et consulaires. Par conséquent, lorsqu'on veut connaître la position officielle d'un État, on se tourne vers les ministères des affaires étrangères et les missions diplomatiques.

3. Analogies, différences et la coordination des missions diplomatiques et consulaires

Les relations diplomatiques et consulaires répondent aux certaines caractéristiques communes, mais il est à remarquer aussi des différences, de même que la nécessité d'une coordination permanente de celles-ci dans le cadre de l'État de résidence, coordination qui a pour but l'amélioration de l'action extérieure de l'État de provenance¹².

¹¹ Merle, M., idem

¹² Dans la littérature roumaine de spécialité, il y a quelques ouvrages fondamentaux pour le domaine de la diplomatie, parmi lesquels je cite Malita, M., *La Diplomatie*, Editura Didactica si Pedagogica, Bucuresti 1975, un véritable ouvrage scientifique qui a constitué, pendant des décennies, „la bible” de la diplomatie roumaine, ainsi que Anghel, I., M., „*Le Droit Diplomatique et Consulaire*”, Lumina Lex, Bucuresti, 1996.

Similitudes:

- les relations diplomatiques et consulaires sont établies et se déroulent par la décision des institutions autorisées à cette fin et en vertu de la législation interne de chaque sujet de droit international. Les missions diplomatiques et consulaires font partie intégrante des ministères des affaires étrangères des États ou, le cas échéant, d'autres organismes publics habilités à cet égard et visent à faire converger l'action extérieure des États. En d'autres termes, les missions diplomatiques et consulaires suivent la ligne tracée par les autorités de tutelle, soit le ministère des affaires étrangères, soit une autre institution habilitée, et reçoivent des instructions de leur part;

- les missions diplomatiques et consulaires font partie du système de relations internationales, étant établies sur la base d'accords entre les sujets de droit international et en vertu du droit international;

- l'établissement des relations diplomatiques et consulaires donnent lieu à des obligations, des facilités et des opportunités;

- les États ont personnalité juridique de droit international, en d'autres termes, ils peuvent envoyer et recevoir des missions diplomatiques et consulaires;

- les missions diplomatiques et consulaires sont généralement ouvertes entre les États qui se reconnaissent mutuellement et se reconnaissent aussi de façon réciproque les formes de gouvernement;

- les relations diplomatiques et consulaires se déroulent, à présent, par le biais des missions diplomatiques et consulaires permanentes qui sont composées de personnel diplomatique et, respectivement, consulaire, qui va et vient, tandis que la mission diplomatique et, selon le cas, consulaire conservent leur caractère de permanence;

- normales, qui régissent les relations diplomatiques et prévoient certaines conditions juridiques particulières, telles que l'immunité, les privilèges, les prérogatives et les facilités spécifiques, sans lesquelles l'activité diplomatique et consulaire pourrait être entravée dans son déroulement normal¹³.

¹³ Voir par exemple l'immunité, dont le but est uniquement celui d'assurer un cadre normal pour le déroulement de l'activité des diplomates accrédités dans un État, sans que ceux-ci puissent être soumis à des pressions de n'importe quelle nature de la part des institutions de l'État de résidence ou des ou certaines entités non étatiques appartenant à l'État respectif. L'immunité n'est pas un paravent à l'abri duquel les diplomates peuvent commettre des violations de la législation nationale de l'État de résidence ou de la législation internationale sur la base de laquelle fonctionnent aussi les missions diplomatiques, dans le cas contraire ceux-ci étant rappelés dans le pays de provenance, à l'initiative des ministères des affaires étrangères ou à la demande des autorités de l'État de résidence.

Différences:

- bien que toutes les deux visent à établir et à renforcer les relations bilatérales entre les sujets de droit international, il existe de nombreuses différences entre les deux, la plus importante étant que, alors que les diplomates des ambassades représentent juridiquement l'État qui les a accrédités, ceux qui travaillent dans les consulats ont plutôt une mission technique (activité notariale, par exemple, ou encore d'autres tâches concrètes liées au visa, au commerce, etc.) qui est exercée, normalement, sur une fraction du territoire d'un État, tandis que l'ambassade a compétence sur l'ensemble du territoire de l'État où elle fonctionne¹⁴ ;

- tandis que les agents diplomatiques (les diplomates des ambassades) représentent juridiquement, dans toutes ses fonctions de relations internationales, l'État accréditant auprès de l'État accréditaire, le consul représente les intérêts de l'État qui l'a accrédité dans les limites de ses fonctions et attributions, et, notamment, dans la fraction du territoire dont il est chargé et uniquement auprès des autorités locales de la région;

- des différences peuvent être identifiées aussi dans les modalités de nomination et dans les documents nécessaires. Ainsi, les chefs des missions diplomatiques sont nommés par le président de l'État par le biais des lettres de créance remises au chef de l'État accréditaire, alors que le consul est nommé par le gouvernement sur la base de certains documents bien différents par rapport aux lettres de créance. Si la nomination est différente en ce qui concerne les composantes des missions diplomatiques et ceux des missions consulaires, la fin de la mission est à son tour différente pour les uns et les autres;

- même si les missions diplomatiques et consulaires ont pratiquement le même statut diplomatique (immunité, etc.), en échange, les membres respectifs de ces missions n'ont pas exactement les mêmes privilèges et immunités générales, dans le cas des missions consulaires celles-ci se réduisant pratiquement à ce qui est directement lié à l'exercice de leurs fonctions et n'étant pas, par conséquent, générales comme pour les diplomates;

- si les missions diplomatiques peuvent être permanentes et *ad hoc*, les missions consulaires ne peuvent être que permanentes;

- si les missions diplomatiques déroulent une activité spécifique de droit international, les autres fonctionnent, en grande partie, dans les limites du droit national, par exemple, la délivrance des certificats de naissance, de décès ou de mariage pour les citoyens de l'État qu'elles représentent, la délivrance des passeports à leurs propres citoyens ou des visas pour les citoyens l'État dans lequel ils sont accrédités, etc.;

¹⁴ Gonidec, P.F., *Relations internationales*, Montchrestien, Paris, 1977.

- alors que l'activité diplomatique peut être bilatérale et multilatérale, celle consulaire ne peut être que bilatérale, à savoir entre les Etats.

La coordination entre les missions diplomatiques et consulaires:

- entre celles-ci il y a coordination, l'interconnexion et complémentarité;

- mais il y a aussi une hiérarchie, de telle façon que, si dans le cadre du même État existent à la fois une ambassade et des consulats, la première est censée de coordonner l'activité déroulée par ses consulats dans les différentes régions de l'État hôte;

- l'ambassade représente l'État accréditant auprès de l'État accrédité, la nomination même des consuls s'effectuant avec la participation du chef de la mission diplomatique;

- il y a quand même des situations où un État n'a pas de mission diplomatique permanente dans un pays, mais il a un consulat général, situation dans laquelle, en vertu du principe de la perméabilité de deux types de missions, stipulé par la Convention de Vienne de 1961 et 1963, le consulat général peut substituer, dans certaines conditions, la mission diplomatique. En réalité, cette action du consulat général est complémentaire à celle déroulée en parallèle par une autre mission diplomatique du même État, accréditée dans un autre pays de la même région, qui reçoit l'accréditation de représenter de point de vue diplomatique son État d'origine auprès de l'État où il n'y a pas une mission diplomatique, mais il existe un consulat général.

4. Conclusion

Très souvent, on accorde plus d'importance aux consulats et aux consulats généraux qu'aux ambassades, et ceci pour une raison très simple: le citoyen, roumain dans notre cas, qui se trouve à l'étranger, a plus d'interactions avec l'institution du consulat, tandis que cela n'arrive que rarement qu'il a besoin des services de l'ambassade.

La perception est toutefois différente si l'on considère la dimension officielle de la relation interétatique, qui se déroule plutôt par l'intermédiaire des ambassades, que par celui des consulats, ces derniers ayant, comme je le disais, un rôle limité par les compétences spécifiques et la séquence territoriale qu'ils couvrent.

On fait souvent de graves confusions entre les consulats et les consulats honoraires, qui ne sont pas, en fait, de missions officielles d'un État dans un autre État, mais plutôt l'expression de la bienveillance privée et ou de l'intérêt de promouvoir l'image d'un État dans un autre État, sans pour autant répondre aux exigences spécifiques d'une mission diplomatique officielle. Autrement dit, certaines personnes physiques, en profitant de

l'absence de missions diplomatiques ou consulaires d'un État auprès d'un autre État, peuvent proposer à ces deux États - au premier pour de le représenter, à l'autre pour lui permettre cela – l'ouverture d'un tel bureau privé afin d'organiser, à ses frais et en nom propre, diverses activités de promotion (fête nationale, missions commerciales, par exemple.). En aucun cas, le consulat honoraire ne peut pas délivrer des documents officiels de l'État qu'il veut, de sa propre initiative et avec les moyens dont il dispose, servir.

Sami National and International Representation

*Ruxandra Emanuela NUT**
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The Status of Indigenous Peoples According to the International Law

There is a false conception that the organization of indigenous peoples is in opposition to the state organization. Although they often rely on migration, indigenous peoples have a strong sense of belonging and a strong connection with their traditional land. Nomadic societies, considered a primitive form of organization, have been ignored for a long time by international law. Such territories were seen as vacant or *terrae nullius* therefore claims to ownership and sovereignty were out of place.¹ From the 16th century until the mid-19th century, the colonization of America by Europeans brought up the issue of indigenous people, many authors taking a stand against the injustices committed with them. For example, Francisco de Vitoria believes that "indigenous peoples possess natural rights, including the right to have independent political institutions and exercise exclusive rights of ownership and sovereignty over the territories."²

After the Cold War, international law shifted its direction to protect human rights and the principle of self-determination. Therefore, the rights of indigenous peoples are now recognized and respected.

The international law does not have a specific definition of indigenous people. Article 1 of the ILO Convention No. 169, tries to explain the term as:

- "(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly

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¹ Marco Moretti, *International Law and Nomadic People*, p.2.

² *Ibidem*, p.3.

or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;

- (b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.”³

However, the representative variant is offered by Jose R. Martinez Cobo⁴ in Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples: “Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system.

This historical continuity may consist of one or more of the following factors:

- a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them;
- b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
- c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, lifestyle, etc.);
- d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
- e) Residence on certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world;
- f) Other relevant factors.

³ *Understanding the Indigenous and Tribal People Convention, 1989 (No. 169) - Handbook for ILO Tripartite Constituents*, Programme to Promote ILO Convention No. 169 (PRO 169) and International Labour Standards Department, February 2013, p.32.

⁴ The Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN.

On an individual basis, an indigenous person is one who belongs to these indigenous populations through self-identification as indigenous and is recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members.”⁵

Because it has its own culture, language, way of life and its historical and traditional link with the land and natural resources, meeting all these criteria, the Sami people should be seen primarily as an indigenous people, and then as a minority.

National and International Representation of the Sami People

Who are the Sami? Probably many would consider them a nomadic people, living in isolation in the distant and cold areas of the Scandinavian Peninsula, surrounded by ice and the aurora borealis, without knowing that behind this perception there is a special story to be told. It is a society with an old and rich history that did not remain forgotten in the past but is strongly anchored in the present, fighting for a future in which their culture may find its own place.

Sápmi, the territory inhabited by the Sami, also known as Lapland, does not exist as an independent state and refers to an area of 47,000 km² in northern Norway, 116,000 km² in northern Sweden and 130,000 km² in northern Finland, with a population estimated at 70,000 inhabitants, of which the largest number, 45,000 are located in Norway.⁶

Being a small country in size and population, Norway was formed and developed as a homogenous state with a strong national spirit. This let them believe that there is no culture superior to the Norwegian culture. The fear of an invasion that would jeopardize this culture resulted in a strong desire to suppress any form of cultural manifestation of the minority peoples, especially the Sami, the largest and most representative. When the Sami identity consciousness began to take shape and the voice of the population has begun to emerge, drawing attention not only nationally but also internationally, the Norwegian state had no choice but to change its position, forced by the international agreements and conventions ratified as a member of various organizations. But translating and accommodating these provisions into national legislation was not easy. But perhaps the most difficult task was to change the mentality of the Norwegian people towards minorities, making them believe that the socio-cultural integration of the Sami does not jeopardize the integrity and security of the state, but is rather beneficial to the economic, social, political and cultural development, transforming their

⁵ Mattias Åhrén, Martin Scheinin, John B. Henriksen, *The Nordic Sami Convention: International Human Rights, Self-Determination and other Central Provisions*, Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No. 3/2007, p.62.

⁶ Vasile Cucu, Dorin Iancu, *Laponii*, București, Ed. Tineretului, p.10.

contribution to various sectors in a win game. Therefore, the Norwegian state redirected its policies to ensure equality of all citizens, and at the same time, to protect diversity. Among the many characteristics that determine the distinctive features of indigenous peoples, three pillars are essential to the preservation of identity: education in the mother tongue, access to traditional land and resources and national and international representation. Therefore, this article focuses on how the Norwegian state has chosen to address national and international representation of its Sami population, with a brief comparison of other Nordic Sami representation models.

One of the central pillars in preserving the Sami identity is the establishment of national and international organizations. The first organization in Norway was created at Kvænangen in 1903 from the need to resist the Norwegianization process. After the Second World War, their number increased and dealt with issues ranging from promoting the interests of reindeer herders, to cultural and linguistic protection.

The cooperation between the Sami from the northern countries began in 1956, by setting up a Nordic Sami Council, an NGO which includes Sami organizations from Norway, Sweden and Finland⁷, being the main political institution until the appearance of the Sami Parliament. The Council's goal is to support and develop the economic, cultural, social and linguistic rights of the Sami, as well as their traditional rights to land, water, natural resources, by protecting them under the law of each state. Its objectives are to promote the rights and interests of the Sami, to consolidate a stronger sense of affinity among the Sami, to obtain recognition and maintain their rights in the legislation of the three states.⁸

The legal basis for the Sami policy is the Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway of May 17, 1814 (with amendments), which provides in Article 110a that " It is the responsibility of the state to create the conditions for the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life."⁹

Law No.56 of June 12, 1987 regarding the Sami Parliament and other legal matters, the Sami Act, mentions in Chapter 1, that: " The purpose of the Act is to enable the Sami people in Norway to safeguard and develop their language, culture and way of life. The Sami people are to have their own nation-wide Sameting elected by and among the Sami population.

⁷ Harald Eidheim, *Aspects of the Lappish Minority Situation*, Oslo, 1971, p.42-43.

⁸ www.saamicouncil.net, accesat la data de 8 septembrie 2016.

⁹ *The Constitution Of The Kingdom Of Norway*, disponibil la: <http://www.constitution.org/cons/norway/dok-bn.html>, accesat la 16 octombrie 2014.

[...] Sami and Norwegian are languages of equal worth. They shall be accorded equal status.”¹⁰

The Sami Parliament is the main source of information and dialogue of the government regarding the Sami policy. It has also assumed the responsibility of administrative tasks and implementation of policy measures in certain areas. The Parliament has already received the task to deal with the cultural, economic and linguistic initiatives.

Elections for the Sami Parliament are held every fourth year. 41 representatives are elected from 13 constituencies with three representatives from each constituency. The representatives are elected from lists established by Sami national organizations, Norwegian political parties and local lists. The Sami Parliament is directed by a president and an executive council. The Sami being members of Norwegian parties is a characteristic of the Norwegian Sami Parliament compared with the Sami parliaments in Sweden and Finland.¹¹

The first Finnish Sami organization was established in 1931, having as members non-Sami people, concerned with this issue. The first commission on Sami issues was established in 1949, followed by the Sami Parliament in 1972. The difference in the establishment of the Finnish Sami Parliament is that in the case of Finland, the initiative to safeguard the Sami identity came from the state, while in Norway and Sweden was the result of Sami demands. The old Sami Parliament was replaced by the new one in 1995, by an Act on the Sami Parliament, stipulating that the Sami have status as an indigenous people. The Sami Parliament has 21 representatives and four deputies who do not represent national parties.¹²

The Sami Swedish Parliament was established in 1993. It has 31 representatives who are not members of any Swedish national party. The Swedish Government appoints a chairman for the Sami Parliament and the Sami Parliament elects a board with seven representatives and seven deputies. The Sami Parliament has financial, educational, linguistic and social responsibilities. Thus, the Sami Parliament is a governmental administrative authority and also an elected Sami body, making it a difficult task to represent an ethnic minority and the state at the same time.¹³

¹⁰ Act of 12 June 1987 No. 56 concerning the Sameting (the Sami parliament) and other Sami legal matters (*the Sami Act*), disponibil la: www.regjeringen.no/en/doc/laws/acts/the-sami-act-.html?id=449701, accesat la 16 octombrie 2014.

¹¹ Eva Josefsen, *The Saami and the National Parliaments-Channels for Political Influence*, Journal of Indigenous Peoples Rights No.2/2007, p.21.

¹² *Ibidem*, p.18-19.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p.20-21.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the Sami organizations are the primary means of Sami national and international representation. They appeared and developed since the early 20th century and aimed at either resistance to assimilation or cultural and linguistic issues. The Sami international cooperation began with the establishment of the Sami Council, the first Sami political institution, fighting for recognition in the three Nordic states and for legislative change to include economic, social, cultural and linguistic rights. At international level, it is an active representative in the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and the UN.

But it should be noted that there is a possibility that the Norwegian state might not have been so open to recognize the indigenous status of the Sami if it had not attracted international criticism in the Alta controversy (the construction of a hydroelectric power plant on the Sami traditional lands), where the situation was out of control. But the outcome was favorable for the Sami. The Constitution of the Kingdom of Norway was amended by inserting an article that forces the state to take responsibility to protect the Sami language, culture and way of life. The Sami Law clarifies that the Kingdom of Norway was established on the territory of two peoples, the Norwegians and the Sami, therefore the latter must enjoy equal rights. Moreover, it consecrates the creation of the Sami Parliament, having a representative role in matters that concern them directly, such as cultural, economic, linguistic initiatives and functioning as a financial mediator. We can notice a decrease of other national Sami organizations' influence with the development of the Sami Parliament, which took over all tasks.

It is obvious that after the Second World War the Sami representation issue has changed, gaining local, regional, national and even international influence through the Sami Parliaments' collaboration in the three Nordic countries and by bringing the Sami issues on the UN international agenda.

Abstract

After a long period of Norwegianization, the Sami people of Norway, Sweden and Finland began to develop a strong sense of belonging that made them more vocal and visible on national and international level. Thus, the relations with the national governments are characterized by another approach. The states started to shape their policies in order to make the integration process easier. One important aspect of identity preservation is the establishment of Sami national and international organizations. Therefore, the present article intends to analyze how the Norwegian state has chosen to address national and international representation of its Sami population, with a brief comparison of other Nordic Sami representation models.

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The *Securitate/ Security*- a Scourge against Romania's European Intellectual Message

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Our analysis focuses on one of the most damaging factors that played a major role in the oppression directed against a considerable segment of intellectuals, many of whom being therefore obliged to flee Romania during the 44 years of communism. This factor is the feared Security, also known by its official title, *The Department of State Security*. The switch of sides adopted by Romania on the 23rd of August 1944, when the country joined the Allies in their fight against an ever less powerful Axis, was decisive in this regard. Thus, it triggered a massive, unprecedented invasion of the Ministry of the Interior by communist aparatchiks, undoubtedly obedient to the will of the Kremlin. In fact, one of the missions of the Soviet Union in its satellite nations was that of completely replacing their intelligence services with new structures, whose manipulation would prove to be uncomplicated and lucrative.

The infamous NKVD, translated as *The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs*, which in 1954 became the KGB, or *Committee for State Security*, was given the task of overseeing the abovementioned transition, under the watchful eye of the famous SMERSH, namely Russian counter-espionage units. The latter had already been set in place throughout the territories that had been invaded by the Red Army.¹ After the official coming to power of the communist regime in Romania, the Great National Assembly, which was controlled by this Party, proclaimed the creation of the *General Direction of the People's Security*, on the 30th of August 1948, by means of Decree no. 221. Its more common name was simply *The Security*.

The functions of this new structure were deliberately formulated in too general a manner, in order to foster discretionary interpretations, in keeping with the line of the Party. Hence, according to its birth act, the Security was meant to protect the values of democracy and the Romanian

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¹ Norman Polmar, Thomas B. Allen, *Spy book: the encyclopedia of espionage*, Random House, 1998, p. 398-399.

state against damaging intrusive factors originating from both within and the outside of its borders. Due to this generous formula, the instruments of the Security became almighty, all the more because this institution was given exclusive rights in the area of penal cases that fell into its area of competence. In fact, the Security made constant use of these provisions, so as to act in a discretionary manner. A relevant example could be the arrest, in 1951, of no fewer than 300 students from the Faculty of Medicine in Bucharest and their internment in labour camps, under the charge of *studying in the French Library, for lack of speciality handbooks at their own faculty*.² The Security became one of the most powerful and widespread political police institutions, comparable in size with the famous Stasi, if we are to take into account its 11.000 agents³ and about 500.000 informants registered throughout the years within its structures.⁴

The powers conferred upon the administrators of this service were also considerable, given the fact that its director participated by right in the meetings of the Romanian Government (called the Council of Ministers), having the rank of Minister. It is also worth mentioning the fact that the first person to have been appointed to this position was Alexandru Nicolschi (1915-1992), whose real name was Boris Grümberg.⁵ A former commander of SMERSH and a KGB agent, he made a habit of following guidelines issued by Moscow and of being merciless, a veritable tormentor of modern times, who was also responsible for the atrocities committed in Pitești Prison.

Before the turning point of 1956, when the attributes of the Security were redefined, the role of this institution had been major, chiefly in the case of the numerous trials directed against the *enemies of the people*. Its roles were basically those of information provider and evidence manufacturer. Moreover, the surveillance task given to the Security was assumed with tremendous ardour, so that the establishment of a consistent form of control over the Romanian society would soon become a reality. Needless to say, the officers of the Security did not hesitate to go beyond purely informative missions, as their involvement in a series of notable murders began since the first years of their mandates. Under the leadership

² Archives of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee, no. 264/18 February 1972, volume 4, p. 13.

³ According to *La Repubblica*, Giulia Cerino, *Romania, paese leader dello spionaggio. Neanche Ceaușescu aveva tanti* 007, 28 January 2010. Last access: 21 June 2016.

⁴ According to Ms Germina Nagât, Head of the Investigations Department of CNSAS, Ziare.com, <http://www.ziare.com/stiri/frauda/l-express-securitatea-din-romania-a-fost-mai-puternica-decat-stasi-978131>. Last access: 21 June 2016.

⁵ Jakab Albert Zsolt, Peti Lehel, *Procese și contexte social-identitare la minoritățile din România*, ISPMN, 2009, p. 191.

of General Alexandru Drăghici, the Security underwent a bloody purging campaign amongst Party members and even within its own structures, by launching accusations of deviationism, so as to consolidate the communists' position. It acted under the careful supervision of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej.⁶ The operations were conducted, without a doubt, in accordance with a Stalinist pattern that Dej was never capable of detaching from, in spite of the signals sent by the Kremlin in this respect, following the arrival of Nikita Khrushchev.

The human potential of the Security was massively expanded during its first decade of existence, which resulted in an inclusion of over 50.000 people within its ranks. Amid this increase in prominence of the Service, the new leader from Bucharest, Nicolae Ceaușescu, chose to keep relying on its mechanisms, in order to conduct his oppression against intellectuals and other social categories. The removal of Drăghici from office, whom Ceaușescu profoundly disliked, triggered a restructuring period for the Security, under the leadership of Ion Stănescu, a close collaborator of Ceaușescu's. This new director promoted intellectuals within the Security's structures, without altering the purpose it had been designed for.⁷ In the eyes of Ceaușescu, the Security was *a restive horse that nobody knows how to ride*⁸, which basically meant it had to become fully submitted to him, personally. The restructuring of the Security, in the form of a *Department for the Security of the State*, was completed in 1972, following several attempts at rendering this institution more effective. The result was a clearer description of its prerogatives. Thus, the Department, which continued to be part of the Ministry of the Interior, became structured into six Directorates, corresponding to the need to control the most important areas of society and politics.

These Directorates thus covered areas such as foreign and internal intelligence, counter-intelligence, economic and military counter-espionage, protection of dignitaries and penal investigations. Furthermore, in order to enhance the operational capacities of the Security, its special units were also given the task of overseeing communications, antiterrorism and external trade.⁹

⁶ Teșu Solomovici, Răzvan Theodorescu, Sorin Roșca Stănescu, *Securitatea și evreii: Despre călăi și despre victime*, Ed. Ziua, 2003, p. 53.

⁷ Mark Stolarik, *The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968: Forty Years Later*, Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 2010, p. 257-259.

⁸ Speech by Nicolae Ceaușescu before the Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party of Romania, 22-25 April 1968. See: Archives of the Executive Political Committee of the Central Committee, no. 268, volume 6, p. 18.

⁹ Cristian Bocancea, *La Roumanie, du communisme au post-communisme*, L'Harmattan, 1998, p. 44.

With regard to the methods used as part of the Security's procedures¹⁰, it is clearly noticeable an utter disrespect towards citizens' rights and freedoms, since tortures, mutilations, rapes, forced labour, nocturnal operations, searches, questionings and arrests were conducted in a discretionary manner, one that was inconsistent with the provisions of the Penal Procedural Code. One of the most urgent priorities for the Communist regime was to infiltrate agents of the Security into all levels and social layers, with the aim of identifying people that would express critical views of the regime and of *persuading* them to denounce their peers. Obviously, all these cases that were often dishonestly processed arrived before courts of law, often on the desks of judges that were under the influence of the Party. Therefore, guilty verdicts and harsh sentences were mere formalities. Only after the adoption of the Geneva Convention by Romania, in 1955, and its UN membership approval, towards the end of the same year, did the state begin to bring back some order to the judicial system. For instance, it started examining the situation of political prisoners, who had been awaiting their trials for a long time.¹¹

Within the Security itself, there was a Directorate whose aim was to censor the postal service, in what was one of the most despicable acts performed by the regime. It was mainly directed against intellectuals, who were thus prevented from transmitting information to the outside world, regarding their conditions within the country. Moreover, it was the same Directorate that exerted control over letters coming from abroad, in an attempt to cut off all the communication routes of the Disapora. This proved to be one of the most destructive hurdles against the spread of an anti-communist message at an interpersonal level. The psychosis was so prominent in this regard that the aforementioned Directorate was ordered to gather handwriting samples, so as to identify more easily those citizens who would exchange messages that were detrimental to the regime. In addition to this, it was the same Directorate that initiated a campaign meant to register all typewriters and copy machines - not very numerous at the time - with the help of the Militia services.¹²

Another priority of the communist regime, achieved by means of the Security, was the surveillance directed against foreigners. A special Directorate of the Security was placed in charge of counter-espionage

¹⁰ Marian Stere, *Arhivele Securității*, volume 2, Ed. Enciclopedică, 2002, p. 435.

¹¹ Romulus Rușan, *Répression et terreur en Roumanie communiste*, in *Communisme 91-92 - Roumanie, un totalitarisme ordinaire*, L'âge d'homme, 2007, p. 25-26.

¹² Henry W. Degenhardt, *Revolutionary and dissident movements: an international guide*, Longman, 1988, p. 312.

operations, including those conducted within the Army¹³, which normally focused on every foreign citizen who was located in Romania. It was mandatory for all Romanians to notify the Security directly after any contact with a foreign citizen, so that the risk factor of the situation would be assessed. It is to be mentioned that the role of the Counter-espionage Directorate was to prevent such contacts, as much as possible, since information exchange was regarded as a potential menace to the state, which could lead to Romanian citizens being determined to ask for political asylum by walking into western embassies in Bucharest.¹⁴

In reality, this form of control was practised in the case of professional or scientific contacts as well, involving Romanian intellectuals and their western counterparts; if such an exchange did occur, the Romanian researcher (for instance) was automatically contacted by a representative of the Security and had to answer a series of questions pertaining to the joint scientific activity, the themes discussed and any foreign publications.¹⁵

In order to attain this goal, the General Operations Technical Directorate completed the other structures of the Security through its surveillance instruments of all means of communication utilised by citizens. These included telecommunications involving a recipient that was located abroad, as well as the transmission of fax messages and telegrams. The human potential engaged in such missions was indisputably immense.

The objectives of this Directorate are strictly connected to our argumentation, which emphasises the extraordinary difficulty encountered in the act of sending messages that were against the official line of the party beyond the frontiers – both communicational and physical – of a country that was becoming more and more isolated. Any message that may be qualified as anti-communist had to be subjected to censorship, which is why traditional means of communication could hardly be successfully used in this act performed by the Romanian Diaspora.

With regard to the policies aimed at international travel, a National Commission dealt with visas and passports¹⁶ and established harsh mechanisms of surveillance in case of any attempt at immigrating. This transformed every citizen that submitted a request for a passport into a potential enemy of the system. Therefore, the conditions were formulated in such a way as to allow only high-ranking officials of the Communist Party to

¹³ National Central Historical Archives, Bucharest, Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party collection, Chancellery, file 4/1950, p. 9.

¹⁴ Ion Mihai Pacepa, *Cartea neagră a Securității*, volume 3, Omega, 1999, p. 34.

¹⁵ C.N.S.A.S. Archives, collection I, file 6151, p. 48-49.

¹⁶ Decision no. 800 from 10 April 1967, Art. 2, published in the *Official Journal*, no. 32 from 13 April 1967.

undergo travel abroad. This is one of the factors that explain the relative stagnation in the number of Romanians within the western Diaspora, such as the ones in Britain and France, whose members encountered countless problems because of such policies.

Inside the country, it was the same Directorate that dealt with the surveillance of communications at a particularly intimate level, through the installation of microphones not only in public spaces, such as offices and companies, but also in the houses of Romanians. This was a grave breach in the right to a private life, a principle which lay at the basis of western constitutionalism. In this way, the Security perpetuated a feeling that nobody could feel safe from the sharp hearing of the state, which translated to a serious violation of the intellectual condition, as the interruption of contacts with the outside world set boundaries to the breadth of knowledge horizons. Moreover, the Ceaușescu couple was informed, according to General Ion Mihai Pacepa, that the Security was able to operate ten million microphones simultaneously, by 1984, so as to meet the obsession of the dictator in this respect.¹⁷

This situation was so grave that not even members of the Security and the state apparatus were immune to this wave of surveillance and oppression. A Directorate of the Security, named Internal Affairs, made use of similar practices of censorship, in order to exert its control over members of the institution, taken as a whole. Government officials and high-ranking members of the Communist Party were not exempt from this either. This approach is proof of a purely Bolshevik line influencing Romanian communists, characterised by fear and even anxiety towards treason and a suspicion that anybody may be playing a double role and, thus, plotting against the regime. Clearly, the army and police forces (referred to as the Militia) were not spared of this paranoia, as they played a strategic role in the protection and self-conservation of the regime. After General Pacepa, counsellor of President Ceaușescu, Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior and Head of the Foreign Intelligence Services, fled to the United States, in 1978, the pressure exerted by the communists on their own ranks became even more intense.¹⁸

The information leak caused by Pacepa, who was sentenced to death in absentia and pursued by the Romanian Secret Service and Ceaușescu's allies, was extremely severe. International terrorist Carlos *The Jackal* was employed by the Romanian President in order to assassinate the

¹⁷ Ioan Scurtu, *Politica și viața cotidiană în România în secolul al XX-lea și începutul celui de-al XXI-lea*, Mica Valahie, 2011, p. 348.

¹⁸ Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Stalinism for All Seasons: a Political History of Romanian Communism*, University of California Press, 2003, p. 221.

General, for a one-million-dollar reward, a mission he failed to accomplish. Nevertheless, Carlos was responsible for the bombing of the Radio Free Europe headquarters in Munich, which occurred on the 21st of February 1980, allegedly under the terms of the same contract.¹⁹ This undoubtedly proves that Ceaușescu would resort to anything so as to hunt down his most powerful oponents, in spite of the severe consequences this could have on an already badly shaken image in the eyes of the West.

The Romanian people were so fearful of the omnipresence of the Security's agents and informants that rumours were circulating, claiming that a quarter of the total number of citizens were part of this category. The real figures contradict this so-called myth, although informants were sufficiently numerous so as to prevent dissidents from creating viable organisation formulas against the regime and from engaging in frequent contacts with the Diaspora from countries like Britain, France and the USA.

During the last decade of the Romanian totalitarian regime, the pressure increased to unbearable levels, mostly for intellectuals. The methods applied by communists relied more and more on plots, public accusations, blackmail and humiliation. The Security often assigned a negative connotation to the term *intellectual*, by wrongfully associating it with felons, a phenomenon which greatly affected prominent personalities, as well as students, who became constant targets of the regime.

The investigations undergone by the Security and its usual methods were genuine sources of apprehension, which further discouraged, through their mere existence, the emergence of a true opposition to the Party. Torture had become a household word, chiefly within the walls of communist prisons, where it manifested itself in two equally outrageous ways: the physical one and the psychological one²⁰. False confessions extracted through tortures were naturally accepted by a justice system sympathetic to the Single Party and they represented one of the most commonly utilised sources for building penal cases by the prosecution. Some of the usual forms of torture, which intellectuals were also submitted to, included water, food and sleep deprivation, extreme threats directed to the person submitted to interrogation or his/her family and friends, along with constant harassment.

The end of the Security came only with the Revolution of 1989, when its restructuring occurred and the last Director, General Iulian Vlad, was placed under arrest²¹. The National Council for the Study of the

¹⁹ John Follain, *Jackal: The Complete Story of the Legendary Terrorist, Carlos the Jackal*, Arcade Publishing, 1998, p. 131-132.

²⁰ Pierre Glaudes, Pierre Bayard, *Terreur et Représentation*, ELLUG, 1996, p. 153.

²¹ Henry F. Carey, *Romania Since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society*, Lexington Books, 2004, p. 504.

Archives of the Former Security (CNSAS) was created by Law no. 197 from 1999²², with the aim of making available for the public the files depicting the acts of this repressive institution. Moreover, the Council has the legal right to rule whether a person was involved in *political police* acts, in the interest of the communist regime. This represents a major step forward in uncovering the horrors committed by this instrument of a regime that was declared *illegitimate and murderous* by President Traian Băsescu, before the Romanian Parliament, on the 18th of December 2006²³, in an act that benefitted from considerable coverage throughout the continent.

It is then explicable why the attraction of the exile was a reality during the time of the People's, and later, Socialist Republic of Romania, if one takes into account both the physical threats and the psychological pressure intellectuals were subjected to. The lifestyle imposed by Ceaușescu's regime, particularly after 1980, involving an exacerbated personality cult and a series of absurd, megalomaniac projects, took its toll on the population and led it to the brink of despair. The last five years of the regime were particularly rough, as they were placed under the auspices of *rationalisation*, in an obsessive attempt by Ceaușescu to pay the external debt of Romania and to further an irrational approach to industrialisation. Starting with 1984, elementary foodstuffs started to be available in ever lower amounts, while the few that could be found on the market were of extremely poor quality. This triggered a steady increase in contraband. Furthermore, one year later, the *rationalisation* programme was expanded, so as to encompass the sale of fuel to the population, in spite of the exports Romania was undergoing in this regard.²⁴

The limits set to vehicle traffic, yet another severe violation of the right to free movement, was accompanied by the shortage of electricity, affecting households, stores, institutions and public lighting. Meanwhile, heating was also drastically reduced in winter, which led to more problems within a healthcare system that was already facing a lack of medicine and equipment.

Romania's foreign policy instruments became severely limited, as western countries voiced opposition to its obsolete regime. The tourism potential of the country also fell²⁵, exports became non-profitable and the heavy industry exhibited the only signs of development, but without being able to exploit its full potential. The technology made available for the population was below minimal standards, especially in terms of telephone

²² *Official Journal*, no. 619 from 17 December 1999.

²³ Dorin Dobrinu, Vladimir Tismăneanu, Cristian Vasile, *Raport final al Comisiei Prezidențiale pentru Analiza Dictaturii Comuniste din România* (Final Report of the Presidential Committee for the Analysis of Communist Dictatorship in Romania), Bucharest, 2006.

²⁴ Ioan Scurtu, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

²⁵ C. A. Brebbia, F. D. Pineda, *Sustainable Tourism*, volume 4, WIT Press, 2010, p. 585.

lines and media access. The large factories triggered an abrupt increase in pollution levels, which left a deep imprint on urban environments, while rural ones were also undergoing damaging transformations.

This is the overview of a context which had little to offer and became hostile not only to the intellectual elite, but to all social categories, with the exception of a few privileged pawns of the regime. Set against this outrageous background, there was the Security, a political police which constantly exceeded its already too permissive mandate, to the detriment of freedom of expression and the comfort of everyday existence. The negative consequences triggered by the prolonged exposure of intellectuals to the oppression of this institution left scars that have not yet fully healed on the face of the Romanian intelligentsia. From the points of view of artistic creation, political expression and international openness, this segment of the population was severely oppressed by the long, merciless tentacles of the hated Security. Had it not been for an active Romanian diaspora in the West, this repression would not have been portrayed with such accuracy in the media and the public debates that raised awareness about the precarious conditions beyond the iron curtain.

Abstract

The article analyses the actions of the Romanian Securitate/Security against intellectuals and the population in general, during the communist period, with the aim of assessing the harmful effects it had on multiple aspects of the country's social, political, cultural and international affairs. The structures within the Security were tailored according to the needs of the regime, so that it may exert its control over all potentially rebellious segments of society, while its means were unusually cruel. A general sense of anxiety was therefore created, which enabled the Communist Party to maintain the high ground, to the detriment of dissident voices and an ever more active Diaspora. However, the Security became so hated that it immediately turned into a target, following the Revolution of 1989.

Keywords: *Security, anticommunism, intellectuals, oppression, Communist Party*

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Normative power faces Great Power politics. The European Union, Russia, and the Ukrainian crisis¹

*Dacian DUNA**

Introduction

The comemoration of one of the most tragic moments of our history, the First World War, is marked by an atmosphere of distrust and disrupted solidarity between the West and Russia, following the Ukrainian crisis that began on 21 November 2013 when Viktor Janukovych, the then-president of Ukraine, suspended the announced preparations for the signing of an association agreement with the EU. This resulted in a spiral of events, starting with the mass protests in the 'Euromaidan' (21 November 2013-spring 2014) leading to what is already known as 'the Ukrainian revolution', followed by the ouster of Janukovych and his self-exile to Russia (February 2014), the unrest in the largely Russian-speaking Eastern and Southern Ukraine (the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and Crimea), the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, and the civil war in Donbass (an ongoing conflict) where the separatist Russophones supported by Russia started a war against the authorities in Kiev. The West reacted and accused Russian Federation of military intervention in Ukraine (February 2014) gradually imposing a variety of sanctions on Russia and Crimea, from interdictions to individual citizens to economic measures. Russia retaliated imposing its own sanctions on the Western countries from Europe and North America, following the same logic. A repetitive action-reaction upset the relations between the West and Russia to unparalleled levels since the Cold War. A particular case shocked the West: the shooting down on 17 July 2014 of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, a passenger flight from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur, claiming 298 lives.

The events in Ukraine and their internationalization could be regarded as a prelude to a 'new' conflict between the West and Russia, an

¹ This is an update version in English to an article published by the same author in 2015.

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ideological conflict that once seemed to have receded after the end of the Cold War. The newest 'avatar' of the Cold War is the conflict between on one hand a post-Westphalian and Kantian West, a society focused on political and economic neoliberalism, and on the other hand a Russian Federation bringing once more in the scene an assertive and aggressive Real-Politik, probably perceiving itself as the exponent of those opposing the international order based on the globalization supported by the West, or the exponent of traditional values rejected by the secular West. This Russia of Vladimir Putin seems to reverberate the times when the conservative principles of the Czarist autocratic imperialism had prevailed over the liberal ones not only within the Russian heartland, but also throughout Eastern Europe. Now it does not seem to be by chance that the crisis occurring in the Russian-Western relations has been previewed by the EU's offer to Ukraine, to sign an association agreement at the meeting of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius (28-29 November 2013). The Kremlin's reaction to the violent removal of Viktor Yanukovych's regime (after its unilateral renunciation to sign the association agreement with the EU), materialized by the annexation of Crimea, has surprised by its roughness and total desconsideration of the principles of the UN Charter and of the international conventions and treaties. It has also illustrated the considerable gap between the normative power of the European Union and the new Russian autocracy, packed in democratic clothes, yet presenting some similarities with other Russian historical manifestations of the same sort: Czarist autocracy and Soviet totalitarianism.

Today's Russia looks once again a power hunted by the ghosts of the past, by the proverbial fear of geostrategic encirclement, subversion and invasion from the West. The destabilization of Ukraine might have seemed for Russian leadership as preferable to the prospects of a European Ukraine that might have brought the issues of democracy, rule of law and human rights closer to Russia's Western frontiers, hence closer to the Russian population. Not to mention the frontiers of the European Union and possibly NATO, even though the Western perspective on territoriality is considerably different.

It seems rather obvious that Russia's reaction to the fall of the Yanukovych regime and the establishment of a pro-Western government in Kiev looks a disproportionate one, standing more as a reminder of the Soviet invasions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) than as a modern 21st century policy.

This situation has questioned from the beginning the willingness and capabilities of the West to solve such a crisis. The EU, a Kantian type of power, based on the rule of law, is confronted with a traditional Great Power, based on force and willingness to use military force, approaching

global politics in geopolitical manner. The Ukrainian crisis maybe perceived, unfortunately, as a new illustration of the dialectical expression formulated by Nicolae Titulescu following Germany reoccupied the demilitarized area of Rhenania (1936): „the force of the right versus the right of the force”.

This paper is not focused on analysing Russia as an international player, nor the Ukrainian crisis, as it might be expected after the previous paragraphs. It is rather interested in aproaching the position of the European Union as an international actor, manifested through its external action. An assumption already suggested in the title is the following: the EU is a civilian, normative or Kantian power confronting in the Eastern Europe a classical or traditional power based on geopolitical reasoning, or Real-Politik: the Russian Federation². It evaluates whether or not the CFSP-CSDP mechanism developed under the auspices of the Lisbon Treaty can safeguard the interests of the European Union and succesfully promote the security and stability of the Eastern Partnership area, in the context of the regional destabilization promoted by Russia. Obviously, the aproach risks being perceived as superficial or speculative, given the volatility of the international situation, or biased since it views things from the perspective of a Member State of the European Union satisfied with the international status quo. However, under the current circumstances the risks are acceptable. Even if the regional situation stabilizes (it relatively did it after the Minsk agreement), in the medium run the tendency in EU-Russian relations seems not to be encouraging, at least during the mandate of President Putin. Under these circumstances, the EU should reconsider and reinforce its external action capabilities, especially in the military field, living behind the constraints of the civilian-normative model.

Since the recent Russian enterprise in Crimea is an unprecedented challenge for the current international order since the 1990 invasion and annexation of Kuwait by the Iraqi forces, one may find necessary to redefine the concept of power in international relations, how it is aplyed to the European Union, what are the defining and specific elements of the current external action mechanism of the EU (responding to the question of what the EU can do under the circumstances) and what the EU has done to solve the Ukrainian crisis, before drawing several conclusions.

² This form of classical geopolitical reasoning may seem to be archaic to many in the post-Cold War world, or to what is today defined as appropriate behavior (or political correctness), but if it continues to be successful it could change the rules of the game with unforeseeable consequences.

Power and international politics

‘Power’ remains a strong, yet controversial, concept in international politics since the beginning of written history. It marked and even shaped the ages in such manner that we are sometimes labeling the periods after important characters or important political entities or empires (e.g. the Roman age, the Victorian age). Its definition and the international status it implies are constantly changing, but some of its features endure.

Power is both a material and an immaterial force, while it remains a contested concept, “with different interpretations held together more by a family resemblance than a core meaning”³. Power is rather a social convention rather than an objective feature of a certain actor or entity or for a better explanation, power is socially acknowledged and socially contested. All the ‘Great Powers’ of history had been both admired and envied by the lesser actors. However, besides these arguments, power has always been linked to status and prestige, or how an actor is acknowledged by the other actors in international relations.

Great Powers

The term ‘Great Power’ was probably first coined during the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary during the Vienna settlement and one of the architects of the post-Napoleonic balance of power system, used the term in a diplomatic letter addressed in February 13, 1814: “It affords me great satisfaction to acquaint you that there is every prospect of the Congress terminating with a general accord and Guarantee between the Great powers of Europe, with a determination to support the arrangement agreed upon, and to turn the general influence and if necessary the general arms against the Power that shall first attempt to disturb the Continental peace”⁴.

There is no one universal standard or definition for what labells a great or major power. However, there are some elements that can be considered as defining or ‘normative’ for a ‘Great Power’: *international status* or *prestige*, *territorial/spatial size*, *military capabilities*, *population size*, *economic power*, and *cultural influence*. Certainly, at least some dimensions are no longer as relevant as they used to be in defining the status of Great Power. Technology and especially the information revolution seem now to be the driving forces in the world. They are continuously eroding the Westphalian

³ Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams, eds., *Power in World Politics*, Londra și New York: Routledge, 2007, p.1.

⁴ M.A. Chaudhary and Gautam Chaudhary, *Global Encyclopedia of Political Geography*, New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2009, p.98.

state system⁵. Even though they are no longer easy to localize, these facets of power still continue to provide the main advantage for the Western societies (especially the US) in front of the rest of the world. Yet, this advantage is hard to maintain, and even illusory (even though there are voices that accuse the direct involvement of the West in the Euromaidan or the Arab Spring, the proofs are not substantiable, the movements using a globalized technology available to everyone – the social media - to advance domestic agendas rather than secretive foreign interests). Even so, it is seemingly important to stress that the modern and postmodern attributes of power are inextricably linked. Their presence can reinforce the position of the international actor, while the lack or precarity of one of them could create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by internal or external forces.

Another related concept is that of 'superpower'. The term was originally coined by Nicholas Spykman in a series of lectures given in 1943 and it was later developed in his famous book *The Geography of Peace* edited posthumously by Helen Nicholl (Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1944). Superpower is traditionally considered to be one step higher than a great power⁶. In fact, the term regards the capacity to project power globally. According to Lyman Miller, superpower can be measured along four axes of power: military, economic, political, and cultural (the last being identical to Joseph Nye's concept of soft power)⁷. Most scholars consider that only Britain, the US, and to a certain degree Soviet Union enjoyed during different epochs this status for limited periods of time.

One may notice that delimitating 'great power' and 'superpower' seems rather superfluous in the age of globalization. The existence of superpowers certainly made sense in the Cold War period explaining the bipolar system. After the Cold War the trend towards a multi-polar or multi-layered system is clear. Globalization forces international players to project power globally with a focus on soft rather than on hard power. Nevertheless, the military dimension still makes the difference between the United States and other powers in terms of global strategic reach. The US seems to have remained for now *primus inter pares* and the only superpower left after the Cold War, though the term remains too emphatic and rather vague. Yet, 'superpower' is still appealing. Many authors have already

⁵ One must remember the 'Facebook revolutions' spreading from the Middle East to Ukraine. For instance, the call for a rally of a Ukrainian journalist on its Facebook page (Mustafa Nayyem – born in Kabul, Afghanistan) in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) triggered the 'Euromaidan' movement which led to the downfall of Viktor Yanukovich.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p.221.

⁷ Lyman Miller, "China an emerging superpower?", in Stanford Journal of International Relations, Winter 2005, URL=< .stanford.edu/group/sjir/6.1.03_miller.html>

emphasizing the relative decline of America or predicted the rise of other 'superpowers' such as the European Union, China, India, Brazil or Russia⁸. Perhaps, the most appropriate formula in the post-Cold War world to define such entities would be 'global powers'. The formula acknowledges their global visibility and does not contradict their focus on the world's macro-regions (globalism coexists with regionalism).

Prestige and international status

Even though there still is anarchy in the international system⁹, a certain hierarchy is implicitly acknowledged by the participants to the global game. The status of global power comes as an international recognition of the power capabilities of the actor, as well as its active involvement in international politics. It is, in fact, a corollary for the other dimensions of global power. It can be maintained only by setting and respecting the rules of the game.

Besides the recognition of the others, an actor must self-define itself as a global power: "A belief in great-power status, traditionally expressed in terms of imperial identity and pretensions, provided a crucial means to strengthen the legitimacy of states"¹⁰. Japan's reluctance to harbor its global power status in the 21st century made most scholars 'forget' that not long ago this country was the second economic 'superpower' of the world after the United States (before 2010 when it was replaced by China). They base their premises on the dynamics of other actors and the relative stagnation of Japan during the last two decades (since the crisis of 1997).

On the other hand, some actors (like North Korea or Iran) consider that international legitimacy can be obtained by joining the nuclear club. Thus, they are investing in acquiring nuclear vectors, believing that prestige and status can be obtained by threat. Of course, this course of action is considered outlawed by the powers favorable to the status quo, but appealing for the countries that reject the current settlement or international order (not only states).

⁸ Rockwell A. Schnabel with Francis X. Rocca, *The Next Superpower? The Rise of Europe and Its Challenge to the United States*, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005; Piya Mahtaney, *India, China and Globalization: The Emerging Superpowers and the Future of Economic Development*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007; Steven Rosefielde, *Russia in the 21st Century: The Prodigal Superpower*, Cambridge University Press, 2005; John Redwood, *Superpower Struggles: Mighty America, Faltering Europe, Rising Asia*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.

⁹ Anarchy defined as the lack of a supranational authority limiting the national sovereignty.

¹⁰ Jeremy Black, *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500*, Londra and New York: Routledge, 2007, p.12.

Territorial size

The territorial dimensions of a major power are no longer as relevant as they used to be throughout history, since distances lost their meaning in the age of globalization and Internet. Nevertheless, size still matters due to indirect conditions. A sizeable territory increases the chances of having large populations and significant natural resources. Even the few exceptions of great powers that initially started from relatively small territories (most notably Britain and Japan) do not contradict the idea that major powers have huge territorial size. The UK, for instance, developed at its peak the largest maritime empire in history, covering a quarter of the globe. Presently, the territory matters not only for its symbolical or strategic load, but also for its resources in a world obsessed by energy. It is not by chance that Gazprom, the Russian energy giant, has already proposed shortly after the Crimean referendum of 2014 to exploit the oil and gas reserves of the newly acquired province of the Russian Federation¹¹. The annexation of Crimea was proving to be also businessly connected. In fact, the EU strengthened at the EU European Council of December 2014 the sanctions on investment, services and trade with Crimea and Sevastopol, indirectly linked to the energy issue.

Economy, technology, and knowledge

The traditional form of power dynamics includes the economic factor. Economic and technological capabilities are decisive for defining a major power. They are usually interlinked with military capabilities, influencing the ability to project power, even though it will be a mistake to establish a deterministic linkage¹².

A simple recourse to history could prove that there was no great power without a strong economy and a highly sophisticated technology in comparison with those of its neighbors. The economic determinants of power on the global scale are currently more important than ever. They seem even to surpass the military power up to a certain degree¹³. The powerful states (in terms of economy, technology and knowledge) are always capable in rapidly developing military capabilities when and if they deem necessary. On the other hand, the economic and technological decline

¹¹ Reuters, „Gazprom proposes oil and gas development in Crimea – RIA”, 18 martie 2014, URL=< <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/18/ukraine-crisis-gas-idUSL6N0MF1X020140318>>.

¹² Jeremy Black, *op.cit.*, p.22

¹³ The cases of South Korea and Japan indicate that economic power is not sufficient to be considered Great Powers. These countries are dependent on the American military power to deter the external threats toward their defense (like the North-Korean one).

downgrades if not totally eliminates a major power. This was the fact with the Soviet Union, starting its inexorable decline in the late 1970s. It was clearly visible also in the demise of the Ottoman Empire nicknamed in the mid-19th century “the sick man of Europe”, an expression attributed to Tsar Nicholas I of Russia.

Technology, knowledge and especially information are fundamental for any Great Power and profoundly interconnected to the political-military factor.

Intelligence capabilities are at the intersection of the mentioned factors and another source of power often used by the historical Great Powers to protect external interests, internal secrets and reveal the secrets owned by other states. There is not only an arms race between the states but also a power race and the technological and scientific edge achieved over the others is an important aim of state's policies.

The political-military factor

The traditional and most enduring perspective on power in international relations comes from the realist-historicist tradition. According to it, military power and political preponderance (if not hegemony) are considered the most pervasive indicators of a ‘Great Power’, even though they should be backed by demographic, political, economic, and cultural indicators. Paul Kennedy's analysis emphasizes the interaction of strategy and economy, noticing that the rise and fall of ‘great powers’ is the result of the wars fought by their armies and the more or less effective use of economic resources during wartime, or the way the economy of a certain nation state is progressing or regressing compared to other nations during the period between wars¹⁴.

Having powerful armies has always been the most important way of acquiring power in the international stage. However, both Nazi Germany and Soviet Union have had huge and highly sophisticated armies to boost their grand strategies, yet they eventually failed in maintaining their power. Currently, the military balance is relatively favourable to the United States, the only state that can be labeled as military ‘superpower’. However, military might is not a guarantee for maintaining the great power status in international politics indefinitely. The other major powers that focus on economic capabilities could use them in building-up military arsenals. The peaceful industrial capabilities have always been used even by democracies to support the military-industrial complexes and conversely. For instance, Britain, the US, and more recently China, have developed throughout

¹⁴ Paul Kennedy, *Ascensiunea și decăderea marilor puteri. Transformări economice și conflicte militare din 1500 până în 2000 (The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000)*, Iași: Polirom, 2011, p.12.

history huge commercial fleets just to notice that they further needed navies to defend and protect them.¹⁵

Population

Not surprisingly, the rise of the European Great Powers coincided with a significant population growth caused by the development of superior technology in agriculture, industry and advances in medicine, allowing the accumulation of surpluses and the overcome of the subsistence economy specific to the Middle Ages. In wars, if all other conditions were met, numbers have always been the decisive factor. The European balance of power favored the most dynamic nations, with growing populations and strong societies.

The French had dominated the continental balance of power during the 18th century when it sheltered the biggest European population¹⁶. They were declining in the 19th century while the Germans have become the largest European nation. With such arguments in mind, it is not surprising that Germany held the upper hand after its unification in 1870. Currently, Germany is momentarily keeping its demographic edge in front of the other European nations, even though the notion of power has become considerably more complex. However, there is another argument for maintaining the importance of the population factor. Numbers are important in accounting the votes held by the Member States of the European Union within the EU Council. At least, a sizeable population remains an important issue in the EU, partially explaining why Turkey is kept at bay by the great powers of the European Union.

Certainly, the demographic element of power is not decisive. The rise of Europe and later the United States or the Soviet Union is not directly related to the population factor, but especially to other elements. Consider the position of China, East Asia, South Asia or even Africa in terms of demographic leverage in comparison with those of the US or USSR. Moreover, the demographic factor works only as far as the population maintains its dynamism, which means that it is progressing. The current population patterns are showing that most of the major powers and the rest of the developed world confront the prospects of an ageing population,

¹⁵ This was the finding of Admiral Mahan in the late 19th century. His masterpiece on geostrategy – *The Influence of Seapower upon History: 1660-1783* (1890) – had soon become a handbook not only for the US Navy, but also for the navy of imperial Japan.

¹⁶ The United Kingdom had maintained its domination over the maritime balance of power throughout the same period and even longer, during the 19th century and early 20th century.

which could worsen the current economic growth rates¹⁷. Hence, the population factor is both an opportunity and a vulnerability, depending on the context and actor. In future it may become necessary to revise the entire economic philosophy since the current economic orthodoxy is based almost exclusively on macroeconomic parameters, on constant and sustainable economic growth, which imply the constant demographic growth to support the consume.

Culture

The cultural dimension of power is no less important. In fact, one might consider culture or cultural superiority to be the binder of all dimensions. Culture is the immaterial factor of power but strongly interdependent with the material ones. It is about influence, persuasion, admiration or seduction. A clear example was since 1945 the so-called “cultural imperialism” exercised by the US upon the Western hemisphere with reverberations across the whole world. Since culture is better explained by Joseph Nye’s concept of *soft power*¹⁸, we will approach it in the following section of the paper.

Joseph Nye’s views on power

One of the most significant and instrumental classifications of power in international relations was proposed by Joseph Nye, one of the most prominent neoliberal IR theorists. Nye developed three concepts of power based on how power is exercised: hard, soft, and smart.

The concept of ‘hard power’ is based on military capabilities and has a long history in the tradition of realist thinking. From Machiavelli and Hobbes to modern theorists such as Morgenthau, Kissinger or Mearsheimer, realists have always put an emphasis on military power. However, a neoliberal theorist such as Joseph Nye Jr. completed the image of hard power by adding the economic dimension to the military one: “*military power and economic power are both examples of “hard” command power that can be used to get others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’)*”¹⁹.

Hard power is the ability of the governments to impose sanctions or exert threats, which is mostly similar to the negative definition of state’s

¹⁷ Neil Howe, Richard Jackson, “The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century”, report by Center for Strategic and International Studies, 23 mai 2008.

¹⁸ Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power”, in *Foreign Policy*, nr. 80, 1990, p. 153-171.

¹⁹ Idem, *Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization*, London, New York: Routledge, 2004, p.5.

power defined by Max Webber.²⁰ In fact, the views of the German theorist on power have inspired Joseph Nye in defining the concept of *soft power* too. Weber created the tripartite formula of authority based on legitimacy: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational²¹. The *charismatic legitimacy* largely corresponds to Joseph Nye's concept of *soft power*.

While hard power is basically an expression of governmental policy, soft power is not necessary an exclusive instrument of the government²², but can also be used by a multitude of state and non-state actors and it is stimulated by the market economy. Essentially, *soft power* is linked to the ability of influencing and even shaping the preferences of the others or in Joseph Nye's original words: "*The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, values, institutions, and a vision that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents a vision and values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. Soft power often allows a leader to save on costly carrots and sticks. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractional power. In terms of resources, soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction*" (Nye, 2006a:2).

There are certain differences between the hard and soft avatars of power. However, the hard and soft dimensions cannot be neatly separated, just as Joseph Nye argues. The postmodern global powers have to use a complex mixture of hard and soft foreign policies, using "sticks", "carrots", and "seduction". This intersection of hard and soft power is encrusted in the concept of "smart power". Joseph Nye named it "the ability to combine them effectively"²³.

Certainly, power is a very complex concept of the international relations. The concepts of power explored above are instrumental for the objective of this paper, while the main focus still remains in measuring the EU as a would-be global power and attempting to respond to the questions many European citizens are raising: who are we, what is and what it should become the united Europe? Unfortunately, many European citizens do not seem to understand or want to understand what the EU stands for, since most of them "cannot see the forrest for a tree" like Hegel would say, or in

²⁰ According to Webber, the state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" (Webber quoted by Dreijmanis, 1994: 156).

²¹ They are formulated in the essay "The three types of legitimate rule" (Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft) published by Max Weber in *Preussische Jahrbücher* 187, 1-2, 1922.

²² Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics*, New York: Public Affairs, 2004, p.14.

²³ Idem, "Think Again: Soft Power", in *Foreign Policy*, 23 februarie 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/02/22/think_again_soft_power.

other words have a limited perception of the march of history. The life obsessively anchored in the present is a characteristic of the Western thinking, which can put the West in front of certain dangers it cannot anticipate.

The European Union: what kind of power?

The EU is clearly not a traditional actor in international relations. Therefore, the defining rules applying to a traditional 'Great Power' does not necessarily apply to the EU. Only if the neorealist prediction that the EU will become a 'superstate' the realist predicaments for superpower capabilities and behavior could apply in its case. However, it is clear that there are few signs that the EU will become such an entity for the time being, if ever. Then, what formula can be considered to define Europe?

If one considers the classical 'norms' for power (prestige, economy, technology, military, culture, population or territory) the EU could be considered as an emergent power of the contemporary world, only the military and economic factors questioning this statement.²⁴

In terms of international prestige, it is clear that the EU has become a player in the international affairs. It already developed a structured dialogue with other global players, most notably with the US, China, or Russia (even though there are diplomatic setbacks). The major global players acknowledge the importance of the Union even in criticizing it. In terms of economy and technology the European Union is a giant in trouble, but remains one of the most developed entities in the world, a global competitor even for the United States. In military terms the EU is not itself a global power because the defense field remains clearly under the control of the Member States. However, it has potential: it brings together traditional former Great Powers such as France or Britain, the industrial power of Germany and actively involved states in conflict prevention and crisis management, like the Scandinavian countries, Italy, Poland and even Romania.

In population terms the EU has about 500 million inhabitants (7% of world's population), having the third population after China and India. Territorial dimensions are less impressive but significant – the greatest part of the European continent. However, a problem for the European Union is not the aggregation of these mentioned factors but the level of integration and cohesion. The indefinite postponement of the European federal project makes from the EU a virtual superpower, not a real one. Even so, the current Russian policy towards Ukraine is a reaction to the pro-European integration attitude exerted by the Ukrainian population – an attitude

²⁴ One could argue here about the lack of a common European army and about the economic crisis still unsolved in the Eurozone (see the case of Greece for example).

leading to the fall of a pro-Moscow regime. This actually says a lot about other actors' perception towards this potential global power, the European Union. The Europeans usually claim that the European integration is not a geopolitical one, yet the Russian policy of destabilizing Ukraine after the success of Euro-Maidan shows that Russia perceives the EU as a geopolitical threat to its ambitions of restoring the empire. Ukraine was indeed a historical part of Russia's hinterland. This view is shared by several thinkers, not only from Russia. For instance, a leading Turkish think-tank appreciated that the EU is covering for the ambitions of Germany to build-up a hinterland in Eastern Europe using its economic power²⁵.

Going back to the power concepts of Joseph Nye one could notice certain aspects regarding the case of the European Union:

1. The hard power capabilities of the EU are quite limited and dependent on the limited willingness of the Member States to coerce certain states or entities. The experience of the crisis in Libya (2011-present) and the recent crisis in Ukraine are indicative. The terrible human tragedy in Syria and Iraq caused by ISIL/ISIS makes another case for the impression that the European Union exhibits a lack of political willingness and capabilities to undertake the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks. These all add to the previous experiences of the Union in different phases of crisis management that all have long demonstrated the limited hard power capabilities of the EU. The only significant hard power instrument remains the economic sanctions with their relative lack of effectiveness.

2. The EU holds important capabilities of soft power, even though its attractiveness has relatively eroded following the European economic crisis (the sovereign debts crisis especially). Nevertheless, many of the European Union's neighbours are still attracted by the prospects of a closed relationship with Brussels and have accepted EU conditionality to enjoy favorable trade and business relations with the EU. The development of cross-border policies such as the ENP was instrumental in augmenting the EU soft power capabilities. Under these circumstances it is not by chance that many authors define the EU as a civilian power in conflict prevention and crisis management, which means using especially soft power capabilities.

3. The lack of significant hard power capabilities makes the EU not qualify for what Nye terms *smart power*. Yet, the industrial and scientific potential of Western Europe can easily be redirected for the purpose of developing hard and smart capabilities. In fact, many

²⁵ Günay, 2014.

European companies specialized in weapons production are toping the worldwide arms deals. France, Germany and Britain are amongst the first 6 arms supliers of the world, the US lead the global rankings with a share of 30% of the global arms sales, followed by Russia (26%), Germany (7%), France (6%), China (5%). Britain falling back to the 6th place in 2012 (SIPRI, 2013).

Jan Manners proposes an alternative concept, one that is probably more suitable to describe the European Union as an international actor: „normative power”. It assumes shifting the EU emphasis from military or civilian capabilities to normative power capabilities, defined as an “ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions”²⁶.

The idea of normative power is not actually new. Edward H. Carr named it once “power over opinion” to distinguish it from the military and economic power²⁷. Johan Galtung identifies it with “power of the ideas” or normative power to distinguish it from “stick” (remunerative power) and “carrot” (coercive power)²⁸. Robert Kagan does not even call it power but its oposite. According to Kagan, “Europe is is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation”²⁹. Instead, Manners focuses on the ability to change conceptions over what is “normal” or “conventional”, considering it the greatest power of all³⁰.

What is aparent in the case of the European Union is the willingness to ignore the Westphalian conventions. Its engagement towards universal norms and principles lies in the center of the relations between Brussels, the Member States and the rest of the world. This is illustrated by the set of common principles that should be met by any state wanting to join the EU – the so-called Copenhagen criteria: *“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions quaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership pressuposes the candidate’s ability to take*

²⁶ Jan Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, *JCMS*, Volume 40, Number 2, 2002, p. 239.

²⁷ Stivachtis, 2007, p. 45.

²⁸ Galtung, 1982.

²⁹ Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, New York: Vintage Books, 2004, p.3.

³⁰ Jan Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms”, *JCMS*, Volume 40, Number 2, 2002, p. 253.

on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union"³¹.

According to Manners the normative bases of the European Union are concentrated in five central norms: (1) the centrality of peace; (2) the idea of freedom; (3) democracy; (4) rule of law; (5) respect for human rights and liberties. These are accompanied by four minor norms: the notion of social solidarity; anti-discrimination and protection of minorities; sustainable growth and good governance³².

The normative capabilities of the EU can be found in the policies and practices related to relations with the neighbours, from the ENP to cross-border cooperation, the Euro-Mediterranean Union, the Eastern Partnership or even the enlargement. Yet, this conditionality can sometimes be a frustrating barrier to the development of relations with other states. The problem accentuates when dealing with actors less inclined towards normative commitments (such as Russia or China) and which, at the same time, are competing with Brussels for resources and markets. However, there are few analysts who would appreciate that the principles and norms sustained by the EU and its enormous economic attraction exercised over the neighbouring countries from Northern Africa or the Middle East has been stimulating the social upheaval in Libya, Syria, Egypt and other states. Nevertheless, one can not overlook that the "Arab Spring" had unfolded after the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the global financial crisis. Some even argue that there is a clear normative influence from the EU over Israel, the Palestinian Authority or even the United States³³. Unfortunately, the follow-up scenarios in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and up to a certain extent Egypt actually harmed the European Neighbourhood Policy and its aim to develop a „ring of friends”.

Even Manners noticed some limits of the normative power, even though he considers it superior to the material types of power. The main limit concerns the credibility gap between ideals and numbers. It is difficult for an entity to express itself as a normative power and succeed at the same time to impose its will upon other actors without credible forces (hard power). For these reasons, the power of the norms has to be supported by the "norms" (or dimensions) of power. The EU is currently an expression of the neoliberal order, without being a neoliberal empire such that of the United States of America.

³¹ EC, "Accession criteria", *Copenhagen European Council*, 1993, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_en.htm

³² Jan Manners, *op.cit.*, p. 242-243.

³³ Roy Ginsberg, *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

Power by institutional design: reforming the external action of the European Union after Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon has proposed the strengthening of the European Union after the great wave of enlargement of 2004 and 2007 and the failure of the “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”³⁴. The Lisbon Treaty, initially known as the “Reform Treaty” was – in the spirit of the European integration – a compromise between the sovereign wills of the Member States, the “mistresses of the Treaties”. Even this treaty came under threat when it was initially rejected by the Irish referendum and by the Polish position represented by the late President Lech Kaczynski, a Euro-skeptical, during the intergovernmental negotiations leading to the signing of the treaty and the subsequent delay of the ratification process by the same country³⁵.

The Lisbon Treaty did not bring substantial changes to the framework and decision-making mechanisms of the CFSP. It actually confirmed once again the evolving character of this policy and the functionalist logic that can better explain it for the latest decades. To illustrate this, the repeated failure to develop a federal supranational construction has led the European leaders advance the idea of progressively extending the area of political cooperation within the CFSP framework, creating the necessary synergies for deepening the integration in future. This is why the Treaty of Nice (December 2000) introduced the *enhanced cooperation procedure* in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Treaty of Lisbon it extended it towards the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

The enhanced cooperation procedure involves at least nine Member States that have the willingness to advance more rapidly in areas that are not in the exclusive competence of the Union without requiring other Member States to join them. Moreover, the EU *acquis* also introduced an opposite procedure to that of enhanced cooperation, known as the *opt-out* clause for the states that refuse to join certain common policies (e.g. Denmark refused to participate in the CSDP, fact acknowledged as the opt-out clause in the Edinburgh Agreement of December 1992³⁶).

³⁴ In 2005 the French and Dutch electorates rejected the Constitutional Treaties.

³⁵ See also Alex Szczerbiak, *Poland Within the European Union: new awkward partner or new heart of Europe?*, Routledge, 2012.

³⁶ This agreement followed the initial rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht by the Dutch electorate in June 1992. The agreement confirmed the ‘national compromise’ negotiated by the Danish Parliament by which it was acknowledged that Denmark has the right to opt-out in four fields, among which the defense one, Denmark being one of the most fervent supporters of the North-Atlantic Alliance.

Under the framework of the CSDP the enhanced cooperation procedure is known, according to the Lisbon Treaty, as the *permanent structured cooperation* procedure (PSC). This allows those Member States “*whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework*” (see art. 28A.6 and 28E from the Treaty of Lisbon). Applying here the functionalist logic specific to the European integration process one may notice that forming of strong synergies between some countries may even lead to a virtuous circle of integration if PSC is a successful experience. The same logic may be helped by a psychological characteristic of the human nature applicable also for the Westphalian system of state: states are jealous for the success of other states and if the success can be attributed to cooperation rather than to conflict they may be tempted to join the efforts of the successful group or alliance. This partly explains the successes of the NATO and EU enlargements towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The PSC might even attract the more Euroskeptical Member States if the perceived benefits of cooperation and integration are ranked higher than the costs. In a world increasingly preoccupied with the reduction of governmental spending and with new external threats, the idea of advancing in the field of defense makes sense.

The extending of the *paserelle clause*³⁷ to the field of the CFSP by the Treaty of Lisbon is another important innovation for the European acquis. Under its auspices the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) is becoming increasingly important in the procedures of the Council, thus reducing the intergovernmental character of the decision-making process, while at the same time increases its potential effectiveness and strengthens the tendency of communitarizing the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The most important elements brought by the Lisbon Treaty with the purpose of consolidating the CFSP-CSDP are the “new” institutions and European jobs, resulted from the compromise between the Member States which allowed the signing of the Treaty: the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), the President of the European Council and the European External Action Service.

The HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is appointed by the European Council by QMV(!). She/he is charged with coordinating and carrying out the CFSP and CSDP. The HR is “double hatted”, meaning that

³⁷ The Paserelle Clause from the Treaties allows the European Council to decide unanimously to replace the unanimity procedure undertaken in the Council with the QMV procedure, in certain policy areas with the consent of the European Parliament.

she/he is also Vice-President of the European Commission. The HR must consolidate the tendency towards more coherence in the matters of CFSP between the two former pillars of the EU, both in terms of formulation and implementation.³⁸ As Vice-President of the Commission the HR must defend the interests of this institution within the Council. Even though the reference to the right of legislative initiative in matters of the CFSP was eliminated from the text of the Lisbon Treaty, there is a provision that 'sweetens' this aspect living for the Commission, the most communitarianized institution of the EU, an open door: "*Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission's support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the Council*" (Art. 15a of the Lisbon Treaty).

A new permanent European function introduced by the Lisbon Treaty within the institutional mechanism of the EU is the *President of the European Council*. The President is elected by a form of qualified majority called the *double majority*³⁹ by the European Council for a mandate of 2.5 years and for a maximum amount of two mandates. To strengthen his/her European commitment, the President may not hold a national office at the same time. The President chairs and ensures the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council meetings in cooperation with the President of the Commission and ensures, based on his/her own capacity the external representation of the Union in matters of common foreign and security policy without prejudice to the powers of the HR (Art. 9B.6 from the Treaty of Lisbon). The President helps in facilitating the cohesion and consensus within the European Council and presents a report to the European Parliament after each European Council meeting.

The establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), an institution helping the HR is certainly essential for increasing the coherence of the external action of the European Union, bringing a new role for the European diplomats. The EEAS combines the former 1 and 2 pillars of the European Union in matters of external action, bringing together personel staff from the General Secretariat of the Council, the European Commission, and from the national diplomatic services (since EEAS has a double mandate: to help the HR and work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States).

³⁸ Here it is about the former European Communities pillar managed by the European Commission and the CFSP, one of the two intergovernmental pillars, governed especially by the Council of Ministers.

³⁹ Type of qualified majority voting requiring the agreement of at least 55% of the members of the Council, representing at least 65% of the citizens of the European Union.

The establishment of new bureaucratic structures within the European Union is not a danger for the representativeness and the democratic character of the European institutions, especially since they rather represent the result of an evolution than an institutional revolution. However, the HR, the President and the EEAS are institutions that better link together the great institutions of the EU: the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. The capacity of identifying the common interests of the European Union is amplified, not decreased.

Unfortunately, the Treaty of Lisbon leaves still suspended the communitarization of the CSDP. This policy remains almost perfectly intergovernmental with unanimity still ruling the decision-making procedures.

The European construction is still a precarious balance between the supporters of a united and powerful Europe (Euro-optimistics) and those opposing this perspective (Euro-skepticals). The geostrategic conditions in Eastern Europe following the Ukrainian crisis might still be a catalytical factor for deepening the European integration in the defense field. On the other hand, the complicated economic situation of the EU and of its Member States and the popular unhappiness with the austerity measures supported by the Commission and the governments of the Member States, amplify the success of Euro-skeptics, radicals and populists. The situation is shown by the increase of extreme right or left parties in Europe during the recent years.

Remarks on the EU response to the Ukrainian crisis

The Ukrainian crisis proves that the external action of the EU remains inhibited by the political will or willingness of the major Member States of Union, like Germany, France or Britain. The profound dependence on the energy provided by the Russian Federation makes some of the Member States extremely cautious when dealing with the issue of sanctions against Russia, even though the values and norms which stand at the European foundations would claim a more coherent and significant response of the European Union. In fact, the mild tone of the Europeans has apparently encouraged Vladimir Putin in pursuing the policies that led to the annexation of Crimea. The strategic calculus of the Kremlin probably started from the assumption of a weak initial Western reaction, which ultimately proved largely correct.

The most clear reactions to the Ukrainian crisis belonged to the new institutions established by the Treaty of Lisbon. This demonstrates that the EU is starting to have a voice in the international politics and that the EU institutions have begun to understand the shared interests of the European Union, not those emanating from the national level.

One of the first Western reactions to the Ukrainian crisis was the one belonging to the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. In March 1, 2014, The HR stated: „*The unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine must be respected at all times and by all sides. Any violation of these principles is unacceptable. More than ever, restraint and sense of responsibility are needed*”⁴⁰. The message was essentially similar to those lauched by Obama Administration, NATO, the EU Member States and other international organizations. So, the initial Western response was limited to moral sanctions. The denouncing of the Russian policy toward Ukraine and Crimea could not unfortunately deter the further escalation of the conflict. Gradual economic sanctions have been raised, but they were too weak in relation to the seriousness of the situation provoked by Moscow in Eastern Ukraine. They reflected the divergencies within the Council and the conciliatory attitude of Germany, a country frightened by the spectre of a return to recession if Russia would have decided to use its energy weapon against the West. The inhibitions exerted by Berlin in terms of foreign policy seemed to expand at European level. The strategic initiative seemed to belong to an increasingly assertive and provocative Russian Federation.

The sanctions, a clearly hard power instrument, clearly influenced the economic situation of the Russian Federation. However, they were not able to determine Russia to renounce its plans for annexing Crimea or its help for the Russian separatists of Eastern Ukraine. The EU has not played a significant role not even in the negotiation phase. The response came from Great Powers politics, reminding the days of the European Concert: Germany, France, and Russia, with the participation of Ukraine, broke a deal known as Minsk II in February 2015 to end the hostilities in the Donbass region of Ukraine.⁴¹ The agreement signed also by the separatists left OSCE in charge together with the Trilateral Contact Group (composed by Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE) to assist the pullout of heavy weapons and monitor the ceasefire.

The ambitious Eastern Partnership is a part of the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy. The Polish-Swedish initiative has certainly been misinterpreted by Russia, a traditional geopolitical player. Moscow saw behind it a plot to control Eastern Europe and especially the former Soviet space by the Westerners, using soft power capabilities: economic inducements, including the prospects of economic integration

⁴⁰ Catherine Ashton, "Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the developments in Ukraine's Crimea", Bruxelles, EU External Action, 1 martie 2014.

⁴¹ The Minsk meeting was held after the failure of the Minsk Protocol signed in 15 September 2014 to end the hostilities between Kiev and the separatists in Donbass region. Minsk I was a protocol signed by the Trilateral Contact Group.

with the European bloc for countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia or Moldova. The meetings of the Eastern Partnership have usually ended in statements proclaiming the positive steps made by the European partners from Eastern Europe towards the European ideals such as democracy, rule of law human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the principles and norms of international law. These are the landmarks of normative power.

The 2015 Riga summit stated that the Partners „underline that strengthening democracy and enabling functioning market economies, improving macroeconomic stability and the business environment, as well as enhancing interconnectivity, mobility and people-to-people contacts open new prospects for cooperation, contributing also to trade, growth and competitiveness. This serves the shared commitment to stability, security and prosperity of the European Union, Eastern European partners and our entire continent”⁴² before condemning the „The acts against Ukraine and the events in Georgia since 2014” using the entire arsenal of the international law, including the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and 1990 Charter of Paris, UNSC Resolution 2202 of 17 February 2015 and UN General Assembly Resolution 68/262 on the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

The summit confirmed once again the progress made by the partner countries and their prospects of achieving some sort of economic integration with the European Union. It does not indicate any roadmap towards political integration for the countries involved in the Eastern Partnership, but this is not the whole story. The progressive establishment of normative and socio-economic interdependencies has the potential to strengthen the cooperation between the Eastern partners and the EU up to a point that could be described by the followers of Real-Politik as an alliance. The summit was careful to also indicate the convergence in CSDP matters, including the Ukrainian contribution to and EU Battlegroup in 2014. Small steps can sometimes be more fruitful than big ones.

Those who question the achievements of the European Union in foreign and security policy and proclaim the failure of the ENP are substantially realists or traditionalists. Those who argue in favor of the achievements in these fields are definitely liberals and constructivists. It is clear that the conflict in Ukraine is a conflict between the Russian hard power and the Western soft power. But will soft power prevail without a smart strategy that includes also hard power capabilities? Let us remind here the words of a great realist statesman, US President Theodore Roosevelt: “speak softly and carry a big stick”.

⁴² Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21-22 May 2015):
URL=< https://eu2015.lv/images/news/2015_05_22_RigaDeclaration_EaP.pdf>

Conclusions

The proverbial expression “with greater power comes greater responsibility” describes the “burden” of any past or present Great Power. The complexity of the (post-)modern world amplifies this reality even more. The current tendency toward a multipolar or multi-layered world is evident. Global, regional and local threats are interconnected, especially due to the action of transnational actors. In such an environment, the notion of power shifts in a rather rapid manner. Even so, the classical attributes of power still remain important. One of these is military power. The events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine confirm this statement.

If one could perceive the European Union as a major power of the world, this remains tributary to a very specific field: the normative one. The EU is a powerful source of international law covering its full spectrum. The values and principles, or even the ideals defended by the Europeans ever since the time of the Enlightenment Age are by themselves a source of power if used for democratic aims.

There are two pressures threatening not only “normative power Europe” (in Manner’s own words) but also the very survival of the European Union: internal pressures (from national or even subnational levels) and external pressures (systemic pressures or pressures exercised by other global powers). Both internal and external pressures are fed by the consequences of the global economic crisis and especially by its European side: the sovereign debt crisis partly solved by employing unpopular austerity programs.

Regarding the Member States, one may notice the erosion of the Westphalian state order and the inability or unwillingness of the post-Westphalian actors⁴³ to save the classical state. There is also a societal reflux against globalization and its by-products: externalization of companies towards the ‘East’ for cheaper working force and resources; migration of labour force from poorer nations towards Western Europe etc. This societal reflux is marked by an increased hostile reaction towards the ‘other’, amplified by chauvinistic and xenophobic politicians and mass-media. Such phenomena increase the pressures on Brussels and its European institutions.

Another set of challenges come from the systemic level. The emergence of new major/global powers with a more empirical, realist, assertive, interest-based rather than normative behavior is clearly a pattern in today’s international affairs. Most notably, China, India, Brazil, and the Russian Federation are closing the gap separating them from the West in

⁴³ International organizations, INGOs, transnational corporations or international banks have all become much more assertive and autonomous in international politics.

terms of GDP, development and technology. This tendency would be acceptable under a relatively democratic and peaceful environment, favorable to market economy, such used to be the one after the Cold War. However, at least the Russian Federation has indirectly indicated – due to its involvement in the Ukrainian crisis and the annexation of Crimea – that it does not support anymore the peaceful transition towards multipolarism.

The global economic crisis is eroding the trust in the EU institutions, even though the European debts' crisis is not directly the result of EU policies, but rather the result of faulty economic policy decisions made by the governments. However, the austerity measures supported by almost every government and financial institution in the world combined with the policies of deregulation and privatization will increase the pressure on the middle-class citizens, increasing social tensions that might even endanger democracy. Why? Because states can retreat from the arena only in the world of ideas, not in the world of facts. Lacking funds states will increase the existing taxes and invent others. We could end in choosing between democracy and free market capitalism. Not surprisingly there is a notable ascension of a right and left wings extreme parties in the European political spectrum, sharing a profoundly anti-European, anti-Semite, xenophobe and populist discourse.

Another tendency is the rebirth of Great Power politics inside the European Union, most notably being the case of Germany, country that currently determines the most important decisions at European level. The European institutions have the tendency to act more like annexes or companions of the big Member States. Another one is the establishment of blocs: the French-German nucleus, and the Visegrad Group, a group of smaller powers yet increasingly dissatisfied with the decisions taken by the big Member States.

There seem to be no perfect solutions to the problems the EU is now confronting. The current European leaders seem to be unable to offer such solutions. However, one thing is sure: any adopted solution should start from the assumption that the European societies cannot stand alone in front of the tsunamis of globalization.

A new vision of Europe, whether federal, confederal or of any other nature should be made a reality but only acknowledging the normative power of Europe. Such vision should start from the basic principles of subsidiarity and solidarity. Why? Because European citizens must be able to control their destinies. The distance between citizens and Brussels is amplified by the elitary character of the European institutions and their reduced democratic legitimacy and representativity. The democratic deficit has not been diminished by the Lisbon Treaty. Member States tend to unite under the lowest common denominator as an alternative to no decision.

Frequently, this denominator is sub-optimal both for them and for their societies. The Member States want always to control the situation since their elected leaders are exclusively legitimized by the national electorates they represent. They are reluctant to make important commitments for fear of being rejected by others and for fear of the effects towards their economy. Hence, external powers, such as Russia, feel safe and receive an impunity clause for actions that would otherwise be absolutely unacceptable for any European state which would find itself in the situation of Ukraine. The historical lessons are confirming the realist assumption that appeasement brings aggression.

An important source of power for Europe – one increasingly contested both by European and their American counterparts – is the transatlantic alliance. This alliance should be reevaluated and reinforced, but what will be hard to renew is the UE interest for Europe. Clearly, Washington reorientates towards Asia-Pacific and less towards Europe, both from strategic and economic reasons. However, in future the Europeans and Americans should take into account a closer relationship based on their natural bonds and shared values. This rapprochement could become a necessity once an Asian bloc would emerge in future. The European normative power and the American superpower could complement each other.

Europe should commit itself more profoundly toward the aim of achieving the knowledge society and improving living standards not only in the Eurozone but also in the European neighbourhood and the rest of the world (e.g. erradicating famine and diseases, promoting education in Africa and the Middle East could reduce the negative transnational flows from this areas bringing societal insecurity to Europe).

Not everything is related to geopolitics and geostrategy, yet united Europe can no longer afford to ignore Russia's return or revival as global strategic player, especially since this return could threaten the security, stability and peace of the European continent, especially in its most vulnerable part: Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, it is necessary to rethink the posture of the European Union, especially in matters of CSDP. Does the EU longer afford not to have a common defense policy? The lack of action in this field would encourage Russia to continuously destabilize the Eastern Partneship and even the Eastern frontier of the European Union. However, the EU should rethink and readjust its policies on the Russian Federation starting from a lucid analysis of the Russian foreign policy motivations and from the identification of its fundamental interests in Eastern Europe. One should acknowledge that the destabilization of Ukraine must not be solely imputed to Russia but also to the West, which at a certain time, signalled a decresed interest for states

such as Ukraine or Georgia or sacrificed this interest to appease Russia and obtain what Russia offered: oil and gas. This is what the Russian and regional mass-medias often named, not without totally unjustified, the "Western hypocrisy".

Finally, the most important question remaining is: what will be the future of Europe? United Europe might be a global superpower, but divided will not rival the US and the emergent global powers. The question is not one about power. It is one about will or willingness. Are the citizens of Europe willing to become European citizens without having to loose their national and not only national identities? Or do we have to return to ultranationalism, xenophobia and hatred? Whether or not we choose a path or another, one thing is sure: in the age of globalization and digital revolution isolation brings backwardness.

The process of Europeanization must not necessarily mean the loss of personal, local or national identities, like some Euroskeptical politicians would argue. It does not require such loss. Quite the contrary, adding a new identity dimension gives more power to all who define themselves as Europeans, the more so as globalization seems to be unavoidable to those who embrace the advancements of our modernity: technology and life style behaviors. Elsewhere in the world increasingly powerful transnational identities are being built as we write these words. The European construction motto „unity in diversity” remains as current as ever and should inspire more reflection and need of action to the political elite of the Member States of the European Union. The development of new EU linkage institutions such as the HR, the President of the European Council, or the EU's External Action Service might prove to be instrumental in this endeavour.

Implications of Brexit and the US presidential elections

Clearly, the British referendum held on Thursday 23 June 2016 left the European Union in dissaray. One of the major players of the European scene decided to "Brexit" (leave the EU) with a majority of 52 to 48% of the participating citizens. This forces us to reevaluate the weight of the European Union compared to other major actors of the world. Certainly, Brexit left the EU less substantial in terms of GDP, population, and military capabilities (even though they never counted for the supranational level). The numbers speak a lot, but this was not the only significance of Brexit.

The follow-up of the referendum is not yet fully comprehended. However, the Brexit proved that European politics is changing rapidly. While the Brexit has little to do with the Ukrainian crisis and more to do with the refugee crisis and the British mistrust in the German European leadership, it also underlines the increasing dissatisfaction of the European

citizens with the domestic and European establishments, capitalized by populist parties and politicians. There is a growing democratic gap between Brussels and the average citizen or at least this is the perception of the latter. The European leaders, even though they are elected by their nationals, are perceived as distancing themselves more and more from their voters in order to support ideals and values that are not fully comprehended by and least not explained to the citizens of their countries. Societal security helps explain this emerging domestic cleavage. The fear of unknown, of foreigners threatening jobs and physical safety is just a part of the story.

This domestic cleavage is accompanied by an international one. There are certain countries and political regimes that increasingly reject what they perceive as the Western corrupted values, immorality, obscenity, and hypocrisy that are the pillars of the globalized world. Putin's Russia has called itself to be their champion. It even mocked some of the Western principles, among which the principle of self-determination, used by the West to justify the independence of Kosovo and by Russia to justify its annexation of Crimea.

The US presidential elections won by Donald Trump - a perceived outsider, against Hillary Clinton - the personification of the establishment, according to Trump's voters, are another example of the political change we mentioned above. It is not yet known how many of the promises made by the future president Trump during the campaign will be upheld throughout his presidency, yet many people ranging ideologically from conservative to extreme right from across the world welcome his election and support his claims. Donald Trump is regarded as a supporter of President Putin together with whom he wants to normalize the US-Russian relations. Does it mean that he would raise the US sanctions against Russia? In this case, the Ukrainian crisis might have a different turnout.

There are pressures from inside the EU institutions to renounce to the policy of sanctions against the Russian Federation. The sanctions did worsen the conditions of the Russian economy, but also those of the European economies. The Brexit and the US presidential elections won by Donald Trump might be a „game changer” also for the European Union. It seems now that the chances that the EU will become a federation of states in the near future have almost faded away. Even the future of the united Europe is questioned. The trend of globalized markets might still be replaced by re-nationalization. We think that this is not the scenario that will prevail, but we fear another one even more perilous, this time for the small countries: the Great Powers will be less inclined toward establishing conditions for sharing the prosperity of globalization with all the peoples of the Earth. The global village maybe shrinking once again. The geographical and geopolitical maps of the world might be once again redrawn.

Abstract

The Ukrainian crisis, followed by Brexit and the results of the presidential elections in the United States, are a few of the latest challenges facing the European Union, a normative actor of the international relations. They are unravelling a new 'brave' world questioning the status quo established since the end of the Cold War. The Ukrainian crisis showed the limits of the European Union in crisis management, the ineffectiveness of sanctions against a regional hegemon, Russia, determined to maintain its traditional control over the former Soviet space, and the return of great power politics in Europe and the world. It also underlines a new ideological conflict developing in and out, not only between the current players of the international arena, but also within societies. It is an irreducible conflict between liberal internationalist-cosmopolitans and conservative-nationalists, each perceiving the other as threatening to the survival of humanity and society. The EU may survive only if it will overcome its political-military inhibitions and settle its own internal disputes regarding the same modernity-postmodernity cleavage.

Keywords: EU, US, Russian Federation, Great Power politics, normative power, CFSP, CSDP, Ukrainian crisis, Eastern Partnership, Brexit

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Complex Impact of Insecurity on Business

George ANGLIȚOIU¹

Introduction

The researchers of Globalisation process have built their critical argumentation mainly using a pro-cons positivist perspective² centered on post-Westphalian political regimes³, modern economic theories⁴ and the combined psycho-sociology of elites and masses⁵.

The Security Studies have emerged in the XX century as a niche scientific area of International Relations in the context and by report to major disequilibriums caused by the two classic world wars, followed by another one, equally global, but atypical - *Cold*. The accent has been placed mostly on the classic realist perspective which defined security as a public good of political and military essence⁶. Only the post Cold War reinterpretative needs have generated meaningful contributions of complex

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² T. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Random House, Updated and Extended Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2000; Idem, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century*. Picador, 3rd Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2007.

³ A. Linklater, A., *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era*. Cornwall: Polity Press & Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998.

⁴ J.E. Stieglitz, *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002; Idem, *Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Amazon Kindle edition, 2010; Idem, *The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Amazon Kindle edition, 2012.

⁵ A. Giddens, *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*. London: Profile, 1999.

⁶ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*. Edinburgh: R.&R. Clark Ltd., 2nd Edition, .pdf version, 1946; H. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York NY: Alfred A. Knopf, .pdf version, 1948.

science⁷ and constructivism⁸ in order to reconfigure the use and content of security by the pluri-disciplinary insertion of soci(et)al, economic, cultural and environmental security in macroscopic interpretation of similar and interconnectable micro-structures.

This paper aims to edit a explanatory contribution over the high degree of insecurity affecting economic enterprise worldwide; a secondary goal is to outline two scenarios for the future with the inclusion of possible remedies to the increased asymmetric and unconventional risks.

1. Asymmetric Risks and Threats

The applied asymmetry to security is centered mainly on terrorism and organised crime. These two categories of risks and threats are not postmodern phenomena but have been part of the world powerplay since the Middle Ages. The post Cold War Era has nonetheless witnessed their expansion and acceleration.

1.1. Terrorism

The terrorism has caused by the sheer size of its impact the inception of a major chronological mark (both in the World and XXIst Century History), namely September 11, 2001. Terrorist events have occurred before, but the different evaluation of 9/11 attacks is based on complexity, superior capacity for asymmetric force projection, vectors, casualties' numbers and target significance. Other terrorist events followed in quick succession (Bali, October 12, 2002, Madrid, March 11, 2004 and London, July 7, 2005) that bolstered the importance of post-September 11, 2001 as compared to the previous time milestone, the post-Cold War Era.

The terrorism can be classified in different ways, but the most relevant to the topic at hand is the one that makes a clear-cut distinction between *faithful* and *infidel* social and ethnic communities. The religious terrorism is seeking to induce a combination of anxiety, fear and panic to

⁷ J.N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; Idem, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Idem, *Distant Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003.

⁸ Copenhagen School, B. Buzan., *People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press (1991), Prentice-Hall, Amazon Kindle edition (2nd Edition, 1991), 1983, 1991; B. Buzan, O. Waever and de J. Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997. B. Buzan, and O. Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Amazon Kindle edition, 2004.

the public sphere in order to secure the success of fundamentalist strategies aiming to overcome the political, military and economic order. The main difference to the End of XIXth Century's Anarchism is based on the fatalist scenario of *Judgement Day / Accession into Heaven* and full implementation into the ordinary life of humankind of the non-negotiable principles of a certain (monotheistic) religion.

To be more precise, we talk about Islamist terrorism, the most elaborate, systemic and radical form of this asymmetric threat. Wahhabism, Salafism, Mahdism, Majaheedinism and Jihadism represent as many denominations as possible for the literalistic and extreme application of Islam. Despite multiple positions stated by religious and political representatives of the Islamic world, the Quran, the holy book of the religious belief in Allah, has become the cornerstone to nullify the civilisational fundamentals of the West and the Globalisation process that the latter promotes.

Sharia, the ethical section of Quran and later Islamic traditions, is considered to be the only legitimate, necessary and sufficient guide to organise individual and collective life, since the *Hegira* (Prophet Muhammad's flight to Medina, 622 A.D.) until present time. From such a viewpoint, any other antic or modern teachings, democratic or authoritarian ideologies are similar to the famous *Library of Alexandria Dilemma* of Caliph Umar.⁹

The main Islamist terrorist organisations, Al Qaeda and newcomer ISIS, have taken the lessons-learned of the previous anti-Western

⁹ The Library is filled with books either opposed to the Quran, thus dangerous, or similar to it, thus futile; in both cases it should be destroyed. For the pro authenticity arguments, see Isya Joseph, *Bar Hebraeus and the Alexandrian Library*, The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures, Volume 27, 1911, p. 335-338, <https://archive.org/details/jstor-528668>, and for the opposite thesis, see Bernard Lewis, *The Vanished Library. In response to: Lost History of the Lost Library from the June 14, 1990 issue*, September 27, 1990 Issue, The New York Review of Books, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1990/sep/27/the-vanished-library-2/>

High-level representatives of the Islam faith have reiterated on several occasions the necessity to destroy by Jihad the ideas and books belonging to the unfaithful – see Abu-Hamid bin Muhammad bin Muhammad bin Muhammad Al-Ghazali (1058-1111), *apud* Andrew G. Bostom (ed.), *The Legacy of Jihad. Islamic Holy War and the Fate of Non-Muslims*, Amherst NY, Prometheus Books, 2005, p. 199): [O]ne must go on jihad (i.e., warlike razzias or raids) at least once a year...one may use a catapult against them [non-Muslims] when they are in a fortress, even if among them are women and children. One may set fire to them and/or drown them...If a person of the ahl al-kitab [People of the Book – Jews and Christians, typically] is enslaved, his marriage is [automatically] revoked...One may cut down their trees...One must destroy their useless books. Jihadists may take as booty whatever they decide...they may steal as much food as they need...

radicalisation phases of the Arab world (Black September, Hamas and Hezbollah) and added the cross-objective, both political and religious, of returning to the Islamic pan-Arabic Caliphate which should be expanded beyond the historical lines reached at the time of the decisive battle of Poitiers (732)¹⁰.

In this context, the Western type of capitalist entrepreneurship is considered to be a mortal sin, a major corruption of the Islamic faithful regardless of their location on Planet Earth, but especially in the Arab space. Corporatism, consumerism and commercial advertising¹¹ are seen as Satan's own doing with the primary purposes of alienating the Islamic believer from Prophet's revelations and fully laicize his bourgeois life as market client.

The bi-directional structuring of business environment between private initiative and financial banking has generated another unacceptable consequence in the eyes of these fundamentalist gurus. The Quran forbids usury (*riba*), with cost plus shared profit, and spot payment for deferred delivery as the only viable financial solutions for entrepreneurship¹². But the booming industry of Islamic banking, estimated at \$ 2 trillion, has generated the paradox of Sharia-compliant consumerism¹³ fueled even by Western banks (e.g. Citigroup, Deutsche Bank)¹⁴, which have joined this financial market.

The support given by the West, mainly the United States, to Israel in detriment to the Arab Palastine is perceived and interpreted to be another proof of the imperative for extreme action against the Western infidels et alia, bought by the Jewish worldwide political and economic lobby. In conclusion, the business environment and the entrepreneurs are considered to be legitimate targets in the punishment actions against infidels who dare

¹⁰ See William Stearns Davis (ed.), *Readings in Ancient History: Illustrative Extracts from the Sources*, 2 Vols. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1912-13), Vol. II: Rome and the West, p. 362-364, from the Internet Medieval Source Book, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/732tours.asp>

¹¹ See the works of Sayd Qutb, one of the most influential Islamic thinkers of the XX Century, seen as a mentor by the Muslim Brotherhood organisation which is currently outlawed and labeled as terrorist structure by Egypt and other Arab states. For a recent analysis of the public and scientific profile of Sayyid Qutb, see John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism*, Columbia University Press, 2010

¹² E.g. Murabaha, Muajjal, Bai Salam, Istisna'a, Ijarah, Musharaka and Mudaraba

¹³ See the advertising campaign of Al Rayan Bank (the leading Islamic bank in the United Kingdom) claiming to be "UK's *only wholly* Sharia compliant retail bank" - <http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/useful-info-tools/about-us/>

¹⁴ In principle, the customers of an Islamic bank have to be Muslims, and the compliance with Sharia to be certified by supervisory boards composed of religious experts. Capitalist competition rules have nonetheless generated the commercial reality of Sharia-like non-Islamic lenders to the Muslim faithful.

to infiltrate the Islamic space. Not without meaning was therefore the act of ISIS predecessor, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Mesopotamia (AQI), of beheading a businessman, Nicholas Evan Berg (2004), among the first, only to be followed by tens of other entrepreneurs, citizens of the countries participating in the US-led multinational coalition against Saddam Hussein regime. Many others were kidnaped and later on released either with millions of dollars-worth ransom payments per person or by the anti-terrorist armed forces. The kidnapers have oftenly tried to negotiate prisoner exchanges and formulated threats, included in the beheading video recordings, against the coalition states.

Another favoured target of Islamist terrorism remains the hotel industry. Either we analyse temporary resort residencies of politicians, military officials and businessmen, or consider popular tourist places, the entrepreneurs and their economic investments are constantly marks to this category of (suicidal) fanatics.

The transportation companies are also directly or indirectly affected by the escalation of the Islamist threat. The increase of perimetral security standards has become a priority for the authorities of target states, with the automotive sector being the hardest to protect taking into consideration the 2005 London terrorist attack when the fourth attacker activated his bomb after failing to access the already shut down subway system. By comparison, even if the explosion of an automobil is a financial loss by itself, it does not bear comparison in terms of terrorist attack evaluation to the hijacking or bombing of a plane. The insurance and reinsurance costs will rise exponentially and similarly to collective psychosis, both to the significant harm of such transportation services.

Generically, terrorism is very much depending on business and entrepreneurs. It needs massive finance for the success of its operations. Therefore, the most important form is the one of cash, taking into consideration the worldwide legislative restrictions on business and bank accounts that could help terrorism secretly or as front cover. ETA and IRA have long been using the „revolutionary fees” on local businessmen. The democratic and multi-ethnic advance has fueled an increased opposition of the business environment against such forced payments, leading in turn to the substantial decline of the extremist power.

Al Qaeda had long been based on the personal fortune of its leader Ossama bin Laden and the voluntary contributions of sponsor businessmen and states. ISIS managed to refine its financing methods by the effective control of energy-rich territories. Estimates¹⁵ indicate daily revenues of over

¹⁵ Luay al-Khatteeb, *How Iraq's black market in oil funds ISIS*, CNN, August 22, 2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/18/business/al-khatteeb-isis-oil-iraq/>

\$ 2 million from black market sales of Iraqi and Syrian oil. Similarly lucrative activities are in progress in other areas under Islamist control, with Lybia as a forefront example. These actions are taking place to the detriment of rightful owners; the entrepreneurship by itself is also at high risk due not only to limited investment perspectives but also from a maintenance and environmental security viewpoint.

Another very worrying development is given by the recurrent tendency of Islamist organisations to target industrial facilities whose destruction or fall under control would lead to severe consequences for the local population and economy, at least. The temporary control exerted by ISIS in July 2014 over the Mosul Dam was a major threat to the regional security and the lives of approximately 1 million people. Destroying or damaging this plant equaled to flooding large areas and severing the electricity flow for domestic use and business. Comparably, the January 2014 Islamist attack in Mali against a refinery and the subsequent hostage-taking crisis undelined once more the huge risks to which the industrial entrepreneurship is exposed to in troublesome areas.

The 9/11 attacks have revealed also the very important lesson of the globalised trend of terrorist threats. World Trade Center was a symbolic target but meant in fact the killing in its two towers of over 3,000 individuals, mostly business professionals. ISIS emergence has led to a global recruitment of wannabe jihadists, a few thousands of which from Western countries. The radicalisation of Western second and up-generation citizens of Muslim faith is by itself a serious development; their potential home return after taking part in ISIS training camps and battlefields could lead to major bombings against any political, military and economic entities. Their effective capacity for recruitment or conversion to radical Islam, given the peripheral status and cluster location in some Western metropolitan areas, could lead to civic insubordination and property damage with direct impact on commerce, for instance in the conflict zones with the security forces.

It should also be added the fact that after 9/11, the business interests of Western companies have been extensively affected anytime a public figure and the media made use of their constitutional free speech in order to criticise or expose with humour „essential” aspects of Islam. Intent on promoting liberty of expression, the Danish cartoons of Prophet Muhammad could be enlisted as case study.

1.2. Organised crime

This category of asymmetric risks and threats has created in the entire history of (post-) modern state major difficulties for the good functioning of local and transnational economy. The share of organised crime and black market is by itself an indicator of good governance and

stability, weak or failed states being characterised by corruption, fragmentation and unpredictability. Finally, organised crime has been acting like a major rival of the state for the control of the production, processing and economic distribution within and beyond borders. Thus, the significant difference is made by mafia structures often substituting financial and fiscal state bodies in the collection (even partial) of benefits from the entrepreneurial process.

Ineffective local (rural or metropolitan) administrative and police structures were nominated and controlled by organised crime families, to mention only the eloquent case of Chicago during the Prohibition time. Only the ambition and vocation of certain decision-makers (FBI director J. Edgar Hoover) and operatives (Elliott Ness) determined criminal conviction of mafia bosses (Al Capone) and unraveled some of their illegal but very lucrative outfits.

In the country of origin, Italy, the most effective regime in combating the already traditional structures of honor proved to be the Fascist led by Mussolini, the ante and post-authoritarian Italian democracy being unable to provide a functional framework of legal and economic conditions for modern business world especially in the South. Intensified judicial campaigns like *Mane Puliti* had produced important results that led to the arrest of the most important Sicilian mafia dons. At the same time, other structures of organised crime continued to thrive in business, the Neapolitan Camorra and the Calabrian N'Drangheta succeeding to have oligo- or even true monopoly positions in the sector of services (harbour or waste management, for example). Thus, it should be emphasised the recurring case of Naples, a famous tourist destination whose streets become covered by fetid garbage whenever the families grow dissatisfied with the level of their revenues, such crises ending up with pay rise or when the army does the cleaning; it is a worrying regional feature for one of the founding states of the European Union and G7.

Protection rackets, loan sharking, gambling, prostitution, production and marketing of drugs, gangsterism, illegal trafficking of persons, goods, hard currency and weapons are some of the most important sources of untaxed and illicit income mafia structures have "organised" in the world¹⁶. An aggravating factor is that terrorist organisations often resort to mafia methods and goals in order to secure and diversify their income sources (Colombian FARC guerrilla, for instance).

The states and the international community have developed best practices and effective remedies in the systematic fight against organised crime. The five largest New York families have been targets of extensive

¹⁶ T. Cretin, *Mafias(s): A la découverte des sociétés du crime*. Paris: Editions Chronique, 2009.

judicial campaigns that led to the detention of numerous leaders which marked the decline of the Gambino clan, the main force within *the Commission* until the arrest and imprisonment in 1992 of John Gotti (*Don Teflon*), the last boss of inter-war tradition.

But we can assess the Italian-American organised crime as being outdated compared to new problematic structures at the southern border of the United States. Located in Mexico, but operating cross-borderly, the Mexican cartels (Sinaloa¹⁷, Zetas, Gulf, Knights Templar, etc.) are a major threat not only because of the extensive drug trafficking seriously affecting the lives of those addicted to drug use, but also due to destabilisation of certain regions and states of the Mexican Confederation¹⁸. Thus, the resilient power of drug cartels¹⁹ has translated into anarchy and severe damage of the socio-economic life due to the inability of Mexican authorities for decisive coercive intervention, over 100,000 people being killed and another 25,000 missing between 2006-2012, the years of Calderon presidency²⁰. Ciudad Juarez²¹, one of the main economic hubs on the border with the United

¹⁷ The leader of Sinaloa Cartel, Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, has been included by the Forbes magazine in its 2009 rankings of the most rich people in the world (no. 701, with an estimated fortune of \$ 1 billion) alongside legitimate self-made businessmen like Bill Gates, Warren Buffett, Richard Branson, Carlos Slim or Steve Jobs. See ***, *The World's Billionaires*. #701 Joaquin Guzman Loera, Forbes, 03.11.09, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2009/10/billionaires-2009-richest-people_joaquin-guzman-loera_FS0Y.html.

His most recent evaluation, prior to his spectacular escape from a maximum security prison in July 2015, ranked him as the 67th on the 2013 list of most powerful people. See ***, *Joaquin Guzman Loera*, Forbes, <http://www.forbes.com/profile/joaquin-guzman-loera/>

¹⁸ I. Grillo, I., *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, London: Bloomsbury Press. Amazon Kindle edition, 2012; A. Hernandez, *Narcoland: The Mexican Drug Lords and Their Godfathers*. London, New York: Verso, Updated Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2014.

¹⁹ John Bailey, Roy Godson (eds.), *Organized Crime. Democratic Governability. Mexico and the US-Mexican Borderlands*, University of Pittsburg Press, 2000, http://www.google.fi/books?hl=fi&lr=&id=IQSS8siWycsC&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=tijuana+tourism+organized+crime+insecurity&ots=Knx1gen42t&sig=XfE5C-WPlgRN06wC-EwBjkIsftU&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false

²⁰ William Booth, *Mexico's crime wave has left about 25,000 missing, government documents show*, Washington Post, November 29, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/mexicos-crime-wave-has-left-up-to-25000-missing-government-documents-show/2012/11/29/7ca4ee44-3a6a-11e2-9258-ac7c78d5c680_story.html

²¹ ²¹ For an extensive depiction of daily, ordinary lives in the derelict Ciudad Juarez, see Charles Bowden, *Murder City: Ciudad Juarez and the Global Economy's New Killing Fields*, Nation Books, New York, 2011

States, where the foreign investment in the automotive industry is significant, has been facing a decade of cartel expansion affecting the economic productivity and shrinking the available workforce²². On the other hand, famous tourist destinations such as Acapulco and Tijuana are severely affected in terms of security of tourists²³ and hospitality industry operations, considering that tourism has been estimated at 8% of GDP, with Mexico a top 10 state destinations worldwide²⁴. An indicator of damage inflicted to tourism is the massive Acapulco opt-out by the sea liners, from aprox. 140 voyages before the year 2010 (aproximately 1,800 passengers per cruise) to 13 in 2013 (with about 600 passengers on board).²⁵

Mexican cartels²⁶ had begun primarily as distributors of Columbian drugs on the narco-American markets. Gradually, in the context of the relative success of Plan Colombia (1999 -), an eminently military initiative promoted by Washington and accepted by Bogota, the Colombian cartels were partially destroyed, which facilitated the rise of the Mexican. The level of intimidation and violence against the people of some communities exceeded the limits of occasional settling of accounts between different groups, and exposed cartel's ambition for supremacy against any oponents (public administration, police, army, media, entrepreneurs). The arrest or physical elimination of alleged cartel leaders in the campaign initiated by the new president Nieto are notable successes but the narco-trafficking structures have a well-proven regenerative capacity. Only tangible economic stimulus measures and strengthening of the

²² n, Beatriz Magaloni, *The Economic Consequences of Drug Trafficking Violence in Mexico*, Stanford University, 2013, http://fsi.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/RoblesCalderonMagaloni_EconCosts5.pdf

²³ The media has covered extensively in recent years many grim stories of rape, kidnapping and homicide against foreign tourists in Mexico, even in cities described as safe (by advertising campaigns). See for example Nathaniel Parish Flannery, *Is Drug War Violence Scaring Away Mexico's Spring Break Tourists?*, Forbes, 3/18/2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanielparishflannery/2013/03/18/is-drugwar-violence-scaring-away-mexicos-spring-break-tourists/>; Daniel Tovrov, *Is Mexico's Drug War Hurting Tourism?*, International Business Times, January 20, 2012, <http://www.ibtimes.com/mexicos-drug-war-hurting-tourism-213786>; Nicholas Casey, Alexandra Berzon, *Mexico Tourism Feels Chill of Ongoing Drug Violence*, The Wall Street Journal, June 8, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304432304576367710290674534>

²⁴ Mark Stevenson, *Mexico may drop out of top 10 tourist destinations*, Associated Press, Mar. 19, 2013, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/mexico-may-drop-out-worlds-tourism-top-10>

²⁵ See ***, *Mexico Tourism Report Q1 2014*, Business Monitor International, 2013

²⁶ For an official in-depth evaluation of its dynamics, see June S. Beittel, *Mexico's Drug Trafficking Organizations: Source and Scope of the Violence*, Congressional Research Service, April 15, 2013, <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41576.pdf>

rule of law can be effective remedies against the scenario of deepening of such a state into anarchy and civil war.

The clandestine production of drugs *per se* is a form of illegal entrepreneurship, which involves large workforce in rural areas with usually limited sources of livelihood. The degree of corruption of authorities can be an aggravating factor in the fight against such phenomenon, despite the presence in some theaters of operations of military units, the production of opium in Afghanistan being illustrative from this viewpoint. Regardless of the type of political regime in the country (Communist, Mujahideen or post-Taliban), efforts to combat illicit poppy crop, the essential ingredient in the production of opium and heroin, have failed, leading to the paradoxical situation of allowing some areas of production in order to avoid further radicalisation of local communities unable to have other sources of living. Military operations conducted by NATO against Taliban guerrillas and al Qaeda cells had initially included campaigns for destroying of the poppy crops which led in turn to acts of local communities in support of Islamist fighters. A corollary of this paradox is the fact that the Taliban regime was the most effective against poppy harvests, despite its short period of reign. This type of illegal entrepreneurship is more difficult to replace by a licit one as long as local tribal communities constantly oppose the cultivation of grain and vegetables (much less profitable sources of income against traditional narco-agriculture) and the weak Afghan state facilitates this duality.

2. Geopolitical conflicts

The most important form of geopolitical conflict is inter-statal while war is the most aggravated phase of it.

In the contemporary world, the initial phase is related to diplomatic disputes that oftenly reflect a collective political imaginary based on identifying the other as the enemy, the source of all problems faced by the entity to which they belong. Denting state honor²⁷ could therefore trigger collective mobilisation and popular support for aggressive foreign and security policy.

Regardless of geographic area, geopolitical conflicts are a major inhibitor of growth by directly affecting the investment environment. Entrepreneurs in conflict areas are adventurers who do not pursue sustainable economic development goals, but *ad hoc* accords with temporary holders of power (see the African black market of *blood diamonds*). Militia leaders who standardly come to power through coups, civil war or border aggression are oftently indicted by special tribunals established by the

²⁷ A.P. Tsygankov, *Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

international community. These warlords favour business solutions that quickly highlight the extracting capabilities of future investors who at their end of business interest aim for rapid exploitation of the abundant mineral resources of the African continent²⁸.

The presence in disputed border areas of significant mineral resources is accelerating the dynamic of geopolitical conflicts, the potential for destruction and effective escalation to classic war being very high. Target intervention by the international community can produce positive effects (see Sudan's peaceful secession), but the transition and fragility of newly created public institutions can generate a new form of internal instability between formerly allied factions for control of those geo-strategic areas (see South Sudan or post-Gaddafi Libya).

The territory by itself, with or without extensive natural resources, is a generic stake. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, beyond its religious dimension, is a historic confrontation over a territory that the two parties define it differently. The recent Israeli military action in Gaza against Hamas guerrillas (with similar goals as to the previous actions in Lebanon against Hezbollah) meant another series of major damage to the Palestinian infrastructure. Entrepreneurial undertakings that were part of the international community's efforts for recovery and subsequent development were highly affected given the fact they were located in the same area Tel Aviv intervened forcefully in 2009. The absence of a predictable security environment, in the context of failure of consensus and effective diplomatic intervention of the great actors, has generated or maintained black spots on the economic map of the world where only the propensity of organised crime and the black market can thrive. The dead or missing victims, and the waves of refugees caused by geopolitical conflicts are a serious problem, drastic loss of human potential seriously distorting the labor market.

The collective psychology can be easily engaged in traditional or recent geopolitical disputes (Le Bon, 1895, 1912, 1915, 1921), but the Globalisation process is expanding and accelerating them against entrepreneurship. The decision taken in 2014 by the Chinese authorities to open oil drilling in the contested Paracelsus islands of the South China Sea caused not only Vietnamese adverse diplomatic reaction, but also street violence and acts of sabotage against Chinese economic interests and businessmen active in the former French colony. Following the killing of about 20 and injury of more than 100 Chinese citizens, entrepreneurs and

²⁸ T. Burgis, *The Looting Machine, Warlords, Oligarchs, Corporations, Smugglers, and the Theft of Africa's Wealth*. New York: Public Affairs, 2015.

workers, the Beijing government decided to make an emergency repatriation of over 3,000 other citizens living in Vietnam.²⁹

The resurgence of China in the past decade as an international player with regional, at least, hegemonic ambitions³⁰ has led to the inception or reignition of geopolitical conflicts in its immediate neighborhood. The fact that *the Middle Kingdom* is such a vast realm is nothing compared to the loss / failure to strategically recover very small pieces of land³¹ such as the Japanese Senkaku islands. In response, error and ignorance of the historical facts of aggression and genocide by the current Japanese government revisionists³² once again have fueled bilateral and multilateral tensions³³ (including the two Korean states and Taiwan) in the East China Sea. The street reaction was simply to be expected (August-September 2012), and angry crowds of protesters, by violence, vandalism and collective boycott, targeted the Japanese interests in China. Panasonic, for example, was forced to suspend production at many of its factories in mainland in the aftermath to arson and other forms of destruction by the Chinese demonstrators.³⁴ Also, such geopolitical conflicts could damage economic relations between the parties, the dispute over the Senkaku islands causing a retaliatory measure from the Chinese government to ban the export of rare metals

²⁹ See Malcolm Moore, China evacuates over 3,000 citizens from Vietnam, *The Daily Telegraph*, 18 May 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10839036/China-evacuates-over-3000-citizens-from-Vietnam.html>

³⁰ H. Kissinger, *On China*. London: Penguin, Amazon Kindle edition, 2011; K. Y. Lee, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master's Insights on China, the United States, and the World* (interviews and selections by Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill). Cambridge: MIT Press, Amazon Kindle edition, 2013.

³¹ On the occasion of his visit to Pentagon in May 2014, general Fang Fenghui, Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army, declared that his country „cannot afford to lose an inch” of its historical territory. – see ***, *Vietnam riots: China accuses US as military chiefs meet in Washington*, *The Guardian*, 16 May 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/16/us-chinese-military-leaders-clash-riots-vietnam>

³² R. Katz, Voodoo Abenomics. Japan's Failed Comeback Plan. *Foreign Affairs*, 93(4), 2014, p. 133-141.

³³ Recent polls indicated an increased perception of war likelihood between China and Japan (53.4% Chinese and 29% Japanese). See ***, *More than half of Chinese see war with Japan: poll*, AFP *apud* Japan Today, September 11, 2014, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/more-than-half-of-chinese-see-war-with-japan-poll>

³⁴ See Kevin Voigt, *Panasonic closes China plants after violent protests*, CNN, September 17, 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/09/17/business/china-japan-panasonic/>

(REE) to Japan, thus affecting to a significant degree the Nipon hi-tech production.³⁵

3. Cyber-Crime

The strategic applications of technological progress, labeled in the modern and contemporary eras as industrial revolutions, have gradually led to the materialisation of quasi-mechanistic world of science-fiction writer Jules Verne.

The IT revolution with its general implementation is intrinsically connected to Globalisation. But the cyber-space quickly came to be characterized by espionage, war, and even terrorism, all accompanied by the prefix descriptor *cyber-*.

Current entrepreneurship is based on IT solutions, and its global presence is dependent on the functionality of the long distance binomial terminal-server. *Cloud computing* technologies have facilitated once again the acceleration of cyber-communication dynamics by emphasizing the importance of wireless data transmissions.

The world cyber society is not a perfect one despite SciFi thinkers' utopias. Conflicts, hegemony, balance of power, anarchy have all accompanied human communities in cyber-space.

The recent success of an excluded branch of Al Qaeda, namely ISIS, is also based on the latter's superior ability, compared to its parent structure to radicalise and recruit online Islamic believers, citizens and residents of the West. By exemplifying the area of religious cyber-terrorism, the author wants to underline the complexity of insecurity in cyber-space. The capacity manifested in the recent past by hostile entities to dismantle whole state computer networks (Russian cyber attack against Latvia in 2006) may ultimately translate into the non-illusory possibility for radical Islamists of access to critical infrastructure servers in the fields of transportation and energy production, for example.

The cyber-industrial espionage has however the main or direct impact on business and entrepreneurial perspectives. The technological espionage has characterised humanity since ancient times with the industrial revolution just emphasizing it. Whether it was about Chinese porcelain and tea, Venetian crystal, military arsenal (*Greek fire* or atomic bomb), state intelligence sought for security reasons or financial gains to compensate in this way its technological inferiority versus an opponent / competitor.

³⁵ See Mari Yamaguchi, *China rare earth exports to Japan still halted*, Bloomberg Business Week, October 2010,
<http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9J02PF01.htm>

Specifics of post-modern technology allow much faster recovery of technological gaps by straight access to IT solutions embedding the patent, meaning *the business secret*. The virtual attacks (technological espionage and cyber-piracy), whether against state or corporate targets, are already regulated by law, but mainly domestically. The relatively recent membership of Russia and China, for example, in the World Trade Organization serves the cause of regulation and enforcement of international norms. But the online environment, despite solutions for prevention or identification of the source of attack, is still full of risks and threats, if only to mention personal data theft, misappropriation of bank accounts and distortion of the activity of an economic rival.

International organisations like the European Union and NATO have put to good use their multilateral powers and generated applied solutions, ranging from institutions (within Europol or Euro-Atlantic commands reshaped on the basis of the Revolution in Military Affairs) to effective action to combat cyber-crime and cyber-war. However, the pivot policy of large international revisionist players in challenging the global supremacy of the United States and the West translated rapidly in major risks of cyber-security.

Conclusions and Scenarios for the Future

The industrial revolutions and Globalisation have given worldwide impetus to entrepreneurship and its expansion. The modern corporate system has been characterized by a multitude of phenomena, positive or negative, but is acting more and more like a full-fledged actor of the international system. Consequently, entrepreneurial vectors are exposed to numerous risks and threats, usually asymmetric, due to terrorism, organised crime, geopolitical conflicts for supremacy, and cyber-crime.

The international cooperation has the potential of solving many problems the people of Planet Earth are facing, but trans-state legal rule still does not have normative power and coercion practice similarly effective to national laws. The fact that humankind is still lacking internationally usable clear definitions and legal concepts of terrorism and cyber-espionage should be analysed together with state revisionist potential in neighbourhood policies and global competition. All these, plus failure both internally and externally to eradicate organised crime, are all facets of the security dilemma which will characterise entrepreneurship for the foreseeable future.

The solutions implemented so far have been rather tactical, yet the author will try by the end of this paper to circumscribe two strategic scenarios for the future:

A. Continuation of the security privatisation process

The global financial crisis of 2008, as well as the overall cost of modern war (based less on the presence of troops on battlefields and more on the hi-tech Revolution in Military Affairs), led to a reduction of the defence budgets and to an increased use of existing resources by joint efforts (the *battlegroup* concept applicable to the EU Rapid Reaction Force or the *time-sharing* of military assets borrowed by NATO from the hospitality industry). The new rise of Islamist effective militancy through ISIS, the Al-Nusra Front, Al-Shabab, Boko Haram, et alia led to NATO countries' decision at the Wales North Atlantic Council to reach in a decade a budget allocation for the security sector of at least 2 percent of the GDP and spending of at least 20 percent of it to develop major capabilities (NATO, 2014, §14). Beyond the positive but formal proclamation still remains the recent practice of non-compliance and *buck-passing*, which is inducing pessimism on the possibility of having an efficient and effective implementation of such financial commitments, adopted by consensus nonetheless.

In the third millennium, the transnational corporations have responded to the continuous deterioration of global security environment by providing consistent financial resources to their private security structures, both for usual operations of perimeter security within headquarters as well as for even sending quasi-armies to secure their extractive industrial fields (e.g., Royal Dutch Shell, to the conflict-prone Niger Delta³⁶).

States themselves have used extensively in the past decade private contractors for providing security services. It can be profiled the activity of Blackwater³⁷ company that was involved in niche missions of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004-2007), estimated to a cost of over 488 million dollars

³⁶ Security costs estimated at 383 million dollars. – see Afua Hirsch and John Vidal, *Shell spending millions of dollars on security in Nigeria, leaked data shows*, The Guardian, 19 August 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/aug/19/shell-spending-security-nigeria-leak?CMP=tw_t_gu

³⁷ Now called ACADEMI as part of the security group Constellis, it has ongoing contracts with the American government in troublesome areas (bodyguards for the officials and offices of the State Department, training of Pentagon personnel, special assignments within the securitisation and reconstruction efforts of Afghanistan etc.). For further details on the dynamics and trends of concentration of the global private security services market, see Kate Brennan, *Blackwater's Descendants Are Doing Just Fine*, Foreign Policy, July 1, 2014, http://complex.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/07/01/blackwaters_descendants_are_doing_just_fine

for the first contract³⁸. One of the main reasons for the increased privatisation of the security sector is the enormous political cost for the state policymakers of ordering direct military involvement in operational theaters that are perceived at individual level to be too far and irrelevant compared to the subsistence and consumerism interests of post-modern Western citizens. The Vietnam syndrome is still present within the Western societies, despite the current legal framework of complete abandonment of compulsory military service.

Labeled by some authors as mercenarism³⁹, the act of contracting private services for the benefit of state or corporate customers is a substantial part of the privatisation of global security.⁴⁰ Despite some controversy highlighted particularly by violent public incidents⁴¹ that have or have not led to legal proceedings, the author's opinion is that regardless of their weight in the balance of power of the international system, the increasing inability of states to get involved and solve security problems will turn the business sector and the entrepreneurs towards the use of private solutions.

B. Return to Anarchy

Although it is a perspective difficult to depict in details, the return to anarchy is innerly indicating the cyclicity described by the philosophers of history (Montesquieu, Hegel, Spengler, Toynbee, Djuvara, Kennedy or Fergusson).

³⁸ Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, 2007. *Memorandum, October 1, 2007*. Washington, D.C. 20515-61 43

³⁹ J. Scahill, *Blackwater: The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army*. New York: Nation Books, Revised Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2008; S. Simons, *Master of War: Blackwater USA's Erik Prince and the Business of War*. New York: Harper, 1st Edition, Amazon Kindle edition, 2009; for opposite thesis, E. Prince, *Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror*. New York: Penguin, Amazon Kindle edition, 2013.

⁴⁰ The author doesn't share the vision outlined by Sean MacFate (2014) of a "neo-medieval" world in which the modern "condottieri" will be dictating terms to regular states. Instead of that, the privatisation of security (subject to at least national regulation) will include market fragmentation both in terms of request and supply but which will not lead to limited containment or anarchy by itself. States will be challenged to offering better contractual terms to potential recruits but the leverage will nonetheless be on their side on judicial and hi-tech aspects.

⁴¹ Blackwater forceful intervention on October 16, 2007 led to the death of 17 and wounding of another 20 Iraqi civilians in the Baghdad Nisour Square. - see Bob Drummond, *Ex-Blackwater Guards Lose Bid to End Iraq Shooting Cases*, Bloomberg, June 4, 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-04/ex-blackwater-guards-lose-bid-to-end-iraq-shooting-cases.html>

The use of violence has characterized humankind from antiquity to the present time, both individually and collectively. Seen through family, ethnic, national, state, regional, trans- or intercontinental lens, within bilateral or multilateral alliances, the collective violent action has been based on the adversity of at least another actor. Furthermore, anomy is the corollary of anarchy, both concepts representing the excess of adversity at a general level.

The skeptical perspective of the English philosopher Hobbes (*homo homini lupus*) in the context of the horrors of the Civil War in England has relevant indicators applicable to the security environment of the XXI century as well. The growing importance of corporations at global level, the high degree of economic concentration on key markets, the conflicts with accelerated dynamics between large companies and the state, the lobbying activity and shadow funding of electoral campaigns of the incumbent political leaders, as well as the significant economic interests in the area of public procurement (especially manifest in weak or failed states), are all factors that facilitate and enhance conflict.

The anarchist movements of the late XIX century were usually fighting the system. Despite some successes (the assassination of monarchs or other heads of state and government, public figures etc.), the anarchist structures were finally defeated by state coercive actions.

The anarchic horizon that the author wants to indicate is related to the conflict condition in which corporations become ambitious in terms of possession and exercise of power at a level comparable to states. Private armies funded by corporations can also wage *ad hoc* wars of variable dimensions; the major difference between classic inter-state conflicts and potential corporate ones is given by the fact that in the past the maximum politico-military aggregation of business interests was the type of Hanseatic leagues of cities led by guilds involved in long distance commerce. The current corporate force can be significantly greater than that of a small and even medium-size state. Anarchy is not to be provoked by such conflicting interests, exacerbated hypothetically. Simply continued deterioration of the security environment can cause companies whose interests are harmed by unpredictability to act proactively, but in excess; the worst consequence could be the undermining of stability and real force of rules, however incomplete and not fully applied in the contemporary political, social, economic and cultural cohabitation. Regulating competition at the level of economic blocs is not uniform, nor fully functional⁴², but even with these drawbacks is still an important balancing factor in global markets.

⁴² I. Lianos, D. Sokol, (eds.), *The Global Limits of Competition Law*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.

Furthermore, the efforts made to expand areas of free trade transcontinentally (e.g. TTIP and BRICS) make the global institutionalization of competition rules even more relevant despite the fact that the economic liberalization could trigger not only cooperation but also adversity and protectionism at the level of business lobby.

The struggle for resources has diachronically characterized humankind, and only the collective memory of tragic and destructive (world) wars can serve as a crucial inhibitor. Otherwise, benign commercial products evolving from *blockbuster* movies, *shooter* games or *pokemon* cartoons to highly publicized performances in *Ultimate Fighting Championship* or *Wrestling Mania* may lead in time, because of fast and ever growing social media, to exacerbated violence. Its agents would be those having *will of power* and eager to celebrate *triumph of the will*, to mention but only a few of the 1,000 year utopian Reich slogans of the Nazi regime whose ascent was based on racial discrimination, aggression and support of German corporations eager for expansion.

Abstract

The post Cold War Era has been characterised by the globalisation of terrorism and organised crime with major negative effects on business environment worldwide.

The Islamic fundamentalism has targeted not only political and military assets but also businessmen-citizens of the "Evil", "Infidel" West. The organised crime, on the other hand, while generating dynamic and lucrative black markets especially in weak states, has ignited violent internal feuds (e.g. the ongoing Mexico Drug War) that destabilise countries even more and annihilate prospects for investments or tourism.

At the same time, an increasing number of geopolitical conflicts (e.g. Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Vietnam-China oil rig disputes) have triggered widespread popular violence and distortion of the economic output, seriously affecting the regional markets.

Nonetheless significant is the cyber-crime, its unconventional insecurity challenging the very foundations of competitiveness, technological progress and modern power prominence.

Keywords: *Terrorism, Cartel Wars, Geopolitics, Economic Nationalism, Cyber-crime.*

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The historical analysis of the development of the area of free movement in Europe: from the emergence of the Iron Curtain to Schengen

*Edina Lilla MÉSZÁROS**

Introduction¹

After the end of the Second World War the Cold War begins, the world becomes bipolarized and Europe is divided between the East and the West. The need for security and the desire to preserve the identity and welfare had contributed to the imposition of securitized borders between the two rival camps. The most illustrious embodiment of this division represented the construction of the Berlin Wall, certainly the most shameful border of the 20th century. As Didier Bigo specified, the erection of walls around borders and the so-called *block* of persons within the state were some methods used by intransigent Communist leaders in that period. Western liberal democracies were against such protective practices, leaving their own citizens at least the *exit* option, giving them the right to move freely, but not to settle down. So, here we must make a clear distinction between the logic of blocking people within a state and the logic to prevent the *outsiders* to come in "even if the frontiers are the locus of these different kind of controls".² After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany and the European enlargement, the need for security has contributed to the emergence of new frontiers in the old continent. Thus, in 1985 was signed the Schengen Agreement, which entered into force a decade later, eliminated internal border controls within the Schengen area,

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¹ See Mészáros, Edina Lilla. 2015. "Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of the Modification of the Frontiers of the European Union", Doctoral Thesis, International Relations and Security Studies Doctoral School, Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, 62-68.

²D. Bigo, 2005. "Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control." In *Controlling Frontiers. Free Movement into and within Europe*, edited by Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p. 56.

transferring control to its external borders, as Bort Eberhard noticed “just as the Iron curtain was lifted, bringing in its wake a softening and opening of frontiers, this became, under the auspices of ‘Europe 92’ and Schengen, the external frontier of the EU, which had to be hardened”³, thus implicitly security appears in another aspect as result of the modification (appearance) of borders.

1. The classification of borders/frontiers

A considerable amount of theoretical work dealing with the definition and differentiation of the concepts of border/frontier has emerged in the last decades. Departing from an etymological analysis the concept of frontier appears for the first time in the 14th century, signifying an architectural façade or a military formation.⁴In the research entitled **The European Union external border, an epistemological approach**, based on the definition given by the dictionary of geography border is identified with a limit that separates two areas, two states, being “a clash between two manners of space organization, between communication networks.”⁵

According to the authors Ioan Horga and Ariane Landuyt *borders* appear as official delimitations between collective entities, politically organized identities in states or equivalent of states, having a dual identity: *political*, defending a set of laws and regulations, and *symbolic* protecting norms, customs and cultural identities.⁶

Based on Malcolm Anderson’s viewpoint the concept of *frontier* has a more widened meaning, and can be referred to as “a precise line at which jurisdictions meet, usually demarcated or controlled by customs, police and

³ E. Bort, 1998. “Mitteleuropa: the difficult frontier.” In *The Frontiers of Europe*, edited by Eberhard Bort, Malcolm Anderson, London: Pinter, p. 94 and E. L. . 2013. “Security Dimension of New EU External Communication: The Duplicity of Borders as Surveillance and Access Points.” In *Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders. Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU’s External Communication Strategy*, edited by Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, p. 210.

⁴A. Cușco, 2007. “De la granița imperială la frontieră europeană [From imperial border to European frontier].” *Revista Contrafort*, p. 4-5, <http://www.contrafort.md/old/2007/150-151/>. Accessed March 26, 2016.

⁵M. Brie and I. Horga. 2009. “The European Union external border: an epistemological approach.” *Romanian Review on Political Geography*, 11th year no. 1: 16. Accessed March 29, 2016.

⁶I. Horga and A. Landuyt. 2013. “Communicating the EU Policies beyond the/Its Borders.” In *Communicating the EU Policies beyond the Borders. Proposals for Constructive Neighbour Relations and the New EU’s External Communication Strategy*, edited by Ioan Horga, Ariane Landuyt, Oradea: Editura Universității din Oradea, p. 5.

military personnel⁷ or it can be identified as a “region, a zone with unclear lines of demarcation”⁸, sometimes described as a border region, becoming an area of exchange, interaction and integration.⁹

In the 21st century many times the terms of *border* and *frontier* are interchanging and sometimes overlapping, but in the case of the European Union we have to make a clear distinction between these two notions. In the case of the United Europe we distinguish between internal (representing the limit between the members states) and external borders (which can be identified with the separating line between the EU and third countries). The notion of border generally refers to the drawing of some external lines of the political structures, within which a collective identity, stability and security are shaped. Unlike the borders between states, in the context of the European colossus the concept of *frontier* can be considered an intermediary contact zone between cultures and different political systems, in great part having a symbolic meaning, rather than a legal connotation.¹⁰

According to the geographer born in Bukovina later immigrated to the United States, Ladis Kristof "the nature of frontiers differs greatly from the nature of boundaries. Frontiers are a characteristic of rudimentary socio-political relations and/or absence of laws. The presence of boundaries is a sign that the political community has reached a relative degree of maturity and orderliness [...] Frontiers are the result of rather spontaneous or at least ad hoc solutions and movements, boundaries are fixed and enforced through a more rational and centrally coordinated effort after a conscious choice is made among the several preferences and oportunities at hand".¹¹ Ladis studied frontiers and borders/boundaries as aspects of *Realpolitik* and as the organizational elements of the state, using functional approach to show the differences between them. According to him, in terms of their position to the state borders are *centripetal* because they are moving towards the

⁷ M. Anderson. 1996. *Frontiers. Territory and state formation in the modern world*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 25.

⁸D. Lynch, 2005. "From 'Frontier' Politics to 'Border' policies between the EU and Russia." In *Russia and the European Union*, edited by Oksana Antonenko, Kathryn Pinnick. New York: Routledge, p. 15.

⁹M. Comelli, E. Greco and N. Tocci. 2007. "From Boundary to Borderland: Transforming the Meaning of Borders through the European Neighbourhood Policy." *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 12/2: 206, <http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/abstract.php?area=Journals&id=EERR2007018>. Accessed April 23, 2016.

¹⁰ Horga and Landuyt, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

¹¹L. D. Kristof 1959. "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 49/3:269-282 apud K. Jowitt. 1992. *New World Disorder. The Leninist Extinction*. Berkley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, p. 308.

interior of the state, dividing and separating its territorial integrity. Unlike borders, frontiers are directed outward, challenging the state control functions, thus being *centrifugal* in their character.¹²

Concerning their classification, borders/frontiers can be *opened-closed*, *soft-hard*, *inclusive-exclusive*, *positive* and *constructive*, *symbolic* and *ideological*, and of course the list could be endless. An *open border* makes possible the freedom of movement of people between different jurisdictions with limited or no restrictions, allowing free movement of people between the two countries or between groups of countries. An example of this is the opening of international borders between different Member States of the European Union, which allowed free movement with very few restrictions, while *closed borders* can be identified as barriers, characterized by surveillance and strict control, restrictions and visa regime.¹³

Nanette Neuwahl along with various collaborators of the volume edited by Joan DeBardeleben makes a clear distinction between the *soft* and *hard* borders, describing hard borders as closed, sharp or exclusive barriers, involving strict regimes of visa controls, extensive police and customs control on freight transport, while on the other hand, *soft* borders are seen as open, permeable, inclusive, even comparing them with some bridges.¹⁴

Mircea Brie and Ioan Horga launch a rather interesting hypothesis, according to which in the European Community the *hard frontier* excludes not only the non-Europeans but also the Europeans therefore; the EU's borders are *closed* or *opened* depending on the exclusivist political interests.¹⁵

¹² H. van Houtum and J. Scott. 2005. "Boundaries and the Europeanisation of Space: The EU, Integration and Evolving Theoretical Perspectives on Borders." *EXLINEA State of Art Report*, p. 9-10. <http://www.ctc.ee/implemented-projects/border-research-exlinea>. Accessed May 4, 2016.

¹³ F. Maron, 2007. "Les nouvelles frontières de l'Europe: repenser les concepts [The new frontiers of Europe: rethinking concepts]." In *Eurolimes 4*, edited by Gerard Delanty, Dana Pantea and Károly Tepercsics, Oradea: Institute for Euroregional Studies, p. 115.

¹⁴ N. Neuwahl. 2005. "What Borders for which Europe?." In *Soft or Hard Borders? Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe*, edited by Joan DeBardeleben, Hamshire: Ashgate, p. 24

¹⁵ M. Brie and I. Horga. 2014. "Le frontiere europea – espressioni dell'identità" [European frontiers- expressions of identity]." In *Transylvanian Review. Categorie europее. Rappresentazioni storiche e letterarie del 'politico'* [Transylvanian Review. European categories. Historical and literary representations of the „political"], edited by Sorin Şipoş, Federico Donatiello, Dan Octavian, Cepraga Aurel Chiriac, Vol 23/1: 205. Oradea, Editura Metropolis.

In terms of relations of the European Community/European Union with the outside world, Michael Smith identified a set of four types of frontiers/borders, namely:¹⁶

1. A geopolitical frontier/border, which during the Cold War produced a line of demarcation between the area of the European Community and that of peace, and dangerous world outside of Eastern Europe;

2. An institutional and legal frontier/border that defines the institutional and legal framework in which the European Union works, creating the image of a "community based on the rule of law" and promoter of civic statehood;

3. A transactional frontier/border through which the EU governs the access to the market for third countries;

4. A cultural frontier/border, relatively permeable established between the inner and the outer for reasons of democratic, political and human rights values.

Undoubtedly, the list concerning the classification of borders/frontiers could continue, but for objective reasons these will not be shown in the current lines, an exhaustive analysis of the typology of frontiers/borders not being the main objective of this article.

2. Iron Curtain versus lace curtain, or the road from the fall of the arbitrary border (Iron Wall) created during the Cold War to Schengen

The Second World War redrew the borders in Central and Eastern Europe, and also led to the division of Germany and the establishment for more than four decades of the so-called *Iron Curtain*, which separated two different systems politically, economically and ideologically.¹⁷ According to Ruben Zaiotti this *Iron Curtain* became the symbol of the Cold War, of which main battleground was the European continent.¹⁸

It is already a known fact that the term *Iron Curtain* was first used by the former Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, in a speech on March 5, 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, when he said that "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an *iron curtain* has descended across the

¹⁶S. Gänzle, Stefan. 2008. "The EU's Policy toward Russia: Extending Governance beyond Borders." In *The Boundaries of EU Enlargement. Finding a Place for Neighbours*, edited by Joan deBardeleben, Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 56.

¹⁷M. Anderson and E. Bort. 2001. *The Frontiers of the European Union*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1.

¹⁸R. Zaiotti, 2011. *Cultures of Border Control. Schengen & the Evolution of European Frontiers*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 56.

Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.”¹⁹

This curtain was nothing but a militarized line separating the two enemy camps in Europe, also representing a special case of border²⁰, which Zaiotti considered as a heavily securitized barrier, but looking on its function of protective shield against external threats, we can perceive it as a traditional border, meant to prevent the passage of people from one part to another. Undeniably, this preventive role was more powerful for the movements from East to West, than vice versa.²¹ John W. Donaldson talks about a special phenomenon, namely the *Iron Curtain effect*, referring to the fact that in case of the Communist side security measures were intended to prevent people to exit the state, condemning them to a complete isolation, without rendering much attention to entries from the Western countries.²²

Malcolm Anderson’s and Eberhard Bort’s perception about the *Iron Curtain* seems to coincide with that of Zaiotti, describing it as highly guarded border, highlighting its intrinsic protective role.²³ The innovation of this barrier, a territorial anomaly, is that it wasn’t a national border, and thus it contradicted entirely with the archetypal ideal of territorial sovereignty, overlapping the borders of several countries in Europe, in case of Germany dividing a territory that before was of a unitary state.²⁴

We identify better with the categorization of the American scholar Bruce L. Brager, who places the *Iron Curtain* among the *arbitrary borders*. If we look at the characteristics of the arbitrary borders we realize that they are usually imposed by external powers, contributing to a possible total breaking of social and economic contacts, thus affecting the lives of people on both sides of the border, as happened in the cases of the Berlin wall or the border between North and South Korea. Arbitrary borders are ambiguous, as they can bring peace in an area consumed by war, or on the contrary they can

¹⁹J. Havardi. 2009. *The Greatest Britons. Essays on Winston Churchill's Life and Political Philosophy*. London: Shephard Walwyn Publishers, p. 307.

²⁰ Zaiotti, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

²¹ Ibidem, p. 56.

²²J. W. Donaldson. 2005. “Fencing the Line: Analysis of the Recent Rise in Security Measures along Disputed and Undisputed Boundaries.” In *Global Surveillance and Policing. Border, Security, Identity*, edited by Ella Zureik, Mark. B. Salter, Devon: Willan Publishing, p. 190.

²³ Anderson and Bort. *op. cit.*, p. 148.

²⁴ Zaiotti, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

become the catalyst of a devastating war.²⁵ The Iron Curtain as an arbitrary border had a double meaning: on the one hand it was a protective buffer for the Soviet Union, and on the other hand, it represented a defensive line of democracy, a limit to the expansion of the Soviet control in Europe.²⁶ The Iron Curtain in addition to its role as a security cordon for the Soviets, gave an important impetus to Western democracies to develop their economies and strengthen their conventional defense.²⁷

We should mention that this *Iron Curtain* was more than just a territorial demarcation line it was a *mental frontier* that separated the two camps with different ideologies. From the perspective of the Western powers it was "a line between good and bad, truth and error, justice and oppression, democracy and dictatorship"²⁸ and for the Communists it meant the line that protected them for the democratic and capitalist ideology the so-called *infectious Western product* which was considered incompatible with the socialist doctrine. Based on the meaning of the word itself, maybe the reader would expect that a real curtain of iron was strewn over Europe, but if someone visited Europe, especially Berlin in that time, he/she didn't see a piece of rigid drapery dividing the European continent between democratic regimes and dictatorships, but a lot of steel barbed wire, surveillance towers, ground radar, and armed soldiers with machine guns, who were willing to use them if necessary.²⁹

As mentioned above, the Berlin Wall can be perceived as the prominent symbol of this division, arguably the most shameful border of the twentieth century. Its construction was initiated on 13 August 1961 by the German Democratic Republic, culminating in the complete isolation of West Berlin from East Berlin and Eastern Germany. The purpose of the Berlin Wall was to prevent the citizens from East Berlin to flee to the West, driven by the desire to regain their freedom. Here we would like to highlight the character of the communist regimes, whose leaders did not have enough confidence in their own co-nationals, stipulating that they will flee across the border on the first occasion. To prevent this, an arbitrary, artificial border was not enough, they needed a real, physical and visible wall: this was the Berlin Wall.³⁰

²⁵ B. L. Brager. 2004. *The Iron Curtain. The Cold War in Europe*. Philadelphia: Chelsea House Publishers, p. 3.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 116.

²⁸ Zaiotti, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

²⁹ Brager, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 4.

3. The creation of *Schengenland* in Europe

The Iron Curtain didn't only have negative effects but also contributed to an unprecedented economic development of Western democracies. When the peoples of Eastern Europe were isolated behind the Soviet security cordon, in the west took place the European integration process and the economies of Western countries flourished. On 25 March 1957 under the Treaty of Rome was founded the European Economic Community, but the abolition of internal borders at that time was not yet a primary goal.

Given the freedom of movement of people nowadays assuredly, it is one of the fundamental aspects of European citizenship, but it was not always like that.³¹ The Treaty of Rome in addition to creating a common market, aimed to achieve progressively the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons within the borders of the six member states of the European Economic Community, but the freedom of movement of people was conditioned, initially being applied only to those citizens of the EEC who pursued an economic activity, such as workers, freelancers or people who provided certain services. Even these people with privileged status could enter on the territory of the Member States of the EEC or exit with a valid passport or identity card.³²

Later that freedom was extended to all EU citizens and also to third country nationals. For more than a decade the possibility of abolishing internal borders between Member States of the EEC wasn't a major preoccupation for European leaders, reaching on their agenda only in 1972 through the report to the European Council of the former Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans. Tindemans raised the issue of standardizing passports and later, the creation of a passport union, proposing "the gradual disappearance of frontier controls on persons moving between member countries, as a corollary of passport union."³³

³¹ F. Atger. 2008. "The Abolition of Internal Border Checks in an Enlarged Schengen Area: Freedom of Movement of a Scattered Web of Security Checks." *Challenges Liberty & Security Research Paper*, no. 8:4. <http://aci.pitt.edu/9405/>. Accessed April 23, 2016.

³² E. Brouwer. 2008. *Digital Borders and Real Rights. Effective Remedies for Third-Country Nationals in the Schengen Information System*. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 15; "Tratado de la Roma [Treaty of Rome]." 25 March 1957, p. 4, 21, 2, http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf. Accessed March 5, 2016.

³³ Commission of the European Communities. "European Union. Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council." *Bulletin of the European Communities*, Supplement 1/76, p. 27.

In the logic of elaborating this report we identify the desire to bring the citizens closer to the supranational European Community by abolishing internal border controls. At the time, unfortunately, this initiative hasn't been warmly welcomed by the Member States of the EEC, but it contributed to the development and future implementation of basic concepts, such as *passports union* or *Europe of the citizens*.³⁴

The first concrete steps towards the abolition of internal borders were made at the Paris European Council from 9 to 10 December 1974, by creating a working group mandated with the task of investigating the possibilities for the achievement of a passport union. One of the necessary preconditions for creating this union was the issuing of uniform passports for the Community citizens. Harmonizing immigration law and the abolition of passport controls at internal borders were among the long-term objectives. This meeting of the heads of state of the EEC materialized a year later with the publication by the European Commission of two reports: one aimed not only the introduction of a passport union and lifting of their control at internal borders, but also the adoption of certain measures of control at the external frontiers; while the second one proposed granting privileged rights, including political rights to the community citizens. Nevertheless, the Commission's initiative for a Directive on a uniform passport came into being only in 1981 as a resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers.³⁵

But for more than a decade (1974-1985) we are witnessing a stagnation during which no serious Community legislation on the abolition of internal borders saw the light of day.

A very important moment in the process of creating the Schengen zone meant the Fontainebleau European Council from June 1984 which, in addition to an ambitious plan aimed at creating the European Union, has emphasized the idea of abolishing internal border control.

The political momentum generated by Fontainebleau was fructified a month later by the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, his undersecretary Waldemar Schreckenberger, the former French President François Mitterand and his foreign minister Roland Dumas, in Saarbrücken, by signing a bilateral agreement under which the parties pledged to gradually eliminate checks at the common borders."³⁶The agreement envisioned the immediate abolition of control of persons, the easing of control of vehicles, and the transfer of these controls to the external borders; the commitment to harmonize visa policy; the strengthening of police and customs

³⁴ Brouwer, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ Zaiotti, *op. cit.*, p. 68-70.

cooperation; and the commitment to harmonize legislation on foreigners, drugs and arms, and passport delivery.³⁷

This Franco-German bilateral agreement served as a positive example also for the Benelux countries, showing interest in starting similar procedures. The peak moment of consultations between representatives of these countries on the abolition of common borders and free movement of their nationals took place on 14 June 1985, in the small town beside the River Mosel in Luxembourg, Schengen. The agreement signed at Schengen was rather a draft than a detailed action plan, so the five signatories have initiated immediate action for the elaboration of a convention which would detail the provisions launched in this agreement.³⁸

Meanwhile falls down the *wall of shame* (Berlin) on 9 November 1989, and after two years also the Soviet Union crumbles, leading to the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, the arbitrary border separating Western Europe from Eastern Europe. The former communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe turned their eyes westward and were expecting a softening, an opening of borders, their hopes, however, were quickly shattered by the 1990 Schengen Convention, which lifted controls at the internal borders of the signatory states (later being extended to other countries), but highlighted the need to strengthen the external border that separated the EEC members from the poor states from the East, generators of risks and threats.³⁹

After 5 years of multilateral consultations was applied the **Convention implementing the Scheme Agreement (CISA)** on 19 June 1990. The Dutch political scientist, Dennis Broeders considers that this convention nicknamed as “inventory of flanking measures” was the first documents, which associated and even more equalized Schengen with the *Fortress Europe* metaphor and with the consolidated securitization measures taken in the name of preserving security and welfare.⁴⁰

CISA is important because it has redefined both the meaning and function of borders.⁴¹ Already the first article of the Convention makes a clear distinction between the notions of *internal* and *external* border, the first referring to “the common land borders of the Contracting Parties, their airports for internal flights and their sea ports for regular ferry connections exclusively from or to other ports within the territories of the Contracting Parties and not calling at any ports outside those territories”; and the second

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 70.

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ Brager, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁴⁰ D. Broeders, 2009. *Breaking Down Anonymity. Digital Surveillance of Illegal Migrants in Germany and the Netherlands*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, p. 159.

⁴¹ Zaiotti, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

to "the Contracting Parties' land and sea borders and their airports and sea ports, provided that they are not internal border".⁴²

The principle of abolishing checks at internal borders is pronounced in Article 2 paragraph 1, stressing in paragraph 2 that if "public policy or national security so require a Contracting Party may, after consulting the other Contracting Parties, decide that for a limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation shall be carried out at internal borders. If public policy or national security require immediate action, the Contracting Party concerned shall take the necessary measures and at the earliest opportunity shall inform the other Contracting Parties thereof."⁴³

Logically, the removal of barriers between the five signatory states of the Convention and the free movement of people has created a security deficit, a vacuum inside that somehow had to be compensated.⁴⁴ At the ministerial meeting of 14 to 15 September 1987 the signatory states of the Schengen Accord have agreed to set up a computerized information system that would be used by border guards and police authorities.⁴⁵ The necessary steps for the creation of the Schengen Information System (Schengen SIS) and its institutional infrastructure have been included in Title IV (Arts. 92-101) of the Convention, art. 93 describing its purpose: "to maintain public policy and public security, including national security, in the territories of the Contracting Parties and to apply the provisions of this Convention relating to the movement of persons in those territories, using information communicated via this system."⁴⁶

Besides setting up a Schengen Information System, the Convention also provided for the establishment of a system called SIRENE (an acronym

⁴²"Convenție de Aplicare a Acordului Schengen din 14 iunie 1985 între Guvernele Statelor din Uniunea Economică Benelux, Republicii Federale Germania și Republicii Franceze Privind Eliminarea Treptată a Controalelor la Frontierele lor Comune [Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders]," p. 1, <http://www.schengen.mira.gov.ro/Documente/utile/catutil/Conventia%20Schengen.pdf>. Accessed April 17, 2016.

⁴³"The Schengen Acquis - Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders", *Official Journal*, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062, p. 239, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:42000A0922%202802%29:en:HTML>. Accessed May 5, 2016.

⁴⁴ Zaiotii, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁴⁵ F. Atger, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ "Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement...", p. 36.

of the definition of the activity for which it was mandated: *Supplimentary Information Requested at the National Entries*, of which task was to provide additional information relevant to the new alerts regardless of their location, facilitating the search for persons and property in the Schengen area. SIRENE involved creating a system of permanent electronic messaging in each state party to the Schengen Agreement and interconnecting it to the national database of the police authorities. In the conditions imposed by the lifting controls at internal borders of Schengen member states, the signalized alerts by the national police and customs authorities would be not only recorded but also stored.⁴⁷

In the final act of CISA it stated that before the entry into force of the Convention, the signatory States shall inform each other about all circumstances that could significantly affect the areas covered by this Convention and its entry into force. The Convention will enter into force before those preconditions for its implementation have been fulfilled in the Signatory States and checks at external borders are effective (Schengen acquis) it means that it shall not become applicable after ratification, but only as a result of a separate decision of entry into force.

Article 131⁴⁸ laid the foundation of an *Executive Committee* in charge with the implementation of the Convention, which entered into force on September 1, 1993, after being ratified by the five signatory states. Its implementation was done by the Executive Committee but only two years after its ratification in Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany, France, Spain and Portugal on March 26, 1995. In Italy the agreement entered into only in October 26, 1997, in Austria on 1st December 1997 and in Greece on December 8, 1997, Great Britain, Denmark and Ireland remained outside the Schengen through the *opt-out* option.⁴⁹ The Schengen framework was incorporated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, creating a complex legal system.⁵⁰

Today, the Schengen area (European Commission, 5) comprises 26 member states⁵¹ and covers an area of 42.673 km of maritime borders and

⁴⁷ Poliția Română [Romanian Police]. "SIRENE România- actualitate și perspective [SIRENE Romania- present and prospects]," p. 1, <http://www.politiaromana.ro/Schengen%20nr%201.pdf>. Accessed June 1, 2016.

⁴⁸ "Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement..." , p. 55.

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰ B. Hayes, 2004. "From the Schengen Information System to SIS II and the Visa Information (VIS): the Proposal Explained." *Statewatch Analysis*, p. 5, <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2005/may/analysis-sisII.pdf>. Accessed May 29, 2016.

⁵¹ Of which 22 are EU member states " Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg,

7.721 km of external land borders, enabling over 400 million Europeans to move freely without a passport.⁵²

In conclusion we might say that since the 1980s there has been a significant progress concerning the freedom of movement across the European continent, facilitating not just the travel for EU and non-EU citizens alike, but also the development of commercial relations. However, the lack of internal border checks between the Schengen member states has also enabled the unauthorized migrants, organized crime groups and potential terrorists to move without major obstacles in the Schengen area. During the current migratory pressure Schengen was seriously tested, and it didn't pass the exam with brio, we can only hope that in the future it won't outlive its usefulness and will disappear, triggering the reinstallation of internal border controls between member states.

Abstract

Undoubtedly, the free movement of persons is one of the biggest achievements of the United Europe project already foreseen by the founding fathers of the European Community. The Treaty of Rome in addition to creating a common market, aimed to achieve progressively the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons within the borders of the six member states of the European Economic Community, but the freedom of movement of people was conditioned, initially being applied only to those citizens of the EEC who pursued an economic activity, such as workers, freelancers or people who provided certain services. Even these people with privileged status could enter on the territory of the Member States of the EEC or exit with a valid passport or identity card. The present article is nothing but a historical overview of the emergence of the area of free movement in Europe from the end of the Second World War and the setup of the Iron Curtain till nowadays.

Keywords: *open/closed borders, passport union, arbitrary border, Iron Curtain, Berlin wall, Schengen Information System*

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Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden and 4 are EFTA members Iceland, Switzerland, Norway and Lichtenstein.

⁵²S. Andersen. 2014. "Non-Binding Peer Evaluation within an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice." *Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union. Internal and External Dimensions of Increased Cooperation after the Lisbon Treaty*, edited by Ronald . L. Holzhaecher, Paul Luif, New York: Springer, p. 31.

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The creation of the League of Nations

*Anca OLTEAN**

1. The consequences of the ending of the First World War

The real cause of the outburst of the First World War was the dismantling of the system of the balance of powers in Europe and the fight of great European states for supremacy. It have to be taken into consideration also other aspects such as the imperialist rivalry outside Europe, the German challenge in front of British naval supremacy, the wish of French to take back Alsace and Lorraine or the ambitions of Russia to control the Constantinople and the channels Bosfor and Dardanele.

It existed also a pretext, the assassination of archiduke Franz Ferdinand, fact that determined the declaration of war to Serbia by the Austro- Hungary. Russia mobilized in the suport of Serbia and Germany declared war to France and Russia. In the conflict it came up also England because of the fact that Germany refused to respect the neutrality of Belgium.

After in 1914, the American president Woodrow Wilson pronounced himself for the neutrality of United States towards the war, in 1917, in the context of the attacks against American vessels from the neutral waters by the German submarines, Wilson sustained the entrance of United States in the war. In 1917 there were sent in Europe aproximatively one million of American soldiers.

Probably the most important aspect of this war was that United States, promoting until then an international isolation according to Monroe doctrine according to which America was of Americans and Europe of Europeans, accepted to get involved in the war. But of the same importance, is the fact that the renonciation to Monroe doctrine was only a temporary attitude, the refusal of American Senate to ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles, but also the signing by USA of separated treaties of peace with the defeated powers, proving this idea. Still, the importance of the moment can not be diminished, the

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intervention of United States in Europe proving maybe for the first time the affirmation of United States as a great universal power.

Aspiration towards security and stability, existent at the end of the war was the factor that determined the creation of the League of Nations. But the context in which this idea took shape was precarious. The costs of the war were huge for Europe, both in human field, but also in the material one. The war costed Europe 8 millions of deceased persons and 6 millions of ingered people. France suffered at this chapter the hardest loss (1.300.000 of deceased persons and 3.000.000 of ingered persons)¹.

Speaking about the material cost of the war, the most seriously affected regions were the regions transformed in teatre of war: North-Eastern France, Belgium, Netherlands, North-Eastern Italy, Serbia, Romania, European Russia. France lost 30% of the fleet, and UK 20% of the fleet.

In order to get sources of financing for the war expenditure, the allies apealled to internal and external loans. The internal loans determined the rise of the public debts (in France from 33, 5 to 219 milliards golden francs, in UK from 17,6 to 196,6 milliards and in Germany from 6 to 169 milliards)² (Milza & Berstein, 1998: 106). The external loans were made especially from United States from which France borrowed 33 milliards golden Francs, UK 32 miliards and Italy 20 milliards. To these money, United States was not willing to give up, fact demonstrated also by the vote of the American Senate which refused the annullment of debts. In consequence, European alliate powers wished too to recuperate the losses from the war on the expence of the defeated and, especially, on the side of Germany. This is explained the sevear treatment aplyed to Germany to the peace negotiations from Versailles and the attitude hostile of France towards the Germany.

The capitulation of Germany at November 11, 1918 produced somehow in a strange way in the conditions in which Germany lost the war of the Western front, although a year before it won the battle against Russia on Eastern front. The Americans, although they had no territorial claims on the expence of Germany, were the ones who sustained the constinuation of war against Germany until its unconditioned capitulation.

The treaty of Versailles let the problem of Germany unfinished. This was required the reduction of armaments, of the army and the redrawal of the forces behind the Rhine. The enormous reparations which were

¹ Pierre Milza, Serge Berstein, *Istoria secolului XX*, vol. I, Editura All, Bucharest, 1998, p. 103

² *Ibidem*, p. 106.

asked from Germany contributed to its full humiliation, but also to the dream that someday it will take its pay back.

Germany was not the only country fallen into disgrace, by a great antipathy enjoying also Russia because of the change of regime imposed by Russian revolution. The Bolshevic government did not manifest any intention to pay the debts of Russia towards the United States of America. After 1920, Russia tried to come back in the world arena through the signation of some comercial agreements with some Occidental states (in 1921 Russia closes commercial agreements with Great Britain and Germany). A certain frustration still remained in the case of Soviet Union so as in the case of Germany, fact that will lead inevitably to their meeting.

2. Woodrow Wilson and its role in the creation of the League of Nations

The origins of Wilson are somehow modest. Born in 1856 in Stanton (Virginia), son of a presbyterian pastor, Woodrow Wilson proved his intelectual performances in the Academic environment both in time of the universitary studies made by Davidson College and College of New Jersey (the future Princeton university), but also during the doctorate studies at John Hopkins University. Before becoming president of United States he was professor and president of the University of Princeton, and then governor of the state New Jersey. In 1912 he was elected as president of United States, democrate candidate, being the 28th American president. He had this function during 1912- 1920, benefiting of two mandates.

I could say about Woodrow Wilson that he was a man who tought above his time. From here it results his idealism. Idealist, not because his ideas were not good, but, because they were unapliable in that moment. His thought was profoundly democratic and his intuitions were very accurate. In the moments when he urged the European states to a better treatment granted to Germany, otherwise proving that it could start another war, he did not suspect that the future will prove he was right. Unfortunately, the interwar epoch was not ready to accept the idea of the equality of states no matter of size and power, ellaboration of some norms of international law valuable for all the states and which to be aplied efficiently in practice or for dezarmation, democratic ideas, in their essence, proposed by Wilson.

The attitude of Wilson, towards the war was, somehow, ambiguous. In 1914, he was an important sustainer of the neutrality of the United States. Still, United States did not remain outside the conflict, offering herself as a mediator in the solutioning of the conflict, fact demonstrated also by the presence of the colonel House in Europe with the purpose to negotiate the peace, mission failed thow. On January, 1917, when the Germans started the submarine war attacking American vessels, Wilson pronounced himself for

the entrance of United States in the war. On January 22, 1917, president Wilson, hold a Speech entitled "Peace without a victory"³. By this syntagm he understood a common peace which will be instaurated after the war, although what hapenned in reality was only a change of the balance of power. Towards the old principle of European system of balance of powers, Woodrow Wilson was completely hostile⁴. Finally, what had seen Wilson by common peace it could be explained as such: no part of the beligerants had not to strive the other, that is why, it will be a peace without victory, because the victorious will not impose intolerable sacrifices which to determine resignation and eventual future hostilities. He was wrong about the strategy of the victorious, but he expected future hostilities. The treaty of Versailles proved as being contrary to the previsions of Wilson, this treaty containing very severe measures towards Germany and being considered a genuine "Diktat".

The purpose for which United States entered into war was uninterested and generous, fact acknowledged by Wilson that considered that the objective of the United States is to defend the principle of peace and justice against the selfish and autocratic power⁵. Concerning the German people, Wilson declared that he does not feel animosity and that they are used by their elites. Unfortunately, his attitude was not regarded as an example.

After the entrance of United States in the war, Wilson lanché in front of Congress at January 8 its famous "fourteen points" in which he proposed measures that would have been implemented after the end of the war. In essence, the ideas that result from these lead to economic freedom, dezarmation, open negociations, considerations regarding other states (mainly the ones coming from Austro- Hungaria) and, last but not least, the creation of a global organization having as task the maintenance of the international security.

For a better analysis, I will formulate these points:

- a.- open negociations for peace with free participation (not to exist secret treaties)
- b.- free navigation on sea outside the territorial waters
- c. the equality of commerce and the dismanteling of economic barriers.

³ Sanderson Beck, *Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations*, Internet: <http://www.san.beck.org/WP20-LeagueofNations.html>

⁴ Jean Baptiste Duroselle, *Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours*, Editions Dalloz, Paris, 1993, 57.

⁵ Beck, *op. cit.*

d. – adequate guarantees given and received that the national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point corresponding to internal security

e.- impartial adjustment of all colonial pretensions measuring equally the interests of the populations with the demands of governments

f. – the evacuation of Russian territory, the possibility for the Russians to choose their own institutions and to get help according to their wishes and needs

g.- evacuation and restauration of Belgium under its own sovereignty

h.- the eliberation and restauration of French territory invaded in 1871 and the return of Alsace and Lorreine to France.

i.- a redrawal of the Italian frontiers should be made on the line of the separation of nationalities.

j.- the popolation from Austria – Hungary should receive freely the right to an autonomous development

k. – Romania, Serbia, Montenegro should be evacuated and restaured and the boundaries of Balcanic States should receive international guarantees of independence and territorial integrity.

l. Turcia herself needs security, but also the other nationalities should be freed from the Turkish rule and it should be provided to them the autonomous deveopment, while the streches Bosfor and Dardanele should be open to all ships and commerce with international guarantees

m.- an independant Poland should include territories of Polish populations, to have access to the sea and guaranteed teritorial integrity

n.- a general Association of nations must be formed according to some specific deals with the purpose to allow mutual guarantees of political independance and territorial integrity both of big and small states.

Some of this wilsonian points will be found in the objectives formulated by the pact of the Leagues of Nations.

Wilson decided to participate to the Paris Peace Conference with a group of exerts in different fields (geographers, etnologists, economists), but it did not have the inspiration to invite aso members of the Senate, fact that determined maybe the American Senators to be more reticent after the ratification of the treaty. Wilson enjoyed a great welcoming in Europe, in his discourses from Paris, Manchester, Roma, a lot of Europeans coming to welcome him. And, in 1920, Wilson received the Nobel prize for peace.

3. The treaty of peace from Paris. Reglementations and significations

The choice of Paris as a centre for signing the peace negotiations was not very sure at the beginning. Several centres were taken into

disussions (London, Bruxelles, Hague, Geneve, Lausanne, Versailles or Paris). After some opinions, it would have been better that this conference not to be hold at Paris, city that kept so alive the memory of the war and whose air was full of resentments.⁶ For instance, the colonel House was saying that it would have been better that this conference to be placed somewhere else, away from the intrigues of Paris. From sentimental and moral reasons, because France had the hardest suffering after the war, it was voted finally for Paris (Versailles).

a. Reglementations with general character of the treaty

The Peace Conference took place during January 12 – June 28, 1919 and reunited thirty allied countries. The discussions took place during the plenary sessions and in the sixteen committees of experts. A more important organ was the Council of the Ten who grouped the chiefs of governments and external affairs ministers of United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan. But the essential organ of decision was the Council of the Four (Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando).

The Treaty of Versailles was signed at June 28, 1919 in the room of the Mirrors. It contained reglementations of teritorial, economic, financial, military nature.

From a territorial point of view it can be said that Germany lost 1/7 from its territory (88 000 kmp) and 1/10 of its population (8 million). It ceased in the favour of France the provinces Alsace and Lorraine, in the favour of Belgium: the cantons Eupen and Malmedy. After a plebiscite, Germany lost in the favour of Danemark the Northern Schleswig, and Saar region passed after a period of 15 years under the administrations of the League of Nations, following that at the end of this period to have decided its faith by plebiscite. During this time, the mines from Saar were given to exploitation to France as a compensation for the destroyal by the Germans of the French mines from North. Pomeronia and Oriental Prussia (partially) were ceased to Poland to whom it was assured through a corridor the door to the sea through the port of Danzig, German city found under the controll of the League of Nations. Germany will never accept its Oriental frontiers. Also, Germany lost all his collonies, administered starting from 1919 under the form of mandate by influent states of the League of Nations.

The economic and financial clauses has as a target Germany which, being considered responsable by the disasters of war, was forced to payment of some huge reparations (initially 132 milliards golden DM). Germany had to give up his commercial vessels and war machines and to grant the

⁶ Consuela Langsam Walter, *Documents and readings in the history of Europe since 1918*, W.C. Langsam – New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969, XXV, p.4.

winners the most favourite nation clause treatment. Germany, also, had to acknowledge the internationalization of its fluvial water courses.

From a military point of view, the clauses of this nature reduced the German army to 100 000 of people, abolished in Germany the military obligatory service, pretended the ceasing of the fleet. Germany was forbidden to have heavy artillery, aviation or tanks.

b. Projects regarding the statute of the League of Nations⁷

Although the term of League or Society of Nations appeared for the first time at Leon Bourgeois in 1908, the associations constituted in states such as France, UK, United States with the purpose of creation of such organization appeared somehow later. In United States in the support of the idea of League of Nations they were people of high prestige such as the presidents Roosevelt and Taft. In 1915, it took birth the League for the support of Peace sustained by Taft.

In fact, the first concrete project concerning the constitution of a League of Nations was launched in 1916 by the Woodrow Wilson. There were launched a lot of polemics in connection to this. State secretary Bryan was militating for bilateral treaties between states which to push them to enquette and arbitrage in case of conflict. He militated also for a mutual pact which to guarantee the teritorial integrity and political independence of states parts. The vision of Wilson was through comparison much more larger, the organization foreseen by him having several purposes: the assurance of colective guarantees, of economic prosperity, of access to natural ressources, of liberty of circulation and safety of maritime navigation, considering the administration of the collonies under the form of mandates.

In what concerns the foreseen of war, this had to be achieved in American view through open diplomacy, apeal of public opinion, economic sanctions, but not military. The British pronounced for economic sanction and military, while the French wanted the institution of some permanent international army.

The dezarmation and arms controll were regarded as some peace guarantees. But, even here, exished clashes of opinions. The Americans wanted a general limitation of armaments and the prohibition of private arms production. The Britanics pronounced for the abolishment of military obligatory service and, the French, having more resentments, wished the dezarmation only in the case of Germany.

⁷ Informations with regard to the projects created having in view the statute of the League of Nations in L. Gyemant, *Preistoria construcției europene*, Efes, Cluj- Napoca, 1999, p. 63-66.

Concerning the institutional structure of the future organization it was foreseen the existence of a Council, the main decisional organ of the future League. While the Britanics sustained exclusively the idea of a new restrained number of permanent members of the Council, the Americans and Italiens had the opinion that it should be also non-permanent members. The General Assembly was foreseen from British perspective as a deliberative forum, convocated without periodicity and with restrained attributions, while the italiens regarded as an organism with precised attributions, including decisional attributions, taken with qualified majority of votes. The Secretariat was regarded from all points of view as a future component of the League of Nations with the task to coordonate and accumulate informations, but without decisional attributes. These points of view constituted the subject of the debates from February- March 1919 in the framework of the Comission of the League of Nations from the Peace Conference from Paris.

c. Decisions aproved at Paris concerning the League of Nations

The Covenant of the League of Nations was included also in the treaty (the first 26 articles) and contained measures referring to the institutions and organization of the League of Nations. They were formulated also some principles which staid on the base of the creation of organisation: dezarmation, arbitrage in front of the Assembly (or of the Court) in case of conflict, economic and military sanctions in case of aggression.(article16)⁸

Let us come back to the endeavours that have been made in the framework of Peace Conference from Paris with the view of creation of the League of Nations. In January 25, 1919 the plenary session of the Peace Conference was adopting in unanimity a resolution according to which the Covenant of the League of Nations was becoming an integrated part of the peace treaties. It was consituted a special commission in which fourteen states were reprezented and whose president was Wilson. The first meeting of the Commission took place in February 3. There existed several proposals concerning the organization and the character of the League of Nations. For example an interesting proposal was coming from the side of Leon Bourgeois who suggested the creation of an international army⁹ (Duroselle, 1993: 58) placed at the disposal of the organization, or of a major state, ideeja rejected by Anglo- Saxons, probably because they were afraid that this major state would have been at the disposal of general Foch

⁸ The Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 16, Internet: <http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/www/league-covenant.html>

⁹ Jean Baptiste Duroselle, *op.cit.*, p.58.

which had a hostile attitude towards Germany. Other projects such this I mentioned above.

Finally the project of the League of Nations was presented by President Wilson and accepted in unanimity by the plenary conference from April 28. The project was of English and American inspiration, at its conception contributing Wilson but also David Hunter Miller (American expert) or Sir Cecil Hurst (British expert). This project had become, with very few modifications, the final Pact of the League of Nations. The pact was included in the texts of the Treaty from Versailles (June 28), but also in the text treaties from Saint Germain, Neuilly, Sevres.

At January 16, 1920 it had taken place at Paris, under the presidency of Wilson, the first reunion of the Council of the Society of Nations. In the framework of the Council there were represented states such France, UK, Japan, Belgium, Brasil, Greece.

4. The failure of the ratification of the Treaty from Versailles by USA

A more or less probable cause of non-ratification by United States of the Treaty of Versailles (and implicitly of the Pact of the League of Nations) was the fact that Wilson omitted the invitation of American senators to make part from the delegation of USA at Paris. But the most important it was the fact that the American public opinion, tributary to the Monroe doctrine, considered that USA paid the price of its intervention in the war of Europe and that America will deal better without Europe than together.

According to the Constitution of United States in order that the treaties to be aproved by the Senate it was necessary the consent of qualified majority (2/3 from the total number of votes). In 1919, the Senate of United States had 47 democrats and 49 republicans. The democrat president, Wilson, could rely only on the votes of the 43 democrats because the rest of democrats (4) and 14 republicans were "irrevocables" and, implicitly, against the signing of the treaty. In order to obtain the qualified majority, Wilson had to win on his side 23 of votes of the Republicans. These people, in principle, would have accepted the ratification of the treaty with the condition that this to be ammended with some modifications, non-essentia, thow. They were reserved in what concerns the eleventh article which stipulated that the members of the League on Nations take the obigation to respect and prezerve the territorial integrity and political independence of all members of the League. In the case when one of them will be agresed or threatened with aggression, the Council of the League of Nations will advise with the means in which this mission will be achieved. (The Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 10) For the president Wilson, this was an essentia point. It was about Monroe doctrine applied to the entire world and protected by everybody.

Wilson tried to diminish the conflicts, asserting that the measures of the Council were more of moral kind, while Lloyd George was asserting that the economic sanctions would prevail on military sanctions.

In order to suport his point of view, the president Wilson tried to win the American public opinion and started, in spite of his precarious state of healthiness, a tour of propaganda on the territory of United States in order to convince the Americans by the importance of United States' adherence to the League of Nations¹⁰. So, during 22 days, he travelled 8000 miles and held 38 speaches. In Pueblo (Colorado) his state of health got worse, and the president returned to Washington where he suffered a hard attack. As a consequence of this illness, the president went out from three months from political life.

In November 19, 1919 the text of the treaty, together with some ammendments, obtained in the Senate only 39 of votes in favor of pro-ratification and 55 of votes against. Non-ratification was dued to an *incomprehensible phenomenon*¹¹ because, not wanting to make concessions, not wanting to bring ammendments, only its votation in its ininitial form, Wilson advised the democrats to vote against. It was organized another vote for the ratification of the treaty without ammendmends in March 19, 1920. They were obtained 49 of votes pro-ratification and 35 of votes against. There would have been necessary 7 votes. Thus the treaty was never ratified by the Senate in United States.

Wilson never gave up and tried to transform the elections from 1920 in a plebiscit. His democate candidate (Cox) was defeated by a republican candidate (Warren G. Harding). Until his death (in 1924), Wilson hoped that the Senate of United States will vote again and will ratify the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles. It was not meant to be like that, and the non- involment of United States in the problem of world security compromised from the very beginning the important innitiative that was the League of Nations. The failures of the League in its tryings to maintain the world peace contributed to the ascension of totalitarian regimes in Europe and, finally, to the outburst of the Second World War.

Abstract

This paper deals with the international context in which it was created the League of Nations and the aproaches and actions accomplished with the view of creating this organization.

¹⁰ See the article, *The League of Nations Fight – A Chronology*, Internet: <http://history.acusd.edu/gen/nw2Timeline/1919League2.html>

¹¹ Duroselle, *op. cit.* p 60

In order to reach this objective, I will analyze briefly the consequences imposed by the end of the First World War, the role played by the American president Woodrow Wilson in the promotion of the organization, the significance of peace treaties, especially of the signed at Paris–Versailles, in which it was included the Pact of the League of Nations. It has not be forgotten from our analysis a factor of major importance, namely the non- ratification by the Senate of United States of the Covenant of the League of Nations, fact that lead to the non- participation of United States to the newly created organization.

Keywords: *League of Nations, First World War, United States, Covenant, peace treaties*

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The Impact of Romania-Hungary Cross Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013 on Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Counties

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1. Theoretical Underpinnings

Territorial, cross-border or other types of cooperation cannot be regarded as an end in itself. Cooperation is a means whereby the human being, a social being par excellence, aims to achieve goals related to improving the quality of life. From this perspective cooperation should be approached in terms of its actual outcomes, since without such results the inherent costs involved in any kind of cooperation will lead either to its weakening to a minimum level, or even to its extinction.¹

Grounded on their value to contribute to the objectives of EU Cohesion Policy, territorial cooperation programs aim at "strengthening cross-border cooperation through joint local and regional initiative, strengthening transnational cooperation through actions that facilitate integrated territorial development under the priorities of the European Community, and strengthen interregional cooperation and the exchange of experience".²

Cross-border cooperation can be defined in relation to direct cooperation between neighboring regions, found along a border, regardless of the level at which this relationship is achieved.³

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¹ *Programul operational Dezvoltarea capacității administrative*, Planificare armonioasă și strategică până în 2020, Compas 20-Concepții și Orientare Modernă, p. 2

² www.infocooperare.ro, the first official source of general information on such programs, accessed on 29 of September 2016

³ AEBR-LACE *Working Paper on the EU Initiative Interreg and Future Developments*, July 1997, p. 2-3

Cooperation can take place in all fields of activity, between all national, regional and local authorities, involving all actors. Moreover, the text of European treaties foresees the need to ensure harmonious development by reducing the development gap between different regions and European countries.

This concept is not a new phenomenon, as the changes on the international relations scene have led to a marked increase in the number of initiatives, which are also supported by the Community programs.

The efficiency, reliability, authenticity and legitimacy of the European project, regarding European integration, are also linked to the success of cross-border cooperation. "The basic principle of cross-border cooperation is to develop, in border areas, some contractual spaces that might allow for the finding of common solutions to similar problems, state entities avoiding to ignore, in the case of their peripheral communities, the peculiarity and the specific problems of neighborhood with which they are confronted⁴.

Cross-border cooperation among the neighboring countries of the European Union (EU) aims to promote a coherent and integrated approach to regional development, addressing common challenges, guaranteeing effectiveness and security at external borders and encouraging local cooperation. Thus, **cooperation cross-border programs** have emerged as solid financial and cooperation instruments.

Currently, the border regions of Eastern and Western European Union represent the basis for the complete European integration process. Cross-border cooperation is seen as having an important role in the increased cooperation across national borders, in supporting the development of pan-European transport and communications networks.⁵

Cross-border cooperation takes place within the **Euro-regions**, and through participation of developing regions to European structures and organizations that promote their economic and institutional development in order to achieve projects of common interest⁶. Thus, in what follows, we shall focus on the impact on the Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013 on Bihor-HajduBihar Euroregion.

⁴ Ricq, C., *Manual de cooperare transfrontalieră pentru uzul colectivităților locale și regionale în Europa*, Ediția a 3-a, Serviciul de Editare și Documentare Consiliul Europei F-67075 Strasbourg Cedex, București, 2000, p.10

⁵ *Europa în Direct*, http://europaindirect.ecosv.ro/cooperare_trans.htm , accessed on 25 of September 2016

⁶ *Europa în Direct*, http://europaindirect.ecosv.ro/cooperare_trans.htm , accessed on 20 of September 2016

2. Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013

2.1. Program Overview

Cross-border cooperation in the border area of Hungary-Romania is a strong basis on which to build in the future⁷.

Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013 is a continuation of cross-border cooperation programmes implemented in the past in the region (Interreg IIIA in Hungary and Phare CBC in Romania), being implemented within a common institutional structure, through the use of common funds, while expanding and developing previous results and experiences. The path leading to strengthening economic and social cohesion in the Romanian-Hungarian border was opened on December 21, 2007, with the formal approval of the programme, by the European Commission.

The programme provides a wide range of opportunities to potential beneficiaries by means of three priority axes and several areas of intervention. Projects launched under the various priority axes will help achieve the overall goal of the program.

Thus:

- **Priority 1:** Improvement of key conditions for joint sustainable development of the cooperation area (approximately 48.9% of the total funding)
- **Priority 2:** Improvement of key conditions for joint sustainable development of the cooperation area (approximately 48.9% of the total funding)
- **Priority 3:** Technical assistance (approximately 9.8% of the total funding)

The program awarded 211 million Euros as grant from the European Union to a number of 455 projects, with the view of facilitating harmonious development in the border area.⁸

The Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation Programme (HURO) aimed at facilitating sustainable development and the integration of the cross-border region, by fostering cooperation and reducing barriers generally associated with borders. In 2007-2013, a number of 455 cross-

⁷ Ţoca, C., V., *Romanian-Hungarian cross-border cooperation at various territorial levels, with a particular study of the Debrecen-Oradea Eurometropolis- The European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation*, Editura Universităţii din Oradea, Oradea, 2013, p.51-52

⁸ http://www.huro-cbc.eu/ro/stiri/rezultatele_si_stadiul_implementarii_programului_de_cooperare_transfrontaliera_dintre_ungaria_si_romnia_au_fost_prezentate_in_ca_drul_unei_festivitati_de_inchidere_care_a_avut_loc_la_gyula_in_data_de_7_decembrie_ac/443, accessed on 25 of September 2016

border projects were implemented. They sought, among other things, to improve mobility and cross-border communications, environmental protection and tourism development, thereby supporting the development of joint initiatives and solutions that would contribute to economic recovery and the development of the economic, institutional (health, education) and cultural potential of the region⁹.

The budget for the implementation of projects totaled 211 million Euros through the Regional Development European Fund, being complemented by the national contribution of 37 million Euros from the two countries participating in the program. The program has managed to attract a total of over 1,100 partners on both sides of the border, the distribution of funds between the Hungarian and the Romanian part being 50.46% to 49.54%. It is estimated that the fund absorption rate exceeded 96%.¹⁰

2.2. SWOT analysis Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013

To quantify the programme's impact on the two countries involved, we have used SWOT analysis, with the view of analyzing the results obtained from implementing the Romania-Hungary Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013.

SWOT Analysis

Strengths	Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Uniformly distributed urban-rural living environments in the county;• Significant development of main roads crossing the border and border-crossing points;• Good connection with nearby urban areas (e.g. ClujNapoca, Timișoara etc.);• Increased residential interest, especially nearby Oradea;• A territory rich in natural resources and a huge availability of arable land;• Five international airports ensure a good access to the area by aircrafts, remarkable in this respect being Timisoara airport capacity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Small dimensions of urban areas;• Relatively low degree of urbanization;• Severe demographic decline, particularly in the former mono-industrial towns (NucetVașcău, Stei);• Phenomenon accentuated by urbanization in the municipality of Oradea - significant pressure on the need for mobility and public services (public utilities, infrastructure, education, social, etc.);• Low level of GDP per capita in the border area;• High degree of dependence of many urban centers (and their areas of

⁹ http://www.huro-cbc.eu/ro/stiri/rezultatele_si_stadiul_implementarii_programului_de_cooperare_transfrontaliera_dintre_ungaria_si_romnia_au_fost_prezentate_in_ca_drul_unei_festivitati_de_inchidere_care_a_avut_loc_la_gyula_in_data_de_7_decembrie_ac/443 accessed on 20 of Septmber 2016

¹⁰ *Ibidem*

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The existence of Oradea metropolitan region; • The favorable position of Bihor county, at the border with Hungary, which give its towns the role of „gate-cities”, as well as oportunities for work force mobility and economic exchanges; • Intense and increasing commercial relations among borderline counties; • The existence of the Bihor - Hajdú-Bihar Euroregion and the access to Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Cooperation Programme. • The availability of high-quality thermal water in the cooperation region, which may be used for tourism or alternative-energy source. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> influence) on a single major employer; • Low level of business cooperation between the various bodies and organizations for the development of SMEs; • Poor infrastructure for research and development; low level of financial involvement of the private sector in research and development; • Low level of Roma population's integration into the labor market; • Few tourist attractions that are well known internationally; • Lack of information about existing tourist attractions, lack of competitive tourism products; • Negative demographic trends: natural loss and migration from border regions of Hungary.
Opportunities	Threats
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Availability of several funding programmes aimed at suporting local development projects and cross-border cooperation, both at urban and local level; • The oportunity for positioning as an entry-exit axis from Romania; • Private developers interest in investment in the county, especially in the exploitation of natural resources. • Significant development of major transport routes on the Romanian and the Hungarian parts of the border area; • Improving connections between the two countries have a positive impact on the border regions • Romania-Hungary Cooperation Programme 2014-2020 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conditions that favor the increase of development disparities in the district (for example, less access to financing on the part of small settlements, limiting the types of eligible projects, etc.); • Increased attractiveness of more developed urban centers nearby, which attract qualified people in the county; • The slow development of motorways in the Romanian side of the cooperation area might hinder the balanced joint economic development; • Lack of access to rural areas leads to perpetuating their backwardness; • Relatively high risk of large-scale pollution; • Relatively high risk of widespread flooding; • Education levels lower than the national standard on the Hungarian side can block or slow down the process of alignment in the region • The lack of integration on the job market of Roma citizens questions the social cohesion.

Source: Table developed by the author using data available at:
http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 28.09.2016

2.3. Analysis in relation to Objectives

a. Relevance

The objectives established as a result of the SWOT analysis meet the common development needs of the two regions involved and implicitly the regional development needs of the European Union as a whole.

b. Effectiveness

The aim of this programme is to improve the economic, social and environmental situation, as well as infrastructure in the area of the programme area, in the context of secure borders, through increased contact of partners on both sides of the border. The analysis of the programme's area shows an overall economic structure having a good agricultural and tourism capacity as well as good natural resources, which can be exploited for the development of the entire region. However, the poor quality of transport infrastructure (lack of highways in Romania), syncope on access to rural areas, the relatively low degree of urbanization and decreased demographic decline (particularly in the monoindustrial cities of Stei, Nucet) hinder the development of competitive cross-border economy in the region. Access to the border area and other elements of infrastructure must be improved so as to extend cooperation purposes. The Programme needs to balance infrastructure and initiatives such as networks, exchange of experience and joint events.

c. Efficiency

According to available information, financial resources were distributed equitably considering the importance of the issues aimed at. The table below details this aspect.

d. Consistency and coherence

The Joint Romania-Hungary Operational Programme, in close connection with a wide range of strategies currently operating at EU, national, regional and local level in the programme's area. The priorities identified in the JOP are consistent with Hungarian and Romanian development strategies (*National Development Plans* for the two countries involved).

e. Pragmatism

The pragmatic character requires that the implementation of strategy should be reflected in accelerating the economic development of the border area, especially since it has become a second external border of the European Union.


f. Management and monitoring arrangements

The main system of monitoring the programme will be a system based on different bodies. Thus, the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) ensures the quality and effectiveness of the programme's implementation by respecting transparency, equal opportunities and financial management. The Joint Selection Committee (ASC) is responsible for the process of operations selection in the programme. The Managing Authority (MA) ensures implementation and capacity in accordance with the principle of sound financial management. Audit authorities (AA) and Research Authorities (RA) will control and audit the system of the Programme's management operation. Bodies independent of the common management structure are National Authorities (NA), with obligations as regards the implementation of the program exclusively at the national level.

3. The ex-post analysis of the impact of Romania-Hungary territorial cooperation operational program from 2007 to 2013 on the Bihor-Hajdu Bihar Euroregion

Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion has played an important role in cross-border cooperation in areas of common interest between Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties.

Chart No. 1 Total Number of projects Submitted in Bihor-Bihar Hajdu Counties




Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information from the website http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30. 09.2016

It was created at the end of 2002, at the initiative of Bihor County's Council (Romania) and of the Local Self-Government of Hajdu-Bihar (Hungary), two bodies that recognized the important role played by cross-

border cooperation in areas of common interest for the European integration precession. The establishment of the Euroregion aims at stimulating new ways of cooperation between the two countries, in accordance to their objectives: maintaining and developing good neighborly relations, identifying areas for potential cross-border cooperation, organization and coordination of activities aimed at promoting cooperation in the established fields, implementation of concrete programmes in areas of mutual interest, promoting the collaboration of the Euroregion with other international organizations and suporting the Euroregion members in the European integration process.


Graph No. 1.shows the total number of completed projects, both in Bihor and in Hajdu-Bihar County. At present, from a total of 86 projects submitted by Bihor county, all projects have been successfully completed. In Hajdu-Bihar 72 projects were submitted and completed. The total number of projects submitted under as part of this Programme is 441, the two counties submitting a total of 158 projects with a value that exceeds 100 million Euros, which means that the Bihor -Hajdu Bihar Euroregion had a share of more than 35% in submitting projects as part of the overall programme.

Chart No.2 Total Budget allocated for the projects in Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar




Source: *Chart completed by the authosr based on information found at the website [http:// www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/](http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/), accessed on 30.09.2016*

Graph No. 2 indicates that Bihor county has a total allocated budget of about 56 million Euros, while Hajdu-Bihar County received only 43 million Euros. The difference of 12 million Euros results from the fact that in Bihor a total of 86 projects have been submitted, 14 projects more than in Hajdu-Bihar County.

Chart No.3 Number of projects for each county/year

Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information found at the website http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016

Graph No. 3 shows the number of projects on Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar counties throughout the programme. In the first two years, after the beginning of the programme, the number of projects was zero (most likely due to the lack of information provided by the actors / beneficiaries eligible); then, in 2009, the number of projects reached the number of 15 in Hajdú-Bihar and of 10 in Bihor. Since 2010 we can identify a significant increase in the number of projects, which reached a maximum of 36 in Bihor and of 18 in Hajdú-Bihar in 2012. In 2013, the last year of the programme, the number of projects fell sharply (due to a diminishing of the funds allocated), as indicated by Chart 3.

Chart No.4 Total number of projects on areas of intervention


Source: Chart realized by author based on information from site http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30. 09.2016

The projects developed as part of the program were divided into a number of 9 major areas of intervention, as shown by Chart no. 4. In Hajdu-Bihar County most projects were submitted to the Innovation


domain, and reached the number of 15, while the highest number of projects in Bihor county projects were achieved in the field of Education and employment, i.e. 17 projects. The fewer projects were registered in the field of Tourism with a total of 7 projects on the two counties, followed by projects submitted and finalized in the areas of Transport, Communication and Health (11 projects).

Chart 5 indicates that the submitted projects in both counties were on Priority 2, with a total of 111 projects. As regards priority 1, 27 projects were submitted by Bihor County, and 20 projects were submitted in Hajdu-Bihar County. From the difference between projects submitted on the 2 priorities mentioned above, we notice that they were double or even exceeded that figure, as compared to projects submitted on priority 1.

Chart No. 5 Number of projects submitted under Priority Axis




Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information found at the website http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016

Chart No. 6 Number of projects submitted on each call / county

Source: Chart completed by the authors based on information found at the website http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016

As part of the cooperation programme, 5 calls for projects were requested, the first being submitted in October 2008. The maximum of 44 projects were submitted under call no. 4, where Bihor county exceeded, with a number of 28 projects submitted, Hajdu-Bihar county, which submitted a total of 12 projects. Regarding Hajdu-Bihar county, most projects were submitted under the first call, namely 22 projects, Bihor having filed, during that year, a number of only 14 projects. The fewest projects were submitted as part of the 2nd call, i.e. a total of 19 projects.


Chart No.7 Number of Projects and Budget €, University of Debrecen and University of Oradea

Source: Chart completed by the authors, based on information found at the website http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016

After analyzing the list of projects, we noticed that the main leaders of projects in Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties were the University of Oradea and University of Debrecen respectively. University of Debrecen, the supreme leader, has submitted most projects and managed to complete 21, with a total budget of about 10 million euros. With a difference of 2 projects, as regards the number of projects submitted, the University of Oradea managed to invest 9.8 million Euros.

The total budget allocated to Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties was approximately 100 million Euro. In Bihor County 79 projects were completed, totaling 56 million Euro. As we can notice in chart no.13, the highest amount was absorbed by Bihor county in 2012, namely 35 million Euros, when most projects (i.e. 160) under the program were submitted. Regarding Hajdú-Bihar, it allocated a maximum amount of 23 million Euro in 2011. The least amount of money from the budget was allocated in 2009, in both counties.

Chart No. 8 Budget allocated for projects in Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar/Year/ €



Source: Chart completed by the authors, based on information found at the website http://www.buro-cbc.eu/en/financed_projects/, accessed on 30.09.2016

Conclusions

Cross-border Cooperation is a key priority of the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) of the European Union. This aims to strengthen cooperation between EU Member States and partner countries along the external borders of the European Union.

In 2007-2013, Romania took part to 11 territorial cooperation programmes, including Hungary-Romania Cross-border Cooperation Programme, which aims to bring closer people, communities and businesses in the border area and thus to facilitate the joint development of the cooperation area, relying on key strengths associated to border regions.

The counties we have focused on for the case study presented in this paper, namely Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar, have a common history. We can mention in this respect Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion, which used to have an important role in terms of cross-border cooperation at the level of the two counties. A number of 158 projects were submitted by the two counties mentioned above, which eventually determined a high rate of funds absorption. From the total of about 100 million Euros absorbed in Bihor and Hajdu-Bihar counties, most projects were submitted to intervention areas such as Education and Employment (28), Innovation (26) and Business (18).

This programme will be followed by CBC Programme Romania-Hungary Interreg VA 2014-2020, which was approved by the Government, and the first call for projects will be launched in October 2015. The program will be divided into 7 axes and will have a total budget of about 232 million Euros, of which the sum of 189 Euros represents the financial allocation from the ERDF and the rest is represented by national co-financing.

Abstract

Cross-border cooperation agreements have become increasingly relevant on the international relations scene, and implicitly in the area of cooperation policies developed by the European Union, as regards either Member States or the European Neighborhood Policy.

From the perspective of specific objectives related to structural funds, such cooperation is considered a means whereby sustainable European regional development may be achieved.

This paper aims to assess the impact of Romania-Hungary Territorial Cooperation Operational Programme 2007-2013 on the two neighboring countries modeled on the idea of objective-related evaluation (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, pragmatism and management and monitoring arrangements). The ex-post analysis will also be employed as research tool, in order to observe the positive outcomes of the program for Bihor-Hajdu-Bihar counties.

Keywords: *evaluation, objectives, effectiveness, partnership, European Neighborhood*

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EU Cross-Border Cooperation: Knowledge Alliances and Schools

*Vasile CUCERESCU**

Introduction

Even cross-border “relations” – as a practice – have existed since the foundation of the first states in the world; the cross-border policies and border studies have a recent history. Early borders are characterized by great permeability and instability. It is only in the 20th century when we deal with state border(s) as such. The nature of clear delimitation / separation at borders has passed through various processes, attaining the new concept of the European Union without borders, i.e. internal borders. All in all the human perception of border and otherness beyond the border has not been diluted fully. An argument speaking about it there are EU cross-border cooperation programmes.

Cross-border cooperation initiatives and programmes have produced new knowledge and research findings in border studies. Research schools in border studies contribute to knowledge alliances not only in Europe but all over the world. The European Union plays a leading role in promoting cross-border cooperation, schools of border studies and knowledge alliances appeared in cross-border cooperation.

The investigation follows to make an excursus on cross-border cooperation, formalized institutions of border studies and knowledge alliances in the field of cross-border cooperation. The primary focus is on the European Union’s internal and external borders. This is a project that does not claim to be an exhaustive to announced subjects nor limitative to relevant research findings.

Cross-Border Cooperation

Cross-border cooperation resides in collaboration between adjacent areas across the borders of two or more states. It is one of the forms of

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territorial cooperation in the European Union alongside with the interregional and transnational cooperation.

First of all let us answer to the question what a border means and what are the border functions: “A border has several functions and sometimes they conflict with one another. The most visible function of a border is to act as a *barrier* and an instrument to be applied for controlling illegal immigration, human trafficking, drugs and weapons and for collecting duties on legal goods. This is the rationale for the infrastructure at a border, which consists of border crossing points and land border installations. Borders enable differences in prices, wages, working conditions, the availability of labour, taxation, public subsidies, business environment and the enforcement of legislation. Operating across the border – using borders as *gateways*– creates possibilities for arbitrage. On the negative side, the cross-border smuggling of drugs into a country where there is demand and purchasing power causes major problems on both sides of the border. However, borders also constitute an *opportunity*. A border is more than an obstacle to contacts; a border also creates “friction” which can offer business possibilities. Differing conditions across the border can therefore also be utilised to benefit regional development. Utilisation of a border as a gateway – legally or illegally – means that the border is a *resource* for those operating across it. It generates benefits that would not be available without the border”¹. Generally speaking, cross-border cooperation has remained anchored within the framework of bilateral collaboration since, on the one hand. On the other hand, the European Union transformed internal borders from barriers into gateways. EU external borders had to be secured resulting in Schengen area (except the United Kingdom and Ireland) along with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. Thus border territories have become opportunities and resources to be exploited by borderlanders and their communities. So, cross-border cooperation has brought together the people and the communities on both sides of the border.

European Cross-border Cooperation

European cross-border cooperation started in the 1950s onwards in the Rhine Basin, including Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Different stakeholders were involved: central and local governments, universities and private business. Cross-border cooperation marks a tendency in eliminating disparities between the border regions. There are three development phases that characterize the European Union: “In the first phase, the lesser developed party has hardly any

¹ *Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders*. Helsinki: Ministry for European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011, 2.

capability for real cooperation with the Member State regions across the border. The Member State regions involved offer expertise and training, organize study visits to the Member State, and conduct feasibility and other studies on the development potential of the border area. This creates important networks between the Member State and partner country actors. In the second phase, plans are drawn up with a view to social and economic convergence between the border regions. Convergence is promoted, among other things, through planning of investment projects that rarely attract outside financing and have little in the true nature of cross-border cooperation. In the third phase, the regions genuinely jointly recognise the potential for regional development provided by the border. The differences between regions are exploited with a view to bringing benefits on both sides of the border. Eventual investments are focused on border infrastructure in order to facilitate border crossing. Joint projects are developed by regional bodies. In addition, direct contacts between the citizens and communities across the border are supported. The nature of cross-border cooperation on the EU's external borders has been a topic of discussion since the early 2000s. Besides the important regional development dimension, this cooperation also has a very strong external policy dimension, and constitutes a broad reflection of the goals and activities of different policy processes. For reasons of geography, the character of cooperation varies in the different borders of the Union. In the Mediterranean area, external border cooperation is implemented largely in the form of economic and other development assistance to the Southern neighbouring countries. Member State and partner country regions are separated by the sea and their common interests are less easily identifiable. Recent developments on the Southern coast of the Mediterranean have changed the picture. With the emergence of democracy and civil society, there appears to be more demand for regional-level cooperation. On the EU's new Eastern external border areas, state borders have undergone major changes in the last century. Before enlargement of the EU in 2004 and 2007, these borders were relatively lightly controlled and there was no visa requirement for citizens of the neighbouring countries. Accession to the European Union required the harmonization of the border controls with Schengen standards and the adoption of the EU's common visa and customs rules. This complicated contacts across the border and endangered the development of the border regions, which had been largely based on small-scale undeclared trade. The new external border regions considered that they were entitled to compensation from the Union for the obstacles to regional development posed by the effective border controls, as well as assistance for re-

establishing contacts across the border”². Results of this cross-border cooperation are Euroregions.

Cross-Border Cooperation Programmes

The European Union has used funding for cross-border cooperation through regional development tools. These funds have been allocated both for internal and external border projects. Even non-EU states as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, participate in INTERREG programmes. In the enlargement process, the European Commission proposed a new instrument for the Neighbourhood Policy based on the best practices of cross-border cooperation via the INTERREG, PHARE and TACIS funding programmes. The initial Neighbourhood Programmes implemented in 2004-2006 introduced joint initiatives by covering both sides of the border. Later, for the financial period 2007-2013, cross-border cooperation actions were part of the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

The ENPI has four objectives for cross-border cooperation: “(1) to promote economic and social development in border areas, (2) to address common challenges, (3) to ensure efficient and secure borders and (4) to promote people-to-people cooperation”³. ENPI CBC programme represents functional instruments of EU external policy. It also refers to the Northern Dimension and the Eastern Partnership, the EU’s macro-regional strategies, the EU Baltic Sea Strategy and the EU Danube Strategy. The external dimension is well shaped by ENPI CBC actions.

Border Knowledge Initiatives

In the second half of the 20th century, the interest for border studies increased dramatically and irreversibly. Usually border studies have been institutionalized within different research centres, think-tanks, institutes, associations and networks. The mission of these institutions resides in developing border studies and cross-border cooperation in the regions that still have borders (enhancing cooperation of both sides of the borders) or eliminated borders in the result of European integration (peripheral borderlands lost the status of border regions, they become Euroregions).

² *Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders* (Helsinki: Ministry for European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011), 4-6.

³ *Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders* (Helsinki: Ministry for European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011), 8.

Centre for Cross Border Studies

The Centre for Cross Border Studies (Ireland) is a valued source of research, information and support for collaboration across borders on the island of Ireland, Europe and beyond. The centre follows two primary public policy imperatives:

1. The commitment to Cross-border Cooperation that is integral to the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement; and
2. EU Cohesion Policy, with its focus on social, economic and territorial cohesion supported in particular through EU Territorial Cooperation programmes (i.e. INTERREG and PEACE) and from 2014 the mainstream Structural Fund programmes⁴.

The policy says that the Centre has a specific and unique role in contributing to the increased social, economic and territorial cohesion of the island of Ireland through:

- promoting and improving the quality of Cross-Border Cooperation between public bodies, and between public bodies, business and civil society;
- improving the capacity of people involved in social and economic development of the island to engage in mutually beneficial Cross-Border Cooperation; and
- addressing information gaps and other barriers that constrain cross-border mobility and cross-border cooperation through research and provision of resources, tools and other practical support⁵.

The Centre for Cross Border Studies provides numerous services, organizes events and publishes research results in the area of border studies and cross-border cooperation.

EURES Cross-Border Partnership

The EURES (European Employment Services) Cross-Border Partnership was established to make things easier for those who wish to commute daily or weekly across the border in order to earn a living. It does this by attempting to overcome at least some of the obstacles which people face. In particular it pathways to the information required by people moving across the border; for example, jobseekers who need information on employment and training opportunities on both sides of the border, on taxation and the social security systems. The Partnership also aims to assist employers by providing them with access to a larger pool of labour, i.e. jobseekers living on both sides of the border. Advice is available to

⁴ Centre for Cross Border Studies. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://crossborder.ie/about-us/>

⁵ Ibidem

employers on a range of cross-border recruitment issues⁶. According to the profile of the centre, it is partnership that provides practical services to people facing cross-border challenges.

Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière

The Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT) was established in April 1997 by the French government to “provide operational assistance to project stakeholders and, more generally, to cross-border territories”. The mission network brings together cross-border cooperation stakeholders. Its members are diverse, representative of all levels of governance and actors implicated in cross-border projects, including states, local and regional authorities and their groupings, associations, federations, cross-border structures and major businesses⁷. The mission encompasses more complex activities being a linkage between the French government and various stakeholders.

Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives

The Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives (CESCI) is a Budapest based think-tank of cross-border issues. It was established in 2009 following the model of the French Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT). CESCI provides professional support to the stakeholders involved in territorial cooperation in Hungary and in Central Europe. By involving experts from neighbouring countries our association aims at strengthening the need and raising the spirit of cooperation and in this way facilitating mutual understanding and tolerance between the nations of the Danube region. CESCI is an open association the members of which are local and regional municipalities, natural persons and professional bodies⁸. The service follows the same complex priorities comparable with those of MOT. The exhaustiveness of cross-border cooperation is functional in the Central and Eastern Europe, too.

European Institute of Cross-Border Studies

The European Institute aims at performing a threefold activity: (a) scientific research in cross-border issues; (b) continued training according to the topics and the needs of border regions, as well as the training of Hungarian experts with professional knowledge in the field of regional

⁶ EURES (European Employment Services) Cross-Border Partnership. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://www.eures-crossborder.org/About.aspx>

⁷ Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière (MOT). Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://www.espaces-transfrontaliers.org/en/the-mot/about-the-mot/>

⁸ Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://www.cesci-net.eu/about-us>

policy; (c) information service activities for any possible question on border regions (creating a Help Desk and Knowledge Portal)⁹. The objectives strive at satisfying the needs for better information and collaboration in the borderlands.

Association of European Border Regions

In line with its statutes, the Association of European Border Regions works on behalf of the European border and cross-border regions with the aim to:

- highlight their special problems, oportunities, responsibilities and activities;
- represent their common interests vis-à-vis national and international parliaments, bodies, authorities and institutions;
- initiate, suport and coordinate cooperation between the regions throughout Europe;
- promote exchanges of experience and information with a view to identifying and coordinating common interests among the diverse range of cross-border problems and oportunities, and to propose possible solutions.

The activities of the Association of European Border Regions involve:

- implementing programmes and projects, to aply for funds and to receive and to dispose of them;
- to organise events that deal with cross-border problems;
- to help to solve cross-border problems and to suport special activities;
- to prepare and implement common campaigns within the networks;
- to inform European political bodies and the public about cross-border issues¹⁰.

The Association of European Border Regions is considered among the most influential associations in the field of cross-border cooperation all over Europe.

CECICN

The CECICN is an EU platform of eight city networks (Atlantic Arc Cities, Mission Opérationnelle Transfrontalière, Forum of Adriatic and Ionian Cities, Medcities, Union of Baltic Cities, Council of Danube Cities

⁹ European Institute of Cross-Border Studies. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://institute.cesci-net.eu/en/introduction-of-the-european-institut>

¹⁰ Association of European Border Regions. Accessed on May 15, 2016. http://www.aebr.eu/en/profile/aims_tasks.php

and Regions, Central European Service for Cross-Border Initiatives, City Twins Association-observer) representing almost 37% of the EU population and involving 600 cities in Territorial Cooperation. Its objective is to boost territorial cooperation among cities with specific geographical features in Europe. The main aim of this network is to put European Territorial Cooperation (ETC) at the core of the debate about 2014-2020 policy implementation and the EU 2020 Strategy. The objectives, following a “bottom up” approach, are the following:

- to represent the interests of its members, especially in terms of cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation involving cities
- to place European Territorial Cooperation at the heart of European politics in the new programming period 2014/2020 and the Europe 2020 Strategy
- to exchange best practices among the different members of the network¹¹.

The platform comprises city networks to improve their common development taking into consideration cultural and geographical nuances.

UniGR-Center for Border Studies (UniGR-CBS)

The UniGR-Center for Border Studies (UniGR-CBS) is a thematic cross-border network of researchers from the UniGR universities conducting research on borders and border issues. The network, launched on 1 December 2014 on the initiative of the researchers, considers itself as a multidisciplinary platform of border studies within the Greater Region. Combining the projects of the participating universities in the field of border studies, the network supports the development of cross-border initiatives, and ensures greater international visibility. Aiming at strengthening the multidisciplinary field of work within the Greater Region, the UniGR-Center for Border Studies is active in four key areas:

- profile formation for border studies in research;
- integration of border studies in teaching;
- exchange and networking with social stakeholders;
- exchange and networking between the UniGR partner universities¹².

Even the UniGR-Center for Border Studies is a very young research initiative, it has a very ambitious research programme on border studies.

¹¹ CECICN. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://cecicn.eu/about/>

¹² UniGR-Center for Border Studies. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://www.uni-gr.eu/en/about-us/unigr-key-areas/border-studies/center-for-border-studies.html>

Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network (TEIN)

The Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network (TEIN), formed in 2010, now brings together 14 partners from 8 border regions in Europe. Its unique feature is that it consists of universities, research institutes and training centres which are dedicated to the practical business of cross-border cooperation in Europe. TEIN is led by the Euro-Institut, created in 1993 in Kehl / Strasbourg on the French / German / Swiss border with the aim of facilitating cross-border cooperation. All members have subscribed to a common charter to ensure the organization of the network and the quality of its output. TEIN partners come from maritime borders, old European borders, new eastern borders, post-conflict borders and external borders. Because of this, TEIN is able to measure the need for capacity building in cross-border cooperation throughout Europe. TEIN Members are real actors of the cross-border cooperation. Their work involves cross-border training and facilitation, managing cross-border projects, providing mentoring, training and advice for cross-border actors, and researching on cross-border issues. In this respect, TEIN can be seen as representing a genuinely bottom-up approach¹³. The Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network is a research partnership at the heart of Europe and a good example of inside and outside EU cooperation.

Institute for Euroregional Studies

One of the most prolific institutions in performing border studies and cross-border cooperation in the Eastern Europe is the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. The Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen was founded in 2005 through the Jean Monnet project as a Jean Monnet Center of Excellence. Since 2008, the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen had become a registered legal entity.

The founders of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen are:

- professor Ioan Horga (University of Oradea, Romania) and
- professor Istvan Suli-Zakar (University of Debrecen, Hungary).

The main research directions of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen are borders, cross-border cooperation, security and regionalism in Europe.

The main fields of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen are:

- historic and demographic regional bases: testimonials on the border area identity; cultural heritage and the border area identity;

¹³ Transfrontier Euro-Institut Network. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://www.transfrontier.eu/>

mentalities in the regional area; demographical Heritage and the border area identity;

- administrative and geographical bases: Euroregions – expressions of subsidiarity; cross-border cooperation from the perspective of community law; the issue of good governance in a borderless Europe; public services in cross-border area; freedom of movement in cross-border area;

- the economic issue of Euroregional cooperation: mechanisms for cross-border communication; SMEs and cross-border cooperation; business management in cross-border area;

- borderless Europe, new identity forms: media and their voice in a borderless Europe; the church and their voice in a borderless Europe; the family and their voice in a borderless Europe; the civil society and their voice in a borderless Europe; new behaviour forms in the border area, security on the Eastern European borders, European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, Black Sea synergy¹⁴.

The researchers of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debreceen are actively involved in implementing EU, regional, national and local projects in the above mentioned fields of interest. Here there are several relevant examples: *Initiative and Constraint in the Mapping of Evolving European Borders* by Ioan Horga; *Euroregional and Regional Structures – Efficient for the New EU's Frontier* by Ioan Horga; *European Parliament in Campus For the Intercultural Dialogue and European Neighborhood Policy in the Carpathian Area* by Ioan Horga; *MA in Euroregional Studies and Cross Border Relations* by Ioan Horga; *Let's Think Together the Future: Cross-Border Agglomeration Debreceen-Oradea* by Ioan Horga; *Regimul juridic al organismelor de cooperare transfrontalieră în dreptul român și maghiar. Modele europene de aplicare* by Ioan Horga; *The Future of Institutional Cross-Border Cooperation in Bihor-Hadju-Bihar Euroregion* by Ioan Horga; *Mass-Media and Intercultural Dialogue in Europe without Borders* by Luminița Șoproni; *Ethnie, Confession and Intercultural Dialogue at the European Union Eastern Border* by Mircea Brie; *The Border, a Space of Innovation and Cooperation in the European Union* by Adrian C. Popovici; *Security Approaches at the Eastern Border of the European Union* by Dorin Dolghi; *Cultural Diplomacy at the East and West Borders of the European Union – an Essential Element in the Process of European Integration* by Alina Stoica; *From Periphery to Center. The Image of European Union at the Eastern Border of Europe* by Sorin Șipoș; *Migration and European Integration of Minorities at the Eastern Border of the EU* by Istvan Polgar; *HURO Croos-Border Area for a Sustainable Development in the Next 2 Decades* by Istvan Polgar; *Boosting Inovation through Capacity Building of Network of Sciences*

¹⁴ Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debreceen. Accessed on May 16, 2016. http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/about_us.htm

Centers in SSE region by Mircea Brie; *The Image of the Other in the European Intercultural Dialogue* by Dana Pantea, etc.

Thus, it is easily identifiable the border studies perspective of these projects. A part of the above mentioned projects were run through the Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013, aiming at enhancing the joint social and economic development of the Hungarian-Romanian border area.

Cross-border co-operation on the Hungarian-Romanian border has a strong foundation to build on. The Hungarian-Romanian Phare CBC programme started as early as in 1996, when the European Commission extended the programme – for the first time in its history – to a border region between two candidate countries. The experimental programme proved to be a success and, the European Commission continued making funds available from the Phare National Programme for Hungary. In the period 1996-2003, from EU Phare CBC fund, altogether 34 M EUR have been allocated for CBC projects to be implemented on the Hungarian side of the border and 28 M EUR for the Romanian side. The PHARE CBC programmes played an important role in establishing some key facilities in the border area, including the modernisation of border-crossing stations and roads, as well as business infrastructure development projects. Environmental protection has also been an area of importance; projects in this field have mainly focused on water resource management, in response to the joint challenges identified. The next stage of co-operation has been the implementation of the Hungary-Romania and Hungary-Serbia and Montenegro (tri-lateral) Cross-border Co-operation Programme 2004-2006; the programme had a budget of nearly 32 M EUR for Hungary (INTERREG), and nearly 20 M EUR for Romania (PHARE CBC), including national co-financing. The 12-year-long cross-border co-operation between Hungary and Romania has now arrived to a very important milestone. Within the frameworks of the Hungary-Romania Cross-border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013 the European Union ensures further assistance in territorial co-operation to the border area between Hungary and Romania, continuing previous INTERREG III.A. and Phare CBC 2004-2006 Community initiatives. The novelties of the programming period are: Improved legal basis (Specific provisions for co-operation, Lead partner principle, EGTC, no mirror or individual projects); This cross-border co-operation programme covers a different geographical area (Hungary-Romania internal border area, since Romania joined the European Union at the beginning of the programme period); Clear focus on Lisbon and Göteborg strategies: more emphasis on competitiveness and environment; Joint European (ERDF) and national funding; In some cases up to 85% EU

co-financing for all regions plus 10-13% national co-financing – only 2-5% own contribution¹⁵.

The general objective of the programme is to bring the different actors – people, economic actors and communities – closer to each other, in order to better exploit opportunities offered by the joint development of the border area. Moreover, the programme is aimed at improving the competitiveness and attractiveness of the border area, through various interventions contributing to the integrated development of the cooperating NUTS III level areas.

The programme offers a wide range of opportunities for organisations through two priority axis and large number of key areas of interventions:

Priority 1: Improve the key conditions of joint, sustainable development of the cooperation area (Improvement of cross-border transport, communication and environmental protection)

Funds allocated to this Priority axis will be used to improve the key conditions of joint development in the co-operation area. This includes the development of the transport and communication infrastructure as well as public transport facilities of the area, which are instrumental to facilitating cross-border passenger and freight transport and proper flow of information. Besides these, the Priority axis also includes interventions aimed at prevention and protection of the relative pure natural environment, as the elemental condition of any kind of human operation.

Key area of intervention 1.1: Improvement of cross-border transport facilities

1.1.1 Road development: construction, rehabilitation of roads, bicycle paths, etc.

1.1.2 Railway development: modernization of stations, harmonization of timetables, etc.

1.1.3 Preparation of studies and plans

Key area of intervention 1.2: Improvement of cross-border communication

1.2.1 Development of cross-border broadband internet infrastructure: distribution points and networks, user accessibility

1.2.2 Community access programmes: development of IT knowledge, development of public services

¹⁵ Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013. Accessed on May 16, 2016. <http://www.huro-cbc.eu/en/overview/>

1.2.3 Cross-border newscast: CBC publications, TV and radio programmes, training

1.2.4 Preparation of studies

Key area of intervention 1.3: Protection of the environment

1.3.1 Protection of nature and natural values: harmonization of regulations, environmental friendly land exploitation, etc.

1.3.2 Water management: rehabilitation of river basins, wetland fields, etc.

1.3.3 Reducing pollution – waste management: rehabilitation of sites, selective waste collection, exchange of good practices, etc.

1.3.4 Preparation of studies and plans

Priority 2: Strengthen social and economic cohesion of the border area (Cooperation in the fields of business, RTD, education, labour market, health care and risk management)

The overall aim of the Priority axis is to enhance the economic competitiveness of the area by development of the business environment, and improvement of the human resources.

Key area of intervention 2.1: Support for cross-border business cooperation

2.1.1 Development of business infrastructure: modernization of facilities, elaboration of studies, plans, etc.

2.1.2 Cooperation between businesses: business events, CB networks and partnerships, etc.

2.1.3 Development of tourism: tourism attractions and infrastructure, etc

Key area of intervention 2.2: Promotion of co-operation in the field of R+D and innovation

2.2.1 Joint research infrastructure development: development of R&D and innovation infrastructure serving CBC, etc.

2.2.2 Cooperation between sectors involved in R&D: exchange and training programmes, partnerships, etc.

2.2.3. Realization of joint research projects

2.2.4 Elaboration of studies, plans

Key area of intervention 2.3: Cooperation in the labor market and education – joint development of skills and knowledge

2.3.1 Cooperation between educational institutions: development of training and educational facilities, for knowledge transfer, etc.

2.3.2 Cooperation on the labour market: distance learning, training courses, co-operation of employment services, etc.

Key area of intervention 2.4: Health care and prevention of common threat

2.4.1 Development of infrastructure for common health and risk prevention: cooperation between health-care service providers, joint mechanisms for intervention, purchase of equipments, etc.

2.4.2 Joint institution building, coordination and training: cross-border ambulance centers, joint trainings, etc.

Key area of intervention 2.5: Cooperation between communities

People to people actions: joint cultural and sport events, institution building, co-operation networks, co-operation between educational institutions, etc¹⁶.

Consequently, researchers of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen succeeded to implement successfully and successively a couple of projects referring to Romanian and Hungarian border development actions.

Eurotimes

It is the journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. The journal was founded in 2006 and has two editors-in-chief: professor Ioan Horga (Oradea, Romania) and Istvan Suli-Zakar (Debrecen, Hungary). Since its foundation, *Eurotimes* appeared in 20 issues having various thematic on border studies. Research results resided in joint volumes as follows:

- Europe and Its Borders: Theoretical and Historical Perspective;
- From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identity Testimonies;
- Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe;
- Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers;
- Religious Frontiers of Europe;
- Intercultural Dialogue and the European Space;
- Europe and the Neighbourhood;
- Europe and its Economic Frontiers;
- The Cultural Frontiers of Europe;
- The Geopolitics of European Frontiers;
- Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders;

¹⁶ Hungary-Romania Cross-Border Co-operation Programme 2007-2013. Accessed on May 16, 2016. http://huro-cbc.eu/en/objectives_and_priorities

- Communication and European Frontiers;
- Permeability and Impermeability of Socio-Economic Frontiers within European Union;
- Enlargements, Borders and the Changes of EU Political Priorities;
- A Security Dimension as Trigger and Result of Frontiers Modifications;
- Cross-Border Governance and the Borders Evolutions;
- The Social Frontiers of Europe;
- The Security Dimension of European Frontier vs the Legitimacy of Political Priorities of EU and EU Members States National Preferences;
- Border Cities in Europe;
- Theoretical Approaches and Borders' Assessment.

In order to draw a brief conclusion out of the activities of the Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen and the research results published in the *Eurolimes* journal, it is fair to say that professor Ioan Horga succeeded to put the foundation bricks of a new school on border studies in the Eastern Europe. Oradea School of Cross-Border Studies is open to academic and intercultural dialogue; the school cooperates both with scholars in the immediate proximity and those beyond it; the school cooperates both with inside and outside EU scholars, thus being an indisputable advantage for academia in a global world.

Books

There are many good books written on cross-border cooperation and border studies. However, a couple of them arrest one's attention. A milestone study is *A Companion to Border Studies*, edited by Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan in 2012. The book *A Companion to Border Studies* brings together these disciplines and viewpoints, through the writing of an international collection of preeminent border scholars. Drawing on research from Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the Americas, the contributors argue that the future of Border Studies lies within such diverse collaborations, which approach comparatively the features of borders worldwide. The book analyzes the following subjects in five parts and seven chapters: Part I Sovereignty, Territory and Governance – Borders and Border Studies; Partition; Culture Theory and the US-Mexico Border; The African Union Border Programme in European Comparative Perspective; European Politics of Borders, Border Symbolism and Cross-Border Cooperation; Securing Borders in Europe and North America; Border Regimes, the Circulation of Violence and the Neo-Authoritarian Turn; Part II States, Nations, and Empires; Part III Security, Order and Disorder; Part

IV Displacement, Emplacement and Mobility; Part V Space, Performance and Practice.

In the chapter *Borders and Border Studies*, the editors Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan mention that there are more international borders in the world today than ever there were before. This is a significant fact when one considers the impact of these many borders on the ways in which the billions of people encompassed by them live, work and travel. As important a development as this multiplication in international borders is, however, it alone is not the guiding imperative behind the origin and evolution of comparative border studies in scholarship worldwide. The proliferation of borders, and the many forces that have created and fostered their development, together have drawn scholars from all the humanities and social sciences to a mutual interest in what happens at, across and because of the borders to nations and states, and in extension to other geopolitical borders and boundaries, such as those of cities, regions and supranational polities. Their interest has been as much in what happens at specific borders, frontiers and borderlands as it has been in what borders help us to understand of major forces of change that seem to be sweeping the globe, forces often included as aspects of globalization, but which may also be seen as neo-liberalism, neo-imperialism, late modern capitalism, and supra-nationalism. Within these interests and perspectives, border studies scholars enter into dialogue with all those who wish to understand new liberties, new movements, and new mobility schemes¹⁷.

Another book presenting interest is *Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Research Methodologies for Cross-Border Studies*, edited by Anna Amelina et al in 2012. The book has the following structure: 1. Methodological Predicaments of Cross-Border Studies, Anna Amelina, Thomas Faist, Nina Glick Schiller and Devrim Sel D. Nergiz; Part I: Researching International Migration after Redefining Spatiality and Mobility 2. Transnationality, Migrants and Cities: A Comparative Approach, Nina Glick Schiller 3. Transnational Migration and the Reformulation of Analytical Categories: Unpacking Latin American Refugee Dynamics in Toronto, Luin Goldring and Patricia Landolt 4. Overcoming Methodological Nationalism in Migration Research: Cases and Contexts in Multi-Level Comparisons, Anja Weiß and Arnd-Michael Nohl; Part II: Material, Culture and Ethnicity: Overcoming Pitfalls in Researching Globalization 5. Global Ethnography 2.0: From Methodological

¹⁷ Wilson, Thomas M. and Hastings Donnan (Eds). *A Companion to Border Studies*. Malden-Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2012. Accessed May 15, 2016 https://books.google.ro/books?id=yu4kFC_vNokC&pg=PA98&dlpg=PA98&dq=cross+border+studies&source=bl&ots=txR3ATRp3h&sig=eMg69A-lg1hhukIVLOcYbOuoujI&hl=ro&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwijnrvp_LMAhUH1SwKHxOfBvo4FBD0AQgqMAI#v=onepage&q=cross%20border%20studies&f=false

Nationalism to Methodological Materialism, Zsuzsa Gille 6. Uncomfortable Antinomies: Going Beyond Methodological Nationalism in Social and Cultural Anthropology, David Gellner 7. Approaching Indigenous Activism from the Ground Up: Experiences from Bangladesh, Eva Gerharz; Part III: Juxtapositions of Historiography after the Hegemony of the National 8. The Global, the Transnational, and the Subaltern: The Limits of History Beyond the National Paradigm, Angelika Eple 9. Incorporating Comparisons in the Rift: Making Use of Cross-Place Events and Histories in Moments of World Historical Change *Sandra Curtis Comstock* 10. Interrogating Critiques of Methodological Nationalism: Propositions for New Methodologies, Radhika Mongia; Part IV: Conclusions 11. Transnational Social Spaces: Between Methodological Nationalism and Cosmo-Globalism, Ludger Pries and Martin Seeliger 12. Concluding Remarks: Reconsidering Contexts and Units of Analysis, Thomas Faist and Devrim Sel D. Nergiz¹⁸.

University Curriculum

Cross-border studies are present including in the university curriculum. They are either independent courses or module courses. For instance, SUNY Buffalo Law School has among various offers a curriculum on Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration. The school has such an offer on Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration due to closeness to the Canadian border with the major business center of Toronto. The school has a strong network of alumni in Buffalo and in Ontario who engage in cross-border legal practice. These lawyers work in the full range of cross-border activities, including trade, tax, immigration, business transactions, and related areas that take them across the border regularly. The Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration capitalizes on their location and linkages on both sides of the border. The students can apply to cross-border work anywhere in the world. According to the requirements, the Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration requires 16 course credits. There is one required course, the 4 credit Cross-Border Legal Studies capstone experiential course, in which students work with practitioners on a range of cross-border legal issues. The capstone course is generally taken in students' final year of law school. In addition, students must take 12 credits from the following list of eligible courses: Advanced International Law; Comparative Law; Comparative Regional Human Rights; Criminal Immigration; Environmental Law and Policy Clinic; Federal Indian Law; Human Rights Lawyering: Advocacy, Influence and Impact (Bridge Course held in DC); Immigrants' Rights and Human Rights Advocacy Clinic; Immigration Law;

¹⁸ Amelina Anna et al (Eds). *Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Research Methodologies for Cross-Border Studies*, London: Routledge, 2012

International and Comparative Labor and Employment Law; International Business Transactions; International Commercial Arbitration; International Corporate Transactions (Bridge Course held in Paris); International Economic Law; International Environmental Law; International Finance (NYC); International Finance Markets; International Human Rights Law; International Law; International Legal Research; International Trade and the Environment; International Trade Law; International Trade Law and Policy; New Zealand: International Economic Law in Context (Bridge Course held in New Zealand); Problems in International Finance (NYC); Public International Law; Refugee and Asylum Law; The Legal Culture of Thailand (Bridge Course held in Thailand); The Global Business Environment – Closing a Deal Across the U.S.-Canada Border; Topics in Global Finance (NYC); US-Canada Relationship; World Bank Group¹⁹.

This is a very good example, especially for law students, in cross-border concentration, which could be taken as an experience in promoting border studies.

Another curriculum experience is the European Master Programme in Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations. Due to the experience of the Chair Jean Monnet in Euroregional Studies and to the Master in Euroregional Studies that was set up at the University of Oradea in 2001, which is associated to the Master in European Studies *The Process of Building Europe* of the Siena Network (Athens, Coimbra, Krakow, Granada, Hanovra, Strasbourg, Siena, Salamanca) and to the Master in *EU Territorial and Urban Development and Planning* organized at the University of Debrecen, in collaboration with the University Paris IV - Sorbonne, the Universities of Oradea and Debrecen, in agreement with the partners worked in setting up a European Master aiming at forming specialists in regional and cross-border administration, as well as in project management in proximity areas of the European Union²⁰.

The Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen worked on the institutionalization of the legal entity, has produced research results and proposed a master program in border studies, completing the status of a school on border studies. The Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen is a rare example in the field of cross-border studies judging the accomplished results.

¹⁹ *Curriculum on Cross-Border Legal Studies Concentration*. Accessed on May 15, 2016. <http://www.law.buffalo.edu/academics/jd/concentrations/cross-border.html>

²⁰ Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. Accessed on May 16, 2016. http://www.iser.rdsor.ro/er_studies.htm.

Conclusion

Firstly, cross-border cooperation represents a possibility to transform the frontier from a barrier into an opportunity for regional development. Borderlands can easily and jointly face the specific regional challenges from geographical, historical, ethnic, cultural, civilizational, economic and societal perspectives. Both the European Union and the Member States are interested in promoting cross-border cooperation at internal and external borders for the sake of better regional development. Cross-border cooperation contributes greatly to regional stability and prosperity on the EU's internal and external borders.

Moreover, cross-border cooperation is an efficient instrument for consolidating inter-human and inter-community relations on both sides of the borders, thus generating mutual understanding, trust and valorization of the human capital in the region. Cross-border cooperation could be a melting pot for the socio-economic development as a whole in building the Europe. Alexander Stubb, the Minister for European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, underlines that "it is useful to elaborate on the concept of cross-border cooperation and to examine the role and motives of various stakeholders: the EU and the Member States, partner countries, regional players and local operators. It is our shared responsibility to translate this innovative and unique form of cooperation into an even greater success in the future"²¹. Borderlands are considered spaces where people and energies meet to make benefits for local communities.

Secondly, cross-border cooperation has become a research area of border studies and a part of university curriculum in a couple of countries. Border studies determined the foundation of specific institutes, centres, associations, and publication of specialized journals and books. All these data speak in favour of schools on border studies all over the world. The most efficient and visible schools on border studies are situated in Europe, namely in the European Union thanks to instruments of support for cross-border development through cohesion programmes.

Among the schools on border studies in the Eastern Europe can be mentioned the Institute for Euroregional Studies, initiated on the banks of Crisul Repede River in Oradea, Romania. Professor Ioan Horga is the founder and the leader of Oradea School of Cross-Border Studies, an unequalled pioneer and promoter of EU cross-border cooperation knowledge alliances. Professor Ioan Horga publishes the *Eurolimes* journal with research findings of various scholars all over the world. Oradea School of Cross-

²¹ Alexander Stubb, "Foreword", *Cross-Border Cooperation – Benefiting from Borders* (Helsinki: Ministry for European Affairs and Foreign Trade of Finland, 2011), 1.

Border Studies succeeded to explore relevant academic resources in order to establish a powerful centre of research and knowledge in this part of Europe.

Abstract

The article strives at analyzing cross-border cooperation both on research and practical levels. The two-fold perspective refers to knowledge alliances of cross-border cooperation. The investigation focuses on cross-border cooperation in Europe, relevant initiatives in the area of interest, by pointing out the contribution of different institutions, centres, think-tanks, associations, networks, books, journals, funds and programmes in developing borderlands. A couple of schools can be identified according to the followed objectives and attained results. One of the schools in the field of cross-border cooperation in the Eastern Europe is the Institute of Euroregional Studies, containing programmatic manifestos and research results published in Eurolimes and other relevant studies; in other words it is Oradea School of Cross-Border Studies.

Keywords: border, cross-border cooperation, European integration, Euroregion, knowledge alliance, regional development.

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Building the Borderless Europe. A historical Overview of the Romanian and Hungarian Cross-Border Cooperation

POLGÁR István*

European Union and integration in the European Community developed itself on three basic ways, creation of a common market, development of common institutions and several common policies. Market integration has progressed a long way, although it stops and restarts again. The institutional integration is left behind, but the most difficult of all is represented by the common policies, especially where they have required founding.

With the reform of the Structural Funds, regions have gained a key role in the design and implementation of regional policy. Yet some of the weakest regions were not equipped with appropriate institutional structures and have struggled to benefit.

While the reform may have given regions an entitlement to participate, we argue that some have lacked the capacity to do so effectively. In this context, enlargement raises questions over the future of the Funds, and how far a commitment to cohesion and convergence can be maintained.

The concept of “Europe without borders” can provide the solution to the ethnic problem on the continent. Some politicians and political scientists consider that the model of the “nation state” has not been able to provide sustainable finality through the citizenship institution. Limited in its defining pattern, the classic citizenship offered only a kind of equality principle, abstract, to residents within the borders of a national state, but the same borders did split many ethno-cultural communities, dividing the population into two categories, the majority and the inhabiting minorities¹.

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¹ Renate Weber, *Un concept românesc privind viitorul Uniunii Europene*, Iași: Editura Polirom, 2001, p.53

The disappearance of multinational empires such as Russia and Austria-Hungary at the end of WWI led Central and Eastern Europe to building national states firstly based on ethnic and demographic criteria, but also on economic and strategic interests of the powers at that moment.

History has proven that the way in which the managing of a new European architecture was envisaged during the interwar period was doomed from the start, as the myriad of ethnic enclaves marring the national unity of the successor states were as many reasons to trigger revisionist actions, which in reality were only the mask that concealed economic interests. This situation was due to the fact that between citizens of different ethnic groups in the same country rose „internal frontiers – as defined by Professor Andrei Marga - separating the parties and their stages from each other (...) limits their areas of availability, values, ideas”².

In turn, the communist Europe shaped into a separate structure. Unlike Western Europe, the binding of this superstructure was the common ideology and not interpersonal relationships, an ideology maintained when the situation was thought to require armed intervention. Such an event shows failure of communist ideology to build social order based on justice and freedom³.

Ethnic intolerance that marked the history of Europe over the centuries has failed to find a cure even under the dome of the proletarian internationalism. Adrian Marino believes that it only froze and preserved the seeds of ethnic adversity. The results of these pseudo-politicians were seen as soon as the system collapsed, the most dramatic example being that of Yugoslavia⁴.

On the same issue, the former counterintelligence officer, Paul Abraham, said in a paper that, based on information collected during nationalist demonstrations in Hungary in 1989, Romania experienced fear of military intervention from Hungary to occupy Transylvania⁵.

Analysis of the system shows that the basic characteristic note describing the vicinity of the two antagonistic blocs was fear, a sentiment felt on both sides of the “iron curtain” that led to the birth of the so-called

² Andrei Marga, *Filosofia unificării europene*, Cluj:Biblioteca Apostrof, 1997, 92, p.140

³ Ștefan Delureanu, *Geneza Europei comunitare: mesajul democrației de inspirație creștină*, București: Editura Paideia, 1999, p. 368

⁴ Adrian Marino, *Revenirea în Europa: idei și controverse românești : 1990-1995*, București: Editura Aius, 1996, p. 398

⁵ Florin Abraham, *Transformarea României: 1989-2006 : rolul factorilor externi*, București: Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006 , p. 74

“strategy of intimidation”, which in turn chipped some of the sovereignty of the states that made up the two military sides⁶.

After WWII, the West seems to have learned from the tragic experience that a new European structure can no longer be built from antagonistic positions and sought to gap and extend bridges to facilitate convergence between the states of the free world, eventually ending up as the European Community, or “Little Europe”. Advances performed here since the early years, especially in inter-system communication, have been felt even in the neighbouring communist countries. Hungary is one such example. Arrangements for travelling abroad being in Budapest more liberal than in the rest of the Communist bloc countries, allowed an innovative blast into the country by accepting into a centralized state economy of a small segment of private enterprises. After the fall of communism, their contribution has proven to be most important in Hungary’s transition to a market economy⁷.

The fall of communism in Europe has created new situations and the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia demonstrated the volatility of postwar borders, at least in the latter case through a peaceful process. In these circumstances, the American politician Henry Kissinger expressed the need to adapt the NATO strategy on the old continent because – noted he – a “paradoxical tend to believe that in Europe two categories of boundaries can be defined: those guaranteed although not threatened, and those threatened but that cannot be guaranteed”⁸.

Analysed through the economic lens, the “national state” in its classic sense is perceived both by the local investor, as well as the foreign investor as an obstacle to the smooth exchange of goods and consequently, a source of diminishing of profit. “Europe without borders” could provide the ideal space in which inputs could freely cooperate, in real conditions of competitiveness, and trade might move towards a market free from customs duties, excise or other protectionist means⁹.

National economies have proved incapable of responding within parameters of maximum efficiency to world market demands, to global exchange and to capital movement, therefore the latest solutions recommend the adoption of “borderless world” concept, developed by Kenichi Ohmae in 1995.

⁶ Andrei Marga, *op. cit.*, p. 53, 142, 167

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 138, 177

⁸ Apud: Adrian Năstase, Roxana Nicolae, România și noua arhitectură mondială: studii, alocuțiuni, interviuri, 1990-1996, București: Asociația Română pentru Educație Democratică, 1996, p. 191

⁹ Renate Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 58

Regional economic policies offered for a while solutions to microeconomic problems, but not to the macroeconomic ones. However, they were the first form of cross-border cooperation and brought coherence and synergy to different economic and equity instruments¹⁰.

However, the procedure for accession to the European Union is extremely difficult today because it is conditioned by a long line of institutional and economic parameters which optant states must meet in advance; there are also subjective reasons that go beyond the statutory framework of the European Union.

Along with states targeting their entry into the Union, there are countries on the continent that fall within the institutional and economic standards claimed by the Union but which are not interested in joining the organization, such as Switzerland or Norway. This does not mean that they would fall outside the circuit of cultural and economic values. It is obvious that we are dealing with two kinds of community aspirations.

That is why Renate Weber proposed in 2001 the establishment of some pre-accession federative structures, which then be integrated in the Union. "The existence of the two dimensions allows the absorption of an initial failure of the federal project without having the entire European edifice collapse. On the contrary, the enlarged EU will be a welcoming «house», from where, after reconsideration, it may be returned with a new project of political integration" - concludes the future Romanian MEP¹¹.

These federative structures could perpetuate their existence even if the EU would become inoperative for any reason. An entity of this type could be the "Danube Federation", a structure planned since the '20s of the XX century, adapted to the current requirements, bringing together Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria¹².

In 1996, Adrian Marino had proposed a transposition in the real world of older project of establishing a Danubian confederation. He saw Romania's membership to such a structure as a possibility only if our country will be able to defuse the conflict between Romanians and Hungarians. During his travels through Europe, Marino noted the existence and the persistence of a collective *forma mentis* at the inhabitants of former Austro-Hungarian regions such as Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Banat, Transylvania, Bukovina, a feeling which

¹⁰ Aurel Iancu, Eugen Simion, Dezvoltarea economică a României: competitivitatea și integrarea în Uniunea Europeană, București: Academia Română. Secția de Științe Economice, Juridice și Sociologie, Editura Academiei Române, 2005, p. 6, 625

¹¹ Renate Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 79

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 351

could facilitate the creation of a confederation also from an interethnic understanding angle¹³.

Membership to the European family does not preclude the national element. Nationalism played a decisive role in forming the modern nations of Europe. According to Professor Andrei Marga, “conservative nationalism” would be the element that could jeopardize the channels of communication with other nations, through the fear that a suprastructure as the EU would create the very conditions for the disappearance of the national identity of the people that make it up. The Union’s main feature is that the largest proportion of the composing nations coexist well with each other, and within them the same can be said about the majority with the minority¹⁴.

In addition to these findings, Adrian Marino believes that there must be made a clear distinction between the “need for national identity” and the “national extremism”, which by its bursts of aggression and chauvinism not only fails to serve the aspirations of national identity, but is even able to compromise them¹⁵.

An important role in removing ethnic barriers in the perspective of European integration of the Eastern European countries lies in the exchange of information between communities after 1990, more often circulated through personal experience gained in this respect by those who lived “abroad” and managed to adapt to the requirements of other social realities¹⁶.

Internally, the removal of ethnic barriers could be possible only if educating both subjects, the majority and the minority, in the spirit of recognizing “ethnic otherness” and of promoting multicultural dialogue. It is a requirement of the today citizenship that ethnic minority rights be defended, a requirement that can only be met through adequate training programs. The level of tolerance of the majority towards minorities indicates the development of “civic nationalism” or “liberal nationalism” as a form of modern nationalism¹⁷.

But the Conference of the EU Stability Pact in March 1995 delivered significant reasons of concern for Romania and gave rise to vivid discussions about the opportunity and the price she had to pay in return for accession, in particular the paragraph in the French party document that, when referring to the agreements to be concluded within the Pact, read that

¹³ Adrian Marino, *op. cit.*, p. 260, 274

¹⁴ Andrei Marga, *op. cit.*, p. 51, 141, 315

¹⁵ Adrian Marino, *op. cit.*, p. 321

¹⁶ Ioana Petre, Ecaterina Balica, Dan Banciu, Tineret, norme și valori: repere pentru o sociologie a tineretului, București: Editura Lumina Lex, 2002, p. 43

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 26, 124, 152

“it cannot be excluded that such arrangements lead to minor changes of frontiers whose intangibility would have been ensured by the conference”, given that a number of acceding countries constrained by circumstances assumed the borders after WWII¹⁸.

In 1995, Romania’s preparations to add the accession file to join the European Union reached a halt at the chapter of concluding bilateral treaties with neighboring countries, as Hungary introduced in the draft document the Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, document that referred to the collective rights of minorities. Unlike Slovakia, Romania failed for this reason to conclude the treaty end until March 20, 1995 when the Stability Pact Conference was meeting¹⁹.

The Romanian part considered that the requirements were met with respect to protecting “the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to minorities”, a condition Romania assimilated to the “collective rights of national minorities” – a claim disputed by the Hungarian part although that internationally there was no such thing as a universally accepted definition of collective rights; moreover, art. 10 of the Framework Convention clearly specifies that “The Parties undertake to recognize all persons belonging to national minorities the right to use freely and without hindrance their minority language in private, as well as in public, orally and in writing”²⁰, without mentioning anything about collective rights.

Corroborating the particular requirement with documents issued by the UDMR (Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania), Professor Valentin Stan establishes that in 1995 it was about a disguised form to obtain ratification of a form of “internal self-determination” targeted by both Budapest and the Hungarian minority in Romania, following the model of the “autonomous community” in the Spanish Constitution enacted as a form of self-government of Catalonia and the Basque communities. In his opinion, the “ethnic vote” established by the UDMR within the Hungarian minority is in opposition to the concept of democracy because it places group interests above the general interest of society. “If we consider the Western democratic system we must accept that the «ethnic vote» in itself undermines any democratic system, since it indicates that ethnic issues outweigh in importance the economic, social and political issues. The ethnic vote diminishes the election purposes because it assumes that the interests of the ethnic group, *per se*, are more important than the various interests of

¹⁸ Valentin Stan, *România și eșecul campaniei pentru Vest*, București: Editura Universității din București, 1999), p. 153, 175

¹⁹ *Ibidem.*, p. 175, 231

²⁰ *Ibidem.*, p. 161-163, 236

individuals within the group. In situations where such divisions exist, the choices become a declaration of loyalty” - states Professor Stan²¹.

The same terms are used by another analyst to qualify the insistence of the UDMR to force the creation of a so-called “Szecklerland” and the insistent stubbornness with which Romania’s situation is compared to that of Yugoslavia in international environments²².

Also, Recommendation 1201 (1993) hindered the process of concluding the bilateral Friendship and Cooperation Treaty between Romania and Ukraine, this time the contesting being Romania, in relation to the status of the Romanian minority in Ukraine²³.

Returning to the Romanian-Hungarian problem, the sociological surveys jointly undertaken by Romania and Hungary in a programme to test youth tolerance towards foreigners in the two countries provided interesting results. As expected, the young Hungarians in Romania registered a greater valuing of the importance of minority rights by comparison with the Romanian majority, the nationalist attitude of the latter, however, could not be regarded as a negative reporting on ethnic otherness.

A similar attitude was recorded at young Hungarians in Hungary, but towards the immigrants, because minorities in Hungary are insignificant, being almost completely assimilated by a refined policy of denationalization. It was found that young Hungarians have a relatively low tolerance towards immigrants, a feature that was made in consonance with attitudes towards other ethnic groups or nations. But the public perception of immigration has similar forms in other European countries, as well²⁴.

As concerns the level of awareness of belonging to the European culture and civilization, the investigation established that only 6% of young Hungarians were aware of their country’s membership to Western Europe and 7.5% thought that the country belonged to the Eastern Europe. In contrast, 14% of young Romanians located Romania in Central Europe, 25% in the Western Europe, while 33.8% located it just in Europe. It is one of the expressions of insufficient valorization of liberal nationalism in comparison with the conservative nationalism²⁵.

However, the main category of beneficiaries of European integration is the youth, because, unlike previous generations who remember controversies and conflicts that troubled the peace of the

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 216, 239, 266

²² Călin-Radu Ancuța, *Interesul național și politica de securitate*, București: Institutul Român de Studii Internaționale, 1995, p. 121

²³ Victor Duculescu, *Instituții de drept public și relații internaționale în dinamică*, București: Editura Lumina Lex, 2002, p. 195

²⁴ Ioana Petre, Ecaterina Balica, Dan Banciu, *op. cit.*, p. 101, 125, 142, 144

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 53-54, 104

continent over the years, the younger generation is not haunted by ghosts of the past²⁶.

Conflicts can be settled only if the states involved do not remain ingrained for too long in incompatible positions. Therefore, the contribution of the European Union to this kind of problems was possible to produce results only where the parties agreed to change positions, otherwise a requirement of the European integration process. The model in this regard was the manner in which the antagonistic positions between France and Germany turned in time to common.

To the other end, we can look at the former Yugoslavia, where the ethnic conflicts simmered throughout the period of the Cold War, although apparently all seemed “good and beautiful”, and in a blink of an eye, once the conditions maintaining her in a latent state disappeared, everything collapsed in a most violent manner²⁷.

Unfortunately even the European Union provides examples of the conflicts that have not been resolved, like the situation in Cyprus where NATO and the EU’s strategic interests were decisive in the decision to accept the Cypriot state in the Union²⁸, or the situation in Greece, an older Member State, but who refuses to recognize the right as international political subject of the Republic of Macedonia²⁹, or the situation maintained between Spain and the United Kingdom on the British occupation of the Gibraltar, catalogued by the specialised literature as minor national “identity crisis”, but kept under control.

Even if the European Union and the Schengen spectrum will virtually abolish national borders, the mark of the past clenched between boundaries can survive if between official statements of the leaders of European states and their concrete policy there is guilty ambiguity between majority-minority relations in the everyday life.

²⁶ Ștefan Delureanu, *Geneza Europei comunitare: mesajul democrației de inspirație creștină*, București:Editura Paideia, 1999, p. 278

²⁷ Thomas Diaz, Mathias Albert, Stephan Stetter, *The European Union an border conflicts. The Power of Integration and Association*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.15

²⁸ Ahmet Sözen, Dogu Akdeniz, *The Cyprus conflict: looking ahead*, Eastern Mediterranean University: Printing-House, 2008, p. 122

²⁹ P. Ioakimidis, „The Europeanization of Greece: An Overall Assessment”, in Kevin Fetherstone, Georgios A. Kazamias, *Europeanization and the southern peripheria*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 73

Abstract

The article entitled "Building the Borderless Europe. A historical Overview of the Romanian and Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation" aims to present the obstacles, problems and tensions which existed during the European construction and integration process with a special regard on Central and Eastern Europe. Also, is focusing on a wide variety of European development and regional policies, which represents the solution for a permanent and harmonious development of the European Union.

Keywords: cross-border, development, cooperation, european, borders

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The Role of Cross-Border Cooperation in the Creation of European Cultural Networks. The Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENPI CBC Programme (20017-2013)

Florentina CHIRODEA*

Introduction

Cultural cooperation in Europe has a long and varied tradition, and is strongly influenced by those technological, economic, social, political or demographic transformations that have modelled both local communities and the global society as a whole. The changes witnessed along the years in European countries bring forth new perspectives, imposing the use of new concepts and approaches in a post-modernist and post-colonial society. Moreover, the creation and enlargement of the political and economic construction that today we call the European Union has raised culture to a higher level. Thus, in parallel to keeping its anthropological dimension, based on a symbolic world of meanings, beliefs, values and traditions expressed through art, religion and myths, culture fully contributes to the construction of the identity of a community and to its dynamic and progressive development.

The diversity of the forms of expression and the mutual dependence of the different constituting elements of culture create bonds between the strata of society (vertically) and between communities (horizontally). These allow individuals and groups to conceive their future in relation to their past and present¹ or to re-define “the architecture of their value model”². The transition of culture from a traditional and conservative interpretation to a role as socio-economic cohesive factor, especially as of

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¹ Mario D’Angelo, Paul Vespérini, *Cultural policies in Europe: Regions and Cultural Decentralization*. Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 2000, p. 10

² Mălina Cocea, *Securitatea culturală. Dilema identității în lumea globală*, Tritonic București, 2009, p. 70

late, changes the agenda of many international stakeholders. The European Union is among these. In this field, the EU creates policies and instruments for the coexistence of parallel cultures - whether they are national, ethnic, regional or local³. The process which underpins the *Europe of cultures* model is changed due to the initiatives influenced by the Member States' interests. The principle of subsidiarity is relevant here - under this principle, national competence takes precedence in the field of culture⁴.

In the absence of a genuine supranational cultural policy, the European Commission launched a new strategy in 2007. As part of the latter, "the relationship between culture and Europe is explored and new partnerships and instruments of cooperation are proposed to the Member States, the civil society and the European Parliament"⁵. Thus, instruments were developed in order to emphasize the linguistic diversity and cultural richness of the Member States, so as to preserve and develop the European cultural heritage. A whole variety of initiatives and programmes promote the access and participation to culture, cultural expression and awareness or multilingualism and supports or supplements actions on a national level⁶. On the other hand, the cultural factor is used in cross-border cooperation programmes as a vehicle of change. Change in the attitude towards the identity of the "Other". It is also used to initiate actions that allow the local leaders to establish paradiplomatic relations or regional de-bordering relations, at least in the cultural sphere⁷. As a result, the crystallization of regional cooperation relations (whether they be interinstitutional or interpersonal) in an organic network-like structure and its extension on a global scale can only stir the interest both of relevant actors in regional development, and of the scholars.

In this context, the study intends to highlight a mechanism for the establishment of cultural networks as part of the cross-border cooperation programmes financed by the European Commission during the 2007-2013 budgetary programming period. We shall concretely focus on the Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENPI CBC Programme (HUSKROUA), due to its particularities, more specifically due to the complex set of relations

³ Alina Stoica, Mircea Brie, "The Cultural frontiers of Europe. Introductory Study", in *Eurolimes*, no. 9, 2010, p.5

⁴ Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, "Europe of Cultural Unity and Diversity", in *Eurolimes*, n. 9, 2010, p. 23-24

⁵ Perla Innocenti, *Cultural Networks in Migration Heritage. Intersecting Theories and Practices across Europe*, Ashgate, 2015, p. 1

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 2-3

⁷ Attila Fábián, "Constructivist Views of Cooperation along the Border", in *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Economics and Business. The Journal of "Sapientia" Hungarian University of Transylvania*, no.1, 2013, p. 44 – 46

created between the four states. These states shared a common history and nowadays, three of them are members of the EU (Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). One of the specific goals of this programme is the creation of connecting bridges between the different communities on the Eastern border of the EU. This facilitates the discovery of common values and the use of instruments of promotion of the cultural heritage of the eligible areas. We shall hereby describe the financed projects, which meet this goal, after which our research will focus on the analysis of the impact of the actions undertaken and of the results obtained. Our intention is to identify a model of cultural cooperation whose characteristics are similar to those that specialised literature associates with cultural networks. Moreover, the mapping of a relation territory, based on a map of the partnerships and cooperation agreements under the projects, allows us to locate the elements of these networks (knods and interlaced lines) in the eligible area of the HUSKROUA Programme.

Instruments used by the EU in the development of cultural networks

It was at the beginning of the '80s that the first cultural networks began to crystallize in Europe. It was also then that the European institutions began to finance such structures so as to reach the objectives of fast integration, social cohesion or good neighbourhood relations at the borders of the European Union. At the request of the European Parliament, the Commission finances the European Bureau for Lesser-Used Languages (EBLUL)⁸. It was organized as a network of national committees working in the Member States, in order to promote linguistic diversity and lesser-used languages. Five years later, the same institution proposes a new instrument, MERCATOR, to encourage knowledge dissemination in order to improve the exchange of information on minority languages and cultures⁹.

⁸ The actions under this project were meant to disseminate information on the community activities in the field of languages and represent and inform lesser-used language communities on Community policies and funding programmes which are appropriate to their languages. Also, the Bureau provides information on European policies and programmes to its Member State Committees and local and regional authorities, and it serves their activities through supporting administrative procedures for applications and seeking partnerships. Finally, EBLUL actively produced informations on linguistic issues in Europe and the situation of linguistic communities. See http://eblul.eurolang.net/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1, accessed on the 2nd of September 2015.

⁹ Through the establishment of the information and documentation network, MERCATOR, four pilot centers will do the groundwork for the creation of a computerized data bank and consider ways and means of involving public and

The contribution of European cultural networks to the development of intracommunity cooperation was officially recognised in 1991, during the Congress of the Ministers of European Culture. The resolution then adopted encouraged those organisations active in the cultural sphere to actively participate in non-governmental cooperation and it also emphasised the objective of and role played by cultural networks in: facilitating the mobility of those involved in different cultural sectors, facilitating communication between different civilisations, avoiding extremist phenomena, developing those cultural expressions without an economic nature, promoting cooperation between community states¹⁰. In this context, beginning with the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the support given to culture evolved and intensified, and part of the EU programmes have already used networks so as to support cultural creation, cultural heritage or different cultural organisations/structures. The first programme of this genre was Kaleidoscope (1996-1999, 36,7 million euro), which financed the events, projects and large-scale European cooperation actions organised by cultural networks or by partnerships of organizations from at least three Member States¹¹. The next such programmes, Ariane (1997-1999, 11,1 million euro) and Raphaël (1997-1999, 30 million euro) did not specifically focus on cultural networks. They only financed certain activities: artist and professional mobility, cross-border cooperation or annual or multiannual crossborder events¹².

The European Commission programmes which support cultural networks have been considered insufficient. Along the years, there have been numerous workshops and debates argumenting the importance of and the potential contribution of cultural networks to the development and promotion of European culture. The most important declaration is made

private organizations in the various regional or minority language communities. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-90-37_en.htm?locale=en, accessed on the 2nd of September 2015.

¹⁰ Nikolaos Karanikolas, Peristera Lafazani, Myron Myridis, Dimitris Ramnalis, *The cultural networks of Europe. Towards Europe of citizens and civilizations*. International Conference of I.C.A., 2007, Moscow, p. 2, http://karanik.webpages.auth.gr/main/images/papers/conferences/final_cultural_networks_final2.pdf, accessed on August 4th, 2015

¹¹ See *KALEIDOSCOPE programme – European Community support for culture*, http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/7078_en.html, accessed on 11 of September 2015.

¹² See *RAPHAEL - A cultural heritage programme for Europe*, http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/9322_en.html, accessed on 11 of September 2015 and *EU cultural programmes - ARIANE advances but no agreement on RAPHAEL*, http://cordis.europa.eu/news/rcn/8387_en.html, accessed on 11 of September 2015.

during the European Cultural Network Forum in Brussels (September 1997). The *Manifest of European Cultural Networks*, adopted then, recommended the EU institutions and the Member States to "recognise the importance of these cultural networks through real and significant support". Based on the ideological platforms of already existing networks, the signatories of the document urged for "the recognition of cultural networks in professional contracts at all government levels in the EU institutions and in the Member States, an adequate environment ensuring both development and sustainability and structural financing, thus recognising that these networks are economically efficient"¹³. The Culture 2000 programme (236,5 million euro), launched by the European Commission, initially designed as a combination of the old Raphaël, Ariane and Kaleidoscope programmes, has not fully met the expectations of the participants to the Forum. The programme (2000 – 2006) focused on the establishment of a European cultural area by promoting cooperation between creative artists, cultural operators and the cultural institutions of the Member States. To this effect, creativity, the transnational dissemination of culture, the movement of creators, other cultural operators and professionals and their works were promoted. Culture 2000 also contributed to the strengthening of the role of culture as an economic factor and as a factor in social integration and citizenship¹⁴.

The Council of the European Union had a more stronger reaction. In January 2002, it adopted the "Resolution on Culture and the Knowledge Society". This document urges the European Commission and the Member States "to promote the use of the existing networks or of any other future networks to facilitate cooperation and to exchange information and good practices at a European level". Towards the end of that same year, on the 19th of December, that same European institution drafted another Resolution on the identification and assessment of the European added value of cultural actions¹⁵. The purpose of these initiatives was the massive capital transfer through the European operational programmes and financing lines, for the implementation of actions and projects along the common strategic lines of the financing bodies and cultural networks¹⁶. The

¹³ Dragoş Eduard Neamu, "Suntem în reţea, vom exista!" in *Revista muzeeelor*, no.1, 2006, p. 7

¹⁴ See *Culture 2000 Programme*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l29006>, accessed on 11 of September 2015

¹⁵ *Decision No 79/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 establishing a Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in the field of culture*. Official Journal of the European Union 30.4.2004, L 138/40 – L 138/43.

¹⁶ Dragoş Eduard Neamu, *op. cit.*, p. 6

Decision no. 792/2004/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in the field of culture was adopted for this specific purpose. For three years (2004-2006), this programme financed two European structures, EBLUL and the Mercator network (already supported at a European level for more than 20 years), and 53 bodies active in the field of culture among which 40 cultural networks, recognised as such at a European level. Out of the 19 million euro allocated, a third tranche was directed towards actions meant to preserve and commemorate the main sites and archives associated with deportation¹⁷.

After numerous consultations, the European Commissions launched a new Agenda for Culture in 2007. This covers the relation between culture and Europe in a globalised world. It suggests new methods of cooperation to the Member States, the civil society and the European Parliament. The programmatic documents recognise the role played by culture in human development and in the complex process of individual and community identity building. During that financial year, those cultural networks which had been functioning for at least one year had access to financing through the CULTURE Programme (400 million euro)¹⁸. The establishment of new European cultural networks was also encouraged through the Commission framework for the implementation of the Cohesion Policy and the European Neighbourhood Policy. The latter is "a new approach in the relations between EU and its neighbours, an approach that exceeds the traditional one based on cooperation"¹⁹ and it uses cross-border cooperation (CBC) to promote the package for integration, unification and integrated regional development²⁰. The short and long-term

¹⁷ Decision no 792/2004/EC and Ernst&Young, *Final external evaluation of the Community action programme to promote bodies active at European level in the field of culture*, 2007, p. 5, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/more_info/evaluations/docs/culture/culturalbodies_en.pdf, accessed on 11 September 2015

¹⁸ European Commission, Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency.. *Culture Programme (2007-2013). Programme Guide*, 2010, p. 67, <http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/culture/programme/documents/2010/may/EN.pdf>, accessed on 11 September 2015

¹⁹ Mircea Brie, "Europe from Exclusive Border to Inclusive Frontiers. Case Study Romanian – Ukrainian Frontier", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 28

²⁰ James Anderson, Liam O'Dowd, and Thomas M. Wilson, "Culture, Co-operation and Borders", in James Anderson, Liam O'Dowd, and Thomas M. Wilson (eds.), *Culture and Cooperation in Europe's Borderlands*, Rodopi, New York, 2003, p. 22; Ioordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu, Mircea Brie, Nicolae Toderaş, *Cooperarea transfrontalieră între România şi Ucraina, respective între România şi Republica Moldova*.

positive effects of CBC in the social and cultural fields are multiplied by the new European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. It was created in 2007 and its objectives are: promoting sustainable economic and social development in the border areas; working together to address common challenges in the fields of environment, public health, the prevention of and the fight against organised crime; ensuring secure and efficient borders; promoting local “people-to-people” type of actions²¹. Meeting these objectives depends on the design and implementation of cross-border cooperation initiatives²², among which the HUSKROUA Programme incentivises cross-border partnerships and actions meant to intensify and deepen a sustainable cooperation in the environmental, social and economic fields between the regions of Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska and Chernivetska in Ukraine and the adjacent NUTS III areas in Hungary, Romania și Slovakia. The programme area includes 598,9 km common border between the EU and Ukraine, and it covers the following territorial units: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (Hungary), Košický and Prešovský (Slovakia), Maramureș, Satu-Mare and Suceava (Romania), Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska and Chernivetska (Ukraine). Suceava and Chernivetska are included on the basis of special rules²³. On the basis of the common cultural heritage and religious traditions, one of the priorities of the programme is to encourage small organisations or the town halls of the localities in the eligible area to find new ways and new cooperation partners in order to strengthen territorial cohesion and mutual understanding. By promoting both institutional cooperation and small scale “people to people” cooperation, these measures help initiate new forms of partnerships, which, on a closer analysis, could have the characteristics of cultural networks²⁴.

The HUSKROUA Programme and the development of cultural networks

The eligible area covered by the HUSKROUA Programme is inhabited by 8,012,259 people. More than 44% of the total population is

Oportunități și provocări în perioada 2014 – 2020, European Institute from Romania, București, 2016, p. 31

²¹ Mircea Brie, *op. cit.*, p. 31

²² Filippo Celata, Raffaella Coletti, “Cross-Border Cooperation Along the EU’s External Frontiers”, in Filippo Celata, Raffaella Coletti (eds.), *Neighbourhood Policy and the Construction of the European External Borders*, Springer, 2015, p. 104-105

²³ European Commission, *European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007-2013. Joint Operational Programme*, 2008, p. 7-8

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 35

made up of Ukrainian citizens, 16% Hungarian, 19% Slovak and almost 20% Romanian. The average population density varies from 82 per/sq km (Maramureş), to 114 person/q km (Košice region). This means 94 person/sq km on average, which does not differ significantly from the European average. The majority of the population lives in rural areas (51,4%) and is affected by a negative demographic growth, caused by natural loss and a very high share of migration loss²⁵. With regard to the population ethnic structure, synthesized in the Table 1 and Graph 1 from below, in each eligible region, the majority has the nationality of the country of residence. Roma communities are present in regions in all 3 Member States. Another regional characteristic is the significant presence of Hungarians in the population structure of the eligible areas in Romania (10%), Slovakia (4,69%) and Ukraine (4,26%). Romanians are a significant demographic presence only in Ukraine (4,14%). The groups of Slovaks and Ukrainians registered outside their country of origin are not very numerous. Only 2,6% of Ukrainians live in the eligible counties in Romania.

Table 1. *The population ethnic structure in the eligible area of HUSKROUA Programme*²⁶

Country of the eligible region	Hungarians	Slovaks	Romanians	Ukrainians	Roma	Other ethnicities
Hungary	84,5%	0,18%	0,11%	0,12%	8,22%	6,87%
Slovakia	4,69%	77,72%	-	0,33%	4,95%	12,31%
Romania	10%	0.1%	79%	2,6%	4,3%	4%
Ukraine	4,26%	-	4,14%	86%	-	5,6%


On the territory of the eligible regions, one notices that „spatial structures parallel to the border in Ukraine but especially in Romania (although as compared to the territory of the whole country, this is of

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 11

²⁶ The data for Hungary, Slovakia, Romania are extracted from the 2011 Census, <http://www.recensamantromania.ro/noutati/volumul-ii-populatia-stabila-rezidenta-structura-etnica-si-confesiionala/>; http://www.ksh.hu/nepszamalas/tables_regional_15; https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/portal/ext/themes/demography/census/indicators/!ut/p/b1/jZBBDoIwEEXP4gk6hQplWRBKTcVSKCobw8IYjIoL4_kthIOLwNk1817-n6laHvH9bD7ttXm33bO59_aO1dS0TDEDGi6wyASqSoV11iHYIGTBWBiGAx7ovRz3QMomK6y3BQNajPwP0fIohwWERxu9Tw6cmghPQcAj37EWUp8CUAlX4NgqdFB7rrA3P_6zwQs-AdUD8hcgwG6LfEO6XNtL LCIPR3M0DZwSmSnJvAbBXZGn3uKDXwxhzhFbcyOoLZD3wSQ!!/dl4/d5/L0IDUmItUSEhL3dHa0FKRnNBLzRKVXFQSEhL2Vu/. For Ukraine, in the absence of a similar census, the numbers were extracted from the official documents of the programme in 2008.

secondary importance), while in Hungary, structural lines perpendicular to the border (one of them is of national importance) are determining”. The largest cities in the region are Košice in Slovakia, Miskolc in Hungary, Ivano-Franivsk and Chernivitski in Ukraine with over 150,00 inhabitants and Nyiregyhaza (HU), Satu Mare and Baia Mare (RO) and Uzhgotrod (UA) with over 100,000 inhabitants, their role and economic importance being relatively low²⁷.

Graph1. *The population ethnic structure in the eligible area of HUSKROUA Programme*²⁸



On the territory of the eligible regions, one notices that „spatial structures parallel to the border in Ukraine but especially in Romania (although as compared to the territory of the whole country, this is of secondary importance), while in Hungary, structural lines perpendicular to the border (one of them is of national importance) are determining”. The largest cities in the region are Košice in Slovakia, Miskolc in Hungary, Ivano-Franivsk and Chernivitski in Ukraine with over 150,00 inhabitants

²⁷ Judit Molnár, Zsuzsanna Ladányi, Viktoria Blanka, Ferenc Kovács, *Ex-ante Evaluation and Strategic Environmental Assessment for the Joint Operational Programme for the HUSKROUA ENI CBC Programme 2014-2020*, Hitesy Bartucz Hollai Euroconsulting and Hydea Kft., Budapest, 2015, p. 48-49; Cosmin Chiriac, Liviu Bucur, "Polycentric Development initiatives in Romania at the First Local level of the NUTS System (LAU1)", in *Annals of University of Oradea. International Relations and European Studies Series*, no. VII, 2015, p. 217-228; Gábor Csüllög, "Spatial structure problems in developing cross-border relationship along the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian triple border", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 44-46

²⁸ The chart was drawn based on the data presented in Table 1

and Nyíregyháza (HU), Satu Mare and Baia Mare (RO) and Uzhgotrod (UA) with over 100,000 inhabitants, their role and economic importance being relatively low²⁹. Nevertheless, the whole area is renowned for its unique traditions and customs, still alive in the border region, and for the relatively high number of tourist activities³⁰:

- Fortified settlements aimed at protecting merchants and used as places of refuge during the raids of Tatars and Turks (13th and 16th centuries);
- Towns that, due to their commercial flourishing in the XVth century, became important points on historical roads such as the Gothic Road, the Post Road, the Wine Route, the Minor Amber Road etc;
- Wooden churches in the East which combine the esthetic ideals of the people and two cultural traditions – the Russian/Byzantine ones and Latin culture. Among these, in Romania (Maramureş County) we can find 92 of them, three other styles of wooden churches – Lemko, Boyko and Hutsul – are named after the Ukrainian ethnical groups;
- The eight churches built from the late 15th century to the late 16th century, from Suceava (Romania), with their external walls covered in fresco paintings inspired by Byzantine art;

²⁹ Judit Molnár, Zsuzsanna Ladányi, Viktoria Blanka, Ferenc Kovács, *Ex-ante Evaluation and Strategic Environmental Assessment for the Joint Operational Programme for the HUSKROUA ENI CBC Programme 2014-2020*, Hitesy Bartucz Hollai Euroconsulting and Hydea Kft., Budapest, 2015, p. 48-49; Cosmin Chiriac, Liviu Bucur, "Polycentric Development initiatives in Romania at the First Local level of the NUTS System (LAU1)", in *Annals of University of Oradea. International Relations and European Studies Series*, no. VII, 2015, p. 217-228; Gábor Csüllög, "Spatial structure problems in developing cross-border relationship along the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian triple border", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 44-46

³⁰ Lóránt Dávid, Zoltán Bujdosó, Bulcsú Remenyik, "Potential Tourism Development Priorities of the Ukrainian-Hungarian Border Region", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 206; Maria Nadova, "Tourist potential in Carpathian Euroregion", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010, p. 221-222; Annamária Oláh, "Hungary-Romania-Ukraine Trilateral Border Area and its Potential", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian - Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press, Debrecen, 2010

- The only one place in Europe (Lviv region) with remainders of a wooden fortress that was built on the top of the rock and was 5-6 storeys high;
- The three-room buildings in the countryside which have a characteristic high pitched roof covered with wooden shingles.

The ENPI Cross-Border Cooperation Programme Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine financed 15 projects³¹, mostly meant to strengthen the cultural cooperation relations in the eligible regions. The cumulated financing of the projects represent 3,5% of the allocated funding for the programme. The absolute values are 2.409.767 euro out of a total of 68.638.283³². The 15 projects had an average implementing period of one year and a half, and they facilitated the involvement of 45 organisations and institutions in the closing of bilateral, trilateral or multilateral partnerships between different local actors on both sides of the border³³. The main categories of specific objectives are³⁴:

- Increasing the level of cultural cooperation between NGOs and cultural institutions, thus facilitating communication and the promotion of interculturality through local traditions and values;
- Establishing new cooperation relations or strengthening the existing relations between institutions active in the artistic and educational fields, so as to transmit cultural traditions and values to younger generations;
- Maintaining and preserving the existing cultural heritage, developing new cultural opportunities for the inhabitants in the eligible regions and increasing the commercial interest in handicrafts.

³¹ The 15 projects focusing on cultural cooperation are: *Joint action for multiculturalism cross-border promotion*; *Friendship SK-UA-HU*; *Hutsul Cultural Center*; *Cultural centre – binder of cross-border cooperation*; *Study of research and exploitation of the cross border cultural heritage*; *Artistic Traditions. Pattern for Non Formal Learning in Romania and Ukraine*; *The International Festival of Religious Choral Music „It is You We Praise”*; *People to People – effective cooperation based on love for folklore*; *‘Get To Know Each Other’ – televisions without borders*; *Together – Televisions without Borders*; *Three in Unity – a project of maintaining ecclesiastic cultural heritage for joint cultural and touristic development*; *Breaking-through culture - European values and common future*; *Interactive institutional cooperation: History, traditions and culture without borders*; *Promotion of folk-arts and handicrafts in Carpathian Euroregion*; *Cultural cohesion through promotion of Hungarian folk traditions*. See <http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/en/financed-projects>.

³² See <http://www.huskroua-cbc.net/en/information-about-the-programme>.

³³ See Annex


³⁴ *Ibidem*

At the end of every implementation period, the following types of activities were registered:


- Organisation of common cultural events in the field of folk arts and crafts (thematic festivals, shows, concerts, open air events, photography exhibitions, fairs, folk costumes parades);
- Organisation of seminars, professional training, exchanges of experience, musical education classes, exchanges of information;
- Common anthropologic and ethnographic research, on different themes (folk costumes, ecclesiastic cultural heritage, traditional art of weaving), the results of which were disseminated through scientific publications, conferences, round tables etc;
- Editing and publishing of materials which emphasise cultural elements which are common to the communities on both sides of the border (guidelines for the preservation of the cultural heritage; catalogues of icon collections, pottery collections and woodcraft collections, repertoire and musicological materials);
- Creation of new cultural products in the following fields: traditional dances; instrumental music; visual arts; choirs' repertoire; folk costumes; television programmes;
- Signing of bilateral or multilateral cooperation agreements which facilitated the establishment of common, short-term and medium-term cultural strategies.

On a closer analysis of the specific objectives, we can state that a regional infrastructure was created under the umbrella of the 15 projects. This facilitated the horizontal interaction of the different communities covered by the HUSKROUA Programme. The concrete results were the identification of common objectives and the strengthening of the communication between local cultural actors. The location of the 45 partner organisations on the map of the eligible areas covered by the HUSKROUA Programme allows us to delineate a relation territory (Map 1), and the spatial mapping of the partnerships under the 15 projects shows a dense network in the area between the cities of Satu Mare, Uzhhorod, Košice, Miskolc and Nyíregyháza (Map 2). The second structure, created in the area between the cities of Baia Mare, Ivan Krevan and Cernăuți is the result of the implementation of only 3 projects and is not as significant as the previously mentioned one.

Map 1. *Network mapping for the 15 projects implemented as part of the HUSKROUA programme³⁵*



Map 2. *Spatial mapping of the relations established under the partnership agreements³⁶*



³⁵ Own elaboration based on data collected from the official website of the Program HUSKROUA.

³⁶ *Ibidem*

One can identify a few common traits of the cooperation relations between the partners in the projects implemented in the region:

- All projects are grouped around a common interest: to preserve and promote the heritage and traditions in the eligible regions;
- Each partnership was based on diversity and knowledge and had as fundamental purpose the promotion of interculturality and intercultural dialogue, as well as the overcoming of regional cultural barriers;
- Cooperation relations did not appear spontaneously. They were favoured by the framework of the HUSKROUA Programme, and some of them were even based on links established prior to the year 2007;
- No local or national public authority intervened in the initiation and development of the partnerships;
- The activities were not organised under the umbrella of a formal or informal organisation, but they rather had a decentralised character;
- The institutional framework provided by the European Commission through the HUSKROUA Programme imposed a certain degree of internal organisation, which granted functionality to the partnerships within each network;
- In promoting the general and specific programme objectives, in organising activities or in implementing medium and long term contracts, ICT instruments were and will continue to be used (project sites, on-line result dissemination, ethnographic collections or anthropological material on DVD, a common television infrastructure, common TV programmes, digitalised choral repertoire, etc);
- Most of the results obtained as part of the projects are tangible and they generate a short-term impact, but medium and long-term benefits were also obtained (a common cultural strategy, medium and long-term cooperation agreements, the involvement of youth in activities for the promotion of regional cultural values, strengthening the existing professional networks etc).

The above-mentioned characteristics do not allow us to state that a network was created in the area delineated by the cities of Satu Mare, Uzhhorod, Košice, Miskolc and Nyíregyháza, given that the cooperation relations established through partnerships did not coagulate into an organic, be it formal or informal, structure. Nevertheless, given that these projects led to the creation of dissemination platforms for knowledge, experiences

and research methodologies, or platforms for professional development and cooperation through trainings, meetings, debates, round tables, we can identify in this area a cultural network in full process of institutionalisation and organisation.

Conclusions

Cultural cooperation in Europe has a long tradition and numerous forms of organising common activities. In time, these forms have been influenced by geographic, political and socio-economic factors. De-a lungul timpului aceste forme au fost influențate de factori geografici, politici și socio-economici specific to each and every European country. Starting with the second half of the XX th century, the establishment and creation of the European political and economic Community started to have an influence. Thus, alongside the cultural exchanges organised by the relevant ministries and used as diplomatic instruments to strengthen the relations between states, more and more often we started seeing activities involving contacts between artists, researchers of professionals above national borders and above rigid structures set aut by formal relations between countries. With the explosion of such activities, the 80s witnessed the existence of new forms of cultural cooperation, which facilitated the multilateral flow of projects and initiatives of individual artists, non-profit organizations, local museums, theatres and companies, arts management companies, local and regional authorities, national governments or those organizations coming under their structures³⁷.

In the European cultural space, the barriers or conflicts generated by potential differences are overcome/avoided through new means of communication, of relating and of information. The paneuropean connections in the field of museums, theatres and festivals or the strengthening of cultural cooperation between cities, regions, universities or associations favour and incentivise the contacts between artists, researchers and other professionals in the field. Moreover, these forms of cooperation are not blocked by national borders or by rigid structures generated by the formal relations between the member states; on the contrary they represent a new approach of the concept of cooperation. In the last decade, the numerous studies published in the field of cross-border cooperation emphasised, in their turn, the role of culture in reinvigorating interpersonal and intercommunity relations, in establishing new horizontal cooperation networks and in multiplying the number of cross-border partnerships.

³⁷ Anna Hieropolitańska, Kamila Rola (eds), *Closer look: European cultural cooperation. Networks in Practice*, Adam Mickiewicz Institute. Cultural Contact Point Poland, Warsaw, 2013, p. 8

Researchers agree that, as opposed to traditional systems, these models offer important advantages as concerns the informal nature of contacts, the flexibility in the decision-making process, the speed of exchanges and actions, the short time span of the implementation of common projects.

The grouping of institutions, organisations or associations in cultural networks at a regional, interregional or transnational level ensures the development of the capacity to communicate, cooperate and understand diversity. This phenomenon is more visible in border regions where two or more cultures meet, and where the mutual multi-level connexions favour dialogue, cooperation, socialisation, identification of rules of cohabitation or unique identity constructions. We thus begin to perceive a solution to the problem posed by borders, as mentioned by Denis de Rougemont in his work *Aspects culturels de la coopération transfrontalière*: the fact that they might separate regions which are otherwise homogeneous from several points of view, their rigidity or their accidental and arbitrary nature³⁸. All these do not allow for smooth exchanges, so necessary for the integration process. Moreover, according to constructivist theory, culture can create a societally safe climate in these border regions, thus significantly increasing the chances of avoiding inter-state conflicts. In the same time, culture can become one of the crucial factors in regional socio-economic progress³⁹. Consequently, we witness a new model of regional cohesion creation, defined by sustainable values based on adaptation and mutual trust, where culture plays an important role.

Cross-border cooperation programmes allow civil communities to realise that there are several ways of counteracting rigid thought when it comes to the perception of the other and that solutions need not necessarily come from state institutions. On the contrary, solutions rather pertain to the sphere of responsibility of local communities. From this perspective, programmes have proven their usefulness by creating connecting bridges between different European communities, especially in border regions, areas where different cultures interact without losing their traditions and fundamental features. In these areas, the cultural regional landscape exceeds the political one in importance. Mutual influence impacts the way in which the other's identity, values and interests are perceived. The coagulation of

³⁸ Cristina Maria Dogot, "Euro-Regions and Permeability of Borders, a Romanian Perspective", in Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar (eds.), *Cross-Border Partnership: with special regard to the Hungarian – Romanian – Ukrainian tripartite border*, University of Debrecen Press Debrecen, 2010, p. 77

³⁹ See Florentina Chirodea, "The Role of Culture in Regional Competitiveness", in Alina Stoica, Ioan Horga, Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (eds.), *Culture and Paradiplomatic Identity. Instruments in Sustaining EU Policies*, Chambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016

the interactions, communication and exchanges of experience in organic structures, apparently spontaneous, horizontal and decentralised, yet with a certain internal organisation, enough to allow for their functioning⁴⁰ has proven beneficial throughout the European territory, and the development of cultural networks in the Eastern areas of the common border between the EU and Ukraine will increase the security and social cohesion in the region. Based on the case study proposed in our research, we managed to identify a rather significant relational territory, created as a result of the implementation of the projects financed through the HUSKROUA Programme during 2007-2013. The cooperation relations between the different partners naturally led to the emergence of elements which are defining for a cultural network. Still in its incipient stage, the network which emerged in the area delineated by the cities of Satu Mare, Uzhhorod, Košice, Miskolc and Nyíregyháza does not have a well defined organic structure, but the continued implementation of the Programme during 2014-2020 budget exercise provides new opportunities for the network's consolidation and development⁴¹.

Abstract

In the current global context, culture is an important factor in socio-economic development, cooperation, identity and citizenship, innovation and social cohesion. In 2007, the European Commission started using culture in order to set up new partnerships and cooperation models, thus placing an emphasis on the role of culture in the building of individual and collective identities. Consequently, a complex and heterogeneous architecture of relations between the different actors takes shape. This architecture is the basis of European cultural networks. Among the specific objectives of cross-border cooperation programmes is also the creation of connections between different European communities. From this perspective, this study aims at identifying the mechanisms whereby the Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine ENPI CBC Programme facilitates interactions, communication and exchanges of experience between the involved communities. The collected data will be analysed and interpreted so as to bring forth arguments for the existence of cultural networks in this area of Central and Eastern Europe.

⁴⁰ Javier Brun, Joaquín Benotí, Pedro Canut, *Redes Culturales. Claves para sobrevivir en la globalización*, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, Madrid, 2008, p. 89

⁴¹ During 2014-2020, one of the specific objectives of the programme is promoting local culture and historical heritage. We thus have the pre-conditions for forming the basis of cultural events, preserving buildings with historical heritage and creating market for local products. All these mean specific activities under projects managed by partners in a cultural network. See JOP, Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine Cross-Border Cooperation Programme 2014-2020, approved on 25 June 2015.

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Annex

The projects under the HISKROUA Programme whose main objective is the strengthening of the cultural cooperation relations in the eligible areas in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and the Ukraine through the preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage and regional traditions

Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
	<i>Joint action for multiculturalism cross-border promotion</i>	99 569,93 € 12 months (Dec. 2010 – Dec. 2011)	Ópályi\'s Circle of Friends Association Hungary Commune Council of Nevetlenfalu, Ukraine Commune Janík, Slovakia Bridge Association, Lazuri, Romania Community Association „Crasna“ Domănești, Romania	Creating a network of active NGOs and institutions that works in the cultural field in the 4 regions A cooperation agreement signed by the 5 partners A common medium-term cultural strategy Promoting the intercultural dimension through local traditions and values Transmission of culture and common traditions to the younger generations
	<i>Friendship SK-UA-HU</i>	90 299,00 € 15 months (March 2011 – May 2012)	For Region, Kosice, Slovakia Uzhgorod Palace of children and youths “PADIUN” – Ukraine Sports Association of Szerencs – Hungary	Organizing of joint cultural events in border regions aimed at promoting folk arts and crafts, maintaining identity and traditions, and developing cultural opportunities for residents of the border regions Carrying out presentations of crafts, folk art and culture in all partnership countries and co-presentation with the participation of selected presentations from local undertakings Joint publications on

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Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
				culture and the common website.
	<i>Hutsul Cultural Center</i>	219 600,00 € 24 months (Dec. 2010 – June 2012)	Local Council Poienile de Sub Munte, Romania Local Council of Zelene, Ukraine Verchovina District Council, Ukraine The Ivan Krevan Association for the Local Development, Maramureş Romania	Organising a festival of the Hutsuls Thematic workshops on the cultural values of the Hutsul community Capitalising the Hutsul traditions and customs Increasing the cultural cooperation between Romanian and Ukrainian Hutsuls
	<i>CULTURAL CENTRE – binder of cross-border cooperation</i>	114 530,29 € 24 months (Dec. 2010 – June 2012)	Repedea Cultural Centre Romania The Maramures Local Council, Romania The Bistra Commune, Romania The Local Council of Poienile de sub Munte, Romania The Ivan Krevan Association for the Local Development, Maramureş Romania The Cultural Centre of The Rahiv District, Ukraine	Facilitating relations between the 5 cultural institutions and cultural centres in Romania and Ukraine Drafting 5 development strategies for the cultural institutions in the area Drafting a genuine folklore collection and training courses on dances and 12 traditional Ukrainian folk songs Organising a common entertainment show (5 folk groups participated) Organising two exchanges of experience between representative cultural operators in the area
	<i>Study of research and</i>	186 990,86 € 19 months	County Museum Satu Mare, Romania	Protection and exhibition of cultural heritage

Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
	<i>exploitation of the cross border cultural heritage</i>	(Aprilie 2011 – Oct. 2012)	Transcarpathia State University, Uzhhorod, Ukraine	Creation of new cultural products
	<i>Artistic Traditions. Pattern for Non Formal Learning in Romania and Ukraine</i>	69 200,00 € 12 months (Aprilie 2012 – 31 of March 2013)	Childrens House Satu Mare, Romania Asociatia Super Kids Satu Mare, Romania Liga Pro Europa Filiala Satu Mare, Romania Solotvyno children school of arts, Ukraine Solotvyno village council, Ukraine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - cooperation between after-school institutions in Satu Mare and Zakarpatska counties in the fields of visual art, traditional dance and instrumental music - supporting information exchange concerning the cultural inheritance and the educational experience - involving teachers and children from both areas in joint cultural activities - crating an artistic products in the three artistic fields (traditional dances, instrumental music and visual art)
	<i>The International Festival of Religious Choral Music „It is You We Praise”</i>	42 899,63 € 12 months (May 2012 – Aprilie 2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Romanian Orthodox Episcopate Satu Mare, Romania • Social Organization “Hope”, Solotvino, Ukraine 	<p>Enriching the choirs’ repertoire - due to the inclusion of some valuable musical plays of the Romanian music culture</p> <p>Cultivation and popularization of choral music</p> <p>Continuing the tradition of choir singing and conducting</p> <p>Setting up new choirs and choral associations</p> <p>Creating a sustained activity of musical education supported by concerts, shows and</p>

Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
				other events initiated by other organizers in the country; Establishing cooperation relationships with local artistic and educational institutions; Establishing relationships with other similar national associations and with choirs from other countries; Encouraging the publishing of repertoire and musicological materials in the choir singing field;
	<i>People to People – effective cooperation based on love for folklore</i>	260 698,00 € 12 months (May 2012 – April 2014)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Raslavice municipality, Presov, Slovakia • Fund of transborder cooperation and special economic zones development, Uzhgorod, Ukraine • Transcarpathian Regional Center for development of rural tourism, Ukraine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion and presentation of cultural events, especially folklore festivals and historic landmarks - Creation of new products in the field of culture - Educational activities for the organizers of cultural events (especially of the folklore festivals) - Research and production of folk costumes, that shall be utilized in case of further project activities (dance schools)
	<i>GET TO KNOW EACH OTHER – televisions without borders</i>	110 940,00 € 12 months (Febr. 2012 – March 2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zemplén Television Public Ltd., Sátoraljaújhely, Hungary • Transcarpathian State Television and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishing and maintaining a joint communication infrastructure within the cooperation of the three televisions involved, through the

Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
			Radio Company (Tisza 1 Television), Uzhhorod, Ukraine	implementation of the project on five areas - Establishing a new communication infrastructure operated by the cooperation of the three televisions
	<i>Together – Televisions without Borders</i>	99 785,00 € 12 months (Aug. 2013 – Aug. 2014)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Zemplén Television Public Ltd., Sátoraljaújhely, Hungary • Transcarpathian State Television and Radio Company – Uzhhorod (Tisza 1 Television), Ukraine • The First Contact Center – Michalovce, Presov, Slovakia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A joint communication infrastructure within the cooperation of the three televisions involved - Fostering the professional cooperation among the televisions stations, - Providing professional training and establishing a new internet communication channel and organizing joint events - Making television programs in cooperation, exchange of programs, implementation of joint events and creation of an internet television homepage
	<i>Three in Unity – a project of maintaining ecclesiastic cultural heritage for joint cultural and touristic development</i>	394 034,22 € 29 months (Jan. 2013 – June 2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Greek Catholic Apostolic Exarchate of Miskolc, Hungary • Transcarpathian District of the Reformed Church, Beregovo, Ukraine • Roman catholic Parish of Kráľovský Chlmec 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Creating a guide for ecclesiastic cultural heritage - Specialised training programme for preserving and handling cultural heritage - Setting the solid foundations of a far reaching cooperative effort to collect and exhibit religious cultural heritage (artefacts)

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Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
				- Developing of cross-border ICT based religious heritage information resources
	<i>BREAKING-THROUGH COOLture - European values and common future</i>	308 655,00 € 18 months (July 2013 – Jan. 2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satu Mare County Museum, Romania • The Transcarpathian Museum of Folk Architecture and Lifestyle, Uzhhorod, Ukraine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Elaborating a visual guide of the 'Transcarpathian Museum of Folk Architecture and Lifestyle ("disability tour") - Organizing an exhibition with photos and traditional costumes from Zakarpatska region of Ukraine and eligible and adjacent areas of Romania - Organising exhibition with photos of the investigated and preserved heritage - Organising Open air events in Romania and Ukraine - Elaborating a traditional folk costume album, a collection of photos and information about the folk costume in the border area, an anthropological film and DVDs including the traditional art of weaving - Elaborating catalogue of icon collection, pottery collection and traditional woodcraft collection of the County Museum of Satu Mare
	<i>Interactive institutional cooperation:</i>	211 693,00 € 32 luni (ian. 2014 –	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • County Museum Satu Mare, Romania, 	- Protection and exhibition of cultural heritage, creation and

Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
	<p><i>History, traditions and culture without borders</i></p> <p>Continuation of the project <i>Study of research and exploitation of the cross border cultural heritage</i></p>	aug. 2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transcarpathia State University, Uzhhorod, Ukraine 	<p>exhibition of new cultural products</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improvement of conditions concerning protection and presentation of cultural heritage - Protection and capitalization of common cultural heritage, of traditions, of religious values specific to majority population or minority - Promoting history, culture and traditions of the minorities - Digitizing of common cultural inheritance in the cross border region - Involvement of the young generation in knowledge and promoting of traditions, of cultural, historic and touristic values - Organizing the "Trade fair and of contemporary creators", the traditional and contemporary costume parade, the "CBC Party – Culture that unit us"-dances, songs, recipes and traditions and photo exhibition "Together without Borders".
	<i>Promotion of folk-arts and handicrafts in Carpathian Euroregion</i>	101 608,00 € 12 months (Aug. 2013 – July. 2014)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Transcarpathian Regional Non-governmental Organization „Ukrainian-Hungarian Regional 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of permanent co-operation network between Ukrainian and Hungarian handicraftsmen - Increasing awareness

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Current no.	Name of project	Amount / Implementing period	Partners	Specific objectives / Results
			<p>Development Centre”, Uzhgorod, Ukraine</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Village Tourism Association, Nyíregyháza, Hungary 	<p>of the local handicraftsmen about the legal issues of their activity, including state registration of entrepreneurship, commercial activity, financial and other reporting issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increasing awareness of the wider public and visitors to the region about the unique local handicrafts and folk-art in the region - Contribution to commercial interest of the handicraftsmen, rising of economic welfare of the local handicraftsmen
	<i>Cultural cohesion through promotion of Hungarian folk traditions</i>	99 263,97 € 12 months (Nov. 2013 – Nov. 2014)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-Governmental Organisation “Chaslovtsi Chicherho Chayok”, Chaslovtsi, Ukraine • Culture and Heritage Association of Ajak Ajak, Hungary • Chaslivtsi Village Council, Ukraine 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cultural exploration of the project region; - Dialogue stimulation between students, teachers and community representatives; - Promotion of cultural opportunities in the project region - Organizing of four ethno-folk concerts

Spatial Analyses and Representations in the Field of International Relations. A Brief Overview

*Cosmin CHIRIAC**

Introduction

At a first, quick look, International Relations is a field of study that focuses on the different types of interactions that involve more than one state. Each state, due to a multitude of reasons, extends over a certain amount of territory and interactions among them are expressed through space and time. Consequently, cartographic representations, as a result of spatial analyses, seem fit to present the way the international environment presents itself at a certain moment in time, or as it evolves in time.

Based on this, our aim in this study is to outline spatial analyses that due to their results are at the core of this research area. A few questions arise from this initial inquiry such as: What does the speciality literature within the field of IR provide in this respect? What is at the core of the field of IR? What methods of research are there in the field of IR? How can they be presented in a cartographical way? What kind of spatial analyses are out there? Which of them do apply to the field of IR?

Considering the questions above, that will not be responded in full here, the initial step, put together in the first section of this paper, is to look take a look at some of the basic elements of the field of IR, outlining how they relate to territory and location.

The second section of the study provides a very succinct introduction to the field of spatial analysis, always making reference to the specifics of IR, in order to make it obvious how the latter can make use of the former.

The third section of this paper takes a look at what the speciality literature has to offer in this regard, without having the goal of making it an exhaustive one. The focus will be on IR studies that use cartographic

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representations but also on those that use quantitative or spatial analyses. In order for the study to be overarching, enormous efforts would be required in the direction of making a list of such representations from the speciality literature, efforts that are not justified at this point. The purpose of this section is to provide a starting point through which a few measures of the relations between states can be outlined.

We conclude that the field of IR already is not foreign to the use of spatial analyses and representations in its studies.

The core elements of International Relations

International Relations, a field of study that emerged in the beginnings of the 20th century, is built on a rather large array of fields from the social sciences family, such as anthropology, economics, law, geography, political science and sociology amongst others. As the name would suggest, it covers the subject of *relations* between *nations* however, the international system is built on *states*, a territorial entity that receives enough recognition from other states to be called itself a state¹.

The scope of the study is not to clarify what the difference between *states* and *nations* is, however, it is important to outline that they are not synonymous and the difference is significant for spatial analysis. Consequently, to define them, we'll take a look at just a few texts of the speciality literature that analyse the two terms and we'll use those definitions in this paper. *Nation* and *nationalism*, are discussed by Barrington² with the purpose of clarifying the meaning of these two terms since, as he observes, they "are often still misused, used loosely, or used inconsistently, especially among those in political science who discuss these terms in passing"³. In any case, two characteristics are important according to Barrington in defining a nation:

- That it consists of a group of people with *common traits*,
- That has the desire to control a *territory* that they consider rightfully theirs.

This is the definition we'll use further in this text.

The definition of the state is also problematic, several alternatives considering an institutional view, a functional one, or both. The key points of Weber's definition, presented by Brenner in his text, that are of interest at this moment is that a state covers a certain *territory* that it governs through

¹ Christopher Lamont, *Research Methods in International Relations*, SAGE Publications, 2015.

² „Nation" and "Nationalism": The Misuse of Key Concepts in Political Science", *PS: Political Science & Politics*, vol. 30, nr. 4, 1997.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 712.

institutions that control it from a *centre* through *rules*, physical violence being mentioned as a means to uphold those rules⁴.

Considering the definitions above, it seems that the *nation-state* is the endpoint of the struggles of a nation to becoming an official body. The cases of Canada and Switzerland, two countries that consist of different ethnic groups, according to Kaufmann and Zimmer⁵, still fit the definition of a nation-state bringing together two uncommon traits such as *ethnic pluralism* and *extensive wild territories*. But just as there are states where ethnic pluralism is not an issue and they can be called nation-states, there are states in which different ethnic groups coexist without the common traits that would make them a nation, so they can only be called states. Getting such differences to a conflictual situation, can transform a state in a failed state a subject extensively covered by the field of IR.

The origin of the state is another subject central to the field of IR. Carneiro⁶ examines some of the theories regarding the formation of the state, ignoring theories that have been “thoroughly discredited”, “metaphysical or adventitious”. He mentions that coercive theories, as opposed to voluntarist ones, are the valid ones, with the addition that war is not sufficient for the rise of the state. The circumscription theory provides the sufficient condition for the rise of a state, Carneiro considers, and it includes reasons such as environmental, social or political circumscription as well as resource concentration. The circumscription theory outlines that the territory and its different characteristics, either human related or natural, are significant in the field of IR.

Due to some of the reasons mentioned earlier and others as well, the division of the world's territory into states is not a finished process. States appear and disappear, their territorial integrity being shattered by either internal or external threats, or both.

Considering a certain territorial division of the state system at one moment in time, each element of this system can be described based on different attributes it carries. The governing type is one of them, the different categories of governing types offering limits or possibilities to cooperation. Geographical, economic, political, military and other characteristics of the states provide the means for the existence of international, transnational, multinational, supranational, or global

⁴ Neil Brenner et al., *State/space: a reader*, John Wiley & Sons, 2008, p. 53.

⁵ „In Search of the Authentic Nation: Landscape and National Identity in Canada and Switzerland”, *Nations and Nationalism*, vol. 4, nr. 4, 1998.

⁶ „A theory of the origin of the state: Traditional theories of state origins are considered and rejected in favor of a new ecological hypothesis”, *The State*, vol. 169, 1993.

organizations. Examples for each of these types of organizations are quite numerous so they won't be listed here.

Since every state extends over a certain territory, geographical representations and the analysis required to build them can certainly bring a plus to the field of international relations. Physical characteristics of the territory are many times significant, such as landscape in the example given above regarding the Canadian and Swiss cases. Territories also hold resources, so their location, extent and volume can also be significant, no matter if they are natural resources or anthropological ones. One important note about landscape and natural resources is that they usually don't follow state limits, though sometimes state limits do follow natural limits, however loosely or strictly they can be defined.

The scale of analysis can also be moved downwards, towards the inner structures of the states, defined by their hierarchical system, going down to the level of localities, as cooperation and conflict sometimes include subnational territories, which might or might not cross their borders, but might indirectly affect neighbouring states.

Territorial extent inevitably brings along discussions about borders, and frontiers. Their nature has been discussed in the IR speciality literature and they have also been subject to spatial analysis. Furthermore, borders and frontiers are dividing lines that can be subject to interaction either positive, meaning *cooperation* or negative meaning *conflict*.

This very brief, and far from complete, introduction to the field of international relations has only the purpose of outlining the fact that territory, and consequently geographical and spatial analyses methods are appropriate for studies that give insight regarding the international climate, its structure and its dynamics.

A brief introduction to the basics of Spatial Analysis and GIS

Spatial Analysis is used in many fields of study, including IR, some studies going back to the 19th century, however, they only gained popularity in the second half of the 20th century⁷ when the field of GIS started to emerge, as a result of developments in computer science. Spatial Analysis and GIS have developed independently, though the former can certainly benefit from the latter by providing the technical capabilities, while the latter can benefit from the former in order to enhance its analytical capabilities⁸.

⁷ A.S. Fotheringham, P.A. Rogerson, *The SAGE Handbook of Spatial Analysis*, SAGE Publications, 2008; J Terry Coppock, David W Rhind, „The history of GIS”, *Geographical information systems: Principles and applications*, vol. 1, nr. 1, 1991.

⁸ Yuemin Ding, A Stewart Fotheringham, „The integration of spatial analysis and GIS”, *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems*, vol. 16, nr. 1, 1992, p. 3; Morton E O'Kelly, „Spatial analysis and GIS”, *Spatial analysis and GIS*, 1994, p. 65, 66.

According to the *Sage Handbook of Spatial analysis* four categories can be outlined that contain the many techniques of spatial analysis such as *data reduction techniques*, *exploratory data analysis*, *the examination of randomness in spatial patterns*, and *mathematical modelling and prediction techniques*.

Spatial datum includes three or a “triple of measurements”, specifically an attribute, a location, and a moment in time. Though attributes and locations are an indivisible part of GIS, time has only recently been included in the capabilities of GIS software and is usually present as part of the attributes of a dataset.

There are different implementations for spatial data and they can be categorized in two views: *the object view* and *the field view*¹⁰.

The object view, modelled through points, lines and polygons is a very important part of GIS applications. They help identify geographical features of the world, such as states, supra-national organizations or sub-national structures, all appropriate for storage through the object view. The way they can be implemented is also dependent on the scale of analysis¹¹. Even though it is called the object view, an object does not have to be an identifiable feature of the geographical environment. Events taking place in different locations of the world, relevant to the field of IR, can be included in point datasets with all the relevant details stored as attributes. Spatial data represented through these elements are also called vector data and their input can be done, either automatically or manually, through vectorization.

The field view is usually implemented as a raster. The basic element of a raster is the cell, which is a rectangle representing part of a territory. All cells in a raster file occupy the same amount of surface, in different locations, basically dividing a territory into matrix like structures. Each cell can have a value, thus providing the ability to store data continuously across a territory. The surface of a cell provides an important feature of a raster file, its resolution. The resolution of a raster file gives us the measure of how detailed the spatial distribution of data in a certain territory is. Raster files can be generated from vector features, through different techniques. One of them is *interpolation*, and is appropriate for point data sets providing a way to display and analyse the dispersion of phenomena and events relevant to the field of IR.

One of the main characteristics of GIS is the overlay technique, specific to mapmaking in geography. Combining different information, such as economic, social, demographic, political, historical, and so on, through

⁹ Robert Haining, „The special nature of spatial data”, *The SAGE handbook of spatial analysis*. Sage, Los Angeles, 2009, p. 5.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ A city can be represented either as a polygon or as a point, depending on the scale and on the relevance of the territorial extent.

the overlay technique is the core of GIS and it certainly brings benefits to the field of IR, through geometric operations performed on one or more layers of data.

As mentioned previously, time is not yet properly implemented in GIS applications and Goodchild makes the argument that a “space-time geographic information system is unlikely to emerge in the near future”¹². Langran emphasises the difficulties in implementing such a system¹³. One of the major issues, especially as far as spatial representations as results of spatial analyses are concerned, is that spatial representations are static and the presentation of changes in time requires dynamic capabilities.

Just as the field of *international relations*, *spatial analysis* and *geographical information systems* are too large and complex to contain in such a short paper. Further insights, though useful, are not justified at this moment in time, consequently we move towards the presentation of a few examples of spatial analyses that scholars of international relations have employed in their studies.

Examples of spatial analyses in international relations

Whenever the territorial extension of states¹⁴ is mentioned, inevitably, *borders* have to be mentioned as well. These lines of division, hard or soft, can be described in many ways through attribute data, using measurable parameters such as *length*, *number of divisions* (depending on how many states surround a country), to descriptive or categorical ones such as *land-based* or *across-water* or maybe not so obvious ones such as *homeland* or *colonial*¹⁵.

Some of the attributes of borders, along with other *features* that provide information about the characteristics of the land on both sides of a border, give the measure for the *opportunity* and *willingness* for and towards interaction between a dyad of states. Harvey Starr¹⁶, for example, with a rich background in studies employing these two indicators explores, through the use of GIS, some of the attributes of borders, in order to define their nature. A difference is made between those situations in which conflicts

¹² Michael F. Goodchild, „Prospects for a Space–Time GIS”, *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, vol. 103, nr. 5, 2013, p. 1072.

¹³ G. Langran, „Temporal GIS design tradeoffs”, *Journal of the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association*, vol. 2, 1990.

¹⁴ No matter if they are a nation-state or a state without the attributes of a nation

¹⁵ H. Starr, „Opportunity, willingness and geographic information systems (GIS): reconceptualizing borders in international relations”, *Political Geography*, vol. 21, nr. 2, 2002, p. 246.

¹⁶ H. Starr, „Opportunity, willingness and geographic information systems (GIS): reconceptualising borders in international relations”.

arise between the initial participants in a war, and the situation in which other states are drawn into an existing war.

The method developed in the paper discussed here uses vector spatial data along with attribute data¹⁷, reclassification of values and vector to raster transformations, through GIS software, in order to create a cartographical representation through a raster layer, for the opportunity of interaction in a buffer area along dyads of borders¹⁸.

For the willingness for interaction, different indicators were used than in the case of opportunity¹⁹, though the method of analysis was developed in much the same way as in the case of the previously presented indicator, as the author also mentioned²⁰. What is different in this case is the use of a cartographical representation that combines both size and colour to present the categorical values of the willingness for interaction, through point vector data.

Though the paper described here also involves some standard statistical analysis, what was presented here is enough to outline one example of the use of spatial analysis in the field of international relations.

One interesting example, that uses both space and time in IR analysis, is that of Lamarche-Perrin and collaborators²¹. It analyzes the one-sided and mutual occurrences of country names, in online newspapers, ranging from local to global events. The analysis uses an agent-based model, and multiple aggregation techniques, depending on the particularities of different countries or geographical areas and their occurrence of their name in online newspapers in other countries, in order to identify spatial or temporal irregularities that could outline the occurrence of international critical events, or rare events. The aggregated parameters are represented, at different scales, as proportional symbols in the world map that accompanies this brief paper.

Rare events have been at the core of IR studies for some time now though, until the development of automated identification techniques of such events, just as the one above, they have been left aside²². They are

¹⁷ Roads and terrain slope values were the main indicators used.

¹⁸ The case of Israel is presented as an example for the results.

¹⁹ Such as urban concentration areas and the location of important military, social or economic objectives.

²⁰ H. Starr, „Opportunity, willingness and geographic information systems (GIS): reconceptualizing borders in international relations”, p. 251.

²¹ Robin Lamarche-Perrin, Yves Demazeau, Jean-Marc Vincent, „Analysis of international relations through spatial and temporal aggregation”, Springer, 2013.

²² Gary King, Will Lowe, „An automated information extraction tool for international conflict data with performance as good as human coders: A rare events evaluation design”, *International Organization*, vol. 57, nr. 3, 2003.

discussed in detail by King and Zeng, providing alternative methods of data collection and analysis that they consider more efficient than previous efforts²³.

Though there are many other representation types available for use in the field of IR, including choropleth, isopleth, dot distribution or dasymetric maps amongst others, there will be no other examples examined here. Spatial analysis is also a very rich field of study and further exploration is not considered necessary at this point.

Conclusions

Regardless of their use, argumentative or descriptive, spatial analyses and representations can offer good insights to International Relations studies. As shown above they are not new to this field, and the development of GIS technology, and of communication possibilities provide more and more opportunities for interaction between these two fields.

The simple goal of this paper is just to provide a very brief introduction to spatial analysis and representations, especially for students of IR, in order to introduce them to a world of possibilities that they seem to be unaware of. Though performing such analyses might not necessarily be something they would do voluntarily, collaboration with students or researchers from the fields of computer science, GIS or geography, can enhance their possibilities of expression. This paper was written in the hope that this might be so, but also to initiate future research in the use of spatial analysis in the field of IR for this author.

Abstract

What usually stands out when teaching to students of International Relations (IR) disciplines related to the field of computer science, is their initial reluctance, or even refusal, to learning anything that requires mathematical thinking. This is a drawback for the future scholar of this field that, amongst other methods, can also make use of statistical ones and, when geographical features are meaningful, of spatial analysis. However troubling statistical methods may be to the student of IR, at least they are aware of them. On the other hand, spatial analysis is something that students in this field are not really aware of so, in this paper, we'll try to address this problem by discussing the territoriality of IR, by explaining the essentials of spatial analysis and by looking at the scientific literature of IR and Political Science that already employs such techniques.

²³ Gary King, Langche Zeng, „Explaining rare events in international relations”, *International Organization*, vol. 55, nr. 3, 2001.

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The Beginnings of the EU in the Western Balkans: A Milestone of Its International Role

Cristina Maria DOGOT

The actual (more) peaceful situation in the Western Balkans, although it is not outside of any potential risk (and the conflict of May 2015 in Kumanovo¹ could be an example), is largely due to the complementary actions of the UN, NATO and of the EU in the region. Despite of many deeply convinced voices regarding the contribution of any of these international actors in the disintegration of Yugoslavia, it is not so easy to exactly measure their role in solving the conflict or, according to the critics, in continuing it. By comparison with NATO or even the UN's operations, the EU's actions in the conflict from the former Yugoslavia were less spectacular and enough (if not very little) known and understood by the large public, although they were initiated from the beginnings of the strife. In the early stages of the tensions (since June 1991), when the UN and CSCE were less or not present in the region², the EU focused especially on mediation, sending its representatives in the conflict theatre with the mission to convince the parties to reconcile their positions and so to maintain peace in Europe and a given geopolitical *status quo* in the region.

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¹ "Violence in Macedonia. Danger or Distraction? After a Long Political Ferment, a Short Burst of Fighting", *The Economist*, May 16th, 2015, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21651262-after-long-political-ferment-short-burst-fighting-danger-or-distraction>, accessed June 12, 2015.

² As Hill and Smith commented, "States could not decide whether this was a case requiring enforcement and measures against identified guilty parties or one in which neutral mediation and interposition were more appropriate; the actions of the international community reflected this confusion. Only when finally the United States stepped in, with a heavy dose of realpolitik, to impose a solution after war-weariness had set in, did the conflict end in the Dayton Accords of November 1995." "Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki, 11 december 1999 (Enlargement)", in Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds), *European Foreign Policy. Key Documents*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, p. 358.

Although the first mediation mission (troika) concluded with a satisfying first fire-ceasing agreement, „European Council remains concerned about the situation in this country and requests the relevant organs of European co-operation to remain seized of this situation and to follow developments closely. It took note of the fact that Luxembourg has invoked the emergency mechanism in the CSCE framework in view of the extreme gravity of the situation in Yugoslavia.”³ The immediately following troika, that met Slovenia and Croatia’s representatives in Brioni, obtained a delay of the implementation of their declarations of independence with three months. Another output of this mission was the „institutionalisation” of the idea of monitoring, materialised in the establishment of the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM), which role was to survey the implementation of cease-fire agreements, providing direct communication between the parties of the conflict and mediation during the hostage crises (but outside of any direct mediation), monitoring the air-traffic in Croatian airports, humanitarian tasks (beside UN and Red Cross missions).⁴

In parallel with the actions of mediation a Commission of Arbitration was established⁵ (Badinter Commission, August 1991 – middle of 1993), a “body of legal experts” playing a consultative role beside the Conference on Yugoslavia developed by the European Community of which opinions partially contributed to the diplomatic recognition of the new states separated from the Yugoslav federation⁶. Along with mediation

³ European Council, „Presidency Conclusions”, Luxembourg, 28 and 29 June 1991. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/luxembourg/lu1_en.pdf, p. 15, accessed October 12, 2015.

⁴ “Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki, 11 December 1999 (Enlargement)” (in continuation: “Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki...”), in Christopher Hill and Karen E. Smith (eds), *European Foreign Policy. Key Documents*, Routledge, London and New York, 2000, pp. 358-359; Rémy Landry, „The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) in Former Yugoslavia: Lessons Learned for OAU Civilian Missions”, *ACCORD Occasional Paper* no. 5, 1999, pp. 3-4, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACL721.pdf, accessed November 02, 2015.

⁵ The deep analysis of Matthew Craven on the legal basis of this Commission (in its different forms and periods), on its very arbitration capabilities and on the basis of the influence of its opinions represents the proof of the very low expertise of the European Community in international issues and the dramatic need for specialized institutions. These missing legal bases and institutions will represent a very good reason for the power of Belgrade to deny any decision considered as adopted following the opinions of the Arbitration Commission. Matthew C.R. Craven, “The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia”, in *British Yearbook of International Law* vol. 66, no. 1, 1995, pp. 339-353.

⁶ *Ibidem*, pp. 334-335.

missions and actions of arbitration, the European Community initiated both **military sanctions/arms embargo**, since July 1991 and conducted against the Yugoslav government and Croatian nationalists, and **economic sanctions** (since May 1992) against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the last ones being maintained, modified and directed against the other actors detached from the federation⁷. Unfortunately, none of these actions stopped the conflict or impeached the “policy vacuum”⁸ on some territories of the former Yugoslavia.

Critics of actions of the European Community and of the other international actors in the conflict from Yugoslavia were and still are numerous. The scant and deficient support for the victims (the Bosnian Muslims), the weak determination against the aggressors (Serbia), the negative effects of the military and economic sanctions over the aggressed parties (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia), all were perceived as mistakes with long-term effects both at European/regional and international level (relations between the Western and Arab world)⁹. Hence, it is no wonder that the Dayton/Paris Agreement, which was concerning the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was perceived as the first serious step towards the end of the conflict. During the negotiations the EU was represented by a Special Negotiator, Spain as holder of the presidency of the EU, and by some member states which were part of the Contact Group, but without receiving or assuming afterwards an important role in the management of the conflict, other than the economic and political recovery¹⁰ of the Balkans and of South-Eastern Europe. The EU tried to compensate for this lack of presence in the conflict management by initialising the Royaumont Process, a new approach related to the war from Bosnia-Herzegovina, focused on democratisation and normalisation, with the support of OSCE and using the

⁷ “Conclusions of the European Council in Helsinki...”, p. 358; „Sanctions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, in *ICGBalkans Briefing Paper*, 10 October 2000, pp. 4-5, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/Serbia%2013.pdf>, accessed October 30, 2015; Milica Delevic, „Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia”, in *International Journal of Peace Studies* vol. 3, No. 1, 1998, accessed October 12, 2015, http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/Delvic.htm.

⁸ Catriona Mace, “Operation Concordia: Developing a European Approach to Crisis Management?”, *International Peacekeeping* vol. 11, no. 3, 2004, p. 475, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1353331042000249055>, accessed December 18, 2015.

⁹ Cohen considers that the genocide of Muslim people in Bosnia Herzegovina will influence relations between the Western and Arab states in the world to come. Philip J. Cohen, “Ending the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia”, *Pace International Law Review* vol. 6, no. 1, 1994, pp. 20-25, 29-31.

¹⁰ We should not forget that these new economical and political approaches were doubled by the negotiation process developed by ECMM.

political dialogue as a main instrument, and the “interstate relations and supporting civil societies” as a basis for future better relations between the states involved in the regional conflict (Former Republic of Yugoslavia, FYROM, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia), with all their neighbours and with the EU too.¹¹ The proposed projects by the participant states concerned “the media, inter-ethnic dialogue, dialogue between political leaders, academic co-operation and education, co-operation between women's organisations, co-operation between cities, trade unions and youth organisations, inter-parliamentary dialogue, co-operation in the areas of business and legal matters, public administration, medicine, culture, science and technology, and the environment”, and according to one of coordinators of the programme, Panaghiotis Roumeliotis, the meetings developed with Phare support allotted the development of a regional network of actors interested in the process of pacification of the region.¹²

In the meantime the EU developed two economic initiatives, focused on the micro (the first) and macro (the second) multilateral programmes: *Regional Approach* (1996-1999) and the *Stability Pact for South East Europe* (1999-2008)¹³. Beside the two large programmes mentioned above, the EU developed some other regional initiatives connecting the Balkans and the South-Eastern Europe: Royaumont Process, South-East European Cooperation Process, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative, Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Central European Initiative, Adriatic–Ionian Initiative, Central European Free Trade Area.¹⁴

¹¹ Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Prevention and Regional Security: The Royaumont Process and the Stabilization of South-Eastern Europe”, in *OSCE Yearbook*, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the University of Hamburg, 1998, pp. 332sq, http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/98/OSCE_Yearbook_1998.pdf, accessed November 25, 2015.

¹² Panaghiotis Roumeliotis, “The Royaumont Process. An Initiative for Stability and Good Neighbourliness in South-Eastern Europe”, 1998, <http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/autumn98/royaumont.html>, accessed December 01, 2015.

¹³ Niels Van Willigen, “The European Union’s Evolving Conflict Management Role in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Kosovo”, Paper for the EGPR Joint Sessions, Rennes 11-15 April 2008, <https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/2d6944e1-29c5-402d-8346-bd1b873b87d7.pdf>, accessed November 23, 2015; Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, “Balkan Regional Cooperation & European Integration”, The Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, The London School of Economics and Political Science, July 2002, pp. 21-24, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/5706/1/policyPaper2.pdf>, accessed November 24, 2015.

¹⁴ Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojičić-Dželilović, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-55; Dusko Lopandik, “Regional Initiatives in South-Eastern Europe”,

The experience achieved by these programme¹⁵ facilitated the EU to establish, in November 2000, in the framework of the Summit of Zagreb, the new lines of its cooperation with the Balkan states (political dialogue, free trade, justice and home affairs, illegal immigration, different forms of trafficking, financial and economic crimes) and to reconsider the Stabilisation and Association Process as the core element of the new bilateral relations between EU and the states coming out of the conflict from the Balkans.¹⁶

The ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam allowed the adoption of the WEU's Petersberg Tasks and provided the possibility for the EU to develop "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making"¹⁷, an important non-economic step to the external engagement of the EU. The Declaration of Saint Malo considered as very important the EU's international attendance and exposed the framework of the EU-NATO cooperation¹⁸. One year later, in 1999, the European Council in Helsinki delivered to the EU "the military and non-military crisis management

http://www.seedcenter.gr/projects/MNE/1stconfer/1stconf_papers/Lopandic.pdf, accessed November 24, 2015.

¹⁵ My consideration was focused especially on the EU's own initiatives related to the parties involved in the conflict, and not on the internal structures established just to analyse the risk factors of the conflict and to identify some possible solutions, as they were done by the European Parliament - Conflict Prevention Network, the Group of Experts (Günter Burghardt, "Early Warning and Conflict Preventions Tasks of the European Union and EU-OSCE Co-operation", *OSCE Yearbook*, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy of the University of Hamburg, 1995, pp. 423-424, http://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/99/OSCE_Yearbook_1999.pdf, accessed November 25, 2015) or over the cooperation with some other organisations, such as NATO, UN or OSCE, as much as they were important in turning off or preventing the conflict.

¹⁶ Othon Anastasakis and Vesna Bojičić-Dželimović, *op. cit.*, 24-25; European Commission, "Summit 24 November 2000. Final Declaration", <http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummit24Nov2000.pdf>, accessed November 26, 2015.

¹⁷ The process was largely explained by Fabrizio Pagani, "A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty on European Union", *European Journal of International Law*, no. 9, 1998, <http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/9/4/695.pdf>, accessed December 01, 2015.

¹⁸ "Joint Declaration on European Defence. Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit (Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998)", http://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_december_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html, accessed December 01, 2015.

capability as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defence” and the possibility “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises”, with the participation of the EU’s political and military bodies¹⁹. Correspondingly, the European Council of Nice adopted the principles of the European Security and Defence Policy and defined some new permanent political and military structures and procedures pledged to support the implementation of EU’s decisions concerning the civilian and military operations²⁰. During the Council of Laeken, the EU stated that by “the strengthening of its capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of the appropriate EU structures, the EU is now able to conduct some crisis-management operations” alongside its partners (NATO and third states)²¹. These initiatives were followed by some new agreements between EU and NATO, that allotted their cooperation in three very important fields: “EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities”²², and opened the possibility, for the EU, to launch its first military operations, Concordia and EUFOR Althea, their development being appreciated as a milestone for the future international interventions of the EU, as a first step in solving the international imbalanced economic and political leading role of EU, and, very important at the time and for the future, as “important test cases for the Union’s ability to apply some of the military policy instruments it envisaged under 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal”²³ and for the future security in the Balkans and of Europe as a whole.

¹⁹ “Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999. Presidency Conclusions”, II (25), (27), (28), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, accessed December 02, 2015.

²⁰ Mark Oakes, “European Security and Defence Policy: Nice and Beyond”, *Research Paper* vol. 1, no. 50, 2001, House of Commons Library, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lang=en&id=44313>, accessed September 08, 2015.

²¹ “Presidency Conclusions European Council Meeting in Laeken 14 and 15 December 2001”, Annex II (A), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-01-18_en.htm, accessed December 04, 2015.

²² “EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus”, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-11-11%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf>, accessed December 05, 2015.

²³ Dov Lynch and Antonio Missiroli, “ESDP Operations”, Institute for Security Studies, <http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/09-dvl-am.pdf>, accessed November 12, 2015.

All these decisions, though important for the relations of the EU with the new states of the Western Balkans, proved, each in turn, insufficient to solve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Hence, it is not by chance that Romano Prodi considered the Balkans “an acid test” regarding the EU’s credibility and its “ability to deliver the effective action” at external/international level, and proposed a boosted economic and political cooperation with these states, with the objective to enhance the civil society, the rule of law and free media, and so “to bring stable peace and strong economic growth, not just to bring a temporary halt to centuries-old conflicts”.²⁴ Though for the instant the Romano Prodi’s proposed tools are yet preponderantly economic ones, his statement will act as a basis for some very important actions of the EU related to the Balkans: the partnership with UN (Commission of the European Communities 2001) and Berlin Plus agreement²⁵, that will establish the principles and put the

²⁴ Romano Prodi, “2000 - 2005: Shaping the New Europe”, Speech 00/41/, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-41_en.htm, accessed May 10, 2016.

²⁵ The agreement was preceded by the meeting of Romano Prodi with Bill Clinton in October 1999 (only one month after Prodi’s appointment as President of the European Commission), when beside the economic discussions they approached the matter of the “our common security” (William J. Clinton, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Book II, July 1 to December 31, 1999. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 2001, 1894); by Prodi’s clearly expressed objective to enhance the EU-NATO cooperation in the Western Balkans (“Meeting of President Prodi with US Secretary of State Powell”, Brussels, 27 February, 2001, IP/01/267, europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-267_en.pdf, accessed May 08, 2016), and his determination to confer to the EU a most important role in providing the international security by its involvement in the stability of the Balkans and other conflict zones (Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability.” “Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”, Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-619_en.htm, accessed May 08, 2016); by the first EU-NATO foreign ministers meeting, in Budapest, May 2001, which established the basis of Balkan strategy and some progress in EU-NATO relationship (Laszlo Szocs, “Week in Review: NATO, EU Foreign Ministers Meet in Budapest”, *Transitions Online: Regional Intelligence*, June 04, 2001, <http://www.tol.org/client/article/3286-week-in-review-nato-eu-foreign-ministers-meet-in-budapest.html>, accessed May 03, 2016) and was followed by the adoption of the European Capability Action Plan, based on “coordination between EU Member States and cooperation with NATO” (“2386th Council Meeting. General Affairs”, Excerpt from the Press Release. Brussels 19-20 November 2001, p. 4,

basis of the military cooperation between the two organisations²⁶. These agreements opened the way of the EU to the adoption of the European security strategy “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, where the role of NATO and USA in European security is highlighted, but the improved role of the EU in providing security and stability in the neighbourhood is considered “in the European interest” and “The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans”, where the role of the EU should be strengthened.²⁷

All these steps²⁸ represented as many situations by which the EU learned “by doing”, as Wallace described the process of development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of EU²⁹, its lessons, and so, with the

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/European%20Capability%20Action%20Plan%20-%20Excerpt%20Press%20Release%20November%202001.pdf>, accessed May 13, 2016). The intentions of the EU related to the European future of the Balkans needed for its deeper involvement in the region, which is why President Prodi asked to Greece and Italy, as next holder of rotating presidency of EU, to put on their agenda the problem of the Balkans. (“Athens News Agency: Daily News Bulletin in English, 03-01-24”, <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/2003/03-01-24.ana.html#05>, accessed May 13, 2016; “Our Europe. Sharing the Future in a Community of Values. The Priorities of the Greek Presidency 2003”, http://www.eu2003.gr//multimedia/pdf/2002_12/267.pdf, accessed May 13, 2016) Despite the problems created by Italy, the plans of Prodi will be continued. Francesc Morata and Lynn Mastellotto, “The Italian Presidency of the European Union: An “Abnormal” Semester?.” In “Italy between Europeanization and Domestic Politics.” *Italian Politics* vol. 19, 2003, Berghahn Books, pp. 124, 127.

²⁶ NATO, “EU-NATO Declaration on CSDP”, Press Release 16 December 2002, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19544.htm, accessed May 10, 2016.

²⁷ “A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy”, Brussels, December 12, 2003, *passim*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>, accessed May 03, 2016.

²⁸ We have to remember some individual mistakes or even failures of the Member States in managing some conflicts that they have the task to manage, as for example the Dutch failure in avoiding the massacre in Srebrenica. For more examples, see Bastian Giegerich and Willem Wallace, “Not such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces.” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* vol. 46, no. 2, 2004, pp. 166-167, DOI: 10.1080/00396330412331343713, accessed December 22, 2015.

²⁹ „Or „experiential learning”, according to Petar Petrov. (William Wallace, „Foreign and Security Policy. The Painfull Path from Shadow to Substance”, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace and Mark Pollack (eds), *Policy-Making in the European*

remaining military forces of the regions of the Balkans, the EU sent its own military capabilities in the conflict areas, but without following the classical recipe of these interventions, that of the use of force against citizens or of their governing.

Final remarks

Unlike its partners, NATO or UN, the EU was a beginner both in the process of mediation in a situation of conflict and as participant in the military actions. While USA and NATO developed targeted approaches, the EU developed both micro- and macro-regional approaches for both political elites (and economic and social environment, trying to solve problems in the long term and for more different levels. The following EU's military actions combined both constructivist and realistic principles and tools, whether they are considered the result of a demand or that of a search (a solution adopted following an analysis of the situation), they followed the so old (and often used) principle of the *stick and carrot*. Nevertheless, the 'stick' of the EU was not so inflexible and harsh such as that of classical geopolitical actors, while the carrot was not so difficult to obtain by those who were determined to follow certain rules. If the results of EU's actions are not the expected ones, this is not because EU used a compromised approach, but especially because the process of assuming the norms needs more time and, probably, a greater firmness of (some leaders of) the EU against of the situations of non-compliance of the norms which would have made impossible the decay of "desires to do right"³⁰. According to Vucetic³¹ "Balkan states have never completely 'Europeanized'". However, "the Western Balkans hold a special place in European security because much of the impetus to create the ESDP came from the conflicts in former

Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 439-441; Petrov Petar, "Early Institutionalisation of the ESDP Governance Arrangements: Insights From Operations Concordia and Artemis", in Sophie Vanhoonacker et al. (eds), *Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy*, *European Integration online Papers* Vol. 14, Special Issue 1, 2010, p. 1, 5, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2010-008.pdf>, accessed December 06, 2015).

³⁰ James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, "Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View", Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds), *Handbook of International Relations*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2002, p. 83.

³¹ Srdjan Vucetic, "The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution", *Southeast European Politics* Vol. 2, no. 2, 2001, p. 111.

Yugoslavia during the 1990s and the EU's inability to formulate an appropriate response"³²

Abstract.

From its inception the European Union was granted with an international actor role, possible to be played only with peaceful methods and tools. During the process of European integration the common foreign policy of the EU coagulated only difficultly, though the first debates and actions in this direction started in 1969. Hence, the crisis and following conflict in the former Yugoslavia found the EU uncovered both from the point of view of experience and the necessary tools for its involvement in negotiations and peacekeeping actions. However, despite the inherent difficulties, the EU succeeded both to adopt the needed norms and to establish the most useful (at least for the period) tools of its intervention in the negotiation process and, later, even in the conflict, although "only" (according to realist voices) as peacekeeping actor. The present paper proposes an overview on the initial stages of progress of the EU on its road to the role of actor of the system of international relations.

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³² Eva Gross, "Civilian and Military Missions in the Western Balkans", in Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (eds), *Evaluating the EU's Crisis Missions in the Balkans*, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011, p. 127.

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